THE  COMING 
DEMOCRACY 


HERMANN  FERNAU 

Author   of    "BECAUSE    I    AM    A    GERMAN" 


SI'     ;i 


THIS  scathing  exposure  of  Germany*s  political  system 
and  the  ringing  appeal  to  Germany  to  rid  itself  of 
its  obsolete  and  mischievous  imperial  dynasty  and 
all  the  monarchical  and  medieval  trappings  which  go 
with  it,  is  by  a  German,  Herr  Fernau,  who  has  already 
fastened  on  his  own  government  the  inescapable  guilt 
of  having  brought  about  the  war  in  his  earlier  book 
"BECAUSE  I  AM  A  GERMAN/*  possession  of  which 
is  now  punishable  in  Germany  by  death. 

The  author  says:  *'What  does  this  book  contain?  .  .  . 
It  contains  a  demand  for  reforms  which  in  all  the  civile 
ized  countries  of  the  world  have  for  decades  past  ap- 
peared to  the  dullest  peasant  an  understood  thing.  In 
fact,  what  I  here  demand  for  Germany  has  been  posses- 
sed by  the  English,  French,  Americans,  and  Swiss  for 
the  past  130  years.  ..." 

**Onward  to  Democracy.  This  will  and  must  tomor- 
row be  the  battle-cry  of  Europe  in  general  and  of  Ger- 
many in  particular.** 

"Away  from  Bismarck.    Germany  for  the  Germans." 


:■•;!  1 


GIFT  or 


^ 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

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THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 


BECAUSE  I  AM  A  GERMAN 

By  Hermann  Fernau 
Edited,  with  an  Introduction, 

by  T.  W.  ROLLESTON 

$i.oo  net 

^  "A  masterly  and  courageous  attack  on  Prus- 
sianism." — The  Times. 

"...  his  work  is  interesting  and  of  conse- 
quence because  it"  adds  another  voice  to  those 
already  crying  out  in  the  European  wilderness 
for  more  sanity  and  justice  and  righteousness 
and  democracy  in  the  conduct  hereafter  of  Eu- 
ropean affairs." — The  Bookman. 

"...  Mr.  Femau  pleads  his  case  with 
dispassionate  earnestness,  He  is  no  reviler  of 
his  country — he  mourns  for  it — but  rather  the 
defender  of  its  better  self  against  its  worst." — 
The  New  York  Evening  Post. 

"...  a  scathing  arraignment  of  the  German 
motives  behind  the  present  war.  It  contains 
a  clear  and  terse  statement  of  Germany's  case 
against  Prussianism,  but  it  is  in  no  sense  a  plea 
for  the  Allies."— rAe  Boston  Globe. 


E.  P.  DUTTON  &  CO.,  New  York 


THE 
COMING  DEMOCRACY 


BY 

HERMANN   FERNAU 

AUTHOR  07  "BECAUSE  I  AM  A  GESJiAIi" 


"The  civil  constitution  of  every  State  must  be  republican'* 

Immanuel  KIant,  Ferpetiial  Peau 


Q^^^  NEW  YORK 

E.  P.  DUTTON  &  CO. 

^       68i  FIFTH  AVENUE 


^v- 


COPYRIGHT.  191 7, 

bt  e.  p.  button  &  ca 


printed  <n  the  CXnfttd  dtates  of  Hmerka 


PUBLISHERS'  NOTE 

The  American  reader  of  "The  Coming  Democ- 
racy" will  note  in  several  places,  for  example  on  page 
122  and  page  259,  that  the  author  of  this  book  is 
thinking  of  Russia  as  an  empire  and  an  aggressive 
autocracy,  whose  political  aims  must  be  guarded 
against.  The  explanation  of  this  is  of  course  that 
the  original  German  version  of  this  book  was  pub- 
lished in  Berne,  Switzerland,  just  before  the  Russian 
Revolution  broke  out,  and  this  fact  should  never  be 
lost  sight  of  while  reading  the  book.  The  title  as 
published  was   "Durch!  .  .  .  Zur  Demokratie." 

The  suddenness  with  which  the  Russian  Revolution 
broke  out  in  March  upset  a  great  many  political 
theories  and  political  prophecies,  not  only  in  Germany 
but  in  this  country  and  in  England.  One  can  imagine 
if  the  author  of  *'The  Coming  Democracy"  had 
delayed  publication  for  another  three  months  with 
what  joy  he  would  have  hailed  the  Russian  Republic 
and  what  a  lesson  he  would  have  read  in  the  triumph 
of  the  Russian  people  for  the  people  of  his  own 
land. 

Another  great  and  significant  event  which  he  did 
not  foresee  was  the  entry  of  America  into  the  war 
on  the  side  of  the  Allies.  This  again  would  certainly 
have  given  him  great  encouragement  and  a  proof  of 


3v^>fr4b5 


vi  PUBLISHERS'  NOTE 

the  final  triumph  of  democracy  which  he  could  have 
made  use  of  so  effectually  in  his  appeal  to  his  own 
people.  Written  as  it  was  before  these  two  momen- 
tous happenings  in  the  march  towards  universal 
democracy,  the  book  is  a  remarkable  piece  of  forward- 
looking  and  constructive  work,  especially  considering 
the  source  from  whence  it  comes. 

As  Herr  Fernau's  earlier  book,  "Because  I  am 
a  German,"  was  an  appeal  to  his  people  to  find 
out  with  whom  lay  the  guilt  of  willing  and  commenc- 
ing this  appalling  war,  so  this  new  book,  "The 
Coming  Democracy,"  is  an  appeal  to  them  to 
make  it  forever  impossible  that  any  man  or  clique 
of  men  should  be  in  a  position  to  plunge  the  world 
into  such  horrors  again. 

Friends  of  democracy  cannot  but  sjonpathize  with 
this  German  citizen  who  sees,  even  as  we  see,  the 
danger  and  iniquity  of  great  hereditary  privilege; 
and  they  must  especially  commiserate  with  him  be- 
cause those  whom  he  accuses  are  of  his  own  blood 
and  his  own  speech. 

It  is  safe  to  say  in  the  days  to  come  when  Germany 
has  recovered  her  senses  that  this  courageous  call  by 
a  German  to  Germans,  this  merciless  yet  judicial  ar- 
raignment of  the  German  dynastic  political  system, 
will  be  looked  back  to  as  a  landmark  in  the  history  of 
German  progress. 

Jhe  Publishers. 


CONTENTS 


>      -,  PAGE 

Some  Problems  for  Future  German  Historians  .      .1 


n 

Of  Dynasties  in  General  and  the  German  Imperial 

Constitution  in  Particular 36 


in 

The  Basis  of  the  Dynastic  Power 70 


IV 

The  Principles  of  German  Policy:  also  a  History 
OF  the  Events  Leading  up  to  the  World- 
War       94 

manifestations  of  german  militarism — william 
n.  and  the  world  peace — the  hague  con- 
ference and  its  consequences — why  all 
attempts  at  understanding  were  without 
result — ^premonitions   of  the   storm. 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 


V 


PA6X 


The  German  Dynasty  and  the  German  Notion  of 
Culture.  To  which  is  added  a  Study  of 
the  Intellectual  Antecedents  to  the 
War 159 

german  philosophers,  professors,  and  histo- 
rians— international  law:  on  this  side  and 
on  that — the  german  racial  science  and 
deductions  therefrom — concerning  the  free- 
dom of  german  culture — german  culture, 
then  and  now. 


VI 

The  German's  Fatherland    .......    212 

vn 

The  Origin  of  and  Meaning  of  the  War      .       .       .    233 
the    opinions    of    german    pacifists    and    social 

democrats — ^DYNASTIC  STATESMANSHIP  AND  WAR — 
THE  MEANING  OF  THE  PRESENT  WORLD-WAR. 

vin 

Onward!  to  Democracy! 267 

dynasty  or  humanity? — dynastic  politics  and 
culture — the  prerequisite  conditions  for  a 
european  peace — the  errors  and  advantages 
of  democracy. 


THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 


THE   COMING   DEMOCRACY 


SOME   PROBLEMS   FOR   FUTURE   GERMAN 

HISTORIANS 

The  task  of  German  historians  in  the  future  will 
be  in  the  highest  degree  both  a  thankless  and  a  painful 
one.  How  will  they  ever  be  able  to  explain  the  en-, 
thusiasm,  the  marvellous  cohesion  and  the  bed-rock 
belief  in  the  holy  mission  of  the  German  cause,  with 
which  the  German  people  embarked  upon  this  World 
War?  Will  they,  no  longer  under  the  restraint  of 
personal  liberty,  i.e.,  under  the  guardianship  of  the 
German  General  Staff,  be  honestly  able  to  maintain 
those  ideas  as  to  the  necessity  for  and  origin  of  this 
universal  conflict,  which  are  prescribed  in  Germany 
to-day?  Or,  will  they  not,  by  the  light  of  the  over- 
whelming proofs  already  at  hand,  reject  them  as 
historically  untenable?  Moreover,  allowing  that  their 
love  of  truth  compels  them  to  it,  how  will  they,  in 
this  case,  be  possibly  able  to  explain  to  posterity 
that  Germany  did  not  rush  into  this  World  War  with 
feelings  of  anguish  and  horror,  but  with  a  shout  of 
joy,  as  though  marching  out  to  a  festival? 


2  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACYi 

I  fear  that  the  German  historians  of  the  future 
will  only  be  able  to  read  the  German  newspapers 
(particularly  the  comic  papers)  of  the  first  months  of 
the  war  with  reluctant  amazement,  so  thoroughly 
un-German  and  barbaric  will  the  extraordinary  ideas 
of  right  and  wrong,  the  intoxication  of  victory,  the 
wrongheadedness,  and,  to  speak  plainly,  the  braggado- 
cio of  the  leading  organs  of  the  Press  and  men  in  Ger- 
many appear  to  them,  in  view  of  naked,  historical  facts. 

And  their  reluctant  amazement  will  change  into 
silent  pain  or  sheer  indignation  as  soon  as  they  have 
studied  the  question:  Was  it  necessary?  Was  the 
World  War  actually  and  really  inevitable?  Relieved 
from  the  thraldom  of  personal  restraint,  and  now 
only  engaged  upon  the  unprejudiced  establishment 
of  historical  truth,  will  it  be  easy  for  them  to  find 
an  answer  to  this  question?  No!  it  need  not  have 
happened!     It  might  have  been  otherwise! 

Then,  finally,  why  was  Germany,  on  August  ist, 
1914,  obliged  to  declare  war  upon  Russia?  Because  an 
heir  to  the  Austrian  throne  had  been  assassinated  at 
Serajevo?  Nobody  regards  this  murder  as  a  casus 
belli  per  se,  because  no  one  can  imagine  that,  in 
civilised  Europe,  people  have  ever  lived  who  value 
the  life  of  a  prince  as  equal  to  that  of  millions  of 
humbler  mortals.  Moreover,  later  German  historians 
will  never  understand  how  this  murder  was  made  a 
pretext  for  the  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  which  set  the  war 
machine  rolling.  When,  in  1894,  the  French  Presi- 
dent, Carnot,  was  murdered  in  Lyons  by  an  Italian  an- 
archist did  it  occur  to  anyone  in  France  to  denounce 
the  Italians  as  a  ''filthy  pack"  (this  is  how  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  statesmen  and  newspapers  described  the 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS    3 

Serbs)  and  to  declare  that  a  "punitive  force''  must  at 
once  be  launched  against  them?  When  the  Empress 
Elizabeth  of  Austria  was  assassinated  on  the  Lake 
of  Geneva  in  1898  by  an  Italian  anarchist,  did  a  single 
person  in  Austria  ever  moot  the  idea  of  an  ultimatum 
to  Switzerland,  on  the  ground  that  the  Swiss  Federal 
Council  was  intriguing  against  Austria  and  supporting 
the  Irredentist  movement  in  Italy?  Not  a  bit  of  it. 
The  whole  world  was  indignant  at  these  acts.  The 
murderers  were  punished,  and  everyone  agreed  that 
this  was  the  only  possible  expiation. 
=  That,  however,  in  191 4,  the  Serajevo  murder  (which 
was  not  perpetrated  by  Serbs,  but  by  Austrian  subjects 
on  Austrian  soil)  was  made  the  subject  of  diplomatic 
action  against  Serbia  is  a  fact  which  deserves  condem- 
nation from  a  legal  point  of  view.  A  State  which,  in- 
consequence of  such  an  occurrence,  makes  such  per- 
emptory demands  cannot  be  regarded  as  pacific;  it  is 
aware,  beforehand,  that  its  action  is  sure  to  entail  a 
risk  of  war. 

"The  assassination  of  this  prince  at  Serajevo  did 
not  cause  this  World  War,"  German  annals  will  reply 
to  later  historians.  "That  Germany,  on  August  ist, 
1914,  was  forced  to  declare  war  upon  Russia  was  a 
consequence  of  her  treaty  obligations  to  Austria. 
The  Serajevo  murder  was  simply  an  outward  and  visi- 
ble sign  of  those  Serbian  and  Russian  machinations 
which  had  long  been  menacing  Austria's  position  as 
a  World-Power.  Serbia  felt  herself  strong,  owing 
to  her  protection  by  Russia.  Since  we  were  allied 
with  Austria,  we  could  not  permit  this  threatening 
attitude,  and  were  forced,  since  Russia  wilfully 
interfered  in  the  Austro-Serbian  dispute,  to  hurry  to 


4  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

our  ally's  aid  against  Russia.    Thus  the  World  War 


arose." 


This  statement  can  only  be  of  intrinsic  value  for 
historical  investigation  if  properly  supported  by 
evidence.  But  the  historians  of  the  future  will  look 
in  vain  for  actual  proofs  of  this  Serbian  and  Russian 
menace.  From  multitudinous  diplomatic  papers,  they 
will  be  unable  to  unearth  a  single  document  which 
unequivocally  proves  that  Russia  had  actually  en- 
couraged the  Serbs  to  hostile  resistance  to  Austria. 
As  little  will  they  be  able  to  discover  any  reliable 
document  whatever  showing  that  the  Serajevo  murder 
was  planned  and  carried  out  with  the  cognisance 
of  the  Governments  of  either  Russia  or  Serbia.  On 
the  contrary,  they  will  have  to  fall  back  upon  No.  40 
of  the  Russian  Orange  Book,  and  the  eminently  con- 
ciliatory Serbian  reply  to  the  Austrian  Ultimatum, 
as  proofs  that  Russia  recommended  the  Serbs  to 
observe  moderation,  and  that  Serbia  followed  this  ad- 
vice. For  a  more  conciliatory  reply  than  Serbia  gave 
to  Austria  it  is  impossible  to  conceive.  If  nearly  all 
German  accounts  maintain  that  Austria-Hungary  was 
most  terribly  menaced,^  there  are  wanting,  as  already 
said :  firstly y  actual  and  historical  proofs  of  this  men- 
ace, and,  secondly  (and  this  is  more  important),  ac- 

*  To  pick  out  one  instance  from  among  hundreds :  Prof.  Her- 
man Oncken  writes  ("Deutschland  und  der  Weltkrieg,"  Berlin, 
1915,  P-  540)  :  "It  was  inevitable  that  this  cruelly  wronged  Great 
Power,  after  having  so  long  and  so  patiently  endured  this  men- 
ace, should  rise  up  at  this  crisis.  It  was  not  a  question  of 
external  prestige,  no!  her  very  existence  was  in  jeopardy,  if  she 
suffered  this  attack."  What  legally  conclusive  evidence  has 
Prof.  Oncken  for  his  statement  that  Austria's  "existence  was 
ever  in  jeopardy"? 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS   5 

tually  credible  evidence  that  Austria  could  not,  through 
a  Court  of  Arbitration,  have  attained  her  rights  more 
cheaply  and  more  reasonably  than  by  sacrificing  mil- 
lions of  men. 

Future  German  historians,  who  will  be  better  versed 
in  the  psychology  of  the  cases  of  Prochaska,  Fried- 
jung,  etc.,  than  we,  will  be  forced  to  discredit  the  state- 
ments of  the  Austrian  diplomats,  who  continually 
speak  of  *'plots,"  without  being  able  to  adduce  any 
tangible  evidence  in  support  of  their  statements. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  regards  Germany's  treaty- 
obligation  towards  Austria,  they  must  allow  that,  as 
events  show,  she  was  not  only  loyal  in  her  observance 
of  it  but  even  officious.  For  Germany  not  merely 
presented  a  twelve-hour  Ultimatum  to  Russia  at  the 
very  moment  when  Austria  herself  had  already  de-- 
clared  her  readiness  to  reopen  negotiations  with  Rus- 
sia (Red  Book  Nos.  55,  56).  She  not  only  nullified 
this  pacific  attitude  adopted  by  Austria  at  the  eleventh 
hour,  but  declared  war  upon  Russia  full  five  days  be- 
fore Austria  herself,  although  the  latter  was  alleged 
to  have  been  so  severely  threatened.  Surely  greater 
loyalty  was  impossible! 

Unfortunately,  the  German  historians  of  the  future 
will  be  compelled  to  discount  this  "Nibelung-faith- 
fulness,'*  when  they  further  investigate  the  history 
of  the  war.  For  when  on  May  23rd,  19 15,  Italy  sud- 
denly declared  war  on  Austria,  then  Germany,  with  all 
her  loyalty  to  her  alliances,  entirely  ignored  this  new 
and  much  more  dangerous  threat  to  her  ally.  Was 
Austria's  existence  and  her  position  as  a  Great  Power 
less  menaced  by  Italy  than  by  Serbia?  Who  was  in 
the  sublime  counsels  of  the  diplomats  of  that  day?  The 


6  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

fact  remains,  Germany  did  not  declare  war  upon  Italy. 
Either,  then,  so  will  our  later  German  historians  de- 
duce, our  treaty-loyalty  to  Austria  was  truly  sincere, 
but,  if  so,  our  attitude  towards  Austria  in  May,  191 5, 
was  a  breach  of  contract;  or,  perhaps  after  all,  it 
was  only  a  diplomatic  lie,  and,  if  so,  our  predecessors, 
if  they  genuinely  desired  peace,  could  as  well  have 
held  themselves  aloof  from  a  conflict  between  Aus- 
tria on  the  one  hand  and  Serbia  and  Russia  on  the 
other,  as  they  could  later  from  one  between  their  ally 
and  Italy. 

From  the  foregoing  it  is  evident  that  neither  the 
assassination  at  Serajevo,  nor  the  constantly  asserted, 
and  ever  unproven,  Serbo-Russian  intrigues,  nor, 
even,  the  German  treaty  obligations  to  Austria,  could 
be  the  real  cause  of  the  World  War.  Future  German 
historians  will  exclaim:  *'It  is  impossible  that  our 
ancestors  could  ever  have  declared  war  upon  half 
the  globe  without  having  been  first  actually  assaulted 
and  attacked.  Even  if  they  were  so  enamoured  of 
war,  they  would  scarcely  be  so  arrogant  as  to  attack 
four  Powers  at  once.  It  is  evident  that  an  attack  upon 
our  country,  infringement  of  our  national  dignity,  in 
short,  an  armed  attack  upon  our  Fatherland,  must  have 
driven  us  into  war." 

But,  ah!  here  we  have  a  bona  Ude  casus  belli. 
(German  White  Book,  p.  14.)  ''However,  before 
a  confirmation  of  the  execution  of  this  order  had 
been  received,  that  is  to  say,  already  in  the  after- 
noon of  August  1st.  .  .  .  Russian  troops  crossed  our 
frontier  and  marched  into  German  territory.'*  It 
is  plain  that  we  could  not  tolerate  that.  Of  course, 
the  German  declaration  of  war  naturally  resulted  from 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  7 

this  Russian  invasion.  Let  us  examine  the  facts. 
Here  we  find  (White  Book,  Exhibit  26)  the  official 
German  declaration  of  war  upon  Russia.  What?  Is 
it  dated  August  ist,  1914,  12.52  p.m.?  How  could  it 
be  known  in  Berlin  at  12.52  p.m.  that  Russian  troops 
had  on  the  afternoon  of  that  day  crossed  the  German 
frontier?  And  what  does  that  mean?  The  German 
declaration  of  war  was  not,  of  course,  the  result  of  an 
invasion  of  Russian  troops!  "Seeing  that  Russia  has 
refused  to  comply  with  this  demand  (the  suspension 
of  military  operations)  and  by  this  refusal  has  an- 
nounced that  its  action  was  directed  against  Germany, 
I  have  the  honour,  etc.  .  .  /'  Accordingly  it  was  not 
the  Russian  incursions  (p.  14)  that  drove  us  to  war 
with  Russia,  but  (p.  46,  Exhibits  26,  2'j)  the  disre- 
gard of  the  Ultimatum  addressed  to  Russia.  This 
contradiction  in  the  German  official  documents  is  ab- 
solutely bewildering.  Did  not  the  German  Govern- 
ment know  why  it  was  bound  to  declare  war  upon 
Russia?  Did  Russian  forces  actually  violate  our  ter- 
ritory, or  did  we  only  declare  war  upon  that  country 
because  she  refused  an  answer  to  an  Ultimatum, 
which,  from  the  short  term  set  for  reply,  was  bound 
to  be  regarded  as  an  insult?  What  an  extraordinary 
contradiction  in  such  a  serious  and  sanguinary  af- 
fair! 

Our  own  supposition  arising  out  of  this  contradic- 
tion (namely,  that  we  did  not  declare  war  upon 
Russia  because  we  were  obliged,  but  because  we 
wished)  amounts  to  a  certainty  by  the  light  of  a 
semi-official  article  in  the  Pester  Lloyd  (Government 
organ  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  in  Buda- 
pest)  of  May  27th,   19 16.     In  replying  to  a  speech 


8  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

of  the  then  English  Cabinet  Minister,  Grey,  in  which 
he  had  emphasised  the  fact  that  the  war  would  have 
been  avoided  had  his  proposals  for  a  Diplomatic  Con- 
ference (English  Blue  Book  Nos.  6j,  84,  loi,  103) 
been  adopted,  the  article  proceeds :  ''how  great  and 
unswerving  was  our  determination  to  settle  our  differ- 
ences with  Serbia  in  such  a  way  that  the  criminal 
menace  should  be  once  and  for  all  disposed  of,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  can  be  assured,  since  we  can  honestly 
state  that :  even  had  the  Russian  Government  desisted 
from  or  suspended  the  mobilisation  she  had,  despite 
her  hypocritical  assurances  and  avowals  to  the  con- 
trary, been  secretly  continuing,  Austria-Hungary 
would  never  have  gone  to  any  Conference,  but  would 
have  insisted,  untrammelled  by  any  third  party,  on 
bringing  her  differences  with  Serbia  to  a  final  issue, 
in  accordance  with  the  necessities  of  her  future  se- 
curity/* 

Even  had  Russia  desisted  from  or  suspended  its 
mobilisation!  Now  every  doubt  has  vanished.  For 
it  is  no  longer  Germany's  enemies  who  assert  this, 
but  a  semi-official  organ  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  making  this  "statement"  in  "complete 
honesty.'*  For  us,  this  statement  is  an  historical 
document,  from  which  we,  unfortunately,  are  bound 
with  unequivocal  clearness  to  deduce  that  Austria, 
backed  up  by  Germany,  absolutely  determined  upon 
war. 

H*  *^  ^  *f*  *i^ 

And  what  of  France?     It  is  true  that  we  cannot 

understand  how  the  German  Government  at  that  time 

could  have  become  obsessed  by  the  idea  that  a  war 

,with  Russia  was  inevitable;  but  it  is  still  more  un- 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS   9 

intelligible  why  she  was  obliged  to  declare  war  upon 
France  (and,  as  a  result  of  this,  unfortunately, 
upon  Belgium  also).  Here  we  have  the  speech  of  the 
German  Imperial  Chancellor  of  August  4th,  1914, 
in  which  he  states:  ''Bombing  aeroplanes,  cavalry 
scouts,  and  companies  violating  our  Alsace-Lorraine! 
In  this  way,  France,  although  no  state  of  war  has  been 
declared,  has  broken  the  peace  and  actually  attacked 
us."  There  appears  to  be  here  no  possible  doubt :  we 
were,  as  the  Chancellor  solemnly  assures  us,  ''actually 
attacked!"  It  certainly  strikes  us  as  curious  that 
the  Imperial  Chancellor  in  the  very  next  sentence  of 
the  same  speech  confesses  that  we  ourselves  had  al- 
ready crossed  the  French  frontier  before  the  declara- 
tion of  war:  "Of  the  French  complaints  as  to  viola- 
tions of  their  territory  on  our  part,  we  can  only  allow" 
one  single  instance.  Contrary  to  express  orders,  it  ap- 
pears that,  on  August  2nd,  a  patrol  of  the  14th  Army 
Corps  under  command  of  an  officer  crossed  the  fron- 
tier." The  Chancellor  endeavours  to  invalidate  the 
import  of  this  fact  by  adding:  "but  long  before  this 
violation  of  territory  occurred  French  aeroplanes 
penetrated  into  South  Germany  and  threw  bombs  upon 
our  railway  communications." 

We  cannot  be  blamed  if,  once  having  established 
the  falsity  of  the  German  representations  touching  the 
Russian  violation  of  territory,  we  here  again  require 
evidence  of  this  "actual  attack."  First,  we  place 
on  record  that  the  German  declaration  of  war, 
delivered  by  Herr  von  Schoen  in  Paris  at  6.45  p.m.  on 
August  3rd,  191 4,  did  not  refer  to  any  infringement  of 
territory,  but  only  to  the  aeroplane  aggression 
upon  which  tlie  Chancellor  insisted :  "the  German  Ad- 


lo  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

ministration  and  military  authorities  have  established 
a  certain  number  of  palpably  hostile  acts  committed 
on  German  soil  by  French  aeroplanes.  Several  of  these 
have  openly  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  by  fly- 
ing over  the  territory  of  that  country.  One  of  them 
attempted  to  destroy  buildings  near  Wesel,  others  were 
observed  over  the  Eiffel  country,  and  another  threw 
bombs  on  the  railway  line  near  Karlsruhe  and  Nurem- 
berg. I  am  commanded,  and  have  the  honour,  etc. 
.  .  ."     (French  Yellow  Book  No.  147). 

The  Imperial  German  Chancellor  could  have  greatly 
assisted  our  investigations  by  furnishing  dates  and 
details.  But  these  are  absolutely  wanting  in  his  speech. 
Hence  we  were  obliged  to  scrutinize  carefully  the 
Wesel,  Karlsruhe,  and  Nuremberg  papers  for  the 
period  July  25th-August  3rd,  1914.  The  work  was 
all  the  more  arduous  in  that  our  search  yielded,  alas ! 
no  result.  Not  one  of  these  newspapers  contains  a 
single  reference  to  the  throwing  of  bombs.  Can 
anyone  believe  that  they  would  have  remained 
silent  in  the  face  of  such  a  sensational  occurrence? 
But  we  have  not  been  alone  in  seeking  for  evidence 
for  the  cause  of  the  war  as  alleged  by  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  and  the  German  Ambassador.  Since  the 
outbreak  of  this  World  War,  honest  German  patriots 
made  a  Hke  investigation  and,  discovering  nothing, 
asked  the  German  authorities  for  information.  One 
of  them.  Dr.  Schwalbe,  editor  of  the  Deutsche  Medi- 
zinische  Wochenschrift,  received  the  following  reply 
to  his  question  in  a  notification  from  the  Nuremberg 
Chief  Magistrate  (Oberbiirgermeister),  dated  April 
3rd,  1916,  and  published  in  his  weekly  journal  of  May 
i8th,  1916: 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  ii 

"The  Acting  General  Commandant  of  the  3rd  Ba- 
varian Army  Corps  in  this  city  has  no  information 
that  bombs  were  ever  thrown  by  enemy  aeroplanes 
upon  the  raihvay  lines  Nuremberg-Kissingen  or 
Nuremberg-Anspach,  either  before  or  after  the  out- 
break of  war.  All  such  assertions  and  newspaper  re- 
ports have  been  found  to  be  false.'* 

Found  to  be  false!  Then  the  justification  for  the 
declaration  of  war  upon  France  was  a  pure  myth! 
Accordingly,  we  did  not  declare  war  upon  France  be- 
cause she  ''actually  attacked"  us,  but  because  we  in- 
tended to  attack  her  under  trumped-up  pretexts?  So 
the  whole  business  was  a  pure  fiction  ?  It  is  staggering 
to  have  to  conceive  that,  in  this  twentieth  century, 
there  were  people  capable  of  such  fabrications,  and  of 
solemnly  proclaiming  in  the  same  breath:  "Gentle- 
men, we  are  now  on  our  defence!"  and  "Necessity 
knows  no  law !" 

In  the  East,  incursions  of  Russian  forces;  in  the 
West,  aeroplane  bombs  on  South  German  railways. 
In  the  East,  an  awkward  contradiction  between 
the  Chancellor's  speech  and  the  German  official 
declaration  of  war.  In  the  West,  a  still  more 
flagrant  contradiction  in  two  sentences  of  the  same 
Chancellor's  speech.  On  the  one  hand,  the  state- 
ment made  in  "full  honesty"  by  a  highly  official 
publication  that  it  had  been  determined  at  the 
outset  to  accept  no  Conference  (i.e.,  war  at  all 
costs).  On  the  other,  the  equally  categorical  state- 
ment of  German  officialdom,  that  the  "actual  attack" 
upon  which  the  German  declaration  of  war  upon 
France  was  based  is  a  pure  fiction  of  the  German 
Government. 


12  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

This  Imperial  Chancellor  is,  indeed,  a  marvel  in  the 

world's  history. 

He  *  *  *  * 

That,  moreover,  is  evident  from  the  speeches  which 
Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  has  delivered  since  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.  For  instance,  in  his  celebrated 
speech  of  November  9th,  1916,  he  said:  "The  act  that 
rendered  this  war  inevitable  was  the  Russian  general 
mobilisation,  ordered  in  the  night  30th-3ist  July." 
We  confess  we  do  not  understand  how,  after  twenty- 
seven  months  of  war,  anyone  could  talk  to  the  German 
people  in  this  way.  The  mobilisation  in  Russia, 
Austria,  Germany  and  France  was  patently  the  re- 
sult of  eight  days'  preliminary  diplomatic  negotia- 
tions, i.e.,  the  final  act  of  the  great  world  drama, 
which  opened  with  the  delivery  of  the  Ultimatum  to 
Serbia  on  July  23rd.  As  one  cannot  tame  a  horse 
by  his  tail,  so  a  play  cannot  begin  with  the  fifth  act. 
And  this  is  most  particularly  true  in  this  connection, 
because  in  the  preamble  to  the  German  White  Book 
(p.  6)  we  find  the  ominous  words:  "We  were  fully 
conscious  of  the  fact  (in  giving  Austria  our  sanction 
to  this  Ultimatum)  that  an  eventual  military  action 
on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary  might  bring  Russia 
into  the  field,  and  thus,  in  accordance  with  our  treaty 
obligations,  involve  us  also  in  war.'*  This  sentence 
clearly  shows  that  in  German  quarters,  as  early  as 
July  23rd,  1914,  the  risk  of  a  European  war  had 
been  carefully  and  advisedly  considered.  Long  before 
the  Russian  mobilisation  had  been  proclaimed,  Austria 
had  declared  war  upon  Serbia  and  begun  it  by  bom- 
barding Belgrade.  On  its  side,  the  German  Govern- 
ment   had    rejected   two   English   and   two    Russian 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  13 

proposals  for  mediation,  and,  moreover,  had  simply 
suppressed' (no  other  word  for  it)  a  personal  note 
from  the  Russian  Czar  (asking  that  the  Austro- 
Serbian  differences  should  be  submitted  to  The  Hague 
Conference). 

The  discussion  of  the  question  of  guilt  must,  accord- 
ingly, if  it  is  to  proceed  without  prejudice  and  con- 
scientiously, begin  with  the  words  "fully  conscious" 
of  the  sentence  cited  above.^  To  single  out  from 
this  series  of  events  the  Russian  mobilisation,  and 
to  treat  it  as  something  standing  by  itself,  is  not 
permissible  and  would  only  give  the  impression  of  a 
deliberate  disregard  of  the  events  leading  up  to  the 
mobilisation. 

But  even  if,  out  of  courtesy  to  the  Imperial  Chancel- 
lor, we  should  pause  and  discuss  the  Russian  mobilisa- 
tion as  a  thing  by  itself,  we  should  be  unable  to  agree 
with  him.  The  Chancellor  said :  "As  regards  the  de- 
fensive character  of  the  Russian  grand  mobilisation,  I 

^  In  my  book  "Because  I  am  a  German !"  (London,  Constable 
&  Co.;  New  York,  E.  P.  Button  Co.)  I,  on  pp.  96-102,  formu- 
lated some  of  the  preliminary  essential  questions  which  should 
be  asked  before  the  Russian  mobilisation  is  discussed.  Vide,  in 
this  sense  also,  pp.  82-8  of  the  same  work,  re  the  reply  to  a 
pamphlet  of  Dr.  Helfferich.  (Contradicting  Herr  von  Bethmann 
Hollweg's  assertion,  his  colleague  Helfferich  says,  moreover,  the 
Russian  mobilisation  was  ordered  on  the  "early  morning  of 
July  31st.")  Again,  in  the  German  White  Book  (p.  13)  it  is 
stated  that  the  Russian  general  mobilisation  was  ordered  "as 
early  as  the  morning"  (of  July  31st).  Again,  as  to  the  question, 
When  did  the  Russian  general  mobilisation  take  place?  the 
German  White  Book  replies:  "in  the  forenoon"  (Vormittag) 
of  July  31st,  Dr.  Helfferich,  "in  the  early  hours  (Friihmorgens) 
of  July  31st,"  and  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  "in  the  night  from 
July  30th-3ist."  Three  German  official  statements  contain,  ac- 
cordingly, three  contradictions.     Which  is  one  to  believe? 


14  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

will,  in  this  place,  expressly  assert  that,  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  in  1914,  an  instruction  of  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment, issued  as  early  as  19 12,  contains  the  fol- 
lowing sentence:  'His  Majesty  has  given  orders  that 
proclamation  of  the  mobilisation  shall  be,  simulta- 
neously, proclamation  of  war  with  Germany/  " 

Here  again,  in  order  to  oblige  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor, we  will  not  investigate  the  question  why  he  only 
published  this  document  after  twenty-seven  months 
of  war,  instead  (as  any  other  statesman  in  his  position 
would  have  done)  of  doing  so  immediately,  when  from 
all  sides  Germany  was  being  accused  of  having,  of 
malice  aforethought,  brought  about  the  war.  More- 
over, we  will  for  a  moment  suppose  with  the  Chancel- 
lor that  the  Russian  mobilisation  actually  took  place 
earlier  than  the  Austrian  (how  very  assailable  this  po- 
sition is,  and  that,  in  any  event,  it  can  only  have  been 
a  matter  of  a  few  hours,  is  demonstrated  by  Yellow 
Book  No.  115  and  Red  Book  No.  53^).  Despite  all 
these  extenuating  presuppositions,  we  are,  after  all,  in 
a  position  to  demonstrate  the  futility  of  Bethmann 
HoUweg's  assertion  (that  the  Russian  general  mobili- 
sation had  rendered  war  inevitable,  in  that  it  was  tan- 
tamount to  a  declaration  of  war)  by  four  facts,  which 
do  not  admit  of  any  argument. 

Firstly,  by  the  following  telegram  of  the  Czar  to 
William  U.,  dated  Petrograd,  August  ist,  19 14 
(dispatched  after  the  Russian  and  German  general 
mobilisation  had  been  ordered)  :     "I  have  received 

^Cf.,  in  this  connection,  also  the  description  in  "J'accuse"  and 
J.  W.  Headlam  "The  History  of  Twelve  Days"  (London,  T. 
Fisher  Unwin),  p.  220. 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  15 

your  telegram,  and  understand  that  you  are  compelled 
to  mobilise,  but  I  should  wish  to  have  from  you  the 
same  guarantee  that  I  have  given  you,  namely,  that 
these  measures  do  not  mean  war,  and  that  we  shall 
continue  to  negotiate  .  .  ."  (see  German  White  Book, 
p.  12,  the  Czar's  message  of  August  ist).  Here  we 
have  the  solemn  word  of  the  Czar  repeated,  that  mo- 
bilisation does  not  imply  war.  What  moral  and  legal 
international  justification  had  the  German  Govern- 
ment for  disbelieving  this  solemn  assurance  of  the 
Czar?  Why  did  not  William  XL  reply  to  this  telegram 
by  giving  the  assurance  requested,  instead  of  by  an- 
other demand  for  immediate  demobilisation,  and 
couched  in  the  momentous  words :  "Until  I  have  this 
reply  from  you,  I  am  sorry  not  to  be  in  a  position  to 
enter  upon  the  subject  of  your  telegram"  (German, 
White  Book,  p.  ^4)  ?    Why? 

Secondly,  Russia  and  Austria,  both  in  1908  and  also 
later,  in  1912,  stood  for  weeks  fully  mobilised  on  their 
frontiers  and  did  not  go  to  war.  Why  ?  Because  at 
the  time  neither  of  the  negotiating  diplomatists 
was  secretly  resolved  upon  war.  Therefore,  in  spite 
of  mobiHsation  on  both  fronts,  the  negotiations  were 
carried  on  and  the  differences  peaceably  adjusted. 
Moreover,  Count  Berchtold,  at  that  time  Austrian 
Minister,  expressly  (Red  Book  No.  17)  pointed  to 
these  precedents  to  make  it  manifest  to  all  the  world 
that  mobilisation  on  one  or  the  other  side  does  not  by 
any  means  signify  war. 

But,  thirdly,  every  child  in  Germany  knew  that 
a  Russian  general  mobilisation  was  in  itself  by 
no  means  such  an  immediate  danger  for  Germany 
as  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  would  lead  us  to 


i6  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

believe.  In  consequence  of  its  vast  territory  and  de- 
ficient railway  communications,  Russia  required  for 
the  full  mobilisation  of  its  forces  about  four  times  as 
much  time  as  other  European  military  States.  This 
very  comforting  circumstance  for  Germany  ought  in 
itself  to  have  enabled  the  German  Government  to  wait 
without  risk  for  a  few  days — that  is,  to  continue  the 
pourparlers.  But  the  German  Government,  far  from 
regarding  this  slowness  of  the  Russian  mobilisation  as 
a  welcome  opportunity  for  further  negotiations,  relied 
upon  it  as  a  factor  of  prospective  victory  in  its  plan 
of  war.  In  fact,  the  German  war  plan  (down  to  the 
battle  of  the  Marne)  was,  as  far  as  is  known 
to  us  to-day,  based  upon  the  slowness  of  the 
Russian  and  the  rapidity  of  its  own  mobilisation. 
That  is  to  say,  it  was,  at  the  beginning,  directed 
not  against  Russia  at  all,  but  against  France  and 
Belgium.  This  was  so  much  the  case  that,  relying 
upon  the  slowness  of  the  Russian  mobilisation,  the 
German  main  army  was  launched  through  Belgium 
upon  France,  the  East  Prussian  frontier  being  only 
garrisoned  by  insufficient  forces,  with  the  result  that 
Germany  lost  the  battle  of  Gumbinnen,  relinquished 
half  of  East  Prussia,  and  was  forced,  at  the  begin- 
ning of  September,  19 14,  to  withdraw  considerable 
forces  from  France  and  send  them  against  Russia,  so 
as  to  avert  utter  catastrophe  in  East  Prussia.  This 
brought  about  the  defeat  on  the  Marne,  the  bank- 
ruptcy of  the  German  war  plan,  and  the  dismissal  of 
its  author,  Moltke.  The  undoubted  historical  fact  ac- 
cordingly remains  that  the  German  General  Staff  con- 
ceived the  Russian  general  mobilisation  to  be,  for 
weeks  to  come,  so  little  dangerous,  and  its  slowness 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  17 

so  certain,  that  it  built  its  whole  war  plan  upon  this 
theory  and,  immediately  after  the  declaration  of  war, 
did  not  turn  against  Russia,  but  launched  its  forces  ex- 
clusively against  Belgium  and  France.  All  the  same, 
Herr  von  Bethmann  Holhveg  dared  to  describe  that 
mobilisation  to  his  contemporaries  as  a  war-storm 
which  was  to  burst  in  the  very  next  second,  and  which 
compelled  Germany,  for  the  sake  of  her  existence,  to 
strike  madly  in  all  directions. 

Fourthly,  we  must  place  on  record  the  very  ex- 
traordinary fact  that  Austria  herself  (for  whose  sake 
it  was  said  the  German  Government  acted  with  such 
precipitancy)  had,  indeed,  mobilised  almost  simulta- 
neously with  Russia,  but  quietly  continued  its  diplo- 
matic negotiations  with  Petrograd  (Red  Books  Nos. 
53,  55,  56),  and  did  not  declare  war  upon  Russia  un- 
til five  days  later  than  Germany  herself. 

The  danger  of  the  Russian  mobilisation  (which, 
according  to  Herr  von  Bethman  Hollweg's  account, 
rendered  the  war  inevitable)  is  thus  refuted  (i)  by  a 
solemn  and  reiterated  assurance  of  the  Russian  Czar; 
(2)  by  historical  precedents,  and  their  quotation  by  the 
German  ally,  Count  Berchtold;  (3)  by  the  formula- 
tion and  execution  of  the  German  war  plan;  and  (4) 
by  the  attitude  of  the  Austrian  Government  itself, 
which  deemed  the  Russian  general  mobilisation  to  be 
of  such  little  danger  that,  in  spite  of  it,  it  continued  ne- 
gotiations and  did  not  declare  war  upon  Russia  before 
August  5th. 

Viewed  by  the  light  of  these  historical  facts,  the 
statements  and  the  logic  displayed  by  the  German  Im- 
perial Chancellor  do  not  appear  to  us  to  hold  water. 
That  nobody  in  the  German  Empire  protested  against 


i8  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

them  at  the  time  is  an  extraordinary  phenomenon, 
only  expHcable  by  the  condition  known  as  the  ''Biirg- 
frieden/'  Our  ancestors  denoted  by  ''Burgfricden" 
that  extraordinary  institution  by  the  aid  of  which  the 
German  Government  could  stifle  every  free  utterance, 
and  be  in  the  right  in  any  and  every  event. 

Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  proceeded  to  say  in  his 
speech :  'The  Hague  Tribunal,  which  he  (Lord  Grey), 
it  is  true,  suggested,  is,  of  course,  apparently  very 
momentous;  but  it  was  offered  when  Russian  forces 
had  already  been  dispatched  against  us."  Here,  again, 
this  sentence  shows  us  how  convenient  for  the  then 
German  statesman  (free  from  all  responsibility  to- 
wards the  people)  this  Burgfrieden  was. 

Firstly,  Lord  Grey  did  not  suggest  The  Hague  Tri- 
bunal, but  the  Serbian  Government  did  so  in  its  reply 
to  Austria  (French  Yellow  Book  No.  49).  This  pro- 
posal had  been  already  made  to  Austria  on  July  25th, 
when  there  was  nowhere  any  talk  about  Russian 
troops.  Instead  of  adopting  this  proposal,  the  Aus- 
trian Government  simply  broke  off  negotiations  and 
declared  war  upon  Serbia.  For  this  action  of  his  al- 
lied Government,  as  precipitate  as  it  was  brutal,  Herr 
von  Bethmann  Hollweg  never  found  a  single  word  of 
blame,  on  the  contrary  (German  White  Book,  p.  7) 
he  expressly  approved  it. 

Secondly,  The  Hague  Arbitration  Tribunal  w^as 
suggested  by  the  Czar  in  a  despatch  to  William  H. 
This  despatch  bears  date  July  29th,  1914.  Twice 
repeated,  it  was  neither  answered  by  the  German 
Government  nor  made  known  at  all  to  the  German 
people.  It  was  only  when  the  Moniteiir  Oificiel 
of   the   Russian    Government    (January   31st,    191 5) 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  19 

indicated  the  existence  of  this  despatch  that  the  Ger- 
man Government  condescended  to  admit  that  it  had 
been  received,  and  then  issued  it  in  a  second  edition  of 
its  White  Book.    This  fact  alone  is  more  illustrative  of 
the  guilt  for  the  war  than  all  the  Chancellor's  utter- 
ances together,  down  to  November  9th,  19 16.    Let  us 
keep  the  dates  clear  :    The  Hague  Arbitration  Tribunal 
was  proposed  by  Serbia  on  July  25th  and  by  the  Rus- 
sian Czar  on  July  29th,  19 14.     The  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor stated  in  his  speech  of  November  9th,   1916, 
that  the  Russian  mobilisation  "was  ordered  in  the 
night  July  30th-3ist,  19 14,"  and  in  his  speech  of  Au- 
gust 4th,  1914,  he  said  that  ''Russian  troops  had  al- 
ready crossed  our  frontiers  in  the  afternoon  of  August 
1st."     Whence,  it  appears,  in  the  first  place,  that  The  • 
Hague  Tribunal  was  twice  proposed  at  a  time  when,  as 
yet  nowhere,  ^'Russian  troops  were  marching  against 
us,"  and,  in  the  second  place,  that  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann  Hollweg  was  compelled  knowingly  to  represent 
facts  differently  than  they  historically  proved  to  be. 
For  only  in  this  way  could  he,  in  apportioning  the 
blame,  get  rid  of  the  most  material   fact  that  The 
Hague  Tribunal  was  twice  offered  him  and  his  Vienna 
colleague,   when  no   Russian  troops  whatever   were 
being  moved  against  us. 

The  Imperial  Chancellor  proceeded  to  lay  stress  in 
his  speech  on  the  point  that  he  had  exercised  pres- 
sure in  Vienna  in  favour  of  peace,  and  advised  the 
acceptance  of  Grey's  mediation  proposal.  He  referred, 
in  making  this  assertion,  to  two  despatches.  As  to 
the  first,  he  said:  "the  instructions  I  gave  our  Am- 
bassador in  Vienna  on  July  30th  are  well  known." 
The  text  of  these  instructions  the  Imperial  Chancellor 


20  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

had  already  made  known  in  his  speech  of  August  19th, 
191 5.     He  then  added  that  he  had  had  this  despatch 
pubHshed   in  the   EngHsh   Press   shortly   before  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.     And  it  was  actually  printed 
in  the  Westminster  Gazette  of  August  ist,  191 4.    But, 
otherwise,  it  is  omitted  from  all  official  budgets  of 
documents,    and    notably    from    the    German    White 
Book.     The  facts  regarding  this  despatch  are  as  fol- 
lows:    It  was  published  in  one  single  English  news- 
paper and  nowhere  else.      It  was  not  until  twelve 
months  later  that  the  German  Chancellor  announced 
this  publication  as  his  work.     EngHsh  historians  have 
deduced  from  this  remarkable  fact  that  the  so-called 
document  was  a  fiction  and  was,  at  the  critical  mo- 
ment, sent  to  the  English  paper  with  the  sole  intent 
of  restraining  England  from  war,  that  is  to  say,  of 
creating  the  impression  that  the  German  Government 
had  seriously  recommended  Grey's  mediation  proposal 
in  Vienna.     But  whether  fictitious  or  not,  the  fact 
yet  remains  that  the  German  Government  has  never 
given  any  plausible  explanation  why  this  despatch  is 
missing  in  all  official  publications.    No  statesman  who 
feels  he  is  in  the  right,  and  finds  himself  in  such  a 
difficult  position  as  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor 
then  did,  can  have  any  motive   for  concealing  such 
documents  for  years.     For,  at  the  very  beginning  of 
the  war,  the  Imperial  Chancellor  was  accused  on  all 
sides  of  not  having  worked  in  Vienna  in  the  cause  of 
moderation  and  mediation,  and  of  thus  having  ren- 
dered the  catastrope  inevitable.    Why  did  he  not  pub- 
lish documents  which  would  prove  the  direct  contrary, 
and  at  a  time  when  no  one  could  possibly  doubt  their 
genuineness? 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  21 

The  same  remark  is  applicable,  and  in  a  far  greater 
degree,  to  the  second  despatch  that  the  Chancellor, 
for  the  first  time,  made  known  in  his  speech  in  Novem- 
ber 9th,  19 1 6.  After  twenty-seven  months  of  war,  he 
suddenly  made  known  a  despatch  to  his  Vienna  Min- 
ister, which,  inter  alia,  states  :  ''the  political  prestige  of 
Austria-Hungary  and  the  honour  of  its  army,  as  well 
as  its  justifiable  claims  upon  Serbia,  might  be  suffi- 
ciently safeguarded  by  the  occupation  of  Belgrade,  or 
other  strongholds.  We  must,  therefore,  urgently  and 
most  emphatically  ask  the  Vienna  Cabinet  to  consider 
if  it  would  not  be  advisable  to  accept  the  mediation  on 
the  conditions  offered.  The  responsibility  for  the  con- 
sequences which  otherwise  are  sure  to  ensue  would  be 
an  exceedingly  heavy  one  for  Austria-Hungary  and 
ourselves."  Unfortunately,  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
does  not  supply  us  with  the  exact  date  on  which  he 
sent  this  important  despatch  to  Vienna.  He  only  says : 
"I  telegraphed  'then'  to  Vienna":  Then!  As  if  the 
most  exact  indication  of  the  time  was  not  of  the  ut- 
most importance.  And  all  the  more  so,  seeing  that 
this  telegram  (like  the  last  above  mentioned)  is  no- 
where to  be  found  in  the  budget  of  the  despatches 
exchanged.  Let  anyone  try  to  fit  it  in,  and  he  will 
only  discover  that,  try  as  he  will,  its  contents  are  in 
sheer  contradiction  to  other  German  documents  that 
have  preceded  it.  (See,  for  instance,  the  German 
White  Book,  exhibit  12,  where  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
expressly  declares  to  his  London  Ambassador:  "It 
is  impossible  for  us  to  drag  our  ally  in  his  dispute  with 
Serbia  before  a  European  Court.") 

But  stiU  more  vital  than  the  question  why  these 
despatches  were  not  published  earlier,  and  why  they 


22  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

stand  in  such  glaring  contradiction  to  other  German 
diplomatic  Notes,  is  that  further  question :  What  re- 
ply did  Austria-Hungary  make  to  these  despatches? 
We  are  still  waiting  in  vain  for  this  document. 

There  are  here  only  two  possibilities:  Either  the 
Austrian  Government  did  not  trouble  its  head  about 
these  German  recommendations  at  all,  and  that  would 
be  a  gross  insult  to  the  allied  German  Cabinet;  or  it 
honestly  endeavoured  to  comply  with  them,  and  in 
this  case  there  exists  no  reason  for  withholding  any 
documents  w^hich  would  clearly  prove  that  to  be  the 
case.    But  such  documents  are  wanting.^ 

Consequently,  the  historical  fact  remains  that  the 
Austrian  Government  disregarded  the  advice  given 
it  from  Berlin.  If,  then,  despite  the  above  considera- 
tions, it  be  for  a  moment  assumed  that  the  genuine- 
ness of  those  despatches  has  been  proved,  i.e.^  that  the 
German  Government  did  actually,  in  the  sense  alleged, 
exercise  pressure  upon  Vienna,  then  we  are  in  this 

*The  way  In  which  the  Chancellor  juggled  with  the  facts  is 
evidenced  by  this :  that  in  his  speech  of  November  gth,  1916, 
he  dared  to  represent  No.  51  of  the  Austrian  Red  Book  (Note 
of  Count  Berchtold  to  the  Austrian  Ambassadors  at  London 
and  Petrograd)  as  being  a  reply  to  the  instructions  he  dis- 
patched to  Vienna.  But,  from  this  No.  51,  he  quoted,  wisely 
enough,  only  a  portion,  and  left  out  the  third  paragraph  alto- 
gether. From  the  third  paragraph  of  this  No.  51  it  is,  however, 
clear  that  No.  51  is  only  the  Austrian  reply  (and  a  wholly  insuffi- 
cient reply)  to  No.  84  of  the  English  Blue  Book  (proposal  for 
a  Conference  of  four  in  London),  and  can  in  no  wise  be  re- 
garded as  a  reply  to,  or  compliance  with,  the  instructions  "then" 
given  by  Berlin  to  Vienna.  (For  this  refers,  as  its  contents 
show,  to  No.  88  of  the  English  Blue  Book:  Proposal  of  the 
Powers  for  mediation  after  occupation  of  Serbian  territory  by 
Austria.) 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  23 

case  confronted  by  the  logical  deduction  that  those 
despatches  sent  to  our  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  and  \yith 
which  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor  sought  to^  jus- 
tify himself,  do,  in  fact,  the  more  seriously  incriminate 
both  him  and  his  allies.  For  since  it  is  proved  that 
Austria  refused  to  entertain  those  proposals  (tide  also 
the  above-cited  semi-official  article  of  the  Austrian 
Government  in  the  Pester  Lloyd  of  May  27th,  1916), 
there  results,  first,  clear  evidence  of  the  desire  for 
war  of  the  Austrian  Government;  and  secondly,  a  dis- 
regard of  the  advice  of  the  allied  Berlin  Cabinet,  which 
was  a  direct  insult  to  Germany.  Suppose  A.  is  al- 
lied with  B. ;  B.  enters  into  a  quarrel  with  C.  and  A. 
seriously  advises  him  not  to  exaggerate  matters,  as 
he  has  no  desire  to  make  war  on  his  account;  and 
then  B.  casts  all  this  good  advice  to  the  winds,  because 
he  has  made  up  his  mind  beforehand  ''to  go  to  no 
Conference,"  even  if  C.  has  dropped  or  suspended  his 
mobilisation.  Is  there,  in  this  case,  any  obligation 
upon  A.  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  B.  ?  Has  he  not 
rather  now  the  right  to  be  indignant  at  B.'s  obstinacy 
and  desire  for  war  and  leave  him  to  his  own  fate  ? 

Either  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor  did  seriously 
advocate  the  acceptance  of  Grey's  mediation  proposals 
in  Vienna,  in  which  case,  when  Austria  shut  her  ears, 
it  was  his  moral  duty  to  cut  adrift  from  such  a  blood- 
thirsty ally;  or,  those  despatches  were  (even  though 
genuine)  mere  make-believe. 

We  repeat:  this  Imperial  Chancellor  is  a  marvel 
in  the  world's  history.  At  least  we  cannot  recall  an- 
other example  of  a  statesman  who,  .while  striving  to 
justify  his  actions,  perpetually  incriminated  himself. 

In  his  famous  speech  of  November  9th,  1916,  the 


24  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Imperial  Chancellor  inveighed  particularly  against  the 
then  English  Minister  Grey  and  the  latter's  speech  of 
October  23rd,  1916.  After  having  in  the  way  above 
described  proved  Germany's  innocence,  it  was  a  grate- 
ful task  for  him  to  refute  Grey's  assertion,  accord- 
ing to  which  the  premature  announcement  of  the  Ger- 
man mobilisation  in  the  Lokal-Anseiger  (Berlin,  July 
30th,  19 1 4  was  an  ''Ems  telegram,"  with  which  the 
German  Government  wished  to  force  Russia  to  im- 
mediate mobilisation.  This  supposition  of  the  Eng- 
lish Minister  was  not  very  happy,  and  absolutely 
irrelevant  as  regards  assigning  the  blame  for  the  war. 
We  readily  believe  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  that 
the  German  Government  was  no  party  to  the  pre- 
mature announcement  in  the  Lokal-Anseiger.  He 
was,  therefore,  fully  entitled  to  say  '"'We  need  not  fear 
any  tribunal,"  and  to  produce  a  credible  refutation  of 
Grey's  allegation. 

This  portion  of  Grey's  speech  and  of  Bethmann 
HoUweg's  reply  was  absolutely  superfluous.  There 
have  never  been  in  the  history  of  the  world  so  many 
and  such  obvious  ''Ems  telegrams"  as  during  the 
period  from  July  23rd  till  August  5th,  1914;  Lord 
Grey  had  really,  therefore,  no  need  to  invent  another 
and  to  overlook  the  ones  actually  in  existence.  By 
an  ''Ems  telegram,"  the  people  of  Europe  were  wont 
to  understand  the  manoeuvre  which  Bismarck  invented 
in  1870,  and  which  is  exhaustively  dealt  with  in 
his  "Reflections  and  Reminiscences."  Its  chief  es- 
sentials were,  by  means  of  forged,  mutilated,  or  even 
fictitious  official  documents,  to  incite  the  opponent 
to  war,  and  win  the  approval  of  the  public  at  home 
for   a   war   already  planned.      In   order  to  be   con- 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  25 

vinced  of  the  staggering  fact  that,  in  the  period 
July  23rd-August  5th,  1914,  at  least  a  dozen  of 
such  *'Ems  telegrams"  were  concocted  and  pub- 
lished, one  need  only  take  up  any  German  or 
Austrian  paper  at  random  during  those  dark  days. 
It  was  the  aim  of  the  German  and  Austrian  Govern- 
ments, towards  the  end  of  July  and  the  beginning  of 
August,  to  persuade  the  people  that  a  manifestly  of- 
fensive war  (also  called  preventive  war)  was  a  holy  de- 
fensive w^ar,  and  thus  kindle  that  patriotic  enthusiasm 
without  which  no  modern  State  could  wage  w^ar.  This 
end  was  attained  by  numerous  ''Ems  telegrams." 

See,  for  instance,  the  "semi-official  comumniqiie'* 
of  the  Vienna  Press  Bureau  of  July  28th,  19 14 
(French  Yellow  Book  No.  75  his),  published  in  all  the 
German  and  Austrian  newspapers,  which  presented  the 
Serbian  reply,  for  popular  consumption,  in  such  a  way 
as  to  convey  that  therein  lay  a  war  challenge  to 
Austria  and  the  necessity  of  rushing  to  arms  for  the 
defence  of  the  menaced  Fatherland. 

A  similar  "Ems  telegram"  lies  before  us  in  the 
publication  of  the  Serbian  reply  in  the  columns  of 
the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitiing  of  July  29th, 
19 14.  This  announcement,  although  it  was  dated  the 
25th,  and,  at  latest,  reached  Berlin  and  Vienna  early 
on  the  26th,  w^as  only  issued  on  July  29th.  Moreover, 
it  exhibited  glosses,  which  are  absolutely  unallowable 
in  the  publication  of  such  documents.  This  means, 
then,  that  the  Serbian  reply  was  only  published  in 
Germany  after  Austria  had  already  declared  war  upon 
Serbia,  and  that  the  people  were  confronted  with  a 
fait  accompli.  And,  in  apprehension  lest  the  Serbian 
reply  should  create  a  too  favourable  impression  upon 


26  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  public,  it  was  "mutilated"  by  "glosses,"  which 
served  the  obvious  purpose  of  anticipating  the  judg- 
ment of  the  reader  and  awakening  his  belief  in  the 
villainy  and  dishonesty  of  the  Serbian  Government. 
Why  these  glosses?  What  other  purpose  did  they 
serve  than  to  disguise  the  submission  of  the  Serbian 
Government,  and  to  justify  a  declaration  of  war,  which 
from  an  impartial  reading  of  the  Serbian  reply  could 
never  for  a  moment  have  been  deemed  justifiable? 

An  *'Ems  telegram"  of  quite  a  different  character 
is  the  following  ''Official  Explanation  of  the  French 
Action,"  which  can  be  read  in  all  German  newspapers : 

"Berlin,  August  3rd  (Official  Announcement)  : 
hitherto  German  troops,  acting  under  orders,  have  not 
crossed  the  French  frontier.  On  the  other  hand,  since 
yesterday,  French  forces  have,  without  declaration  of 
war,  attacked  our  frontier  posts.  Although  the  French 
Government,  only  a  few  days  ago,  agreed  to  the  keep- 
ing of  a  neutral  zone  of  10  kilometres,  they  have  at 
various  points  crossed  the  German  Frontier.  French 
companies  yesterday  occupied  German  villages,  bomb- 
ing aeroplanes  made  their  appearance  over  Baden  and 
Bavaria,  violated  Belgium's  neutrality  by  crossing  her 
territory,  penetrated  into  the  Rhine  Province  and  at- 
tempted to  wreck  our  railways.  France  has  thus  first 
made  an  attack  upon  us.  The  safety  of  the  realm  de- 
mands counter  measures.  The  Emperor  has  issued  the 
necessary  orders.  The  German  Ambassador  in  Paris 
has  been  notified  to  demand  his  passports." 

Here  we  have  no  longer  to  deal  with  a  pure  interpre- 
tation and  mutilation  of  official  documents,  as  in  the 
two  previous  cases,  but  (as  we  positively  know  to-day) 
with  a  sheer  invention.    Every  German  of  those  days 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  27 

was  accustomed  blindly  to  believe  the  "official 
announcements"  of  his  Government ;  on  reading  in  all 
the  newspapers  and  learning  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  (Reichstag  sitting  of  August  4th) 
that  'Trance  had  actually  attacked  us,"  he  rushed  to 
arms,  in  holy  indignation,  for  the  defence  of  his  Fath- 
erland. The  object  of  this  *Tms  telegram"  had  been 
brilliantly  attained.  But  for  the  facts  asserted  in  it 
the  German  Government  does  not  only  not  produce  a 
tittle  of  evidence,  but  has,  on  the  contrary,  even  fur- 
nished a  refutation  of  its  own  assertions  {znde  the 
above-cited  notification  from  the  Chief  Magistrate  of 
Nuremberg  of  April  3rd,  19 16). 

We,  who  without  prejudice  and  passion  only  serve 
historical  truth  and  have  all  the  documentary  evidence 
of  those  days  at  our  disposal,  cannot  understand  why 
the  statesmen  of  the  countries  then  leagued  against 
Germany  made  subsidiary  episodes,  like  the  premature 
special  edition  of  the  Lokal-Anzeiger,  a  subject  of  long 
discussion,  instead  of  drawing  the  attention  of  the 
German  Imperial  Chancellor  to  these  and  similar  "Ems 
telegrams."  After  twenty-seven  months  of  war,  peo- 
ple on  both  sides  finally  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that 
the  conditions  of  peace  must  be  made  dependent  upon 
the  allocation  of  the  blame  for  the  war.  Happily,  both 
Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  and  the  whole  German 
Press  associated  themselves  with  this  point  of  view  and 
declared  themselves  ready  to  co-operate  towards  a 
reasonable  answer  anent  this  question  of  liability. 
Under  these  circumstances,  there  ought  to  have  been 
but  one  question  for  the  statesmen  of  the  Quadruple 
Alliance  to  propound  to  the  German  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor :  with  what  tangible,  legally  provable  and  proven 


28  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

facts  can  the  German  Government  maintain  that  it 
was  "actually  attacked"?  By  what  valid  documents 
can  it  show  that  those  "official  announcements"  of  the 
German  and  Austrian  Governments,  which  we  consider 
to  be  "Ems  telegrams,"  were,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  no 
"Ems  telegrams"  at  all?  If  it  could  be  indisputably 
shown  to  us  that  Germany  was,  in  fact,  "actually 
attacked"  and  is  now  waging  a  defensive  war,  then  we 
are  prepared  to  suit  our  conditions  of  peace  to  this 
fact,  and  to  conclude  a  peace  that  will  in  future  secure 
Germany  from  similar  attacks. 

And  if,  on  the  other  hand,  Herr  von  Bethmann 
Hollweg  "had  to  fear  no  tribunal"  and  was  at  the 
same  time  of  opinion  that  the  apportionment  of  the 
blame  (which  would  have  to  be  determined  by  the 
evidence  of  the  twelve  critical  days)  must  be  a  con- 
dition preliminary  to  the  opening  of  peace  negotia- 
tions, why  did  he  not  anticipate  such  questions  and 
insinuations?  Why  did  he  (just  like  his  antagonists) 
discuss  only  the  side  and  single  issues  of  those  eventful 
twelve  days  ? 

Offensive  or  defensive  war  ?  That  is  here  the  ques- 
tion. It  cannot  be  answered  by  general  assertions,  but 
only  by  historically  provable  or  proven  facts.  Thus, 
either  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  must  furnish  the 
evidence  that  those  "official  announcements"  (and 
his  speech  in  the  Reichstag  of  August  4th)  were  no 
"Ems  telegrams,"  but  incontestably  truthful  presenta- 
tions of  facts  ....  then,  we  should  be  in  a  position 
to  examine  further  how  far  his  statement  (that  Ger- 
many had  been  maliciously  assailed)  is  correct.  Or, 
supposing  he  does  not  adduce  this  actual  evidence 
(and,  unhappily,  he  has  not  yet  done  so),  then  it  is 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  29 

clear  that  those  "official  announcements"  were  pure  fic- 
tions, which  could  only  serve  one  purpose,  viz.,  to  rep- 
resent to  the  German  people  a  palpable  war  of  aggres- 
sion as  a  defensive  war.  But  if  this  is  proved  (and  it 
is  proved  to-day),  then  everything  the  German  Impe- 
rial Chancellor  has  told  me  about  the  Russian  general 
mobilisation,  of  his  endeavours  to  exercise  pressure  ■ 
in  Vienna  in  favour  of  peace,  etc.,  etc.,  is  invalidated 
and  hardly  deserves  any  further  refutation. 

From  the  mass  of  diplomatic  and  generally  historical 
testimony  that  lies  before  us  to-day  (as  it  did  also  then) 
there  emerges  the  incontrovertible  certainty  that  this 
terrible  war  was  not  fate  and  necessity,  but  design  and 
will,  and  by  no  manner  of  means  a  holy  war  of  defence 
on  the  part  of  Germany  against  foreign  aggression. 

A  careful  study  of  the  German  literature  of  those 
days  has,  moreover,  forced  upon  us  the  conviction  that 
Germany  waged  a  palpable  war  of  conquest.  We  leave 
entirely  aside  the  historical  fact  that  Prussia  has  never 
fought  a  victorious  campaign  without  acquisition  in 
land  or  money.  Although  this  is  a  peculiarity  which 
Prussia  shares  with  no  other  State,  it  is  not  adduced 
here  by  way  of  evidence.  But  if,  as  was  the  case  in 
the  World  War,  an  ''actually  assailed"  country,  simul- 
taneously with  its  protestations  that  it  had  been 
grievously  attacked,  brings  out  enormous  annexation 
projects,  which  find  enthusiastic  support  among  the 
people  and  the  open  support  of  its  leading  statesmen, 
that  is,  to  some  degree,  a  serious  matter.  Whoever, 
like  the  German  philosophers  and  politicians  in  those 
days,  speaks  in  the  same  breath  of  defence  and  con- 


30  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

quest,  is  manifestly  using  the  theory  of  defence  only 
as  a  subterfuge. 

Scarcely  had  the  first  blows  been  delivered  upon 
unhappy  Belgium  than  the  most  influential  persons  in 
Germany  began  to  demand  its  annexation.  The  first 
thirty  months  of  the  World  War  had,  it  is  true,  to  a 
certain  extent  run  in  favour  of  Germany,  but,  for  good 
reasons,  the  German  Government  had  prohibited  the 
discussion  of  her  war  aims.  Firstly,  she  could  not,  by 
making  known  her  projects  of  conquest,  stamp  her 
elaborately  constructed  fable  of  a  war  of  defence  as 
pure  fiction;  secondly,  she  realised  fully  that  the  war 
was  not  at  an  end,  and  that  Germany,  if  the  first  at- 
tempt miscarried,  would  never  be  in  a  position  to  an- 
nex anything  whatsoever.  It  was  no  use.  The  more 
the  German  specious  successes  increased,  the  louder 
became  the  clamour  that  the  miserable  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor should  allow  the  discussion  of  the  war  aims. 
And  as  the  most  elementary  wisdom  compelled  him  to 
silence,  because  the  bear,  whose  skin  the  agitators  were 
in  their  assurance  of  victory  continually  dividing,  was 
as  yet  not  killed,  they  accused  and  abused  him  in  the 
vilest  manner.  It  was  both  a  ludicrous  and  a  shameful 
spectacle  that  Germany  then  presented  to  the  world. 

The  German  people  thought  it  was  waging  a  holy 
and  defensive  war  against  a  ruthless  attack  by  the 
**Land  Partition  Syndicate"  (so  the  Triple  Entente 
was  styled  in  Germany),  and  had  to  look  on  for  two 
whole  years  (as  long  as  the  war  conditions  were  fa- 
vourable for  Germany)  while  new  land  partition  syndi- 
cates were  daily  being  formed  in  Germany.  Some 
dreamed  of  a  ^'Greater  Germany,"  extending  from 
Antwerp  to  Bagdad ;  others  of  the  ^'emancipation"  of 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  31 

the  Flemings,  Baits,  Poles  and  Letts ;  others  of  the  ap- 
propriation of  rich  coal  and  iron  mines  in  the  North  of 
France,  of  the  French  colonies  in  North  Africa,  of  a 
sea-controlling  German  world  empire,  and  many  other 
splendid  things.^  Fortunately  for  Europe  the  events 
of  the  war  finally  checked  their  greedy  appetite.  For 
had  their  plans  been  realised,  then,  instead  of  the  peace- 
ful Europe  which  we  had  known  for  fifty  years,  and 
which  we  are  striving  to  secure  for  coming  genera- 
tions with  yet  firmer  guarantees,  we  should  experience 
once  again  in  Europe  the  same  gigantic  armaments, 
the  same  policy  of  violence,  which,  to  the  distress  of  the 
nations,  has  continued  from  1871  to  1914.  For  the 
surest  way  to  bring  about  "unavoidable"  wars  is  an- 
nexation against  the  will  of  the  annexed. 


*  As  early  as  the  summer  of  1915  the  six  chief  German  Indus- 
trial Associations  (the  Farmers'  League,  the  German  Peasants' 
League,  the  Westphalian  Peasants'  Union,  the  Central  League 
of  German  Industrials,  the  Manufacturers  League,  and  the  Im- 
perial German  Middleclass  League)  demanded,  in  an  address 
to  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  the  annexation  of  Belgium,  the 
North  of  France,  the  Baltic  Provinces,  etc.,  etc.  The  address 
of  the  German  high  school  teachers  made  similar  demands.  A 
petition  of  March,  1916,  to  the  Federal  Council  ("Richtlinien 
fiir  Wege  zum  dauernden  Frieden")  demands  the  annexation 
of  Belgium,  the  "acquisition  of  a  favourable  military  frontier 
comprehending  the  for  us  indispensable  mineral  fields"  lying 
towards  France,  "the  forcing  back  of  Russia  as  far  as  ever 
possible  from  territories  not  inhabited  by  the  Great  Russians," 
the  "establishment  of  the  largest  possible  continuous  extent  of 
colonial  territory  in  Africa,"  etc.,  etc.  A  comprehensive  survey 
of  the  German  annexation  demands  is  published  by  Payot  & 
Co.,  Lausanne  ("Das  annexionistische  Deutschland,"  compiled 
by  S.  Grumbach).  The  authentic  material  condensed  into  this 
volume  is  extraordinarily  voluminous  and  enough  to  shame 
every  democratically-minded  German, 


32  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

The  schemes  of  conquest  of  the  so-called  Pan-Ger- 
manists  of  those  earlier  days  were  so  monstrous  that  a 
Minister  of  Finance  who  should  hit  upon  the  idea  of 
taxing  the  Pan-Germanist  megalomania  by  levying, 
say,  a  shilling  on  every  square  yard  of  land  those  gen- 
tlemen desired  to  annex,  could,  by  means  of  this  an- 
nexation tax,  cover  all  the  German  war  expenses  and 
make  beggars  of  Rohrbach,  Bassermann,  Chamberlain, 
Reventlow,  Harden  and  a  hundred  others. 

The  German  "victories"  of  the  first  thirty  months 
of  the  w^ar  were  needed  to  lay  clear  before  our  eyes 
the  extravagance  of  the  German  greed  of  territory. 
Certain  books,  which  advocated  the  wildest  annexation 
demands,  ran  into  editions  of  200,000  copies  and  more. 
Even  numerous  German  Socialists,  who  had  hitherto 
been  regarded  as  level-headed,  fell  victims  to  this 
disease.  People  like  Lensch,  Kolb,  Geek,  Adelung, 
Quark,  Landsberg,  Siidekum,  Heine,  Hanisch,  and 
many  other  so-called  Socialists,  cynically  spat  upon 
the  testaments  of  their  great  predecessors, — Marx  and 
Bebel — and,  like  the  crowd  of  Pan-Germanists, 
spoke  of  "frontier  readjustments,"  "safeguards  for 
our  existence,"  "guarantees  against  future  aggres- 
sion," etc.,  etc.^  At  a  time  when  the  war  had 
already  entered  upon  a  critical  stage  for  Germany, 

*In  this  strain  writes,  for  example,  the  deputy  Hanisch  (Vor- 
wdrts,  September  6th,  1916)  :  "But  as  far  as  the  much  discussed 
annexations  are  concerned,  I  have  for  my  own  part  never  made 
a  secret  of  the  fact  that,  in  the  interest  of  the  German  people 
and  especially  of  the  working  classes,  I  consider  a  considerable 
extension  of  our  frontier  lines  towards  the  East,  possibly  as 
far  as  the  Narew  line,  a  highly  desirable  war  aim."  And,  then, 
a  few  sentences  further:  "therefore  I  roundly  state  that,  in  my 
view,  the  peace  aims  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party  will  have 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  33 

royal  personages,  such  as  the  King  of  Bavaria,  in- 
fluential industrial  and  economic  societies,  leading 
newspapers  and  politicians,  incessantly  demanded,  as 
an  understood  thing,  conquests  and  an  acquisition  of 
power,  in  a  manner  which  proves  that  the  ridiculous 
and  the  barbaric  were  in  those  days  regarded  in  Ger- 
many as  the  patriotic} 

To-day,  w^hen  we  know  the  fortunately  unfortunate 
issue  of  this  war  for  Germany,  the  whole  of  this  im- 
mense mass  of  literature  does  not  merely  throw  a  woe- 
ful light  upon  the  idiocy  and  bombast  of  the  then 
spokesmen  of  the  German  nation,  but  it  is  before  all 
else,  as  already  said,  the  clearest  refutation  these  peo- 
ple have  themselves  given  of  the  ofhcial  pronouncement 
of  a  holy  defensive  war.  Anyone  who,  confronted 
with  this  vast  mass  of  Hterature,  in  which  robbery  of 
land  and  money  is  treated  as  a  perfectly  natural  result 
of  the  *'holy  defensive  war  forced  upon  us,"  can 
still  for  a  moment  entertain  any  doubts  as  to  the 
true  significance  of  this  war  must  be  scoffed  at  as  a 
simpleton. 

There  was,  at  the  time,  so  far  as  we  can  perceive, 

to  lie  more  or  less  in  the  same  direction  as  those  peace  aims 
which  the  Imperial  Chancellor  laid  down  in  his  well-known 
speech  of  December  9th,  1915,  and  later."  Similar  expressions 
of  eminent  Social  Democratic  leaders  are  to  be  found  in  the 
Sozialistische  Monatshefte,  in  the  Hamburger  Echo,  in  the 
Cheynnitzer  Volksstimme,  and  other  party  organs. 

^Even  when  the  war  situation  had  become  so  hopeless  that 
the  Imperial  Chancellor  in  his  above-cited  speech  of  November 
9th,  1916,  had  to  state  that  he  "had  never  declared  the  annexa- 
tion of  Belgium  to  be  our  intention,"  the  spokesmen  of  the 
Centre,  the  National  Liberals,  and  Conservatives  still  persisted 
that  Belgium,  politically,  militarily,  and  economically,  should 
remain  in  German  hands. 


34  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

in  the  whole  of  Germany  but  one  eminent  man, 
MaximiHan  Harden,  who  had  the  courage  openly  to 
confess  adherence  to  his  old  opinions,  that  is,  he 
called  the  long-desired  war  of  conquest  by  its  right 
name,  as  soon  as  it  had  broken  out. 

"Away  with  the  miserable  attempts  to  justify  Ger- 
many's action.  Finish  with  this  vulgar  abuse  of  our 
foes. 

"We  did  not  embark  upon  the  enormous  risk  of 
this  war  like  irresponsible  fools.  We  willed  it, 
because  we  were  obliged  and  bound  to  will  it.  May 
the  Teuton  devil  throttle  the  whiners,  whose  prayer 
for  pardon  makes  us  ridiculous  amid  the  marvels  of 
great  events.  We  do  not  stand,  we  do  not  place  our- 
selves before  the  tribunal  of  Europe.  Our  might  shall 
create  a  new  right  in  Europe.  Germany  strikes.  If 
it  conquers  new  realms  for  its  genius,  the  priesthood 
of  all  the  gods  shall  belaud  the  good  war.  We  do 
not  wage  the  war  in  order  to  punish  sinners,  nor 
to  free  enthralled  peoples  and  then  bask  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  unselfish  magnanimity.  We  wage  it 
from  the  bed-rock  of  conviction,  that  Germany,  after 
having  completed  its  task,  can  and  must  demand 
further  elbow  room  and  further  potentiality  for  de- 
velopment in  the  world.  Spain  and  the  Netherlands, 
Rome  and  Hapsburg,  France  and  England  have 
possessed,  ruled  and  colonised  vast  tracts  of  the  most 
fertile  soil.  Now  the  hour  of  German  ascendancy 
has  struck."     (Znkttnft,  October  17th,  1914). 

The  truth  is,  the  diplomatic  origin  of  this  World 
War,  the  contradictions  and  forgeries  about  the 
"actual  attack"  that  were  fabricated  and  confessed  to 
by  the  German  Government   itself,   the  voluminous 


PROBLEMS  FOR  GERMAN  HISTORIANS  35 

literature  demanding  annexations,  and  the  annexation 
craze  which  infected  the  ranks  of  the  German  So- 
ciaHsts,  compel  us  to  the  admission,  which,  though  sad- 
dening for  us  Germans,  is  yet  incontrovertibly  true, 
that  no  war  of  modern  days  has  ever  borne  the  stamp 
of  a  war  of  conquest  more  unmistakably  than  that 
which  Germany,  on  August  ist,  191 4,  embarked  upon 
against  one  half  of  the  world. 


II 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL  AND  THE  GER- 
MAN IMPERIAL  CONSTITUTION 
IN  PARTICULAR 

How  was  it  possible  that  the  German  Government 
could  conceal  from  its  people  the  true  character  of 
this  war  and,  in  the  way  we  have  delineated,  instil 
into  them  the  conviction  that  warlike  possibilities 
were  actualities,  infringements  of  rights  acts  of  self- 
defence,  and  purely  fictitious  attacks  ^'actual'*  ones? 
With  what  right  could  it  demand  the  sacrifice  of  the 
lives  of  its  citizens,  when  it  is  historically  proven 
that  the  real  causes  of  the  war,  and  the  war  aims, 
were  different  from  those  for  which  the  German  citi- 
zen was  prepared  to  lay  down  his  life?.  To  propound 
this  question  (and  it  must  be  propounded)  involves 
the  solution  of  a  problem  which,  remarkably  enough, 
has  not  hitherto  been  solved  in  Germany.  I  say  "re- 
markably," because  Germany  is  regarded  as  a  civilised 
State  of  the  first  rank;  and  because,  without  a  rea- 
sonable discussion  and  solution  of  this  problem,  it 
is  really  no  civilised  State  at  all.  Since  England, 
France,  and  Italy  led  the  way  in  the  solution  of  this 
problem,  most  of  the  other  European  States  fol- 
lowed their  example.  Even  the  small,  almost  despised 
Balkan  States  recognised  this  as  the  most  important 
of  all  political  problems,  and  each,  according  to  its 
national  individuality,  has  furnished  a  solution. 

36 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        37 

This  problem,  practically  unknown  in  Germany, 
or  in  any  event  excluded  from  any  public  discussion, 
can  be  comprehended  in  one  word :    Dynasty. 

In  my  book  ''Because  I  am  a  German,"^  I  said 
in  reference  to  the  origin  of  wars :  "War  is  never 
a  'logical  consequence'  or  a  'necessary  result';  war 
is  a  will.  Not  the  will  of  a  revengeful  God,  nor  of 
any  other  supernatural  power,  but  the  will  to  power  of 
individual  men.  .  .  .  The  exuberant  will  to  powxr  of 
the  few  individuals  who  still,  by  virtue  of  antiquated 
Constitutions,  enjoy  an  absolute  political  power:  that 
is  the  virus  of  war.  That,  and  that  alone,  has  the 
power  to  transform  the  latent  war-madness  existing 
in  certain  classes  of  the  population  into  an  acute  war 
crisis." 

It  is  clear  that  dynasties  are  hereby  intended.  As 
there  can  be  no  religion  without  gods,  no  art  without 
ideals,  in  like  manner  there  can  be  no  wars^  without 
dynasties.  Dynasties  are  the  gods  of  wars  and  the 
spirit  of  a  warlike  thought  in  the  world.  ''Cherchez 
la  femme,"  said  Dumas  relative  to  the  investigation 
of  the  cause  of  crime.  ''Cherchez  la  dynastie!"  one 
must  exclaim  to  all  those  who  are  seeking  the  true 
causes  of  wars. 

The  whole  world  instinctively  feels  that  there  Is 
an  intimate  correlation  between  dynasty  and  war,  but 

M Constable  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  London;  E.  P.  Button  &  Co.,  New- 
York,  p.  123.] 

^  The  notion  *'war"  is  in  this  book  intended  to  mean  a  bloody 
conflict  between  whole  nations.  This  notion  of  war  naturally, 
therefore,  presupposes  the  existence  and  the  full  employment 
of  the  general  obligations  for  national  defence.  Civil  and 
colonial  wars  do  not  come  within  the  compass  of  our  argu- 
ment. 


38  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

hitherto  this  instinctive  feeling  in  mankind  has  never 
found  clear  and  practical  expression.  And  for  simple 
and  readily  intelligible  reasons.  For  since  dynasties 
are  at  once  both  lawgivers  and  judges  in  their  own 
cause,  and  dispose,  moreover,  of  powerful  armies, 
all  pacific,  scientific,  and  philosophical  investigations 
on  this  topic  are  only  permitted  so  long  as  they  do 
not  run  counter  to  the  interests  of  the  dynasties.  But 
as  the  investigation  of  political  truth  is  altogether 
against  the  interests  of  dynasties,  this  may  well  be 
the  reason  why  the  otherwise  so  versatile  German 
scholars  and  politicians  have  until  now  avoided  an 
unprejudiced  approach  to  this  problem.  Particularly 
lamentable  is,  in  this  connection,  the  fact  that  most 
German  ''scientific"  pacifists  in  many,  far  too  many, 
books  have  spoken  about  the  causes  of  wars,  without 
uttering  a  single  word  about  dynasties.  We  shall 
recur  later  to  this  peculiarity. 

First,  what  is  a  dynasty? 

The  word  comes  from  the  Greek  and  means  power- 
wielder,  ruler.  In  the  Greek  political  system,  those 
were  called  dynasts  who  had  by  an  act  of  violence 
gained  possession  of  the  government.  In  modern 
speech,  we  understand  by  dynasties  ruling  families, 
who  preside  over  the  destinies  of  a  country,  whose 
sovereign  right  is  vouched  for  by  the  gods  of  the 
Christian,  heathen,  or  Mahomedan  faith,  as  being 
hereditary  and  absolute;  and,  thus,  can  neither  be 
impugned  by  human  powers,  nor  in  any  way  compared 
with  other  human  institutions. 

The  dynasties  arose  and  are  based  upon  the  national 
necessity  of  defence  and  leadership.  Everywhere  in 
history  they  crop  up,  first  as  protectors,  liberators, 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        39 

or  fortunate  conquerors,  then  as  the  anointed  of  the 
Lord,  and,  finally,  as  tyrants  and  oppressors.  The 
history  of  every  dynasty  begins  with  popular  en- 
thusiasm and  ends  with  popular  revolt.  It  is  the  his- 
tory that  the  Brothers  Grimm  have  so  dramatically 
described  in  the  legend  of  Frau  Ilsebill:  the  ever- 
lasting story  of  growing  arrogance  which  ends  in  a 
catastrophe. 

Among  primitive  peoples,  who  have  no  legal  or 
political  organisation,  and  who  love  personal  liberty 
beyond  all  else,  their  leaders  were  mostly  chosen  only 
for  the  period  of  the  war,  and  afterwards  again  lost 
their  power.  But  when  the  primitive  peoples  came 
to  settle  down,  and  began  to  exhibit  political  and 
national  cohesion,  then  their  leaders,  who  had  been 
victorious  in  war,  retained  their  position  in  time  of 
peace.  They  exercised,  mostly  in  conjunction  with 
the  medicine  man  and  the  elders  of  the  tribe,  author- 
ity over  their  companions;  and  their,  ruling  rights 
gradually  usurped  all  spheres.  When  such  leaders 
were  not  merely  strong  and  successful  as  warriors, 
but  also  shrewd  as  lawgivers,  and  gifted  with  or- 
ganising faculties  and  generally  ambitious,  they 
gradually  ousted  the  medicine  man,  made  themselves 
sorcerers  and  priests,  proclaimed  themselves  prophets 
of  God,  and  exercised  a  despotic  power,  which  was 
the  more  unlimited  the  more  arrogantly  they  asserted 
themselves,  the  more  absolutely  they  obtained  the  sym- 
pathies of  the  leading  men  of  the  tribe,  and  the  more 
superstitious  the  race  became.  So  Moses  was  not 
only  the  chief  war  lord  of  the  Jews,  but  was  at  the 
same  time  a  lawgiver  who  had  intercourse  with  God 
Himself. 


40  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Their  descent  from  and  intercourse  with  the  Divin- 
ity are  the  essential  characteristics  of  every  dynasty. 
Gods  and  kings  are  colleagues.  The  kings  stand 
either,  as  was  formerly  the  case  among  the  Chinese, 
in  direct  kinship  with  the  Divinity  and  call  them- 
selves sons  of  Heaven,  or  they  style  themselves,  as 
is  the  case  to-day  in  Germany,  "by.  the  grace  of 
God"  and  exercise  their  functions  as  the  chosen  in- 
struments of  Heaven  (speech  of  William  11,,  August 
25th,  1910).  As  is  their  descent,  so  also  are  their 
powers  of  a  divine  nature.  Among  the  Incas,  they 
caused  the  sun  to  rise;  in  the  case  of  the  Egyptians 
and  Persians,  they  held  sway  over  all  the  good  and 
evil  spirits  of  heaven  and  earth;  among  the  Chinese, 
they  controlled  even  the  degree  of  bliss  after  death, 
and,  among  us  Germans,  the  Lord  of  Hosts  is  the 
annihilator  of  our  enemies  (speech  of  William  11., 
June  5th,  19 16,  at  Bremerhaven). 

Somewhat  unscientifically,  but  with  psychological 
subtlety,  Anatole  France  describes  in  his  'Tenguin 
Island"  the  origin  of  kingship  and  the  nation  of  sov- 
ereignty. An  intelligent  man  disguised  himself  as  a 
dragon,  and,  as  such,  terrified  the  inhabitants  of  the 
surrounding  villages,  stole  their  cattle  at  night,  and 
exercised  an  uncanny  reign  of  terror  over  the  dis- 
trict. But  as  his  dark,  illegal  existence  began  after 
a  while  to  displease  him,  he  hit  upon  the  brilliant 
idea  of  regularising  it.  Accordingly  he  made  his  ac- 
complices among  the  people  ventilate  the  idea  that  the 
dragon  was  a  bewitched  god  which  could  only  be  de- 
stroyed, that  is,  set  free,  by  a  virgin.  He  then  ar- 
ranged a  theatrical  display  with  the  said  virgin,  who 
thereupon  slays  this  dragon  in  the  open  and  finally 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        41 

frees  the  country  .from  the  beast.  The  dragon  here- 
upon adopted  human  form  and  declared  itself  a  higher 
Being.  In  consequence,  that  which  he  formerly  stole 
was  henceforth  brought  him  as  tribute  by  the  grate- 
ful inhabitants  of  the  liberated  district.  Thus  he 
became  king,  surrounded  his  majesty,  which  had  been 
hallowed  by  a  virgin,  with  the  indispensable  safe- 
guards, provided  for  his  children  by  making  his  dig- 
nity hereditary,  and  ruled,  beloved  of  all,  until  his 
blissful  end. 

If  we  leave  antiquity  aside  and  confine  ourselves 
to  the  Christian  era,  we  can  also  set  up  for  dynasties 
a  "theory  of  declension,"  similar  to  that  taught  by 
Marx  in  the  realm  of  economics.  When  the  victory 
of  Christendom  and  the  migration  of  nations  had 
shattered  heathen  civilisation  into  fragments,  there 
ensued  a  long  period  of  lawlessness  and  arbitrary  rule 
in  Europe.  Every  rich,  strong  and  adventurous 
chieftain,  patrician,  prince  of  his  Church,  landowner 
or  bandit  leader,  possessed  the  possibility  of  being 
able  by  force,  cunning,  marriage,  or  inheritance,  to 
obtain  for  himself  by  violence  the  absolute  lordship 
over  a  territory  and  its  inhabitants;  that  is,  to  found 
a  dynasty.  The  early  centuries  of  the  Christian  era 
were  dominated  by  the  struggles  of  these  numerous 
dynasties  for  the  hegemony.  Of  course,  in  these 
struggles,  the  small  man  had  to  give  way  to  the  big, 
and  many  a  proud  emissary  of  God  had  to  atone  for 
his  dream  of  power  in  the  dungeons  of  a  stronger 
emissary  of  God.  Well  into  the  eleventh  century 
the  royal  dignity  in  Europe  was,  in  consequence  of 
the  numerous  competitors,  who  were  to  be  found 
in  every  feudal  castle,  neither  surrounded  by  special 


42  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

protective  laws,  nor  yet  hereditary.  The  king  was 
elected ;  and,  in  many  instances,  this  election  required 
not  merely  the  consent  of  the  princes,  the  nobiUty, 
and  the  clergy,  but  of  the  people  also. 

The  first  country  in  which  the  royal  title  became 
hereditary  and  absolute,  and  in  which  accordingly  the 
lesser  princes  gradually  declined  in  favour  of  the 
greater,  was  France.  The  Merovingians,  by  dint  of 
fierce  struggles  against  the  small  dynasties  and  the 
nobility,  laid  so  securely  the  foundations  of  the  king- 
ship, that  their  heirs,  the  Capets,  became  the  first, 
in  every  sense  the  all-powerful,  dynasty  in  Europe. 
Their  originally  beneficent  activity  (the  unification  of 
the  nation,  the  laying  of  the  first  foundations  of  a 
system  of  organised  administration,  etc.)  soon  de- 
veloped into  disaster  for  the  country  and  found,  in 
the  French  Revolution,  its  inglorious  end.  In  the 
rest  of  Europe,  as,  for  instance,  in  Italy  and  Ger- 
many, the  division  of  the  dynastic  power  remained. 
A  thousand  and  one  dynasties  vied  w4th  each  other 
for  the  pre-eminence.  The  endeavours  of  the  Haps- 
burgs  and  the  Hohenstaufens  to  found  a  world  power 
suffered  shipwreck  on  the  rocks  of  resistance  of  the 
Papal  and  the  minor  German  dynasties,  as  did  the 
struggles  for  world  dominion  of  the  Papacy  and  the 
struggles  for  independent  sovereignty  of  the  minor 
dynasties  on  the  resistance  of  the  German  Empire. 
But,  after  the  Reformation,  and  particularly  after 
the  introduction  of  the  universal  German  'Teace,"  we 
perceive  both  in  Germany  and  Italy  the  gradual  de- 
clension of  the  minor  dynasties. 

In  France,  it  is  true,  for  the  first  time  in  modern 
history,  the  divinity  and  infallibility  of  dynasties  be- 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        43 

came  jeopardised  by  a  revolt  of  the  national  con- 
science, but  this  revolution  only  prepared  the  way  for 
the  new  dynastic  star  of  first  magnitude,  which,  with 
Napoleon's  advent,  arose  in  the  European  sky.  Ac- 
cordingly, at  the  dawn  of  the  nineteenth  century,  five 
powerful  dynasties  altogether  held  sway  over  the  Eu- 
ropean Continent  and  its  inhabitants :  Bonaparte  in 
France,  Italy,  etc.,  the  Hohenzollerns  in  Prussia,  the 
Hapsburgs  in  Austria-Hungary,  the  Romanoffs  in 
Russia,  and  the  Osmanlis  in  Turkey.  The  Hohen- 
zollerns had,  since  the  battle  of  Fehrbellin  (1675) 
shown  themselves  powerful,  adventurous  conquerors. 
They  clearly  understood  how  continually  to  add  to 
their  possessions,  to  equip  them  with  a  new  culture 
and  rule  them  with  economy.  Since  1701  they  had 
become  kings  by  the  grace  of  God,  although  the  then 
holder  of  all  divine  authority,  the  Pope,  had  with- 
held from  them  his  blessing.  With  Frederick  II.  the 
Hohenzollern  dynasty  had  become  a  respected  power 
in  Germany  and  even  in  Europe.  As  early  as  181 3 
the  decline  of  the  other  German  dynasties  had  pro- 
ceeded so  far  that  the  German  races  vehemently  clam- 
oured for  a  centralisation  of  the  supreme  power 
under  the  leadership  of  the  Hohenzollerns.  The  dy- 
nasty of  the  Hapsburgs  opposed  this  German  national 
desire,  which,  as  we  know,  was  only  prepared  and 
realised  by  the  defeat  of  the  House  of  Hapsburg  in 
1866,  and  in  1870-71  by  the  crushing  of  the  Bona- 
partes. 

To-day  there  are  still  three  powerful  dynasties  in 
Europe  which,  despite  all  the  revolutions,  inventions, 
and  progress  of  the  last  century,  still  wield  nearly  all 
the  divine  privileges  and  powers  of  the  absolute  dy- 


44  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

nasties  of  antiquity.  These  are,  first,  the  Hohenzol- 
lerns,  who,  in  consequence  of  their  brilHant  victories 
and  their  first-class  army,  are,  no  doubt,  at  present 
the  most  powerful  dynasty  in  Europe ;  next,  the  Haps- 
burgs,  who,  by  reason  of  their  defeats  of  1866  and 
their  attitude  in  this  World  Wslv,  are  still  more  or  less 
dependent  upon  the  Hohenzollerns ;  and  thirdly,  the 
Romanoffs,  at  once  Emperors  and  Popes,  the 
wealthiest  persons  and  the  greatest  landowners  in  the 
world.  As  a  fourth,  one  might  mention  the  Osmanlis. 
But  their  sovereignty  has  been  so  much  diminished 
in  the  last  century  that  they  can  be  regarded  as  a 
dynasty  and  Great  Power  of  the  second  class  only. 

In  order  to  obviate  any  misapprehension,  I  must 
emphasise  here  that  wherever  in  this  work  ''dynasties" 
are  spoken  of,  only  these  three,  or  at  most  four,  are 
intended :  the  Hohenzollerns,  the  Hapsburgers,  the 
Romanoffs,  and  the  Osmanlis.  The  remaining  Euro- 
pean dynasties,  as,  for  instance,  that  of  Brunswick- 
Liineburg-Hanover,  which  rules  over  England,  or  that 
of  Savoy,  which  holds  sway  over  Italy,  we  exclude,  in 
this  book,  from  the  denotation  "dynasty,"  because,  in 
one  form  or  another,  they  stand  under  the  control  of 
popular  parliaments — that  is,  they  are  no  longer 
equipped  with  the  same  divine  and  absolute  attributes 
as  their  four  above-mentioned  colleagues.  Seeing  that 
the  dynasties  ruling  over  England,  Italy,  Spain, 
Sweden,  etc.,  no  longer  possess  the  divine  right  of 
deciding  upon  war  and  peace,  it  follows  that  the  word 
"dynasty"  can  only  here  be  applied  to  those  Great 
Power  Governments  that  stand  under  no  popular  con- 
trol and  have  only  to  be  responsible  to  Almighty  God 
for  their  actions. 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        45 

Again,  I  should  wish  here  to  emphasise  expressly 
that,  in  this  book,  the  word  ''dynasty"  is  not  con- 
fined to  single  individuals  and  direct  relations  of  the 
ruling  houses.  It  is  rather  applicable  to  all  those 
who,  in  conjunction  with  these  "God-appointed" 
rulers,  ordain  the  destinies  of  a  people.  Thus,  wher- 
ever I  employ  the  word  ''dynasty,"  an  "oligarchy"  or 
a  "camarilla"  can  be  equally  substituted.  As  I  have 
never  lived  at  the  Court  of  an  absolute  ruler,  and 
cannot,  therefore,  know  whether  this  or  the  other  gov- 
ernmental act  was  ordained  by  an  oligarchy  (that  is 
to  say,  to  suit  a  privileged  class)  or  by  a  camarilla 
(that  is  to  say,  by  influential  favourites  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  the  throne),  the  expression  "dynasty" 
appears  to  me  to  fit  best  the  purpose  of  this  investiga- 
tion in  every  case. 

For  the  persons  of  the  rulers  are,  of  course,  of 
divine  origin  and  fulfil  the  wishes  of  Providence  upon 
earth,  yet,  all  the  same,  they  are  not  omnipotent  and 
omnipresent  as  is  the  Deity. 

For  instance,  such  a  rare  consummation  of  dynastic 
universality  as  William  II.  could  not  be  content  merely 
to  rule.  William  II.  is,  to  be  sure,  at  once  Imperial 
Chancellor  and  Chief  of  the  General  StafY,  Bishop  of 
the  State  Church  and  clergyman  in  ofSce,  a  final  au- 
thority in  all  matters  of  science  and  art,  an  expert 
in  industry,  trade,  agriculture,  education,  sport,  archi- 
tecture, etc.,  etc.;  he  is  present  at  every  laying  of  a 
foundation  stone,  christening  of  a  ship,  dedication  of 
a  church,  statue,  or  barrack;  musical  festivals,  exhi- 
bitions, automobile  and  horse  races  are  for  him  not 
merely  recreations,  but  also  opportunities  for  the  de- 
livery of  speeches  displaying  his  expert  knowledge  of 


46  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  subject  In  question ;  he  is  constantly  arousing  the 
unbounded  admiration  of  his  associates,  because,  just 
where  he  might  naturally  have  been  expected  to  appear 
merely  as  a  layman,  he  reveals  himself  an  expert  au- 
thority and  critic;  yet,  none  the  less,  in  a  huge  coun- 
try like  Germany,  he  cannot  overlook  and  arrange 
everything  exactly  in  accordance  with  his  views.  Like 
all  his  colleagues  by  the  grace  of  God,  he  therefore 
requires  ministers,  officials,  advisers,  courtiers,  to 
whom  he,  wholly  or  partially,  transfers  his  authority, 
and  who  administer  the  country  in  his  name. 

In  this  way,  around  the  sun  of  dynastic  power, 
circles  an  aristocratic  satellite  class  of  wielders  of 
arbitrary  power,  who,  either  in  conjunction  with  the 
sovereign  lord,  or  by  intrigues  and  the  pursuit  of 
personal  interests  contrary  to  the  will  of  the  ruler, 
govern  land  and  people  according  to  their  own  fancy. 
''The  patricians  formed  a  class  of  a  higher  order; 
they  were  descended  from  the  gods,  and  were  alone 
capable  of  performing  the  religious  ceremonies  and 
observing  the  omens  correctly,  and,  hence,  were 
ordained  by  the  grace  of  God  to  rule  the  masses."^ 
So  it  was  in  ancient  Rome,  according  to  Prof.  Del- 
briick's  description,  and  so  it  is  still  to-day  in  modern 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  and  Russia ;  save  and  ex- 
cept that  we  do  not  in  the  modern  Germany  of  these 
days  speak  any  longer  of  patricians,  but  of  Junkers. 

It  certainly  frequently  happened  (as  lately  in  Ser- 
bia)  that  a  dynasty,  in  this  way,  quietly  reared  up 

*  Prof .  Hans  Delbriick:  "Regierung  und  Volkswille"  (Berlin, 
1913.  P-  96).  This  description  by  Delbriick  contains  the  precise 
definition  of  what  I,  in  this  book,  mean  by  "dynasty."  The 
reader  should  not  overlook  that. 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        47 

another  side  by  side  with  itself,  which,  as  soon  as  it 
felt  itself  strong  enough,  in  its  turn  asserted  its  divine 
rights,  ousted  the  first,  and  put  itself  in  its  place. 
The  normal  course  of  development  was,  however,  as 
a  rule,  this :  that  the  rulers  had,  in  the  stress  of  affairs, 
to  abandon  something  of  their  power.  Thus  arose 
the  very  varied  forms  of  ancient  and  modern  po- 
litical systems;  from  the  despotism  of  x\siatic  States, 
in  which  the  person  of  the  sovereign  is  so  hallowed 
that  no  mortal  eye  may  gaze  upon  it,  and  where  his 
representatives  are  the  sole  rulers  in  the  land,  down 
to  the  feudal  monarchy,  which  has  a  parliamentary 
constitution  and  ministers  appointed  by  the  Crown. 
\\'hen  the  dynasties  were  not  always  happy  in  their 
warlike  adventures  and  consequently  lost  in  prestige,- 
or  when  they,  despite  their  divinity,  showed  them- 
selves too  human,  i.e.,  too  egoistical,  a  conflict  arose 
between  dynasty  and  people  (the  latter,  according  to 
the  characteristics  of  land  and  people,  now  imploring, 
then  demanding,  and  finally  in  open  revolt),  and  be- 
came a  Mene  Tekel  for  the  dynasties.  After  the 
Greeks,  who,  in  many  matters,  attained  a  degree  of 
perfection  unknown  to  us  of  these  days,  had  given 
to  the  world  the  first  examples  of  pure  popular  gov- 
ernment, we  nowhere  find  the  idea  of  popular  govern- 
ment entirely  disappear.  It  existed  in  both  Athens 
and  Rome  in  the  beginnings  of  Christendom  and  dur- 
ing the  peasant  and  religious  wars  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
till  finally  at  the  French  Revolution  it  animated  a 
whole  nation  and,  with  spontaneous  force,  substituted 
the  modern  State  principle  of  a  sovereign  nation,  that 
is,  the  government  of  the  people  by  the  people,  for 
dynastic  divinity  and  absolutism.     Almost  all  Euro- 


48  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

pean  dynasties  at  those  times  rushed  to  arms  against 
this  attack  on  their  divine  privileges/  but  they  were 
only  so  far  successful  in  that  their  attacks  upon  the 
new  secular-republican  State  ideal  aided  the  birth 
of  the  new  dynasty  of  the  Bonapartes,  the  activity  of 
which  filled  the  beginning  and  the  middle  of  last  cen- 
tury with  wars,  victories  and  defeats,  and,  finally,  re~ 
suited  in  the  European  dynasties  (with  the  exception 
of  Russia)  being  compelled  to  accept  the  principle  of 
participation  in  government  by  the  people. 

So  after  a  thousand  birth  pangs,  and  against  the 
will  of  the  gods,  the  modern  legal  State  arose  upon 
earth,  one  possessing  a  constitution  and  conceding  to 
the  people,  in  one  or  other  form,  an  influence  upon 
the  Government.  But  only  in  France,  and  earlier 
still  in  England,  was  this  victory  of  the  democratic 
idea  a  veritable  one.  In  other  countries,  the  dynasties 
overcame  the  revolutionary  reaction,  only  ostensibly 
accommodated  themselves  to  the  new  demands  of  a 
new  epoch,  and  remained  what  they  had  hitherto 
been,  divine,  absolute  and  hereditary.  To-day,  as  we 
have  said,  we  have  in  Europe  three  or  four  dynasties, 
whose  absolute  powers,  compared  with  the  pre-revo- 

*The  well-known  German  historian,  Heinrich  von  Sybel,  cer- 
tainly considers  that  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution  were 
no  crusades  on  the  part  of  the  dynasties  against  the  modern 
idea  of  popular  sovereignty,  but,  on  the  contrary,  propaganda- 
and  conquest-wars  of  the  then  all-powerful  Girondist  party. 
But  Herr  von  Sybel  is  like  most  other  German  historians  in 
that,  in  consequence  of  having  been  appointed  an  acting  Prus- 
sian Privy  Councillor,  he  knew  how  to  make  out  a  case  for  the 
dynasties.  That  he  and  his  official  colleagues  were  not  per- 
mitted to  give  any  other  account  we  can  but  regret,  but  cannot 
help. 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        49 

lutionary  period,  have  changed  at  most  in  form,  but 
not  in  actuality. 

*  *  *  *  * 

That  the  Hohenzollern   dynasty   is  to  be  classed 
among  these  will  be  indignantly  denied  by  most  of 
my  countrymen.    If  you  dare  tell  an  average  German 
that  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty  to-day  rules  Germany 
almost  as  absolutely  as,    for  example,   Louis   XIV. 
in  his  day  did  France,  then  if  he  is  polite   he  will 
calmly  smile  in  a  condescending  way  and,   from  the 
height  of  his  political  satisfaction,  give  you  to  under- 
stand that  you  would  do  better  not  to  discuss  mat- 
ters  of  which  you  are  so  utterly  ignorant.     First,  for 
example,  in  our  case,  the  King  is  not  absolute,  but- 
constitutional — that   means   that   his   arbitrariness   is 
held  in  check  by  Parliament,  House  of  Lords,  Federal 
Council  and  Imperial  Diet.     Secondly,  in  the  opinion 
of  our  average  German,  pure  parliamacntary  govern- 
ment, such  as  France,  England,  Italy,  etc.,  possess,  is 
a  "matter  long  since  settled,"  since  it  only  leads  to 
corruption  and  faction;  it  is  just  because  Germany 
does  not  possess  this  sort  of  parliamentarism  that  it 
has  been  enabled  to  develop  itself  into  the  most  pro- 
gressive of  all  civiHsed  countries.     And,  finally,  that 
sort  of  system  does  not  fit  in  everywhere;  that  which 
all  civilised  nations  regard  as  the  basis  of  their  po- 
litical systems  does  not  suit  the  peculiarity  of  German 
civilisation. 

In  this  fashion,  our  average  German  w^ill  prove  to 
you,  with  a  thousand  good  reasons,  that  our  country 
has  the  most  ideal  of  Constitutions,  the  most  united 
policy,  the  grandest  ideal  of  civilisation,  and  many 


so  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

other  things,  which  other  nations  so  much  begrudge 
us  that  we  must  declare  war  upon  them. 

But  if,  in  an  attack  of  pardonable  malice,  you  go 
further  and  tell  your  average  German  that  Germany, 
constitutionally  regarded,  is  no  nation  at  all,  but  is 
only  a  dynasty,  which  accordingly  means  that  the 
German  Fatherland  does  not  belong  to  the  German 
people,  then,  if  he  has  been  hitherto  polite,  he  will 
begin  to  be  rude  and  wrathful.  Have  not  we  Ger- 
mans the  finest  freedom  of  the  press,  of  speech,  meet- 
ing, coalition  and  religion  in  the  whole  wide  world? 
Where  is  there  another  State  in  existence  that  has 
democratised  education  in  a  way  such  as  we  have? 
Where  is  there  a  better  organised'  national  army, 
where  a  more  efficient  school  system  or  a  more  equi- 
table system  of  taxation  to  be  found?  Have  we  not, 
in  the  realm  of  science,  commerce,  social  legislation, 
public  sanitation,  and  many  other  things,  become  the 
pioneers  of  the  world?  A\'hat  have  all  these  German 
achievements  to  do  with  the  form  of  the  German 
government?  Nothing  whatsoever;  they  exist  and 
develop  in  the  sight  of  all  in  complete  independence 
of  the  dynastic  government.  At  length,  this  defensive 
speech  of  our  average  German  will  become  so  elo- 
quent that  he  himself,  without  intending  it,  will  stand 
before  you  as  a  living  proof  of  the  fact  that  modern 
Germany  actually  finds  its  embodiment  in  a  dynasty. 
As  often  as  I  have  discussed  this  same  theme  with 
my  countrymen  I  have  excited  their  contradiction  and 
wrath.  You  can  talk  calmly  with  a  Russian,  a  Turk, 
or  an  Asiatic  about  his  dynasty,  but  hardly  ever  with 
a  German.  If  he  is  not  altogether  speechless  with 
amazement   that   one   can   talk   about   a   dynasty,   as 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENEK\L        51 

about  other  things,  then  he  generally  becomes 
frightened. 

This  trait  goes  through  the  whole  German  people. 
Those  constitutional  questions  which  for  a  hundred 
years  past  have  occupied  all  other  European  civilised 
nations  and  convulsed  them  to  their  depths  have  never 
been  really  popular  in  Germany.  Our  constitutional 
struggles  were,  in  point  of  fact,  always  decided  before 
they  properly  began,  and  the  special  privileges  of 
God-appointed  dynasties  have  never  been  seriously 
questioned.  From  Privy  Councillor  down  to  artisan, 
from  Countess  to  chambermaid,  everyone  in  Germany 
either  knows  nothing  of  the  existence  of  a  dynastic 
problem,  or  is  silent  on  the  subject.  There  are  cer- 
tainly hundreds  of  thousands  of  Germans  who  would 
gladly  welcome  drastic  reforms;  and  there  are  mil- 
lions of  socialistically  inclined  German  labourers  who 
instinctively  feel  the  dynasty  to  be  hostile  to  them; 
yet  they  only  reluctantly  discuss  it,  because  they  fear 
the  lese  majeste  paragraphs.  But  there  are  in  Ger- 
many hardly  a  hundred,  all  told,  who  see  the  dynasty 
as  it  really  is.  And  among  those  hundred  there  are 
scarcely  a  dozen  serious  democrats  who  have  fully 
realised  the  dynastic  side  of  this  World  War.  Even 
those  who  only  yesterday  were  declaring  themselves 
opponents  of  the  dynasty,  for  instance,  the  German 
Social  Democrats,  hurried  in  the  hour  of  danger  to 
ask  pardon  and  to  prove  to  the  world  that  their  former 
anti-dynastic  attitude  was  only  "put  on." 

Let  us,  next,  in  order  to  form  a  picture  of  the  com- 
prehensive authoritative  powers  of  the  German  dy- 
nasty, make  a  brief  survey  of  the  German  Constitu- 
tion. 


52  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

The  law  concerning  the  Constitution  of  the  German 
Empire  bears  date  April  i6th,  1871.  According  to  it 
the  German  Empire  forms  an  ^'eternal  league."  The 
wielders  of  the  Imperial  power  are  the  federated 
princes  and  their  instrument,  the  Federal  Council.. 
The  Federal  Council  is  composed  of  the  plenipoten- 
tiaries of  the  twenty-two  German  princes  and  of  the 
Senates  of  the  three  Hanseatic  cities.  It  is,  in  short, 
a  sort  of  collective  Sovereign.  Its  powers  are,  how- 
ever, more  of  a  theoretical  than  practical  nature.  The 
German  Emperor,  as  President  of  the  Council,  is,  in. 
regard  to  it,  entirely  independent.  He  remains  Em- 
peror by  heredity.  And,  as  against  the  German  fed- 
erated princes,  the  Federal  Council,  and  the  German 
people,  he  is  free  from  every  legal  responsibility.  The 
chief  Imperial  powers,  above  all  the  military,  were  not 
delegated  to  him ;  he  possesses  them  directly  by  virtue 
of  the  Constitution.  The  Federal  Council  is  nothing 
but  a  deliberative  body;  the  execution  of  its  resolu- 
tions is  the  affair  of  the  German  Emperor. 

Prussia,  whose  King  bears  the  title  of  "German 
Emperor,"  is  president  of  the  "eternal  league."  By 
Article  6  of  the  Imperial  Constitution,  Prussia  dis- 
poses in  the  Federal  Council,  out  of  58  votes  (the 
three  Alsace-Lorraine  votes  have  only  an  "advisory 
co-operation"),  of  17.  To  what  degree  Prussia  dom- 
inates the  Federal  Council  appears  from  Article  78 
of  the  Imperial  Constitution:  "Changes  in  the  Con- 
stitution must  be  made  by  way  of  legislation.  They 
are  regarded  as  rejected  when,  in  the  Federal  Coun- 
cil, 14  votes  are  given  against  them."  Seeing  that 
Prussia,  as  was  said,  disposes  of  17  votes  in  this 
assembly,  it  follows  that  no  constitutional  change  can 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        53 

take  place  without  her  consent.  And  as,  on  the  other 
hand,  any  important  reform  in  poHtical  life  is  un- 
thinkable without  a  constitutional  change,  we  can  at 
once  realise  how  resolutely  the  president  of  the  league 
has  brought  all  the  threads  of  the  pohtical  Hfe  of 
the  nation  into  his  hands.  This  Article  No.  78  is, 
moreover,  the  clearest  demonstration  of  our  above- 
mentioned  theory  of  the  decline  of  the  small  dynasties 
to  the  advantage  of  the  great,  for  it  is  an  act  of 
abdication  of  the  minor  German  princes  into  the  hands 
of  the  Prussian  King  and  German  Emperor. 

Altogether,  the  legal  status  of  the  German  Imperial 
Monarchy  is  fixed  neither  by  the  Federal  Council  and 
Imperial  Diet  nor  by  the  Imperial  laws,  but  solely 
by  the  Prussian  land  laws.  Constitutionally,  then,  the 
German  Imperial  Monarchy  can  by  no  manner  of 
means  be  viewed  as  a  fundamental  German  institu- 
tion, but  merely  as  an  appendage  to  and  extension  of 
the  Prussian  kingship  and  Prussian  political  power. 
For  instance,  it  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  the  costs 
of  the  Imperial  dignity  are  defrayed  by  the  King  of 
Prussia.  The  Emperor  has  no  claim  upon  the  Im- 
perial Exchequer  for  the  grant  of  his  Civil  List;  the 
Imperial  budget  only  annually  places  a  certain  amount 
of  funds  at  the  Emperor's  disposal. 

By  Article  11,  the  German  Emperor  represents  the 
Empire  internationally ;  he  has  the  right  to  declare  war 
and  conclude  peace,  to  enter  into  alliances  and  treaties, 
to  accredit  and  appoint  envoys.  As  far,  then,  as  for- 
eign intercourse  is  concerned,  the  German  Empire  is 
a  purely  monarchical-absolutist  State.  This  Article 
II,  which  consigns  the  conduct  of  the  German  for- 
eign policy  to  the  sovereign  decision  of  the  German 


54  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Emperor,  is  the  key  to  the  history  of  Germany  of 
the  past  forty  years.  It  is,  moreover,  the  key  to  the 
World  War.  Whoever,  as  champion  of  this  war,  dis- 
cusses the  origin  of  the  present  catastrophe  without 
this  Article  ii  is  as  cowardly  as  a  surgeon  who 
shrinks  from  what  would  be  a  successful  operation 
only  because  he  does  not  wish  to  incommode  the  pa- 
tient. The  fact  that,  among  a  thousand  German 
writers  who  speak  on  the  subject  of  the  war,  scarcely 
one  mentions  Article  ii  of  the  German  Imperial  Con- 
stitution, is  only  a  proof  that  our  ''great  time"  has, 
indeed,  found  but  a  puny  race. 

An  absolutist  complement  of  Article  ii  is  Article 
68  of  the  German  Imperial  Constitution :  "The  Em- 
peror can,  when  public  security  within  the  federal  ter- 
ritory is  threatened,  declare  any  portion  of  it  in  a 
state  of  war."  The  pronouncement  and  putting  into 
effect  of  such  a  state  of  war  is  provided  for  by  the 
Prussian  law  of  June  4th,  185 1.  This  Article  con- 
cedes to  the  German  Emperor  the  absolute  right,  at 
any  moment  when  it  appears  to  him  to  be  necessary, 
to  extinguish  the  civil  authorities,  the  liberty  of  the 
Press,  speech,  meeting,  union,  and  even  travel,  and 
entrust  the  military  authorities  with  the  protection  of 
the  whole  political  life  of  the  nation.  In  other  words, 
Article  68  confers  upon  the  German  Emperor  the  sov- 
ereign right  to  invalidate  all  the  other  articles  of  the 
German  Imperial  Constitution  for  any  time  he  pleases. 
Article  68  expresses  the  constitutional  possibility  of 
ruling  the  German  State  without  a  Constitution.  This 
state  of  siege  or  state  of  war  (called  poetically  "Burg- 
frieden")  has  prevailed  in  Germany  since  July  31st, 
I9i'4.     The  Imperial  Chancellor  did,  it  is  true,  at  the 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        55 

beginning  of  the  war,  give  a  formal  assurance  that  the 
state  of  siege  would  not  extend  beyond  the  period  of 
mobilisation,  but  no  one  can  compel  him  to  adhere  to 
this  promise;  for  here,  as  already  said,  everything 
is  subservient  to  the  sovereign  pleasure  of  the  German 
Emperor.  It  is  evident  in  what  close  correlation 
Article  6S  stands  to  Article  11.  And,  therefore,  this 
ordinance  of  the  German  Imperial  Constitution  stands 
in  direct  connection  with  the  outbreak  of  the  World 
War. 

Article  18  (Imperial  departments  and  officials) 
makes  the  German  Emperor  head  of  the  whole  Im- 
perial administration.  He  appoints  the  Imperial  of- 
ficials, has  them  sworn  in,  and,  in  case  of  need,  ordains 
their  dismissal. 

Article  19  nominates  the  Emperor  executor  against 
members  of  the  league  who  do  not  fulfil  their  con- 
stitutional federal  obligations.  *'The  execution  can 
be  extended  to  the  sequestration  of  the  land  in  ques- 
tion and  its  sovereign  power."  The  German  Emperor 
is  thus  absolute  master  in  the  house  of  each  of  his 
minor  German  colleagues. 

The  legislative  bodies  of  the  Empire  are  the  Fed- 
eral Council  and  the  Imperial  Diet  (Reichstag).  The 
Federal  Council  is,  as  we  have  seen,  not  a  Parliament, 
but  the  theoretical  expression  of  the  sovereignty  of 
the  federated  German  princes;  its  deliberations  are 
secret  and  are  not  under  any  public  control.  Laws 
formulated  by  the  Reichstag  are  either  accepted  or 
rejected  by  the  ''Bundesrat"  (Federal  Council).  The 
German  Emperor  himself  possesses  no  right  of  sanc- 
tion or  veto;  this  means,  therefore,  that  he  can,  in 
theory,  be  forced  to  rule  by  laws  which  appear  to  him 


56  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

to  be  intolerable.  But  as  the  Bundesrat  is  in  point 
of  fact  scarcely  anything  more  than  a  gathering  of 
nominees  of  the  German  Emperor,  who  would  never 
venture  to  be  of  a  different  opinion  from  their  Presi- 
dent and  executor,  such  a  case  could  not  arise.  Articles 
19  and  78  suffice  in  every  case  for  the  suppression 
of  any  possible  tendency  to  opposition. 

The  Imperial  Chancellor,  appointed  by  the  Em- 
peror, and  at  once  the  representative  of  the  Emperor 
in  the  Bundesrat  and  the  embodiment  of  Imperial 
authority  in  the  country,  presides  at  the  sittings  of  the 
Bundesrat.  Both  in  his  selection  and  dismissal  the 
Emperor  has  an  entirely  free  hand.  Again,  the  Im- 
perial Chancellor  is  only  a  servant  of  the  Emperor. 
The  Imperial  Chancellor  is,  accordingly,  a  stranger 
to  the  German  people,  inasmuch  as  he  stands  in  no 
direct  constitutional  relation  to  them  whatever.  He 
is  appointed,  not  elected.  That  the  ordinances  and 
other  contracts  of  the  German  Emperor  require  the 
counter-signature  of  the  Chancellor  has  a  purely 
formal  value,  for  the  Imperial  Chancellor  is  only  the 
executor  of  Imperial  orders  and  wishes.  If  the  Im- 
perial Chancellor  were  elected  by  the  Parliament  and 
stood  before  the  Emperor  as  representative  of  the 
popular  will,  then  he  could,  if  necessity  demanded, 
oppose  the  Imperial  will;  for  he  would  feel  himself 
responsible  to  the  people  and  its  deputies  and  would 
have  to  base  his  policy  upon  a  parliamentary  majority. 
But,  as  it  is,  the  position  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
and  his  counter-signature  are  only  a  secularisation  of 
the  divinity  of  the  dynasty.  As  the  person  of  the 
Emperor  is  God-appointed  and  above  controversy, 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  exercising  a  decisive  influ- 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL         57 

ence  in  politics,  it  requires  a  secular  representative.  So 
the  German  Imperial  Chancellor  is,  for  the  country, 
only  the  symbol  of  the  Emperor;  when  German  poli- 
ticians and  newspapers  erroneously  treat  him  as  the 
responsible  leader  of  German  affairs  of  State,  they  do 
so  only  out  of  respect  for  the  person  of  the  real  di- 
rector of  German  destinies.  Whoever  criticises  the 
Chancellor  actually  criticises  the  Emperor. 

Responsible  Imperial  Ministers  are  unknown  to  the 
German  Constitution.  The  Imperial  Chancellor  is 
not  the  German  but  the  Prussian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  The  various  administrative  departments  of 
the  Empire  have,  as  their  chiefs,  Secretaries  of  State 
who  act  merely  as  representatives  of  the  Imperial 
Chancellor. 

In  these  circumstances,  naturally,  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Constitution  does  not  contain  any  law  estab- 
lishing the  responsibility  of  Ministers  or  Secretaries 
of  State.  The  opinion  of  the  Reichstag  does  not  in- 
fluence the  Imperial  Chancellor  and  his  secretaries, 
the  opinion  of  the  Emperor  is  everything.  As  against 
the  Imperial  Chancellor  and  his  secretaries,  the  Reichs- 
tag finds  itself  in  the  position  of  a  man  who  every 
moment  expects  to  be  warned  by  his  landlord  that  he 
is  really  living  in  a  hired  house.  The  Reichstag  clearly 
possesses,  under  these  circumstances,  no  right  to 
censure  the  instruments  of  the  Government.  In  prac- 
tice, the  German  Empire  has  but  one  responsible  Min- 
ister. Yet  his  responsibility  is,  as  regards  the  people, 
purely  theoretical;  as  a  fact,  he  is  only  responsible 
to  the  Emperor;  that  means  that  he  is,  in  fact,  as 
irresponsible  as  the  monarch  himself,  only  that,  in  con- 
. sequence  of  his  earthly  parentage,  he  condescends  to 


58  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

discuss  the  politics  of  his  lord  with  the  popular  repre- 
sentatives. The  responsible  post  in  the  German  Em- 
pire is,  therefore,  not,  as  in  other  civilised  States,  oc- 
cupied by  a  responsible  statesman,  but  by  a  nominated 
official. 

Up  to  Article  19  the  German  Imperial  Constitution 
was,  in  fact,  merely  a  summary  of  the  absolute  powers 
of  the  German  Emperor.  One  could,  in  fact,  cancel 
the  first  nineteen  articles  of  the  German  Imperial 
Constitution  and  replace  them  by  a  single  sentence: 
*'The  German  Emperor  is  the  God-appointed  absolute 
lord  of  Germany,"  and  the  practical  result  would  be 
the  same. 

With  Article  20  begins  a  limitation  of  the  Imperial 
absolutism  by  the  Reichstag.  This  Reichstag,  founded 
in  1867  by  Bismarck  primarily  for  the  North  German 
Confederation,  became,  after  the  foundation  of  the 
German  Empire,  the  corporate  representation  of  the 
German  people.  As  it  is  elected  by  universal,  direct 
suffrage,  with  secret  ballot,  it  is  such  a  democratic  in- 
stitution that  Bismarck  at  the  end  of  his  life  heartily 
lamented  his  great  liberality  and  seriously  contem- 
plated "retrieving"  the  greatest  mistake  in  his  life,  the 
creation  of  universal  equal  suffrage,^  that  is  to  say, 
again  suppressing  the  Reichstag. 

All  our  statesmen  have  lived  in  perpetual  appre- 
hension that  they  have  been  too  liberal;  they  have 
almost  always  robbed  us  again  of  what  they  had 
given  us  a  moment  before.  Scarcely  had  Bismarck 
by  creating  the  Reichstag  perpetrated  the  most  liberal 
act  that  we  in  Prussia  have  experienced  since  Baron 
vom  Stein,  when  he  with  his  Socialist  law  committed 
^Vide  Delbriick,  "Regierung  und  Volkswille,"  pp.  61-65. 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENEIL\L        59 

the  greatest  conceivable  violation  of  the  new  German 
civil  rights,  which  he  had  himself  initiated,  and 
scarcely  had  this  Socialist  law  been  repealed,  when 
our  Government  brought  in  a  so-called  revolutionary- 
bill,  which  was  a  repetition  of  the  Socialist  law,  and 
from  which  we  escaped  only  by  a  miracle. 

From  the  very  outset,  the  Reichstag  had  no  sover- 
eign but  solely  a  constantly  menaced  and  circum- 
scribed existence.  In  other  words,  it  never  was  re- 
garded by  our  Government  as  a  constitutional  gov- 
ernmental necessity,  to  check  and  modify  the  absolute 
regime,  but  as  a  support  and  popularising  resource 
of  the  Government.  'The  soldier  and  the  army,  and 
not  parliamentary  majorities  and  resolutions,  have 
welded  together  the  German  Empire.  .My  trust  I  place" 
in  my  army,"  said  William  II.  on  April  i8th,  1891, 
in  Berlin;  and  on  October  i8th,  1894,  he  repeated: 
"The  only  pillar  upon  which  our  Empire  rests  was 
its  armj^  And  this  is  true  to-day."  German  po- 
litical authorities  are,  of  course,  of  like  opinion.  ''In 
Germany,"  says  Professor  Delbriick  in  a  transport  of 
pride  in  the  respect  of  the  Germans  for  their  dynasty, 
"popular  representation  arose,  because  the  Government 
summoned  it  and  placed  it  side  by  side  with  itself." 
And  Professor  Lamprecht  adds^ :  'The  intention  was 
to  win  by  this  means  the  support  of  the  multitude  of 
enthusiasts  for  German  unity,  on  behalf  of  a  Prus- 
sianised central  administration."  For  Bismarck,  the 
democratic  franchise  of  the  Reichstag  was  no  modern 
principle  of  government,  but  merely  a  sort  of  con- 
venient referendum  towards  the  foundation  of  the 
German  Empire ;  vulgarly  expressed :  the  democratic 

*Karl  Lamprecht,  "Deutsche  Geschichte,"  Vol.  II.,  p.  215. 


6o  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

honey  with  which  the  democratic  Southern  German 
States  were  caught  for  the  German  idea  of  unity 
under  Prussian  hegemony.  As  soon  as  the  franchise 
had  played  its  part,  it  was,  as  being  an  unwelcome 
limitation  of  the  dynastic  power,  again  slowly  ren- 
dered innocuous  (Socialist  law,  educational  law,  pro- 
longation of  the  electoral  period,  the  so-called  septen- 
nate,  non-distribution  of  electoral  divisions,  attempts 
at  restricting  liberty  of  speech,  repeated  dissolutions, 
threats  of  abolition,  etc.,  etc.).  Bismarck  was  a  mas- 
ter in  such  matters.  His  Electoral  Law  of  May  31st, 
1869,  2-nd  the  electoral  regulation  of  187 1,  announce 
that  every  German  is  an  elector  from  his  twenty-fifth 
year  onwards,  and  that,  on  the  average,  one  deputy 
should  fall  to  every  100,000  inhabitants.  And,  in 
fact,  the  German  Empire  was  then  divided  into  elec- 
toral constituencies  including  100,000  souls  in  each; 
this  yielded  the  number  of  382  deputies,  which  (after 
the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine)  was  increased  to 
397.  Now  Article  20  of  the  Imperial  Constitution 
states :  ''Until  the  legal  regulation,  which  is  reserved 
in  par.  5  of  the  Electoral  Law  of  ^lay  31st,  1869," 
but  there  is  a  modest  addition,  in  a  note  to  Article  20 : 
"The  legal  regulation  has  not  yet  been  effected."  That 
means  that  the  German  Empire  of  to-day,  containing, 
as  it  does,  66  million  inhabitants,  instead  of  having 
660  deputies,  counts  but  397,  as  in  the  year  1871, 
when  it  had  barely  40  million.  That  means,  again, 
that  the  100,000  souls  have,  in  many  cases,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  growth  of  cities  and  industrial  cen- 
tres, become  500,000  (Berlin,  for  instance,  elects,  with 
a  population  of  over  two  millions,  only  six  deputies), 
whilst,  in  other  cases,  in  consequence  of  emigration 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        61 

and  similar  phenomena,  the  100,000  have  been  re- 
duced to  50,000  and  less,  and  yet  return  their  deputy. 
Whence  results  the  remarkable  fact  that  the  less  in- 
telligent country  districts  have,  compared  with  the  en- 
lightened metropolis,  been  ludicrously  favoured. 

Since,  then,  the  vote  of  one  Lower  Pomeranian  or 
Upper  Bavarian  peasant  is  equivalent  to  the  votes  of 
ten  progressively  minded  Germans  of  the  urban  pop- 
ulation, we  cannot  be  surprised  that  our  Government, 
by  the  aid  of  this  unconstitutional  distribution  of  elec- 
toral districts,  can  always  count  upon  a  Conserva- 
tive and  Clerical  majority  in  the  Reichstag.  Without 
this  happy  majority,  the  Reichstag  would,  probably, 
have  long  ceased  to  exist,  for  it  is,  as  already  stated, 
by  its  very  nature  not  a  sovereign  but  only  a  subordi-. 
nate  factor  of  government.  If,  at  any  time,  the  Gov- 
ernment loses  its  majority  in  the  Reichstag,  it  either 
dissolves  the  latter  (the  Emperor  only  requires  for 
this  purpose  the  assent  of  the  Bundesrat,  of  which 
he  is  assured  beforehand),  or  simply  ignores  it.  Pro- 
fessor Delbriick  would  have  us  believe  that  Prince  von 
Billow  had,  in  1908,  to  retire  from  the  Government  be- 
cause he  could  not  obtain  a  majority  for  his  "Inheri- 
tance tax,"^  but  we  are  aware  that  he  was  not  obliged 
to  go,  but  himself  wished  to  go  On  December  4th, 
19 1 3,  the  Imperial  Chancellor  von  Bethmann  Hollweg 
received,  as  a  result  of  the  Zabern  debate,  with  its  293 
against  54  votes,  the  plainest  possible  intimation  to 
preside  no  longer  over  the  destinies  of  the  German 
nation.  Even  in  States  like  Serbia  and  Bulgaria 
(even,  perchance,  in  modern  China)  a  Minister  so 
sharply  reprimanded  by  the  popular  representative 
*  Delbriick,  "Regierung  und  Volkswille,"  p.  6o. 


62  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

body  would  have  to  retire.  In  Germany,  nothing  of  the 
sort.  This  Imperial  Chancellor,  who  manifestly  did 
not  rule  in  accordance  with,  but  contrary  to,  Ger- 
man public  opinion,  was  the  same  who,  eight  months 
subsequently,  declared  war,  in  the  name  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire,  upon   Russia,   Belgium,  and  France. 

Of  all  rights  possessed  by  the  Reichstag,  the  voting 
of  the  Budget  and  the  taxes  is,  beyond  doubt,  the 
most  important.  In  so  far  as  the  Reichstag,  by 
Article  69  of  the  Constitution,  controls  the  expenses 
of  the  Government  and  either  grants  or  rejects  its 
proposals,  it  locks  the  door  against  any  unlimited 
financial  arbitrariness  on  the  part  of  the  absolute 
regime;  this  beautiful  theory  of  fiscal  control  is,  how- 
ever, most  unfortunately  disregarded  in  practice 
owing  to  a  loophole.  There  is,  to  begin  with,  Article 
62,  which  separates  the  military  budget  from  other 
imperial  finances,  and  thus  practically  withdraws  it 
from  any  parliamentary  control.  Then  there  is  fur- 
ther the  practice  of  introducing  the  Budget  and  dis- 
cussing it  in  the  Reichstag  itself,  which  by  Budget 
law  (particularly  in  military  votes)  properly  only  pos- 
sesses a  right  of  voting  the  supply.^  The  problem  of 
State  financial  control  by  popular  parliaments  cer- 
tainly requires   (mainly  in  consequence  of  the  arma- 

^Thus,  for  instance,  the  military  expedition  to  China  (1900), 
the  cost  of  which  amounted  to  ^7,500,000,  was  resolved  upon 
and  carried  out  entirely  without  consulting  or  obtaining  the 
approval  of  the  Reichstag.  After  everything  had  been  arranged, 
the  Reichstag  was  calmly  invited  to  give  its  subsequent  sanc- 
tion to  the  steps  taken.  When  it  wished  to  complain  of  this 
violation  of  the  Constitution,  the  "responsible"  Chancellor,  von 
Hohenlohe,  was  suddenly  dismissed,  and  his  place  taken  by 
Herr  von  Biilow,  who,  of  course,  knew  nothing  about  the  mat- 
ter. 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        63 

ments  policy)  considerable  readjustment  in  all  States, 
but  in  Germany  more  than  elsewhere;  for  the  reason 
that  the  Reichstag  does  not,  in  principle,  possess  any 
sovereignty. 

The  Reichstag  has,  again,  the  right  to  initiate  laws 
and  to  present  petitions  to  the  Bundesrat,  i.e.,  the 
Chancellor.  But,  as  the  German  Government,  In  vir- 
tue of  its  inaccessibility  and  infallibility,  unfortunately 
makes  a  rule  of  not  participating  in  the  discussions 
of  proposals  emanating  from  the  Reichstag,  here  the 
theory  is  again  more  satisfactory  than  the  practice. 
Likewise,  petitions  submitted  by  the  Reichstag  are, 
for  the  most  part,  ignored  by  the  Government.  It 
was  not  until  the  A\'orld  \\^ar  w^as  fully  launched  that 
It  began,  here  and  there,  to  make  some  modification 
in  these  feudal  customs. 

According  to  the  Imperial  Constitution,  the  Reichs- 
tag has  no  right  of  interpellation.  It  is  true  that  it 
arrogated  to  itself  this  right  and  that  the  Government 
tacitly  conceded  it.  But,  in  accordance  with  the  per- 
fectly correct  theory,  that  without  responsibility  of 
ministers  even  the  right  of  interpellation  is  superflu- 
ous, the  responsible-irresponsible  men  reply  to  the 
questions  of  the  deputies  (that  is,  if  they  ever  trouble 
to  reply)  only  as  persons  who  need  not  do  so. 

From  this  it  is  clear,  in  the  first  place,  that  uni- 
versal suffrage  in  Prusso-Germany  is  not  a  fact,  but 
merely  a  pious  fraud.  The  Reichstag  is  nothing  more 
than  a  debating  society,  and  a  wilfully  bungled  Imi- 
tation of  other  Parliaments ;  semblance  and  not  reality. 
Continually  muzzled  and  bullied  by  the  dynasty,  it 
could  never  develop  into  a  real  Parliament.  Prince 
von  Billow  tells  us,  it  is  true,  that  'Tohtical  life  in 


64  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

a  modern  monarchy,  as  created  by  our  Constitution, 
entails  co-operation  between  the  Crown  and  the  peo- 
ple,"^ but  we  are  no  longer  impressed  by  these  flowers 
of  speech.  What  do  we  want  with  a  "co-operation," 
in  which  the  representatives  of  the  people  are  not 
treated  like  equally  privileged  collaborators,  but  are 
forced  to  play  the  role  of  inferiors?  What  use  to  us 
is  a  right  to  co-operate  in  the  framing  of  laws,  when 
we  have  no  right  to  w^atch  over  their  execution,  to 
expose  their  deficiencies  and  to  protest  against  their 
infringement? 

Prince  von  Biilow  further  instructs  us  that  it  is  not 
so  much  a  matter  of  constitutional  reform,  but  rather 
that  we  ''are  so  lacking  in  political  judgment  and 
political  training."  That  is  to  say,  Herr  von  Biilow 
assures  us  once  again  (more  politely,  be  it  said,  than 
Hegel  and  Bismarck  in  their  day  but  none  the  less 
plainly)  that  we  are  still  too  ignorant  for  the  exercise 
of  new  political  rights.  Even  Prince  von  Biilow 
does  not  forsake  the  good  old  Prussian  style.  He, 
also,  treats  us  as  a  man  whose  money  one  first  steals 
and  then  comforts  him  by  saying  that  he  did  not 
know  how  to  take  care  of  it,  and  whom,  at  last,  when 
nothing  further  is  to  be  done,  he  roundly  abuses,  say- 
ing that  money,  after  all,  has  not  the  value  that  the 
silly  world  attaches  to  it.  Herr  von  Biilow  honestly 
assures  us:  *'It  is  an  old  mistake  to  want  to  gauge 
the  concern  of  the  nation  in  political  affairs  solely 
by  the  rights  granted  to  the  representatives  of  the 
people."^  You  tell  us  nothing  fresh,  Serene  High- 
ness !  pray,  obey,  pay  taxes,  or :  God,  King  and  Father- 

^  Prince  von  Biilow,  "Imperial  Germany,"  Cassell  &  Co.,  Ltd., 
Lx)ndon,  p.  313. 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        65 

land.  That  is,  in  the  view  of  an  old  German  demo- 
crat, better  suited  to  us  Germans  than  political  rights 
of  which  we  know  nothing.  But  what  galls  is  not 
so  much  the  assertion  that,  blockheads  as  we  are,  we 
do  not  understand  the  value  of  money,  but  the  demo- 
cratic lie  with  which  our  dynasty  describes  its  money 
wealth  as  a  "co-operation  of  Crown  and  people."  Be- 
lieve me,  your  Serene  Highness!  this  hypocrisy  is 
worse  than  the  very  absolutism  it  conceals. 

For,  in  truth,  Bismarck  never  dreamt  of  a  serious 
"co-operation  between  Crown  and  people."  For  him, 
the  sole  point  was  to  leave  the  God-appointed  dynasty 
its  old  rights,  and  at  the  same  time  give  the  new 
German  Empire  the  semblance  of  a  modern  political 
system.  Germany  could  not  and  would  not  enter  the 
councils  of  the  European  nations  without  a  concession 
to  the  modern  ideas  of  the  nineteenth  century.  But, 
although  the  buildings  of  the  Reichstag  may  look  more 
splendid  and  imposing  than  the  edifice  of  the  "Cham- 
bre  des  Deputes"  on  the  banks  of  the  Seine,  yet  there 
resides  therein  not  the  will  of  the  people,  but  the  will 
of  the  dynasty.  The  German  Government  needs  the 
Reichstag  as  an  advertisement  and  emblem  of  its  mod- 
ernity. For  the  purpose  of  ruling,  it  has  as  little 
need  of  it  as  a  tradesman  has  of  the  opinion  of  his 
employes  as  to  the  working  of  his  business. 

Moreover,  there  exists  between  Government  and 
Reichstag  in  Germany  not  merely  a  constitutional  but 
also  a  strictly  patriarchal  order  of  precedence.  Only 
the  nobility,  endowed  with  divine  insight,  is  entitled, 
in  Prusso-Germany,  to  fill  the  most  important  ofiices 
and  to  solve  the  most  difficult  political  problems.  Con- 
sequently all  leading  governmental  administrative  and 


66  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

military  posts  are  filled  by  members  of  the  nobility.^ 
If  an  exception  is  occasionally  made,  the  civilian  ad- 
vanced to  be  Minister  or  General  is,  as  a  rule,  at 
once  ^'raised"  to  the  rank  of  nobility.  A  German 
deputy  can,  under  such  circumstances,  hardly  ever 
become  Minister;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  former 
Minister,  after  his  dismissal,  can  scarcely  ever  be- 
come again  a  deputy;  he  would  thereby  desecrate  the 
rank  already  conferred  upon  him,  and  render  himiself 
unfit  for  Court  and  governmental  circles.  Since,  con- 
sequently, not  one  German  deputy  has  ever  actually 
taken  part  in  Government  business,  it  follows  that 
expert  critics  of  the  Government  are  altogether  lack- 
ing in  the  Reichstag.  In  other  Parliaments  there  are 
at  least  a  dozen  members  who  have  previously  been 
Ministers  and  are,  hence,  in  a  position  to  exercise  a 
sound  criticism  upon  their  successors.  In  the  Reichs- 
tag, such  a  case  is  unthinkable ;  thus  the  deputies  know 
only  the  theory  but  not  the  practice  of  governing;  the 
story  of  the  man  who  does  not  understand  the  value 
of  money  is,  it  is  plain,  likewise  the  story  of  our 
popular  representatives.^ 

This  is  in  keeping  with  the  conception  that  our 
Reichstag  deputies  have  (and  must  have)  of  the  dig- 
nity of  popular  representation.  A  French  or  English 
and  a  German  deputy  are  about  as  far  apart  as  the 
proprietor   of   a   business   house    from   his   employes. 

^  Cf.  here,  footnote  p.  46. 

^  While  I  write  this,  news  arrives  from  Russia  that  there  a 
Vice-President  of  the  Imperial  Duma  (Protopopoff)  has  been 
appointed  Minister  of  the  Interior.  A  similar  case  has  not 
occurred  in  the  forty-four  years'  life  of  the  German  Reichstag. 
If  it  be  remembered  that  Russia  has  only  possessed  a  Constitu- 
tion since  1905,  one  may  conclude  that  it  has  developed  its  par- 
liamentary  regime   more  quickly  than   Prusso-Germany. 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        67 

Where  the  one  acts  independently,  the  other  scarcely 
dare  intrude  a  modest  objection;  where  the  one  is 
animated  by  the  feeHng  that  he  is  looking  after  the 
interests  of  the  people,  the  other  is  only  oppressed 
by  his  helplessness,  and  is  forced  to  bargaining  and 
so-called  ''horse-dealing,"  in  order  to  obtain  the 
smallest  concessions  from  the  Government.  A  clas- 
sical example  is  the  passing  of  the  first  great  naval 
Bill,  v^^hich  Caprivi  received  at  the  hands  of  ( !)  the 
Poles;  by  making  liberal  promises  in  the  matter  of 
Germany's  brutal  policy  towards  the  Poles  he  won  their 
support  for  a  cause  which  was  utterly  repugnant  to 
them. 

The  feeling  that  they  only  distantly  control  the  Ger- 
man Government,  instead  of  leading  it,  deprives  our 
deputies  of  that  proud  feeling  of  responsibility  which 
national  representatives  in  other  lands  display.  It 
can  only  happen  in  Germany  that  the  President  of 
the  Reichstag  should  say  in  a  public  sitting:  "The 
Emperor  understood  his  time;  he  said:  T  live  in 
the  days  of  publicity  and  free  speech,  and  I  will  not 
be  a  so-called  constitutional  monarch,  who  reigns  and 
does  not  rule.'  I  am  convinced  that  it  would  not  be 
agreeable  to  our  glorious  Emperor  if  he  were  asked 
to  accept  such  a  role.  .  .  .  Gentlemen,  this  ought 
to  fill  us  with  admiration,  and  we  ought  to  thank 
Providence  that  we  have  in  these  times  such  an  Em- 
peror; this  should  stimulate  us,  to  the  best  of  our 
ability,  and,  so  far  as  our  conviction  allows  it,  to 
anticipate  and  further  the  great  intentions  of  our 
Emperor."^ 

*  Speech  of  the  President  of  the  Reichstag,  Count  von  Balles- 
trem,  January  27th,   1900. 


68  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Such  Byzantine  utterances  cannot  be  publicly  im- 
pugned. As  soon  as  a  deputy  makes  a  sign  of  criti- 
cising the  person  of  the  Emperor,  he  is  at  once  called 
to  order.  When  the  deputy  Liebknecht  (senior)  re- 
mained seated  when  cheers  were  called  for  the  Em- 
peror, a  motion  was  made  by  the  Government  to  prose- 
cute him  for  lese  majeste;  the  motion  was  rejected, 
though  by  a  bare  majority. 

How  matters  generally  stand  with  the  liberty  of 
speech  and  competence  of  the  Reichstag  is  to  be  seen 
from  a  book,  "Unser  Kaiser  und  Sein  Volk,"  which 
was  pubHshed  in  Germany  and  caused  a  considerable 
sensation.^  A  passage  in  it  runs :  "The  President  of 
the  German  Reichstag,  'gasping'  in  humility  and 
obedience  at  the  foot  of  the  throne,  has  found  it  to 
be  advisable,  in  order  to  shield  the  very  assailable 
utterances  of  the  Emperor  from  the  criticism  of  Par- 
liament, only  to  permit  the  discussion  of  such  speeches 
as  are  published  in  the  Reichsanzeiger.  Since  these 
tactics  passed  into  law,  the  official  journal  cautiously 
avoids  taking  note  of  any  of  the  Emperor's  polemical 
speeches.  It  pretends,  with  a  clumsy  naivete,  that 
speeches  of  the  monarch  have  never  been  delivered, 
although  the  official  telegraph  bureau  distributes  them 
in  thousands  of  copies  to  the  smallest  provincial 
papers." 

That,  since  then,  little  change  has  been  made  in  the 
Byzantine  habits  of  the  President  of  the  Reichstag  is 

'Published  by  Paul  Waetzel  (Leipzig,  1906),  this  book  "von 
Einem  Schwarzseher"  is  the  despairing  cry  of  a  German  patriot. 
The  "Schwarzseher"  is  not  a  Social  Democrat,  but  earnestly 
protests  against  the  "personal  regime"  because  it  is  continually 
pouring  water  on  the  mills  of  that  social  democracy  which 
knows  no  fatherland. 


OF  DYNASTIES  IN  GENERAL        69 

shown  us  by  the  present  "Hberal"  President  Kampf, 
who  telegraphed  to  the  German  Emperor  on  the  oc- 
casion of  the  second  anniversary  of  the  declaration 
of  war,  *'May  the  blessing  of  Heaven  continue  to 
be  with  your  Majesty,  our  whole  Fatherland,  and 
our  faithful  allies,''  thus  obsequiously  placing  the 
well-being  of  the  Emperor  before  that  of  his  country. 

If  we  reflect  that  the  institution  of  the  Reichstag 
was  an  act  of  grace,  and  its  subsequent  continuation 
only  due  to  toleration  on  the  part  of  our  dynasty, 
we  can  understand  why  a  flavour  of  servility  and 
Byzantinism  has  always  clung  to  it,  of  which  it  is 
itself  quite  unconscious.  The  constitutional  impotence 
of  the  Reichstag,  which  is  lamentable  apart  from  this, 
is  thus  displayed  in  its  most  glaring  light  and  makes 
our  German  Parliament  a  laughing  stock  for  every 
serious  democrat. 

If,  in  spite  of  all  these  constitutional  and  self- 
inflicted  evils,  our  intellectuals  and  politicians  clutch 
at  and  hold  fast  to  the  illusion  of  a  democratic  Ger- 
man popular  Government  and  "working  community," 
then  that  may  demonstrate  to  the  world  that  we  Ger- 
mans so  instinctively  adore  the  democratic  conquests 
of  the  nineteenth  century  that  we  gladly  imagine  that 
we  possess  some  of  them,  and  cannot  endure  it  when 
someone  by  the  light  of  facts  tries  to  dash  this  fair 
illusion  to  fragments. 


Ill 

THE  BASIS  OF  THE  DYNASTIC  POWER 

Germany  accordingly  possesses  neither  a  parlia- 
mentary nor  a  really  constitutional,  but,  at  best,  an 
autocratic  system  of  government,  adorned  with  a 
democratic  fagade.  If  there  sat  in  the  Reichstag  a 
majority  of  far-seeing  straightforward  democrats, 
then  they  certainly  could  limit  certain  of  the  ruling 
rights  of  the  German  Emperor  by  Imperial  laws,  but 
never  his  God-given  monarchical  rights.  As  by  the 
decree  of  God  and  of  His  representatives  on  earth 
such  a  Reichstag  has  never  been  vouchsafed  to  us 
(and  never  could  be  vouchsafed),  so  in  Germany 
there  are  only  liberal  institutions  without  a  liberal 
spirit,  popular  rights  without  popular  government, 
Ministers  without  responsibility,  deputies  without 
plenary  powers ;  and,  on  the  other  side,  unassailable 
rights  of  the  Crown,  the  widest  scope  for  the  im- 
position of  dynastic  arbitrary  will,  supervision  and 
domination  by  the  King  of  Prussia  over  the  Federal 
princes  and  the  Federal  Council,  and  Articles  5  and 
37  of  the  Imperial  Constitution,  by  virtue  of  which 
Prussia's  vote  in  legislation  touching  the  military  sys- 
tem, the  Imperial  Navy,  Customs  and  indirect  taxa- 
tion everywhere  is  preponderant  in  the  Bundesrat, 
when  it  is  cast  for  the  ''perpetuation  of  the  existing 

70 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER         71 

condition  of  things."  We  have,  then,  a  political  sys- 
tem, the  political  basis  and  spirit  of  which  so  clashed 
with  the  demands  and — in  other  countries — actualities 
of  modern  days,  that  it  was  compelled  to  adopt  the 
civilised  institutions  of  these  modern  times  at  all 
events  as  a  trimming  and  a  phrase. 

That  Prussia  watches  jealously  in  Germany  not 
only  over  "the  maintenance  of  the  existing  order  of 
things,"  but  also  over  that  of  ''feudal  conditions," 
is  shown  with  compelling  clearness  by  the  relation 
of  our  dynasty  to  the  army.  "W^here  lies,  after  all, 
the  true  power?  It  lies  in  arms.  The  question  by 
which  to  decide  the  inner  character  of  a  State  is, 
accordingly,  always.  Whom  does  the  army  obey?"-^ 

This  question,  as  Professor  Delbriick  rightly  affirms, 
is  the  most  vital  of  all  political  questions,  and  perhaps 
that  is  why  it  is  so  rarely  discussed  in  Germany. 
The  army  is,  in  fact,  the  basis  and  the  most  indispen- 
sable bulwark  of  a  dynasty.  Every  dynasty  has  been 
brought  into  being  by  means  of  an  army,  can  only 
by  the  aid  of  an  army  raise  itself  to  power  and  pres- 
tige, and  could  not  endure  without  a  military  pro- 
tective force.  *'As  the  living  forces  of  Parliament 
reside  in  the  parties,  of  whom  there  is  not  a  word  to 
be  found  in  the  Constitution,  so  does  the  essence  of 
a  monarchy  consist  not  in  the  functions  that  the 
Constitution  allocates  to  it,  but  in  the  forces  that  took 
origin,  long  before  any  legal  declarations,  in  the  re- 
mote past;  namely,  the  relations  of  the  dynasty  to  the 
army.  ^ 

This   extremely  personal   and,   in   all   its  aspects, 

^Delbriick,  "Regierung  und  Volkswille,"  p.   133. 
^Ibid.,  p.  141. 


72  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

somewhat  selfish  relation,  in  which  the  army  stands  to 
the  dynasty,  is  in  the  modem  world,  and  especially 
in  Germany,  not  only  disregarded,  but,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, disguised  from  the  people. 

If,  for  instance,  you  ask  a  German  with  an  average 
political  education  whether  Germany  has  a  ''national 
army,"  the  chances  are  a  thousand  to  one  that  he  will 
not  only  answer  this  question  with  an  unhesitating 
affirmative,  but  also  be  seriously  indignant  that  you 
should  have  thought  of  asking  it.  Most  Germans  do 
not  entertain  the  slightest  doubt  not  only  that  we  have 
the  best  but  the  most  national  arm^y  in  the  w^orld.  Is 
not  every  healthy  German  of  full  age  liable  to  mili- 
tary service?  Can  there  be  a  more  national  army 
than  one  maintained  by  taxes  levied  upon  the  whole 
population  and  composed  of  all  the  citizens  of  the 
nation  without  distinction?  Does  not,  therefore,  the 
German  army  form  a  nation  in  arms  in  the  grandest 
sense  of  the  word? 

The  fact  that  in  the  course  of  the  past  hundred 
years  a  thorough  revolution  has  been  effected  in  the 
domain  of  the  military  system,  which  not  only  com- 
prises universal  military  service,  but  also  the  right  of 
the  citizens  to  control  the  organisation  and  employ- 
ment of  the  army — our  German  either  does  not  know 
at  all,  or  he  does  not  wish  to  know  it.  He  confines 
the  notion  ''national  army"  to  universal  military  serv- 
ice, and,  out  of  respect  to  his  dynasty,  takes  good  care 
not  to  extend  it  to  the  command,  the  spirit,  and  the 
organisation  of  the  army. 

Before  the  great  French  Revolution  all  armies  were 
only  the  instruments  of  dynastic  interests.  Of  course, 
we  find  national  armies  in  bygone  days  among  the 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER         73 

Greeks  and  Romans — that  is,  soldiers  who  served  not 
a  dynasty,  but  their  country.  But  with  the  decay  of 
these  States  the  idea  of  national  defence  of  country 
became  completely  lost.  In  the  jMiddle  Ages  there 
was  no  idea  of  fatherland,  and  thus  no  idea  of  the 
defence  of  country;  the  armies  were  the  avowed  play- 
things and  instruments  of  the  princes.  That  is,  they 
were  composed  of  mercenaries  and  adventurers,  stood 
in  no  relation  to  the  people,  and  obeyed  only  the 
behests  of  their  princely  possessors.  The  most  per- 
fect pattern  of  this  standing  dynastic  army  was  cre- 
ated by  the  Prussian  King,  Frederick  William  I.  His 
army  of  the  "tall  fellows"  was  a  purely  personal  cre- 
ation without  any  national  character.  All  the  nations 
of  the  world  were  represented  in  it.  Frederick  Wil-, 
liam  I.  would  have  been  very  angry,  had  anyone  at- 
tempted to  criticise  the  composition  of  his  army.  He 
stood  in  relation  to  his  army  as  an  artist  to  his  work. 
He  never  could  understand  that  he  could  not  enlist 
a  "tall  fellow"  because  he  happened  to  be  a  French- 
man or  Englishman,  and,  as  such,  could  not  fight  with 
zeal  and  love  for  Prussia. 

This  army,  which  Frederick  11.  took  over  from  his 
■father,  did  not  go  to  battle  out  of  love  for  a  father- 
land (this  idea  died,  as  we  have  said,  with  the  Greeks), 
but  out  of  a  sense  of  duty  and  because  it  was  paid 
for  its  services  by  its  lord  and  master.  Prussia's 
military  ascendancy  over  its  then  enemies  resided  in 
the  iron  discipline  of  these  royal  hirelings.  It  was  a 
superiority  in  drill  and  method,  having  no  concern 
with  any  popular  or  national  idea.^ 

*  Prince  von  Biilow   in  his  book,  "Imperial   Germany"    (Cas- 
sell),  pp.  133-4,  says:    "From  the  very  first,  Brandenburg-Prus- 


74  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

The  French  Revolution  begat  two  things  which 
impressed  their  stamp  upon  the  military  system  of 
modern  days:  love  of  country,  and  the  resulting  na- 
tional military  organisation.  The  triumphant  Revo- 
lution declared  the  people  to  be,  in  every  sense,  sov- 
ereign. The  dynastic  army  that  had  fought  out  of 
a  sense  of  duty  and  for  pay  was  replaced  by  the  na- 
tional army,  which  fought  out  of  devotion  to  coun- 
try. The  soldier  stands  no  longer  in  a  mercenary 
relation  to  his  leader,  but  is  sworn  to  uphold  the 
Constitution  of  his  country.  Not  fealty  to  a  mon- 
arch, but  love  of  country,  becomes  henceforth  the 
impelling  force  and  ideal  of  an  army.  The  soldier 
of  the  modern  national  army  became,  accordingly, 
the  armed  citizen  of  his  land,  in  the  defence  of  which 
he  is  bound  to  have  an  interest,  because  he  possesses 
an  effective  share  in  his  country's  government. 

Just  as  Frederick  II.  found  in  the  pattern  army  of 
his  father  a  superior  instrument  for  the  prosecution 
of  his  dynastic  campaigns,  so  now  did  Napoleon  I.  find 
in  this  popular  army  begotten  of  the  Revolution,  and 
founded  upon  entirely  new  principles,  an  engine  of 
war  superior  to  all  the  armies  launched  against  him. 
Prussian  superiority  in  drill  and  sense  of  duty  was 
of  no  avail  against  the  new  moral  ascendancy  of  the 
soldier  fighting  with  religious  ardour  for  his  country. 
And    it    was    only    when    Stein,    Scharnhorst,    and 

sia's  military  power  was  founded  on  the  two  great  supporting 
forces  of  national  life  in  the  State:  the  love  of  home  and 
country  and  the  conception  of  State  Power";  but  he  himself 
partly  contradicts  this  assertion  (pp.  140-1)  when  he  says  that 
it  was  due  to  "the  master  mind  of  Scharnhorst"  that  "In  the 
war  of  liberation,  the  Prussian  Army  became  the  nation  in 
arms." 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER        75 

Gneisenau  had  organised  for  Prussia  also  the  first 
national  army  on  the  French  pattern  that  the  victory 
of  Prussia  over  Napoleon  was  rendered  possible. 

Napoleon  I.  was  the  first  who  abused  the  new  prin- 
ciple of  a  national  army  which  had  been  born  of 
the  French  Revolution.  Just  as  the  dynastic  armies 
of  feudal  days  were  all,  more  or  less,  drilled  for  attack 
and  conquest,  it  was  intended  that  the  new  national 
army  should  only  be  animated  by  the  proud  idea  of 
pure  national  defence.  The  Constitution  of  1791, 
par.  VI.,  leaves  no  doubt  on  this  point.  "The  French 
nation  expressly  declares  that  it  renounces  any  idea 
of  waging  wars  with  the  intent  of  making  conquests, 
and  will  never  employ  its  power  against  the  liberty 
of    another   people.'* 

The  National  Convention,  when  it  had  driven  away 
the  King,  and  openly  revolted  against  all  divine  dy- 
nastic rights,  was  simultaneously  attacked  on  five 
fronts.  Valmy  and  Jemappes  were  the  victories  of 
the  new  national  idea  over  the  dynastic  world  of  the 
Ivliddle  Ages.  On  the  eve  of  the  battle  of  Valmy, 
Goethe  exclaimed  prophetically:  'Trom  here  and 
from  to-day  a  new  era  opens,  and  you  can  say  that 
you  w^ere  present  at  its  birth." 

Napoleon  retained  the  universal  levy  (for  it  pro- 
cured him,  as  we  have  said,  an  enormous  superiority 
over  his  antagonists),  but  he  was  the  first  to  betray 
the  intrinsic  purpose  of  the  national  army,  for,  in 
his  arrogance,  he  proceeded  from  national  defence 
to  the  dynastic  war  of  conquest  of  feudal  times.  His 
army  had,  in  form,  remained  national,  but,  in  regard 
to  its  employment,  the  soldiers  of  Jena,  Austerlitz, 


76         THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

and  Friedland  only  obeyed  the  arbitrary  will  of  their 
ruler. 

After  Napoleon's  fall,  France  returned  more  or  less 
openly  to  the  principles  of  the  dynastic  army.  For 
even  if  the  army  of  Napoleon  III.  was  no  longer 
composed  of  foreigners  and  mercenaries,  it  yet  con- 
sisted of  soldiers  of  seven  years'  service,  and  the 
universal  military  service  had,  owing  to  all  manner 
of  limitations,  purchases  of  exemption,  etc.,  been  prac- 
tically abolished.  Napoleon  III.'s  campaigns  served 
so  successfully  his  dynastic  interests  that  they  brought 
about  the  same  result  as  did  the  wars  of  his  great 
predecessor:  the  entry  of  the  enemy  into  Paris,  to- 
gether with  an  enormous  territorial  and  pecuniary  loss 
and  the  fall  of  the  dynasty. 

To  return  to  Prussia :  the  victories  of  Frederick  II. 
had  been  the  brilliant  achievement  of  dynastic  armies. 
The  defeats,  from  Valmy  to  Austerlitz,  had  furnished 
proof  that  the  dynastic  principle  was  not  adapted  to 
a  modern  army.  Prussia  found  herself  faced  with  the 
necessity  of  organising  for  herself  a  national  army, 
and  in  the  well-known  proclamation,  *'To  My  Peo- 
ple," the  Prussian  King,  Frederick  William  III.,  prom- 
ised that  fundamental  reform  without  which  a  na- 
tional army  is  impossible :  the  co-operation  of  the  peo- 
ple in  the  government  of  the  country.  It  is  patent, 
and  the  French  Revolution  had  dinned  it  audibly 
enough  into  the  ears  of  all  the  dynasties,  that  the 
soldier  can  only  possess  a  fatherland  if  he  is  called 
upon  to  participate  in  its  government.  How  could  he 
be  ready  to  die  for  a  country  in  which  he  has  only 
obligations  and  no  rights? 

The  royal  promise  of  a  democratic  Constitution  was 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER        77 

reiterated  by  the  Prussian  Minister,  von  Hardenberg, 
at  the  Vienna  Congress  of  1815;  moreover,  it  was 
formally  assured  to  the  Prussian  people  by  the  law 
of  May  22nd,  1815,  "concerning  a  representative  Con- 
stitution."   Yet  not  only  was  this  promise  never  kept, 
and  this  law  never  put  into  force,  but  the  grateful 
dynasty  went  so  far  as  to  see  that  any  person  who 
reminded   King  Frederick  William   III.   or  his   suc- 
cessor of  its  ever  having  been  given  was  cruelly  per- 
secuted as  a  demagogue  and  traitor.     Just  as  all  the 
endeavours  of  William  von  Humboldt  at  the  Vienna 
Congress  for  the  attainment  of  a  united  and  liberal 
Constitution  for  Germany  were  wrecked  by  the  op- 
position of  Austrian  diplomacy,  so  later,  all  his  re- 
peated efforts  in  this  direction  were  wrecked  by  that 
of  the  King  of  Prussia.     In  1819  this  very  incon- 
venient would-be  reformer  fell  Into  disgrace.     Only 
the  little  State  of  Saxe-Weimar,  then  under  Goethe's 
influence,  kept  the  promise  it  had  given  of  a  liberal 
Constitution. 

In  Prussia  everything  remained  as  of  old.  That  is 
to  say,  Prussia  had,  it  is  true,  modernised  Its  army, 
the  Prussian  nation  had,  thanks  to  this  modernisa- 
tion, saved  the  throne  for  its  dynasty,  but  had  after 
all,  by  so  doing,  only  increased  its  obligations.  From 
this  time  forth  we  Prussians  had,  indeed,  a  national 
army,  in  the  sense  of  universal  military  service,  but 
as  far  as  the  control,  equipment,  and  employment  of 
this  army  were  concerned,  we  had,  as  before,  only 
the  right  of  not  interfering  with  the  King.  From  the 
fresh  obligations  that  the  Prussian  citizen  had  taken 
upon  himself  the  Prussian  dynasty  merely  reaped  new 
rights   for  itself. 


78         THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Professor  Delbrtick^  tells  us  that,  when  the  old 
Roman  kings  had  trained  their  peasantry  to  efficiency 
in  war,  there  came  as  the  "inevitable  consequence" 
of  this  popular  war  organisation  a  democratic  ele- 
ment into  the  hitherto  absolutist  regime.  Yes!  when 
the  monarchy  was  too  obstinate  in  resisting  the  democ- 
ratisation  of  the  political  system,  the  latter  was  simply 
abolished  by  the  people,  who  had  been  forced  to  mili- 
tary service,  and  replaced  by  the  consular  system. 
Nietzsche  was  wrong:  history  is  not  an  eternal  re- 
currence. At  all  events,  the  Prussian  King,  when  he 
forced  his  peasants  and  citizens  to  universal  military 
service,  had,  fortunately  for  himself,  no  Roman  peas- 
ants to  deal  with.  What  Professor  Delbriick  styles  an 
"inevitable  consequence"  of  the  popular  war  organisa- 
tion may  possibly  be  applicable  to  France  and  per- 
haps even  to  modem  China.  For  Prussia  all  this 
remained  a  promise  which  was  often  repeated  but 
never  kept.  Professor  Delbriick  may  say  what  he 
likes.  What  in  the  case  of  the  Romans,  the  Greeks, 
the  French,  the  Swiss,  and,  latterly,  even  in  that  of 
the  Chinese,  led  to  democracy,  i.e.,  the  institution  of 
universal  military  service,  led  in  Prusso-Germany,  on 
the  contrary,  to  a  reinforcement  of  dynastic  absolut- 
ism. For  in  Prussia  there  began,  after  the  introduc- 
tion of  universal  military  service  and  the  victories 
over  Napoleon  which  it  made  possible,  instead  of  a 
democratic  era,  its  exact  contrary — that  terrible  re- 
action which,  beginning  with  Metternich,  celebrated 
its  highest  achievement  in  the  violent  imposition  of 
the  autocratic   Prussian   Constitution   of    1850   and, 

*  Ddbriick,   "Regierung  und  Volkswille,"  p.   100. 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER        79 

finally,  under  Bismarck,  took  on  the  legal  forms  of 
the  Socialist  law,  etc. 

Yes!  the  Romans  were  better  off  than  we  are.  It 
is  certainly  a  fact  that  Frederick  William  IV.,  in 
1848,  again  renewed  the  solemn  promise  and  vow  to 
make  his  army  thenceforth  take  the  oath  to  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  country.  But  this  promise  was  again 
not  kept.  The  Parliament  which  resulted  from  the 
Revolution  of  1848  was  forcibly  dissolved  in  Novem- 
ber of  the  same  year  under  the  pretext  that  "it  had 
exceeded  its  authority"  (?),  and  Prussia  was  com- 
pelled to  accept  that  feudal  Constitution  by  which  it 
is  still  governed.  In  days  when  even  the  Chinese  have 
emancipated  themselves  from  dynastic  ideas,  the 
Prusso-German  soldiers,  as  in  bygone  days,  swear 
their  oath  to  the  colours  not  upon  the  Constitution 
of  their  country,  but  to  the  King  and  Emperor,  as 
their  War  Lord.  They  swear,  according  to  Article 
64  of  the  German  Imperial  Constitution,  ''to  render 
unconditional  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the  Em- 
peror." And,  in  order  to  put  the  matter  beyond  doubt, 
par.  108  of  the  Prussian  Constitution  expressly  adds: 
"a  swearing-in  of  the  army  upon  the  Constitution  of 
the  country  does  not  take  place." 

The  idea  that  the  introduction  of  universal  mili- 
tary service  must  involve  the  democratic  right  of  the 
people  to  have  a  voice  in  its  employment,  and  thus 
end  the  era  of  offensive  wars,  is  so  self-evident  that 
it  was  always  treated  by  most  German  authors  and 
politicians  as  practically  a  matter  of  course.  Gustav 
Freytag,  for  instance,  in  1870,  demonstrated  with 
great  complacency  that  it  was  Prussia's  duty  to  bring 
civilisation  to  France  in  the  form  of  universal  military 


8o  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

service.  "With  this  highest  and  noblest  form  of  war- 
service  the  possibiHty  of  insolent  wars  of  conquest 
and  of  an  insane  military  vanity,  those  repulsive  mala- 
dies of  the  French,  is  inevitably  extinguished."  And 
he  emphatically  asserts  that  "universal  military  serv- 
ice makes  a  nation  not  merely  redoubtable  in  war,  but 
also  peaceable  in  peace/'^ 

The  same  idea  is  to-day  expounded  by  those  Ger- 
man authors  who  have  undertaken  to  prove  Germany's 
innocence  in  this  war.  Professor  Ernst  Troeltsch 
says,  for  example,  "But,  above  all,  this  universal 
arming  of  the  people  brings  about  the  important  con- 
sequence that  an  effectual  war  can  only  be  waged 
with  the  actual  consent  and  enthusiasm  of  the  people, 
and  must,  accordingly,  be  always  a  war  of  defence."^ 

A  statement  of  this  sort,  examined  by  the  light  of 
the  German  Constitution  and  the  facts  mentioned  in 
the  first  chapter  of  this  book,  strikes  one  as  simply 
ludicrous.  Gustav  Freytag  could  not  know,  of  course, 
in  1870  what  use  would  one  day  be  made  of  uni- 
versal military  service  in  Germany;  but  Professor 
Troeltsch,  who  does  certainly  know  our  Constitution 
and  the  true  facts  as  to  the  outbreak  of  the  World 
War,  should  know  how  easily,  in  the  country  of  the 
"Ems  telegram"  and  the  Treitschke  conception  of 
constitutional  law,  "the  consent  and  enthusiasm  of  the 
people"  can  be  secured  under  false  pretences.  Wher- 
ever, as  in  Germany,  universal  military  service  is 
not  accompanied  by  the  right  of  the  people  to  an 
active  share  in  the  government,  it  becomes  not  only 

*  Gustav  Freytag,   "Der   Kronprinz  und   die   deutsche  Kaiser- 
krone,"  8th  ed.,  Leipzig,   1889,  p.  43. 

'  "Deutschland   und  der  Weltkrieg,"  Berlin,   1915,  p.   ^2, 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER        81 

no  check  upon  offensive  wars,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
an  encouragement  to  them. 

The  fact  that  universal  mihtary  service  without  pop- 
ular sovereignty  is  sure  to  encourage  offensive  wars 
even  Professor  Delbriick,  who  has  himself  just  nar- 
rated to  us  the  prophetic  story  of  the  Roman  peas- 
ants, was  obliged  to  concede  indirectly.  With  a  naive 
pride  in  the  pretorian  organisation  of  the  German 
army,  he  ventures  to  inform  us^  that  the  Prussian 
officers-corps  is  even  to-day  animated  by  the  spirit 
of  the  ancient  Germans,  who  fought  not  for  their 
country,  but  for  their  prince,  and  never  troubled  their 
heads  about  the  aim  and  object  of  a  war,  or  the  po- 
htical  ideas  of  their  chief,  but  were  merely  pledged 
to  him  personally  by  their  oath  of  fealty.  *The  King 
is,  still  to-day,  the  head  of  his  retinue;  he  is  the 
comrade  of  his  officers,  and  to  him  they  look  up  as 
their  War  Lord,  and  such  is  the  foundation  of  our 
political  system.  In  the  Prussian  Constitution  it  is 
merely  stated  that  the  King  is  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  army,  and  this  is  stated  also  in  the 
Imperial  Constitution.'* 

Yes!  thus  it  is  actually  written,  and  thus  it  is;  the 
German  officers  are  the  retinue  of  the  King;  they  are 
pledged  by  their  oath  to  do  him  personal  service,  and 
they  trouble  not  a  jot  about  the  political  ideas  of 
their  prince.  The  German  Emperor  possesses  an  army, 
and  those  who  compose  and  defray  the  cost  of  this 
army,  namely,  the  German  citizens,  have  no  voice 
whatever  in  the  organisation  and  employment  of  this 
army — not  even  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  not  even  the 
Minister  of  War.  Under  the  German  constitution 
^  Delbriick,  "Regierung  und  Volkswille,"  p.  137. 


82  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

there  is  no  legal  connection  whatsoever  between  the 
army  and  the  people.     The  German  army  does  not 
exist  for  the  sake  of  the  country,  but  for  the  sake  of 
the  Emperor ;  for  "a  swearing-in  upon  the  Constitution 
of  the  country  does  not  take  place/'    In  peace,  as  in 
war,  the  German  Emperor  is  the  personal  and  absolute 
governor  of  his  army  and  navy.     Nothing  has  been 
altered   in  Prussia  in  this  respect   for  the  last  two 
hundred  years.     There  are  only  two  essential  points 
of   difference  between  William   II.   and  the   creator 
of  the  Prussian  military  power,  Frederick  William  L  ; 
firstly,  William  II.  no  longer  needs  to  send  recruiting 
sergeants  into  other  countries  to  impress  "tall  fellows'' 
at  a  high  rate  of  pay;  his  soldiers  are  granted  him 
by  the  Reichstag  and  paid  by  the  people;  and  when 
this    Reichstag   objects   to   the   military   demands    it 
is  straight  away  dissolved.^     Secondly,  the  German 
soldiers  of  to-day  no  longer  fight,  like  the  "tall  fel- 
lows" did,  grudgingly  and  for  money;  their  bravery 
no  longer  has  to  be  kept  up  to  the  mark  by  means 
of  the  cudgel.   No!  the  modern  soldiers  are  animated 
by  that  love  of  country  which  was  born  of  the  French 
Revolution,  and  the  moral  advantages  of  which  have 
been  turned  to  use  by  the  Prussian  dynasty,  without 
any  corresponding  recompense.    Otherwise  there  is,  as 
we  have  said,  no  difference  between  then  and  now. 
For  then,  as  now,  the  army  was  only  subservient  to 
the  royal  will ;  then,  as  now,  the  appointment,  advance- 
ment, punishment,  or  cashiering  of  officers  was  left 
solely  to  the  personal  and  arbitrary  decision  of  the 

^  E.g.,  on  ]\Iay  6th,  1893,  on  which  occasion  William  II.  de- 
clared openly  that  he  would  "crush  the  opposition,"  which,  in 
fact,  he  did,  for  the  Reichstag  very  promptly  voted  all  the 
soldiers  he  had   demanded. 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER        83 

King.  In  those  days,  as  in  these,  the  Prussian  officer 
did  not  trouble  his  head  about  the  political  aims  of 
his  prince ;  he  fought,  "like  the  good  old  Germans,"  not 
for  his  country,  but  only  for  his  War  Lord.  To-day, 
as  then,  the  King  is  the  first  officer  in  the  land,  struts 
about  in  the  uniform  of  his  troops,  devotes  his  main 
energies  to  his  army,  and  concedes  it  the  first  position 
in  the  life  of  the  State.  It  is  true  that  he  does  not, 
as  Frederick  William  I.  did,  arrange  the  marriages  of 
his  officers  by  a  peremptory  decree,  and  that  he  does 
not  perform  sentinel  duty  in  person  at  Potsdam,  but 
he  forces  his  officers  to  observe  special  ideas  of 
honour,  protects  them  against  any  civilian  attacks, 
prescribes  for  them  marriages  suitable  to  their  rank, 
and  grants  them  at  his  Court  privileges  that  the  most 
famous  university  professor  cannot  enjoy  unless  he 
happens  to  be  an  officer  of  the  Reserve.  To-day,  as 
then,  the  spirit  of  the  army  is  the  same:  sense  of  duty, 
blind  obedience,  absolute  fealty  to  the  lord  of  the  land. 
As  we  have  pointed  out,  the  only  things  that  have 
been  altered  since  those  bygone  days  are  the  composi- 
tion of  and  the  cost  of  maintenance  of  the  army, 
which,  in  consequence  of  the  liability  of  citizens  both 
to  serve  in  its  ranks  and  pay  the  taxes,  are  no  longer 
a  private  concern  of  the  King  but  the  affair  of  the 
nation  at  large.  Every^thing  else  (including  the  brutal- 
ities which  form  part  of  the  education  of  the  Prussian 
soldier)  has  remained,  in  principle,  undisturbed,  and 
the  idea  of  defence  of  country  is,  after  all,  only  a 
tacit  assumption  on  the  part  of  patriotic  citizens. 

*jC  5|C  ^»  •(•  ^h 

I  can  hear  the  indignant  remonstrances  of  my  Ger- 
man readers,  and  I  am  prepared  to  hear  the  shouts  of 


84  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  ninety-three  signatories  of  the  famous  appeal  to 
the  civiHsed  world:    ''It  is  not  true!    It  is  not  true!'* 

But  it  is  true !  In  these  calamitous  days  it  is  doubly 
true,  and  it  needs  to  be  proclaimed  to  the  whole  world ; 
the  Prussian  army  is  feudal,  not  national;  dynastic, 
not  democratic.  It  is  only  in  the  imagination  of  the 
German  taxpayer,  only  in  the  credulity  of  the  German 
people,  that  there  exists  a  national  army,  employed 
for  national  defence.  The  tradition  of  Prussia,  the 
form  of  its  constitution,  the  spirit  which  rules  in  it, 
and  the  absolutism  of  the  German  Emperor,  based 
upon  Article  ii  of  the  German  Imperial  Constitution, 
stamp  this  army  as  being  pre-eminently  a  royal  and 
Imperial  bodyguard — that  is,  an  instrument  for  the 
safeguarding  of  the  dynasty. 

If  anyone  still  has  any  doubts  on  this  subject,  let 
him  read  the  proclamations  and  speeches  of  William 
II.  Immediately  on  ascending  the  throne,  on  July 
15th,  1888,  he  addressed  a  proclamation  to  his  army, 
in  which  occur  the  words :  ^'So  we  belong  together, 
I  and  my  army,  so  we  were  born  together,  and  so  will 
we  indissolubly  hold  fast  to  one  another,  come,  as 
God  wills,  peace  or  storm."  In  William  II.'s  speeches, 
wherever  they  relate  to  the  army,  we  find  the  possessive 
pronoun  of  the  first  person:  my  army,  my  guard,  my 
engineers,  my  officers,  my  soldiers,  my  fleet,  etc.,  etc. 
In  this  way  he  insists,  on  every  opportunity,  that  the 
chief  quality  of  the  German  soldier  must  be  uncon- 
ditional, blind,  and  unfaltering  obedience.  And  that 
not  only  in  time  of  war,  but  also  in  internal  emer- 
gencies. William  II.  feels  so  intensely  that  he  is  the 
personal  owner  of  the  German  army  that  on  every 
occasion  of  the  swearing-in  of  recruits  he  perpetually 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER        85 

reiterates :  "You  have  sworn  me  the  oath  of  alle- 
giance"; and  on  November  23rd,  1891,  he  declared  to 
the  newly  sworn  recruits :  ''More  than  ever  before 
unbelief  and  dissatisfaction  lift  their  heads  in  the 
Fatherland,  and  the  occasion  may  arise  when  you 
will  have  to  shoot  down  or  bayonet  your  own  brothers 
and  relations.  Then  seal  your  allegiance  with  the 
sacrifice  of  your  heart's  blood!"  Again,  at  Breslau, 
on  December  2nd,  1896,  he  says:  *The  more  people 
shelter  themselves  behind  catchwords  and  party  con- 
siderations, the  more  firmly  and  securely  do  I  count 
upon  my  army,  and  the  more  confidently  do  I  hope 
that  my  army,  either  without  or  within  my  realms,  will 
wait  upon  my  wishes  a,nd  my  behests."  ''You  have 
the  honour  to  belong  to  my  guard  and  to  stand  in 
and  about  my  residence  and  my  capital.  You  are 
called  upon,  in  the  first  place,  to  protect  me  against 
internal  and  external  foes."  Thus  William  II.  ad- 
dressed the  newly  sworn  recruits  at  Berlin  on  Novem- 
ber i6th,  1893.  And,  on  June  15th,  1898,  in  the 
Lustgarten  at  Potsdam :  "I  assumed  the  Crown  with 
a  heavy  heart;  my  capacity  was  everywhere  doubted, 
and  everywhere  I  was  wrongly  judged.  Only  one 
had  confidence  in  me,  only  one  believed  in  me,  and 
that  was  the  army;  and,  with  its  support,  and  trust- 
ing in  our  old  God,  I  undertook  my  responsible  office, 
knowing  full  well  that  the  army  is  the  mainstay  of  my 
country  and  the  chief  pillar  of  the  Prussian  throne,  to 
which  God  in  His  wisdom  has  summoned  me." 

Anyone  who  is  acquainted  with  the  internal  develop- 
ment of  affairs  during  the  reign  of  William  II.  will 
also  know  that  the  Kaiser's  thirst  for  personal  pos- 
session and  power  does  not  merely  extend  to  the  army 


86  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

as  a  whole,  but  has  also  thrust  the  General  Staff  and 
the  Ministry  of  War  into  a  subordinate  position.  Just 
as  William  II.  was  always  his  own  Imperial  Chancel- 
lor, so  as  an  ardent  soldier  was  he  even  more  pro- 
nouncedly his  own  Chief  of  the  General  Staff. 

"A  far  more  modest  role  even  than  that  of  the 
Chancellor  in  relation  to  William  11.  is  that  of  the  man 
who  occupies  the  responsible  post  of  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  of  the  Army.  It  is  characteristic  of  the 
startling  importance  that  our  Emperor  attaches  to 
purely  external  considerations  that  a  Moltke  was  sum- 
moned to  the  post  as  soon  as  one  was  available.  A 
man  like  the  *great  man  of  silence'^  William  11.  could 
just  as  little  have  endured  at  his  side  for  any  length 
of  time  as  first  military  adviser,  as  he  could  endure 
the  Chancellorship  of  Bismarck.  But  he  wanted  to 
have  a  Moltke."  ^ 

And  so  in  this  field  William  II.  had  such  an  ab- 
solute sense  of  personal  property  in  his  army  that  he 
conferred  its  chief  command  on  any  one,  according 
to  his  fancy,  though  the  person  he  selected,  as  in 
Moltke's  case,  was  manifestly  incompetent,  and  though 
he  had  the  opinion  of  all  competent  Generals  against 
him. 

Anyone,  therefore,  who  is  not  satisfied  with  the  evi- 
dence afforded  by  the  German  and  Prussian  Consti- 
tutions cannot  fail  to  be  convinced  by  the  speeches  and 
acts  of  William  11.  that  we  have  not  a  national  but 
a  dynastic  army,  which  is  entirely  subservient  to  the 
private  judgment  of  the  sovereign  ruler,  and  regarded 

^i.e.,  Moltke,  of  whom  it  was  said  that  he  was  silent  in  seven 
languages. 

'"Unser  Kaiser  und  Sein  Volk,"  von  einem  Schwarzseher, 
Leipzig,    1906,   p.    TO. 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER        87 

by  him  as  the  "chief  pillar  of  the  Prussian  throne." 
Let  anyone  point  out  to  me  one  single  passage  in 
the  Emperor^s  speeches  in  which  William  11.  has  placed 
the  defence  of  our  country  before  that  of  his  person, 
his  house,  and  his  personal  power!  Let  anyone  cite 
me  the  speech  of  a  German  Minister  where  the  ques- 
tion of  the  right  of  the  people  to  have  a  voice  in  mili- 
tary matters  is  treated  with  anything  but  contempt. 
Such  a  speech  will  be  sought  in  vain.  Instead,  you 
will  find  at  every  turn  expressions  such  as:  *'The 
German  people  must  deem  it  an  honour  to  wear  the 
Emperor's  uniform  and  protect  the  Emperor's  house." 
"With  God  for  King  and  country !"  This  watchword, 
emanating  from  Frederick  William  III.,  and,  since 
1 87 1,  converted  into  "with  God  for  Emperor  and  Em- 
pire," expresses  clearly  and  unmistakably  what  Wil- 
liam II.  has  emphasised  over  and  over  again,  that  in 
Germany  the  Emperor  and  King  come  first,  and  the 
Fatherland  after^vards. 

The  fact  that  such  a  state  of  things  should  exist 
in  the  modern  w^orld  is,  as  we  have  said,  so  distress- 
ing to  a  German  that  he  either  pretends  not  to  notice 
it,  or  else  denies  it.  Ever  and  again  the  German  news- 
papers speak  of  "our  brave  greycoats,"  "our  redoubt- 
able troops,"  etc. ;  that  is,  they  try  to  take  it  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course  that  the  German  army  is  the  concern  of 
the  German  people.  Moreover,  there  are  large  num- 
bers of  Social  Democrats  who  declare  quite  seriously 
that  the  German  army  is  the  people  and  the  people 
the  German  army. 

But,  unfortunately,  viewed  by  the  light  of  the  Con- 
stitution and  of  facts,  all  this  is  only  pious  humbug, 
which  may  possibly  be  uttered  in  ignorance  and  good 


88  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

faith,  but  by  its  incredible  naivete  is  only  a  fresh 
proof  of  the  fact  that  we  Germans  are  wont  to  invest 
anything  incredible  in  our  politics  with  the  lying  sem- 
blance of  the  normal  democratic.  Here,  more  than 
anywhere  else,  the  naked  truth,  in  all  its  mediaevalism, 
is  utterly  intolerable  to  us. 

The  pious  legend  of  the  German  popular  army  does 
not  become  a  fact  because  it  is  constantly  referred  to 
by  distinguished  German  writers.  For  example,  the 
late  German  Imperial  Chancellor,  von  Biilow,  assures 
us  quite  seriously:  *'the  army  to-day  is  what  history 
has  made  it;  the  vigorous  expression  of  the  unity  of 
Empire,  State,  and  people."  ^  And  he  adds,  with 
great  complacency,  "so  it  is  also  in  France,  the  re- 
publican State  and  the  French  nation  are  blended  to- 
gether in  the  army."  Seeing  that  Herr  von  Biilow 
studiously  avoids  speaking  about  the  constitutional 
structure  of  this  army  and  only  praises  its  superb  quali- 
ties and  excellent  conduct  in  the  course  of  history, 
he  has  no  difficulty  in  assuring  us  that  ''the  officers 
and  men  both  in  the  North  and  the  South  feel  them- 
selves before  all  else  members  of  the  German  army, 
subjects  of  the  German  nation  in  arms."  Indirectly, 
indeed,  his  ebullitions  show  that  this  so-called  "na- 
tion in  arms"  is,  in  fact,  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
a  monarchical  army,  which  lives  "apart  from  all  in- 
ternal politics,  from  particularism  and  parties  gen- 
erally," but  he  endeavours,  in  the  same  breath,  to  make 
the  reader  understand  that  the  German  army  is,  like 
the  French,  the  strong  expression  of  the  national  will 
and  character.     We  are  sorry.  Your  Highness;  the 

*  Prince   Bernhard   von   Biilow,   "Imperial   Germany,"   p.    148. 
XLondon:  Cassell  &  Co.) 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER         89 

times  are  really  too  grave  for  such  conjuring  tricks! 
In  the  first  place,  the  question  is  not  what  the  Ger- 
man officers  and  men  feel  themselves  to  be,  but  what 
they  are  under  the  constitution.  And,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  our  constitution  absolutely  forbids  and  renders 
impossible  any  blending  of  the  Army  and  the  people 
in  Germany.  The  fact  that  the  officers  and  men  swear 
allegiance  expressly  to  the  person  of  the  King  instead 
of  to  the  welfare  of  the  nation  creates  an  impassable 
gulf  between  the  Army  and  the  people.  The  two  exist 
side  by  side,  without  interfusion  and  without  any  legal 
interdependence.  Our  very  constitution — or  rather 
the  hankering  of  the  dynasty  for  power  which  finds 
expression  in  our  constitution — establishes  the  Army^ 
as  a  State  within  the  State,  as  an  inviolable  dynastic 
institution,  placed  high  above  the  citizen  and  his 
morality.  If  anyone  still  has  any  doubts  on  this  head, 
he  may  learn  from  the  Kaiser's  speeches  that  in  Ger- 
many the  Army  and  the  people  are  rigorously  sundered 
by  the  clearly  and  repeatedly  expressed  intention  of 
the  Kaiser  that  the  Army  should  be  employed  at  his 
pleasure  against  "the  enemy  within  our  frontiers." 
And,  in  the  second  place,  Herr  von  Biilow  is  pleased 
to  deceive  both  himself  and  us.  For  the  German  of- 
ficers do  not  by  any  means  "feel"  themselves  what  he 
pretends.  Professor  Delbriick  emphasises  with  uncon- 
cealed pride,  in  his  book  "Regierung  and  Volkswille," 
the  wide  difference  between  the  German  and  the  French 
Armies:  "Xow  let  us  suppose  this  (the  French  sys- 
tem of  parliamentary  control  of  the  Army,  without 
which  no  national  army  is  really  possible)  transferred 
to  Prusso-Germany.  Let  us  assume  a  control  of  the 
Army  by  parliament,   and  select  anyone  you  please 


90  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

from  the  House  of  Deputies  or  the  Reichstag  and 
let  him  be  our  Minister  of  War.  Anyone  who  has 
the  least  acquaintance  with  our  officers  and  generals 
knows  that  this  is  an  impossibility,  knows  that  our 
Army  would  need  to  have  experienced  a  Sedan  in  the 
French  sense  before  it  would  submit  to  such  a  state 
of  things." 

Yet  Prince  von  Biilow  is  perfectly  well  acquainted 
with  Article  64  of  the  German  and  paragraph  108  of 
the  Prussian  constitution;  he  is  acquainted  also  with 
the  numerous  speeches  of  William  11.  relative  to  the 
Army;  he  knows  the  spirit  of  our  Officers  Corps,  and 
he  knows  that  Delbriick's  description  (written  a  year 
before  the  war)  is  entirely  in  accordance  with  facts. 
It  is  true  that  he  enjoys  the  reputation  of  seeing  things 
in  the  rosiest  light,  and  we  can  understand  that  in 
the  midst  of  the  stress  of  this  World  War  he  should 
more  than  ever  feel  the  need  of  insisting  on  the  rosy 
aspect  of  things,  but,  none  the  less,  the  problem  is 
so  momentous  a  one  for  the  future  of  Germany  that 
we  are  compelled  to  answer  him  with  the  most  em- 
phatic contradiction:  No,  Your  Highness!  The  Ger- 
man Army  is  not  ''the  vigorous  expression  of  the  unity 
of  Empire,  State  and  people";  it  is  the  expression, 
guaranteed  by  the  constitution  and  by  tradition,  of 
the  thirst  for  power  of  the  German  dynasty.  It  is 
what  the  soldier-king,  Frederick  William  I.,  made  it, 
and  what  it  has  been  plainly  and  repeatedly  declared 
to  be  by  the  soldier-emperor,  William  II. :  the  chief 
support  of  the  Prussian  throne. 

That  is  the  German  Army.  Anyone  who  ventures 
to  compare  the  French  Army  with  this  Army,  organ- 
ised entirely  upon  dynastic  principles,  and  to  speak  of 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER        91 

this  as  a  "national  army,"  must  incur  the  suspicion  of 
deliberate  falsification. 

But  it  is  the  same  with  our  army  as  with  our  Reichs- 
tag. Democratic  notions  have,  nowadays,  attained 
such  an  ascendancy  over  public  opinion,  and  are  felt 
by  every  rational  man  as  being  so  self-understood, 
that  we  Germans  quite  instinctively  try  to  represent 
as  democratic  things  that  are  two  centuries  behind 
democracy.  Hence  it  comes  that  Biilow  and  other 
representatives  of  German  culture,  including  also  the 
majority  of  our  Social  Democrats,  ever  and  anon  talk 
about  a  "nation  in  arms,"  a  "popular  army,"  and  other 
democratic  triumphs,  which  only  live  and  have  their 
being  in  the  imagination  of  ignorant  or  wilfully  blind 
patriots,  and  which,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  de- 
ceive the  German  people  as  to  the  real  aspect  of  af- 
fairs. For  the  true  facts  in  all  their  mediaevalism  are 
so  disgraceful  that  no  one  dares  admit  them  in  Ger- 
many. 

It  is  without  parallel  in  the  world's  history  that  a 
dynasty  contrived,  not  merely  to  retain  in  the  modern 
world  all  its  absolute  feudal  powers,  but  also  to  take 
advantage  of  modem  progress  (universal  military  ser- 
vice and  universal  taxation)  to  enhance  them  still 
further,  without,  in  return,  giving  the  serving  and  pay- 
ing portion  of  the  nation  a  democratic  equivalent. 
This  marvellous  achievement  of  dynastic  government 
could  only  occur  in  a  State  such  as  Prusso-Germany, 
in  which  thousands  of  servile  and  learned  sophists 
were  ever  ready  in  pompous  speeches  to  represent  to 
the  people  their  dearest  wishes  as  accomplished  facts. 
It  is  surely  not  presumptuous  if  to-day,  confronted 
with  the  World  War,  we  at  last  exclaim  "Enough !" 


92  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Let  the  German  people  be  honestly  told  how  matters 
stand.  Tell  them  that,  constitutionally,  they  are  not 
fighting  for  their  country,  but  for  their  Emperor.  Ex- 
plain to  them  that,  by  their  Constitution,  they  have 
no  right  to  inquire  into  the  why  and  the  wherefore  of 
the  war,  and  that  the  true  meaning  of  the  word  Burg- 
frieden  must  be  sought  in  the  attempt  to  disguise  the 
dynastic  policy  of  power. 

Then  we  shall  see  what  the  German  people,  who  do 
not  know  (but  at  most  guess)  this  state  of  affairs, 
really  think  :  Whether  they  will,  perchance,  with  Pro- 
fessor Delbriick,  find  their  ideal  in  fighting,  ''like  the 
Germans  of  old,"  not  for  country,  but  for  the  chief- 
tain, without  knowledge  of  his  political  aims,  and  only 
attached  to  him  blindly  by  the  oath  of  allegiance;  or 
whether  the  German  people  will  continue  to  be  be- 
fooled by  the  rhetoric  of  Biilow  and  Scheidemann, 
and  to  believe  that  we  possess  a  ''popular  and  a  na- 
tional army." 

What  Professor  Delbriick  in  191 3  arrogantly 
scoffed  at  as  an  impossibility,  namely,  that  the  Ger- 
man Army  should  some  day  experience  such  a  Sedan 
as  that  which  democratised  the  French  Army,  is  more- 
over imminent,  and  it  will  bring  about  the  same  result 
as  in  France.  It  is  the  fate  of  nations  and  of  the 
rulers  of  nations  that  they  only  learn  in  war  that  they 
have  learnt  nothing  from  war.  Professor  Delbriick 
and  the  other  worshippers  of  the  German  Empire  did 
not  suspect  what,  if  they  had  been  a  little  more  modest, 
they  might  have  learnt  from  the  world's  history, 
namely,  that  the  same  spirit  in  which  they  declaim  so 
arrogantly  against  the  French  military  system  was  also 
the  spirit  which   conjured   up  the   World   War  anc? 


BASIS  OF  DYNASTIC  POWER        93 

helped  to  prepare  that  Sedan  which  inspires  them  with 
so  much  uncalled  for  sympathy  for  France  and  her 
army. 

Yes!  the  German  people  will  learn  this  bitter  les- 
son from  the  World  War.  Henceforth,  to  the  ques- 
tion "Whom  does  the  army  obey?"  it  will  reply,  "The 
German  people." 


IV 


THE    PRINCIPLES    OE    GERMAN    POLICY: 

ALSO  A   HISTORY  OF   THE  EVENTS 

LEADING  UP  TO  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Manifestations  of  German  Militarism 

Whenever  the  Reichstag  in  a  serious  controversy 
attempted  to  raise  its  voice,  it  was  either  ignored,  or 
roundly  told  that  a  police  sergeant  with  twelve  men 
would  suffice  to  dissolve  it,  or  it  was  actually  dissolved. 

Our  Reichstag  has  been  at  infinite  pains  to  make 
something  of  itself.  And  in  spite  of  its  unconstitu- 
tional composition,  as  already  described,  it  would  have 
become  a  good,  domestic,  progressive  Reichstag,  had 
this  only  been  allowed.  But  was  this  ever  allowed? 
It  protested,  in  1878,  against  the  disgraceful  Socialist 
law ;  it  was  dissolved,  and  the  Socialist  law  for  twelve 
years  exposed  Germany  to  the  scorn  of  the  world. 

In  1887  it  had  the  audacity  to  propound  the  ques- 
tion: Imperial  or  parliamentary  army?  and  voted  the 
effective  force  of  the  army  for  three  instead  of  seven 
years ;  it  was  dissolved,  and  never  again  attempted  to 
talk  about  a  parliamentary  control  of  the  army. 

Again,  in  1893,  i^  ventured  to  protest  against  the 

94 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY       95 

constant  increase  of  armaments;  it  was  once  more  dis- 
solved, and  henceforth  was  obliged  to  vote  not  only 
the  land  armaments,  but  also  the  whole  new  naval 
programme  of  William  II. 

In  1907  it  raised  its  voice  against  the  colonial-  and 
world-policy;  it  was  again  dissolved,  and  (despite  the 
augmented  numbers  of  the  opposition  votes)  the  dy- 
nasty again  carried  the  day. 

More  than  once  it  vigorously  protested  against  the 
ill-usage  of  the  soldiers;  their  ill-treatment  was  re- 
gretted, but  not  suppressed,  for  it  is  part  and  parcel 
of  the  iron  discipline  of  the  Prussian  military  system. 
It  protested  (in  May,  19 12)  against  the  duelling  ob- 
ligation of  the  officers ;  but  although  an  Imperial  Order 
in  Council  (January  ist,  1897)  had  done  the  same,  a 
fresh  Order  in  Council,  in  defiance  of  Parliament, 
confirmed  what  the  Imperial  Chancellor  had  already 
in  person  told  it,  that  an  officer  who  was  not  at  any 
time  prepared  pistol  in  hand  to  defend  his  honour 
(which  was  a  special  honour)  could  remain  an  officer 
no  longer. 

In  the  affair  of  the  Daily  Telegraph,  the  Reichstag 
had  emphatically  protested  against  such  an  interven- 
tion of  the  Emperor  as  sensational  and  dangerous  to 
the  safety  of  the  State  (November,  1908) i;  but  Herr 

^On  October  29th,  1908,  the  Daily  Telegraph  published  some 
remarks  of  the  German  Emperor  regarding  his  relations  with 
England.  William  II.  expressed  therein  his  dissatisfaction  that 
the  English  did  not  credit  his  peaceful  assurances.  "Lies  and 
deception  are  foreign  to  my  nature.  My  actions  speak  for 
themselves.  You  have  paid  heed  not  to  my  actions,  but  to  those 
who  misrepresent  and  misinterpret  them."  The  Kaiser  de- 
clared that  it  would  be  difficult  for  him  to  maintain  a  friendly 
relation,  because  the  feeling  of  the  German  people  was  exceed- 
ingly  hostile  to   England;   that  he  was,  to  his   regret,   in  the 


96  THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

von  Billow,  who  had  dared  to  convey  to  the  monarch 
the  modest  wishes  of  the  popular  representative  body, 
had  to  go  at  the  first  available  opportunity,  and  Wil- 
liam 11. ,  in  his  Konigsberg  speech  (August  25th, 
1 9 10),  once  again  asserted  that  the  royal  power  "had 
been  granted  to  him  alone  by  the  grace  of  God  and 
not  by  Parliaments,  popular  assemblies,  and  popular 
resolutions."  With  greater  distinctness  than  this  no 
modern  sovereign  has  ever  rejected  the  principle  of 
popular  co-operation  in  government.  It  is  not  estab- 
lished whether  it  was  Louis  XIV.  or  Elizabeth  of 
England  who  uttered  the  famous  phrase  "Uetat,  c'est 
moi"  \  but  it  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  at  the  beginning 
of  the  twentieth  century  William  II.  repeatedly  and 
emphatically  made  this  notion,  "I  am  the  State,"  the 
keynote  of  his  public  utterances. 

Poor  Reichstag!  Over  and  over  again  it  initiated 
proposals  for  an  act  establishing  the  responsibility  of 
the  Imperial  Chancellor;  but  the  Government  treated 
all  such  endeavours  with  contempt.  Many  and  many 
a  time  it  tried  to  alter  its  standing  orders  and,  for 

minority,  as  it  were,  among  his  own  people;  that  he  had  shov/n 
during  the  Boer  War  what  peaceful  sentiments  he  nourished 
towards  England,  when  he  refused  to  receive  the  mission  from 
the  Boers  and  to  associate  himself  with  the  proposed  inter- 
vention of  France  and  Russia,  and  even  worked  out  a  plan  of 
campaign  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Boers,  and  sent  it  to  the 
Queen.  (William  II.  forgot  to  mention  the  famous  telegram 
to  Kriiger,  and  explained  his  desire  for  a  powerful  navy  as 
due  merely  to  the  necessity  of  protecting  Germany's  world- 
wide trade.)  These  statements  William  II.  allowed  to  be  pub- 
lished without  any  previous  consultation  with  his  Chancellor. 
It  turned  out  that  the  Imperial  Chancellor  had,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  approved  the  publication  of  this  Imperial  utterance, 
but  that,  wonderful  to  relate,  he  was  wholly  ignorant  of  its 
substance. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY      97 

example,  oblige  the  Chancellor  to  reply  to  questions 
within  a  specified  time;  the  Government  alwa3^s  re- 
mained deaf  to  these  entreaties.  Often  did  the  Reichs- 
tag demand  rewards  for  the  heroes  of  the  war  of 
1870-71,  but  the  Governm.ent  had  already  distributed 
a  portion  of  the  five  milliards  of  francs  it  received 
from  France  between  Moltke  and  his  General  Staff, 
and  nothing  remained  over  for  the  soldiers  who  had 
fought  and  bled. 

And,  finally,  the  Reichstag,  in  December,  19 13,  in- 
dignantly protested  that  the  military  authorities  should 
brutally  overrule  the  civilian  authorities  in  a  Consti- 
tutional State,  and  that  a  mere  lieutenant  should  have 
superior  rights  to  those  of  a  German  civil  authority." 
Poor  Reichstag!  The  vote  of  censure  passed  by  the 
Reichstag  was  not  only  absolutely  ignored  by  the  dy- 
nasty, and  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  who  had  under- 
taken the  impossible  task  of  proving  a  glaring  wrong 
to  be  right,  remained  still  more  firmly  established  in 
office,  but,  in  addition,  the  Zabern  criminals  were  dec- 
orated and  congratulated,  and  the  German  people  were 
once  again  given  to  understand  that  in  Germany  only 
one  will  prevails,  and  that  is  the  will  of  the  dynasty. 

So  we  find,  in  the  whole  course  of  the  Reichstag's 
history,  only  a  long,  dismal  chain  of  oppressions,  dis- 
solutions and  unwilling  submission  of  the  popular  will 
to  the  thirst  for  power  of  the  d}Tiasty.  It  was  only 
in  subordinate  matters  that  the  Reichstag  was  allowed 
a  free  hand.  Yes!  when  Biilow,  in  consequence  of 
the  rejection  of  the  probate  duty,  retired  from  the 
conduct  of  State  affairs,  we  were  filled  with  delight, 
and  pictured  ourselves  as  living  in  a  parliamentary 
model    State.      The   delight  was   of   brief   duration. 


98         THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Biilow^s  place  was  taken  by  a  man  who  soon  put  an 
end  to  the  "liberal  era,"  declared  Social  Reform  to  be 
completed,  and  in  every  respect  revived  the  old  regime. 

The  simple  German  has  fared  with  his  Reichstag 
much  as  did  "Hans  in  luck"  of  the  fairy  tale,  when  he 
exchanged  his  lump  of  gold  for  a  horse,  and  then  the 
horse  for  a  cow,  the  cow  for  a  donkey,  and  so  on, 
until  he  had  nothing  left,  but  still  comforted  himself 
with  the  reflection  that  he  was  the  richest  and  luckiest 
man  in  the  world.  Similarly,  the  promises  made  to  the 
German  people  after  the  war  of  1870-71  may  be  com- 
pared with  a  veritable  lump  of  gold  of  democratic 
rights  and  privileges.  But  Bismarck,  and  still  more 
the  "new  course"  of  William  II.,  forced  our  popular 
Assembly  to  make  one  exchange  after  the  other. 
When  the  simple  German,  on  the  occasion  of  the  well- 
known  Zabern  affair,  was  able  to  some  extent  to  strike 
the  balance  of  his  democratic  rights  and  liberties,  he 
found  that  all  that  was  left  of  his  lump  of  gold  was 
a  lordly  building,  before  which  stand  a  column  of 
Victory  and  a  gigantic  Bismarck  in  bronze,  to  wit,  a 
glittering  Nothing,  surrounded  by  military  symbols 
and  serving  purely  military  ends  and  objects.  But 
comfort  was  forthcoming  from  his  intellectual  su- 
periors ;  they  proved  to  him  over  and  over  again  that 
he  had  no  use  for  gold,  that  he  was,  nevertheless,  the 
wealthiest  and  luckiest  of  Europeans,  since,  as  Herr 
von  Billow  says,  "the  degree  of  popular  participation 
in  State  affairs  is  not  to  be  measured  merely  by  the 
sum  of  the  rights  accorded  to  the  popular  assembly." 

And  the  simple  fellow  was  comforted.  Could  he  be 
aught  else?  To  him,  as  Herr  von  Biilow  so  politely 
put  it,  "political  talent  was  denied."     He  convinced 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY      99 

himself,  again  to  quote  von  Biilow,  that  "we  are  not 
a  political  people."  So  he  buried  his  disgust  and 
vexation  with  politics  in  philosophy  and  social  science. 
And  here,  where,  so  long  as  he  only  stuck  to  theories, 
he  was  free  from  dynastic  interference,  he  became  the 
most  revolutionary  being  in  the  world. 

No  one  ever  planned  such  brutal  revolutions  on 
paper  as  Kautsky  and  the  other  devotees  of  the  social 
economy  of  Marx.  No  one  was  so  energetic  in  re- 
valuing all  values,  or  so  merciless  in  philosophising 
against  the  good  God  with  a  hammer  as  Nietzsche 
and  his  disciples.  And  while  the  German  riddle  was 
presenting  itself  to  us  with  a  more  threatening  aspect 
every  day,  Haeckel,  Ostwald,  and  Eucken,  with  bold 
intellectual  flights,  solved  the  riddle  of  the  universe, 
severed  friendship  with  the  gods  above,  and  built  up 
a  monistic  theory  of  civilisation  the  audacity  of  which 
was  only  exceeded,  if  at  all,  by  the  revolutionary 
phrases  of  the  social-democratic  orators.  Then  there 
w^ere  the  radical  theories  concerning  free  love  and  the 
education  of  children,  and  all  the  daring  reforms  in 
literature  and  art,  in  the  theatre,  the  school,  and  the 
association ! 

It  seemed  as  if  revolution  were  ready  to  blaze  up 
at  every  turn  and  corner.  A  cloud  of  dissatisfaction 
brooded  over  Germany,  and  to  observant  foreigners 
it  seemed  as  though  the  flashes  of  lightning  were  pro- 
claiming the  approach  of  a  new  Germany. 

But  alas !  This  same  simple  German,  who  had  just 
overthrown  all  the  gods,  who  had  criticised  without 
mercy  the  whole  ordering  of  civilian  society  and  law, 
and  had  constructed  the  most  ideal  freedom  in  the 
upper  air,  became  as  red  as  a  schoolboy  if  a  policeman 


loo       THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

at  the  next  corner  of  the  street  looked  at  him  more 
suspiciously  than  usual;  his  revolutionary  theories 
evaporated  completely  at  sight  of  an  officer's  uniform, 
and  all  his  beautiful  ideals  of  freedom  fluttered  away, 
as  if  they  had  been  criminal  fancies,  as  soon  as  a  Gov- 
ernment organ  showed  the  slightest  tendency  to  disap- 
prove of  them.  An  impassable  something  separated 
the  idea  of  liberty  from  the  liberating  act.  Revolu- 
tionary views  and  reactionary  realities!  Of  w^hat 
avail  to  the  German  citizen  was  disrespect  for  the  gods 
in  heaven,  if  the  gods  of  the  earth  forcibly  demanded 
his  respect  at  every  turn? 

Herr  von  Biilow  was  right;  we  are  not  a  political 
people!  Nowhere,  not  even  in  Freemason  lodges,  not 
even  in  the  trade  unions,  dare  we  discuss  politics.  The 
statutes  of  every  respectable  association  contain  the 
rule  that  political  (and  religious)  discussions  are  pro- 
hibited. Where  three  Germans  talked  politics,  the 
walls  had  ears.  Questions  such  as :  Republic  or  Mon- 
archy? Whom  does  the  army  obey?  Who  decides 
upon  war  and  peace,  and  our  future  development  as 
a  nation? — questions  of  life  and  death,  and  right  and 
liberty,  which  can  be  traced  through  the  political  his- 
tory of  all  civilised  peoples  and  gave  the  dynasties  of 
Athens  and  Rome  more  trouble  than  all  their  ex- 
ternal foes  put  together,  may,  among  us,  only  be  de- 
bated and  answered  in  a  purely  monarchical  sense. 
There  was  a  deluge  of  prohibitions  of  meetings.  Press 
prosecutions,  and  charges  of  Use  majeste  whenever 
anything  smacked  of  "Revolution"  and  "liberty";  and 
anyone  who  tried  to  write  a  word  of  truth  on  political 
matters  was  in  danger  of  imprisonment. 

We  are  certainly  not  a  political  nation.     We  lacked 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     loi 

a  political  ideal.  Seeing  that  in  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury political  ideals  are  necessarily  democratic,  our 
dynasty,  to  save  trouble,  forbade  us  to  concern  our- 
selves with  politics,  declaring  that  we  were  too  stupid 
for  them.  It  instinctively  felt  that,  in  a  free  contest 
of  opinions,  it  could  not  hold  its  own  in  these  days, 
and  so  it  allowed  us  all  possible  liberties,  except  the 
one  which  is  the  key  to  all  of  them — political  liberty. 

This  is  the  explanation  of  the  peculiarity  Herr  von 
Billow  has  constantly  taxed  us  with — that  we  have 
remained  an  unpolitical  people,  and  this  procures  for 
us  also  the  satisfaction  of  being  unanimously  praised 
by  our  professors  as  a  "monarchically-minded  people." 

The  simple  German  instinctively  felt  that  a  danger 
and  a  reaction  were  concealed  in  the  political  events 
of  the  past  forty  years,  but  he  could  not  and  dared 
not  realise  the  secret  opposition  which  necessarily  arose 
in  a  feudal  military  State  like  Prusso-Germany  be- 
tween dynastic  rights  and  privileges  and  nineteenth- 
century  notions  of  civil  law.  Hence,  the  German  peo- 
ple never  comprehended  the  more  deeply  rooted  causes 
of  the  arbitrary  acts  which  constantly  offended  their 
sense  of  justice  in  German  home  politics.  The  mon- 
strous fact  that,  wherever  the  prestige  of  the  dynasty 
or  the  privileges  of  the  officer  or  official  were  con- 
cerned, the  whole  theory  of  right  under  civil  law  was 
simply  put  on  one  side  and  replaced  by  a  military- 
dynastic  theory  of  right,  was,  as  far  as  possible,  con- 
cealed from  him.  The  simple  German  allowed  him- 
self to  be  perpetually  assured  by  his  superiors  that 
our  Government  was  the  most  progressive  of  all 
Governments,  that  everything  took  place  in  accord- 
ance   with    a    well-thought-out    plan,    and    that    the 


102        THF  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

national    welfare    was    always    the    end    in    view. 

On  ascending  the  throne,  the  Emperor  first  ad- 
dressed his  army,  then  his  navy,  and  only  then  "My 
people,"  just  as  though  the  people  was  there  for  the 
army's  sake,  and  not  the  army  for  the  sake  of  the 
people.  But  the  simple  German  regarded  this  as  merely 
a  tradition,  which  was  no  doubt  intended  to  be  more 
friendly  towards  the  people  than  it  appeared. 

Did  not  a  cobbler  don  an  officer's  uniform,  and  by 
aid  of  this  costume,  which  renders  a  person  in  Ger- 
many all  powerful,  rob  the  town-chest  of  a  burgo- 
master and  arrest  both  him  and  his  secretary?  The 
simple  German  only  saw  the  comic  side  of  this  episode, 
and  did  not  reflect  what  an  alarming  proof  of  the 
militarised  mentality  of  the  German  civil  authorities 
this  Kopenick  affair  really  was. 

William  II.  declared  to  his  soldiers:  "You  wear 
the  Emperor's  coat,  therefore  you  are  raised  above 
other  men!"  (Kiel,  December  3rd,  1894.)  Here  again 
the  simple  German  only  regarded  this  as  a  chance 
phrase,  which,  though  it  annoyed  him,  could  not  rob 
him  of  his  joy  in  the  proud  German  army. 

That  the  Emperor  always  appeared  in  public 
dressed  as  a  soldier  and  never  spoke  to  the  citizens  of 
the  nineteenth  century  in  mufti,  that  the  Prussian  Min- 
ister of  War  and  other  State  officials  also  showed 
themselves  in  the  popular  assembly  in  uniform,  and 
that  even  the  President  of  the  Reichstag  strutted  about 
in  the  uniform  of  a  lieutenant  of  the  Reserve  when- 
ever he  was  permitted  to  appear  in  his  Majesty's  train 
— all  this  had  no  deep  significance  for  the  simple  Ger- 
man.    These  things  made  no  impression  on  him;  he 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     103 

regarded  them  as  a  custom,  and  could  not  imagine 
them  otherwise. 

Although  at  all  the  official  receptions,  parades,  and 
banquets  the  military  always  took  precedence  of  civil- 
ians; although  the  Imperial  acts  of  grace  referred  only 
to  military  persons;  although  the  Berlin  Court  was 
such  a  glitter  of  uniforms  that  the  late  English  Min- 
ister of  War,  Haldane,  felt  abashed  amid  all  this 
brilliancy,  and  modestly  declined  the  Imperial  invita- 
tion to  the  manoeuvres;  although,  from  these  and  a 
hundred  other  customs  and  events,  it  became  clearer 
and  clearer  that  the  officer  in  Germany  takes  the  first 
place,  while  the  citizen  is,  as  it  were,  regarded  only 
as  an  adjunct  to  the  military,  still  the  honest  German 
failed  to  realise  the  true  import  of  these  facts.  On 
the  one  hand,  a  rational  co-operation  in  politics  was 
denied  and  abused  to  him,  and,  on  the  other,  he  had 
been  so  much  drilled,  both  by  education  and  habit, 
into  a  military  conception  of  the  State  that  he  hon- 
estly believed  the  whole  system  to  be  part  and  parcel 
of  the  organisation  of  a  modern  constitutional  State. 
Yes,  he  perceived  in  all  this  merely  evidence  of  a  higher 
culture.  His  views  were,  as  we  have  said,  influenced 
by  people  who,  like  Herr  von  Biilow,  honestly  assured 
him:  "The  voice  of  our  national  conscience  tells  us 
w^hat  German  militarism  really  is :  the  best  thing  we 
have  achieved  in  the  course  of  our  national  develop- 
ment as  a  State  and  a  people"  ;^  or,  again,  by  chemists, 
who,  unfortunately  for  Germany,  have  a  passion  for 
generalities,  for  instance,  Professor  Ostwald,  who, 
from  the  height  of  his  scientific  knowledge,  preaches 

^Prince  von  Biilow,  'Imperial  Germany,"  p.   147.    (London: 
Cassell  &  Co.) 


104        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

that  German  militarism  "actually  represents  the  high- 
est degree  of  civilisation  yet  developed."^ 

There  is  certainly  no  objection  to  be  made  to  the 
simple  German  and  his  betters  regarding  as  both  nor- 
mal and  civilising  what  all  other  modern  States  regard 
as  contempt  of  the  people  and  political  slavery.  If 
the  political  development  of  the  German  people  had 
arrived  at  a  point  where  the  army  was  regarded  not  as 
the  servant,  but  as  the  master  of  the  nation,  this  was 
to  be  lamented  (as  a  proof  that  we,  out  of  servility  to 
our  dynasty,  are  about  a  hundred  years  behind  the 
times),  but  was  at  the  same  time  perfectly  compre- 
hensible. We  Germans  have  had  the  belief  forced 
upon  us  that  the  Hohenzollerns,  thanks  to  their  mili- 
tary genius,  saved  the  united  Germany;  we  were  told 
so  much  about  the  unfavourable  position  of  Germany 
and  the  resulting  devastations  of  the  Thirty  Years' 
War,  about  the  deplorable  disunion  of  the  German 
races,  and  other  things  of  the  sort,  that  we  were, 
finally,  led  to  believe  that  the  drill-master  was  our 
only  salvation. 

Hence,  we  must  define  German  militarism  as  an 
historical  product,  and  realise  that  the  German  people 
had  gradually  become  militarised,  not  only  in  their  or- 
ganisation, but  in  their  whole  outlook  and  philosophy. 

We  might,  therefore,  in  agreement  with  the  repre- 
sentatives of  German  culture,  laud  German  militarism 
as  the  basis  of  German  culture,  and  prove  that,  far 
from  being  a  menace  to,  it  is  actually  a  safeguard  of 
the  peace  of  the  world.  Unfortunately,  however,  the 
principles  which  govern  a  State's  home  policy  also 

^Prof.      Wilh.      Ostwald,      "Monistische      Sonntagspredigten" 
.(Monistic  Sunday  addresses),  December   ist,   1914. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     105 

govern  its  foreign  policy.  And,  unfortunately,  conduct 
which  at  home  only  vexes  or  pleases  the  private  citizen, 
when  extended  beyond  the  frontiers  becomes  a  source 
of  vexation  or  pleasure  to  other  nations. 

And  since  Germany's  foreign  policy  is  far  less  sub- 
ject to  national  control  even  than  her  home  policy,  the 
same  principle  which  at  home  only  produces  a  comedy 
like  the  Kopenick  incident  or  a  tragedy  like  the  Zabern 
affair  may  become  a  danger  to  the  whole  world.  If 
even  a  man  like  Biilow  has  to  admit  that :  *The  his- 
tory of  our  home  policy,  with  the  exception  of  a  few 
bright  spots,  is  to  the  time  of  the  World  War  a  history 
of  political  mistakes,"  ^  one  may  imagine  the  nature  of 
a  foreign  policy  governed  by  the  same  principles. 

For  whereas  in  home  policy  the  dynasty  was  still 
frequently  obliged  to  disguise  the  answer  to  the 
question  "Whom  does  the  army  obey?"  with  all 
kinds  of  democratic  phrases,  there  was  no  such  restraint 
upon  its  arbitrary  will  in  the  case  of  foreign  policy. 
Moreover,  in  the  realm  of  foreign  policy,  the  dynasties 
have  at  their  disposal  a  perfectly  irresponsible  secret 
diplomacy,  which  on  the  ground  of  higher  interests 
of  State  renders  account  to  no  one  of  its  proceedings. 
Even  in  a  democratic  State  like  France,  this  secret 
diplomacy  concludes  treaties  and  alliances  over  the 
head  of  the  Parliament.  How  much  more  must  this 
be  the  case  in  a  State  like  Germany,  where,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  dynasty,  in  virtue  of  Article  11  of  the  Consti- 
tution, pronounces  the  supreme  decision  in  everything. 

It  is  well-known  that  the  foreign  policy  of  all  States 
has  hitherto  been  guided  solely  by  military  considera- 

^  Prince   von  Billow,  "Imperial   Germany,"  p.   158.     (London: 
Cassell  &  Co.) 


io6        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

tions.  Humanity  is  still  waiting  for  the  genius  who 
shall  compel  Governments  to  apply  the  same  standard 
of  civic  justice  and  morality  to  their  foreign  policy  as 
they  (apart  from  exceptions)  already  apply  to  their 
home  policy.  Hitherto,  in  the  realm  of  international 
politics,  everything  has  been  a  question  of  mihtary 
strength.  Without  intending  to  insult  the  diplomats, 
they  might  be  described  as  anarchists  in  kid  gloves, 
who,  in  their  conversation,  with  the  utmost  amiability 
and  discretion,  make  constant  allusion  to  their  pro- 
vision of  bombs,  in  order  to  give  more  emphasis  to 
their  demands.  Hence  the  attitude  of  a  State,  its 
demands  and  its  threats  are  regulated  according  to 
the  armed  might  which  it  hasbehind  it  as  a  last  resource 
for  proving  the  justice  of  its  conduct.  The  only  excep- 
tions to  this  sublime  rule  are  the  small  States  like 
Switzerland,  Holland,  Belgium,  etc.,  which  support 
their  foreign  policy  not  so  much  by  armed  strength  as 
by  exploiting  the  rivalries  of  the  Great  Powers. 

Thus,  in  reference  to  foreign  policy,  armies  are  no 
longer  considered  as  passive  instruments  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  country;  in  the  hands  of  the  diplomats  they 
become  threats  and  standards  of  right  and  wrong. 

Down  to  the  French  Revolution  it  was  an  under- 
stood thing  that  the  Almighty  had  only  created 
nations  for  the  sake  of  kings.  Still,  the  dynasties  of 
feudal  days  were  so  considerate  that  they  only  enforced 
their  policy  by  means  of  soldiers,  whom  they  hired, 
much  as  an  African  explorer  hires  his  escort.  Hence, 
the  fact  that  the  foreign  policy  of  those  times 
openly  and  honestly  served  only  the  interests  of  the 
dynasties,  and  that  dynasties  waged  war  upon  each 
other  at  will  and  upon  the  most  trifling  pretexts, 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     107 

without  the  slightest  regard  to  the  welfare  of  their 
peoples,  is  perfectly  intelligible.  For  they  employed 
for  the  purpose,  as  already  stated,  only  such  soldiers 
as  voluntarily  undertook  the  task.  Love  of  country, 
defence  of  country,  blessings  of  civilisation,  etc.,  were, 
in  those  days,  not  dreamt  of.  Politics  and  ''their 
continuation  by  other  means,"  that  is  to  say,  by  war, 
was  not  a  national  question  but  a  private  concern  of 
the  dynasty.  When  Soubise  was  defeated  at  Rossbach 
the  Paris  populace  hardly  concealed  their  jubilation 
that  the  braggarts  of  Versailles  had  got  a  rebuff. 
When,  in  1792,  Prussia  and  Austria  marched  upon 
France,  the  Prusso-Austrian  peoples  hardly  troubled 
their  heads  about  it;  no  one  regarded  the  defeats  at 
Valmy  and  Jemappes  as  a  national  disaster;  and 
Goethe's  "Campaign  in  France"  treats  this  campaign 
as  a  purely  dynastic  episode,  and  one  looks  in  vain, 
in  his  description  of  it,  for  any  patriotic  sentiment. 

This  epoch  of  absolute  lordship,  and  of  undisguised 
camarilla  politics,  when  war  was  openly  regarded  not 
as  a  crime  against  nations,  but  merely  as  an  adventure 
for  illustrious  personages,  led  to  the  great  French 
Revolution,  which  gave  it  the  death-blow. 

That  birth  certificate  of  modern  society,  the  declara- 
tion of  human  and  civic  rights  formulated  by  the 
French  Revolution,  states,  in  Article  3,  "the  principle 
of  all  sovereignty  essentially  rests  in  the  nation; 
and  no  corporation,  no  individual,  can  express  any 
authority  which  has  not  originated  from  it."  With 
these  words  the  people  themselves  undertook  the  shap- 
ing of  their  destiny;  the  armed  force  was,  henceforth, 
based  upon  universal  military  service,  and  was  inspired 
by  the  sacred  idea  of  defence  of  country.    The  modem 


io8        THE  COMING  DEMOCIL\CY 

Fatherland,  that  is  to  say,  the  constitutional  State 
striving  towards  ever-increasing  justice  and  liberty, 
had  come  into  being. 

It  is  patent  that  foreign  politics  were  thus,  at  one 
stroke,  revolutionised.  The  political  organisation, 
army,  administration  and  government  of  the  new  form 
of  State  were  bound,  for  the  future,  to  place  their 
services  at  the  disposal  of  the  common  weal. 

These  new  and  excellent  ideas  were,  to  be  sure, 
overthrown  in  France,  at  any  rate  in  practice.  The 
National  Convention  conquered  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine  and  Xapoleon  I.  waged  war  against  all  Europe. 
All  the  same,  this  fundamental  readjustment  of 
the  aspirations  and  aims  of  foreign  policy  became, 
in  theory,  a  model  for  all  States.  Dynasties  were 
compelled  to  bow  to  the  common  weal.  From  a 
purely  dynastic  affair,  the  policy  of  the  State  and 
all  that  appertained  thereto  (especially  the  military 
system)  became  nationalised.  Henceforth,  if  a  dynasty 
wished  to  engage  in  war,  it  had  first  to  prove  to  its 
subjects  that  its  aim  was  not  to  increase  by  this  means 
its  own  power  and  exchequer,  but  to  promote  the 
welfare  of  the  people  at  large. 

But  in  this,  as  in  everything,  the  dynasties  only 
unwillingly  and  apparently  yielded  to  the  new  de- 
mands. The  same  France  which  had  proclaimed  to 
the  world  those  magnificent  ideas  reverted  openly  in 
its  foreign  policy  (in  spite  of  the  fact  that  these  same 
principles  had  again  been  insisted  upon  in  the  Revolu- 
tion of  1848)  to  the  dynastic  point  of  view.  With  the 
Crimean  War  and  the  Mexican  campaign,  Napoleon 
III.  annihilated  the  last  remnants  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
and  raised  the  Bonaparte  dynasty  to  the  zenith  of  its 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     109 

power.     France,  to  be  sure,  became  once  again  '7a 
grande  nation"   and   the   most   redoubtable   military 
Power  in  Europe,  but  the  French  people  had  to  pay 
for  this  patriotic  satisfaction    (just  as  the  German 
people  had  after  1871)  with  the  loss  of  all  those  politi- 
cal liberties  that  they  had  painfully  won  in  the  course 
of  three  revolutions.   Like  causes  produce  like  effects. 
The  France  of    1850-1870  was  a  precursor  of  the 
Germany    of    1871-1914;    detested    and    feared    by 
other   nations,    condemned   by    the   whole    world    as 
arrogant,  vain,  and  thirsty  for  war,  the  Second  Empire 
was,  in  its  home  policy,  reactionary  through  and  through. 
It  is  an  historical  law  (alas!  disregarded)  that  every 
increase   of    dynastic   power   must   be   paid    for   by 
the  people  with  a  corresponding  diminution  of  their 
rights  and  privileges,  and,  at  the  same  time,  regarded 
by  neighbouring  countries  as  a  danger  and  menace  of 
war.     Napoleon   IIL   wrote   several   books    (just   as 
William  II.  made  a  host  of  speeches),  in  which  he 
vigorously  endeavoured  to  prove  that  his  foreign  policy 
was  only  subservient  to  the  weal  of  the  French  nation. 
Yet    dynastic    weal    and    popular    weal    are    poles 
asunder,  just  as  are  capital  and  labour.     They  can 
only    be     reconciled     by    pious    phrases     and     lies. 
Napoleon's  w^ife  destroyed  the  effect  of  the  whole  of 
his  literary  work  with  a  single  sentence :     "C'est  ma 
guerre !''  she  exclaimed  with  great  complacency  on  the 
outbreak  of  the  Franco-German  War.     Possibly  the 
long  ennui  of  Court  festivities  prompted  this  desire  for 
other  distractions;  in  any  case,  this  expression  shows 
clearly  that  the  assertion  of  human  rights  and  the 
democratic    aspirations    of    the    nineteenth    century 
had  made  no  impression  on  this  exalted  personage. 


no        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

In  the  eyes  of  a  dynasty  nations  have  only  the 
right  to  serve  ^'higher  interests,"  that  is  to  say,  to 
gather  laurels  for  their  rulers  on  the  bloodstained 
fields  of  battle. 

After  the  death  of  Frederick  II.  foreign  politics 
were  little  discussed  in  Prusso-Germany.  The  Wars 
of  Liberation,  the  ensuing  Vienna  Congress,  and 
the  Holy  Alliance  won  for  Prussia  once  more  some 
respect  in  Europe.  Yet  how  little  Prussia's  foreign 
policy  was  dictated  by  considerations  for  the  public 
w^eal  was  immediately  after  displayed  to  the  nation 
by  Frederick  William  III.  in  that  terrible  reaction 
which  followed  the  \A'ars  of  Liberation  and  only 
terminated  in  1848.  After  the  brief,  bright  interval  of 
1848  Bismarck  entered  upon  ^letternich's  inheritance. 

Bismarck's  speeches  and  letters,  his  ''Reflections  and 
Reminiscences,"  are  full  of  proofs  that  he,  as  he 
acknowledged,  regarded  himself  only  as  the  "servant  of 
his  lord."  He  was  very  skilful  in  proving  to  the  Ger- 
man people  that  dynastic  weal  is  tantamount  to  public 
weal.  We  were  wrong  in  believing  him.  For  Bis- 
marck, though  in  his  youth  imbued  with  republican 
ideas,  was  the  absolute  negation  of  all  those  democratic 
ideals  which  had  already  been  more  or  less  put  into 
practice  in  the  politics  of  Western  Europe,  and  without 
which  a  popular  form  of  government  had  become  in- 
conceivable. 

Bismarck's  foreign  policy,  which  was  directed  first 
against  the  Hapsburgs,  then  against  the  Bonapartes, 
resulted,  when  he  had  triumphed  all  along  the  line,  in 
a  united  German  Empire  with  a  constitution  w^hich, 
as  we  have  said,  placed  all  the  power  in  the  hands  of 
the  German  Emperor  and  stamped  it  henceforward  not 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    in 

as  a  liberal-progressive,  but  as  an  autocratic  State 
with  a  democratic  veneer. 

It  may  be  asserted  that  Bismarck's  foreign  policy 
was  advantageous  to  Germany.  In  fact,  almost  all 
German  historians  and  politicians  agree  that  the 
victories  of  1864,  1866,  and  1870-71  brought  the 
nation  that  moral  prestige  which  enabled  it  to  develop 
its  commercial  and  technical  capacity  and  to  become  a 
State  with  a  world-wide  trade  of  the  first  rank. 

But  there  appertain  to  the  common  weal  not  merely 
material  but  ideal  blessings,  of  which  the  greatest 
and  most  essential  is  political  liberty.  Moreover,  if 
we  place  Germany's  material  progress  since  1870  to 
the  credit  of  the  Bismarck  wars,  we  must  reflect  that 
France  also  has,  during  the  same  period,  achieved 
a  similar  result.  The  astounding  economic  develop- 
ment of  Germany  during  the  past  forty  years 
must  then  be  attributable  to  other  causes  than  Bis- 
marck's foreign  policy.  Otherwise  the  vanquished  and 
ruined  France  would  not  be  able  to  show  a  like 
phenomenon. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  furnish  evidence  that 
victorious  wars  can  never  be  the  cause  of  material 
national  prosperity.  But,  speaking  generally,  we  may 
say  that  if  Bismarck  had  welded  the  German  races 
into  national  unity  without  any  war,  the  national 
prosperity  of  Germany  would,  thanks  to  the  genius  of 
the  German  merchant  and  technologist,  have  developed 
just  as  brilliantly  as,  and  certainly  more  safely  than, 
it  did  through  Bismarck's  annexation  and  armament 
policy,  which  brought  us  forty  years  of  unrest, 
oppressive  taxation,  and  finally  this  World  War. 

The  war  of    1870-71    was,   like  the  present  war, 


112        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

ushered  in  with  hollow  bombast.  Then,  as  to-day, 
much  was  talked  about  progress,  liberty,  and  unity. 
But,  as  so  often  before,  pompous  words  only  veiled 
private  interests.  The  German  nation  hoped  to  achieve 
through  the  war  not  only  its  unity,  but  its  political 
emancipation,  but  it  soon  discovered  that  the  only 
result  of  the  war  was  to  raise  the  rank  of  its  dynasty. 
The  battles  of  Worth  and  Weissenburg  had  hardly 
been  fought  when  the  Crown  Prince  Frederick 
asked :  "And  what  is  to  be  the  position  of  the 
King  of  Prussia  after  this  war?"  and  he  himself 
furnished  the  reply:  ''He  must  become  Emperor!" 
But  why  should  he  become  Emperor  ?  Gustav  Freytag-^ 
explained  to  his  prince  the  dangers  of  Imperialism: 
the  glamour  of  Majesty,  of  Court  life,  uniforms,  etc., 
would  displace  the  simplebluecoatof  theHohenzollerns. 
The  self-importance  of  the  princes  would  increase  the 
self-importance  of  the  nobles.  Not  merely  the  bureau- 
cracy and  the  army,  but  also  the  people  at  large  would 
gradually  be  infected  with  a  snobbish  and  servile  spirit 
and  the  highest  military  commands  conferred  upon 
persons  on  account  of  their  birth,  and  no  longer  on 
account  of  their  proved  efficiency.  The  strong,  demo- 
cratic undercurrent  of  the  time  would  pass  unheeded. 
And  how  did  the  Crown  Prince,  in  the  face  of  these 
just  objections  (they  read  to-day  like  prophecies), 
none  the  less  establish  his  claim  to  the  Imperial  crown? 
Listen!     "When  I  w^as  in  Paris  with  my  father  in 

^  Gustav  Freytag,  "Der  Kronprinz  und  die  Deutsche  Kaiser- 
krone"  [Leipzig,  1889,  8th  ed.],  p.  21  et  seq.:  Freytag  accom- 
panied the  Crown  Prince  during  the  campaign  in  France,  and 
he  tells  us  in  his  preface  to  this  work  that  "the  august  gentle- 
man very  kindly  assured  the  author  that  he  had  understood  his 
friendly  intention." 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    113 

1867  during  the  French  Exhibition,  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  sent  word  that,  seeing  that  the  Emperor 
of  Russia  had  announced  his  visit,  he  wished  to  learn 
from  the  King  how  he  desired  the  question  of  the 
precedence  of  the  distinguished  guests  to  be  arranged, 
and  he  would  do  everything  in  accordance  with  the 
King's  wishes.  Thereupon  my  father  replied :  'The 
Emperor,  of  course,  has  precedence.  No  Hohenzollem 
ought  to  say  that,  it  ought  not  to  be  true  of  a  Hohen- 
zollem,' he  concluded,  fiercely."  And  this  man,  who 
was  imagined  to  be  entirely  occupied  with  his  plans  of 
campaign,  had,  in  the  midst  of  the  stress  of  war,  noth- 
ing more  important  to  do  than  to  sit  down  and  dictate 
a  memorandum  to  Count  Bismarck,  in  which  he  urged 
energetically  the  conferring  of  the  Imperial  title  upon 
the  Hohenzollerns. 

This,  then,  was  the  main  issue.  Before  the  all- 
important  question,  whether  the  Czar  of  Russia  should 
in  future  take  precedence  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  all 
other  reflections  and  democratic  tendencies  of  the 
century  were  scattered  like  chaff!  No  longer  to  rank 
below  the  Czar  of  Russia;  that,  in  the  mind  of  the 
Crown  Prince,  was  the  pre-eminent  question.  It  was 
in  order  that  "this  should  be  no  longer  true  of  a 
Hohenzollern"  that  the  German  nation  had  gone  to 
war. 

What  a  glaring  light  this  casts  upon  the  secret  causes 
leading  up  to  war !  Freytag's  gossip  "out  of  school" 
only  confirms  what  history  tells  us  on  every  page,  that 
behind  the  fair  talk  of  public  weal  and  liberty  there 
are  generally  concealed  the  most  terribly  trivial 
dynastic  interests.  Bismarck,  in  his  "Reflections  and 
Reminiscences,"  tries  to  represent  himself  as  having 


,114       THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

first  devised  the  ^'imperial  plan,"  and  carried  it  through 
single-handed  against  a  world  of  opposition,  but  this 
was  not  the  case.  The  Hohenzollerns  were  less  modest 
than  Bismarck's  respect  and  the  servility  of  German 
professors  would  have  us  believe.  The  Diary^  of  the 
Crown  Prince,  his  memorandum  to  Bismarck  composed 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Gustav  Freytag's  notes 
and  other  documents,  sufficiently  demonstrate  that 
the  idea  of  a  German  Emperor  by  divine  right  had 
ever  been  a  secret  ambition  of  the  Hohenzollerns. 
They  had  rejected  the  Imperial  crown  of  the  German 
Democracy  in  1848,  because  their  good  God,  their 
martial  fame,  and  a  victorious  army  appeared  to 
promise  them  more  stable  guarantees  than  the  demo- 
cratic basis  of  popular  political  liberty. 

It  is  clear  then  that  the  assertion  that  the  Franco- 
Prussian  war  was  undertaken  in  the  cause  of  the  public 
welfare  and  of  liberty  is  one  of  the  many  pious  frauds 
to  be  met  with  everywhere  in  Germany,  when  one  talks 
to  the  people.  It  is  not  merely  contradicted  by  the 
subsequent  forty  years  of  German  home  politics,  but 
also,  directly  after  the  war,  received  a  staggering 
refutation  in  the  remarkable  fact  that  the  leading  men 
of  Prussia  had  unhesitatingly,  and  materially,  enriched 
themselves  by  the  war.  Immediately  after  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  a  so-called  Donation  Bill  was  presented 
to  the  Reichstag.  !Moltke  received  for  his  glorious 
part  in  the  campaign  a  gift  of  £45,000;  and  m.any  of 

*When,  at  the  end  of  the  'eighties,  Prof.  Geffken  published 
these  Diaries,  Bismarck  was  so  incensed  that  he  sent  an  imme- 
diate report  to  the  Emperor,  took  proceedings  against  Geffken, 
and  had  him  arrested.  But  the  genuineness  of  the  Diaries  could 
not  be  questioned,  and  in  January,  1889,  Geffken  had  to  be 
released  from  custody. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     115 

the  other  Generals  £15,000  or  more.  Bismarck  re- 
ceived the  Sachsenwald  Estate.  And  so  forth.  For 
the  soldiers,  who  had  actually  shed  their  blood  in  order 
to  win  from  France,  for  the  dynasty,  the  Imperial 
crown,  five  milliards  of  francs,  Alsace-Lorraine,  and 
universal  prestige,  there  was  nothing  left.  Again  in 
1910  a  reward  for  the  soldiers  of  1870  was  refused 
by  the  Government. 

The  Aristotelian  theory,  that  war,  like  hunting 
and  agriculture,  belongs  to  the  natural  sources  of 
livelihood  (while  trade  and  banking  are  unnatural), 
was,  despite  all  modern  ideas,  brutally  confirmed  by 
Prussia  in  the  midst  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The, 
dynasty  of  the  Hohenzollerns  had  not  only,  owing  to 
its  victories,  risen  suddenly  from  a  small  Power 
into  the  rank  of  the  first  European  military  Power,  it 
had  also  become  materially  wealthier,  having  acquired 
Schleswig-Holstein,  Hesse-Nassau,  Hanover,  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  five  milliards,  as  well  as  statesmen  and 
staff  officers  ^  who  made  war  a  personal  source  of 
income;  to  boot,  the  finest  army  in  the  world,  a 
down-trodden  people,  and  a  Constitution  that  only 
masked  and  did  not  curb  dynastic  omnipotence; 
that  was  the  harvest  of  Bismarck's  policy.  These, 
as  every  impartial  critic  will  allow,  were  purely 
dynastic  gains,  which  were  very  soon  to  develop  into 
distressing  losses  for  the  people.  One  of  the  few 
German  democrats  of  those  days  who  did  not  allow 
themselves  to  be  led  astray  by  the  loquacious  humbug 
of  sycophants  and  orators,  namely,  the  scientist,  Karl 
Vogt,  wrote  as  early  as  1870  the  prophetic  words  ^: 

^  Vide  note  to  p.  46. 

» Karl  Vogt,  'Tolitische  Briefe  an  Fr.  Kolb,"  p.  18,  Biel,  1870, 


ii6        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

"In  my  opinion  there  is  nothing  whatever  behind  the 
whole  Bismarck-Moltke  machinery  save  the  desire  to 
perpetuate  in  Germany  the  iron  mihtary  regime,  and 
by  a  marvellous  organisation  to  keep  the  whole  of 
Germany  *in  strict  Prussian  discipline/  in  obedience 
to  its  hereditary  ruler  and  in  humble  subservience  to 
that  Providence  which  is  represented  on  earth  by  the 
Government." 

This  criticism  by  an  influential  German  has  been 
completely  confirmed  by  Germany's  development 
during  the  past  forty  years.  Prussia  became  the  model 
and  the  ruler,  and  made  of  Germany  a  modern  Sparta, 
admired  by  many,  feared  by  most,  and  sincerely 
loved  by  none.  Step  by  step  it  pursued  its  iron  way, 
from  the  formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance  to  its  naval, 
colonial,  and  world-policy,  from  the  threat  to  France 
in  1875  to  Tangier,  Agadir,  and  Serajevo,  with  ever- 
increasing  armaments,  with  more  and  more  boastful 
journalists,  with  more  and  more  servile  professors, 
and  more  and  more  undemocratic  Social  Democrats. 
A  new  nation,  a  strong  nation,  but  also,  alas !  a  nation 
which,  as  a  result  of  political  serfdom,  unalleviated  by 
any  democratic  experience,  had  remained  blind  to  the 
dangers  of  despotism;  a  nation  devoted  to  peaceful  la- 
bour and  organisation,  arbitrarily  cut  off  from  politics, 
which,  in  its  need  for  gratitude,  unthinkingly  attrib- 
uted the  marvellous  development  of  German  com- 
merce and  wealth  to  the  results  of  Bismarck's  policy. 
Prevented  by  force  from  attaining  political  maturity, 
it  rejoiced  in  its  material  development,  and  at  last 
regarded  the  "strict  Prussian  discipline"  as  God-sent 
pre-eminence  in  culture. 


^    s 


o 

5    rr, 


)F  GERMAN  POLICY     117 

AND  THE  World  Peace 

i^  ascended  the  throne,  he  already 

)n  of  being  a  prince  of  warHke 
»f  the  Hohenzollern  princes  have 
,?-  ^  from  the  Emperor  William  I., 

o  led  by  the  people  the  "Grapeshot 

^  inprinz"),   down  to  the  present 

H  ^  :  German  Empire,  who  with  his 

S  ^  yful  war,"  and  so  forth,  was  the 

^  lest  pacifist.] 

^  showed  that  he  was  better  than 

is  Speech  on  the  occasion  of  his 

-^   5th,  1888,  he  said:     "In  foreign 

to  keep  the  peace  with  everyone, 

My  devotion  to  the  German  army 

and  my  position  in  relation  to  it  will  never  lead  me 
into  the  temptation  of  depriving  my  country  of  the 
blessings  of  peace,  unless  the  necessity  of  going  to  war 
be  imposed  on  us  by  an  attack  on  the  Empire  or  its 
allies.  Our  army  shall  safeguard  our  peace,  and  if 
peace  should  none  the  less  be  broken,  regain  it  with 
honour.  This  it  will  not  fail  to  achieve,  owing  to  the 
strength  afforded  it  by  the  last  Army  Bill,  which  you 
passed  unanimously.  It  is  far  from  my  ideas  to  utilise 
this  power  for  offensive  purposes.  Germany  needs  no 
further  martial  glory,  nor  any  conquests  whatsoever, 
now  that  it  has,  finally,  conquered  its  right  to  exist 
as  a  united  and  independent  State." 

This  speech  was  joyfully  welcomed  by  the  German 
people  and  sympathetically  approved  in  foreign 
countries.  To  be  sure,  the  subsequent  utterances  of 
the  monarch  very  soon  aroused  the  disapproval  and 


ii8        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

indignation  of  the  people,  notably,  that  notorious 
speech  on  the  occasion  of  swearing  in  the  recruits  at 
Potsdam  (November  23rd,  1891),  in  which,  with  an 
unmistakable  allusion  to  social  democracy,  he  enjoined 
upon  his  soldiers  to  shoot  down  father  and  mother  at 
his  orders  should  necessity  arise;  but  our  nation  is, 
like  all  nations,  optimistic.  The  imperial  speeches  at 
Hamburg  and  at  the  opening  of  the  Kiel  Canal  (June 
1 8th  and  21st,  1895),  which  were  again  clear  manifes- 
tations of  the  Emperor's  love  of  peace,  were  enthusi- 
astically received  throughout  Germany. 

As  a  result  of  the  great  talent  for  speech-making  of 
William  II.,  a  whole  book  could  be  filled  with  the 
speeches  he  has  delivered  during  his  long  reign  in  w^hich 
he  again  and  again  emphasised  his  desire  for  peace. 
Particularly  notable  in  this  respect  are  his  speeches 
at  Aix-la-Chapelle  on  June  19th,  1902,  in  which  he 
emphasised  the  spiritual  nature  of  the  German  world- 
empire,  and  that  delivered  at  Bremen  on  March  22nd, 
1905. 

But  W'hat  concerns  us  democrats  and  pacifists  is 
not  whether  a  dynasty  desires  peace  (that  we  demand 
of  it  in  this  modem  w^orld  as  a  matter  of  course),  but 
how  it  proposes  to  secure  peace  and  whether  its  actions 
are  in  agreement  with  its  words.  In  the  above-men- 
tioned speech  on  his  accession,  William  II.  is  already 
speaking  of  "our  army"  which  is  to  maintain  the 
peace  for  us.  On  October  5th,  1899,  w^e  find  William 
II.  saying  to  the  Prince  of  Wales  :  "Germany  possesses 
an  army  corresponding  to  its  needs;  and,  if  the 
British  nation  has  a  fleet  corresponding  to  its  needs, 
this  will  be  regarded  by  the  whole  of  Europe  as  an 
important  factor  in  the  maintenance  of  peace."     In 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    119 

his  Bremen  speech  of  1905  he  certainly  stated  that  we 
"never  aspire  to  an  empty  world  dominion,"  yet  he 
added,  "with  every  new  battleship  that  leaves  the 
yards  we  have  one  more  guarantee  of  peace  on  earth," 
and  "that  we  can  stand,  hand  on  sword,  shield  lying 
before  us  on  the  ground,  and  exclaim:  Tamen!  let 
come  what  will  come."  The  Emperor's  idea  that  peace 
could  only  be  sustained  by  strong  and  ever  stronger 
armies  was  still  more  clearly  expressed  in  his  Konigs- 
berg  speech  of  August  25th,  1910,  in  which  he  said: 
"...  so  we  will  be  always  on  the  alert,  above  all 
keeping  our  armour  without  a  flaw,  in  view  of  the 
tremendous  progress  our  neighbouring  Powers  have 
made.  For  our  peace  rests  entirely  upon  our  arma- 
ment." 

And  like  an  echo  it  is  repeated  in  the  book  "Deutsch- 
land  in  Waffen"  ("Germany  in  Arms"),  to  which  the 
Crown  Prince  contributed  a  preface,  that  "The  sword 
will,  until  the  end  of  all  things,  ever  remain  the  decisive 
factor." 

Upon  what  then,  in  the  Emperor's  mind,  does  the 
security  of  the  world's  peace  rest?  Upon  armies, 
battleships,  preparations  for  war,  that  is  to  say,  upon 
a  constant  increase  of  war  material,  of  militarism,  and 
of  the  fear  which  these  inspire?  The  German  Emper- 
or's love  of  peace  cannot  be  better  illustrated  than  by 
a  consideration  of  the  following  facts : 

The  whole  policy  of  William  II.  towards  France 
was  permeated  by  a  certain  graciousness.  The 
holding  of  the  international  conference  for  the  protec- 
tion of  labour  at  Berlin  (1890)  aroused  in  France, 
which  had  just  overcome  the  Boulangist  danger,  uni- 
versal approbation,  and  William  11.  was  proclaimed  as 


120         THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  "Protector  of  the  peace  of  Europe."  Jules  Simon, 
whom  the  Emperor  WilHam  11.  honoured  with  his 
special  friendship,  published  in  1894  in  the  Revue  de 
Paris  his  impressions  of  the  Berlin  Court,  obtained 
after  long  residence  in  that  city.  They  amount  to 
an  enthusiastic  appreciation  of  the  young  monarch, 
which  gained  for  the  latter  many  friends  in  France. 
Among  other  matters,  Jules  Simon  narrates  the 
following  observation  which  William  II.  made  to  him 
relative  to  a  possible  collision  between  Germany  and 
France:  "Therefore,  I  regard  the  man  who  should 
try  to  drive  Germany  and  France  into  a  war  as 
both  a  fool  and  a  criminal."  Whenever  France  was 
shocked  by  any  disaster  (the  assassination  of  Carnot, 
the  death  of  Jules  Simon,  the  fire  at  the  Paris  Charity 
bazaar,  the  loss  of  the  Bourgogne,  the  mine  explosion 
of  Courriere,  etc.,  etc.),  the  German  Emperor  was 
always  ready  with  his  telegrams  of  sympathy,  which 
were  intended  to  improve  the  strained  Franco-German 
relations,  but  were  regarded  by  the  French  people  as  a 
proof  of  the  Emperor's  sympathy  and  desire  for  peace. 
The  Emperor,  on  the  death  of  the  valiant  defender  of 
St.  Privat,  Marshal  Canrobert,  even  went  so  far  as  to 
express  his  deep  sympathy  with  the  family.  In  this 
manner  he  wished  to  prove  to  the  French  that  he  was 
chivalrously  and  peaceably  inclined. 

Now  compare  this  demonstration  with  the  fact  that 
AVilliam  II.,  neither  on  the  decease  of  the  great  pacifist, 
Bertha  von  Suttner,  nor  on  any  other  occasion, 
addressed  a  word  of  encouragement  to  those  pacifists 
whose  purpose  it  was  to  secure  peace,  not  by  military 
intimidation,  but  by  the  methods  of  civil  law,  that  is 
to  say,  by  the  development  of  international  law.     He 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    121 

had  such  an  admiration  for  the  hero  of  St.  Privat 
that  he  made  his  death  the  occasion  for  a  declaration 
of  his  peaceable  intentions.  For  the  gifted  woman  who 
had  championed  the  new  ideal  of  justice  and  peace  he 
had,  despite  the  fact  that  she  sprang  from  a  highly 
aristocratic  Austrian  family,  not  a  word. 

It  may  now  be  asserted  that  the  Emperor's  love 
of  peace  was  genuine,  with  the  proviso  that  it  was 
diametrically  opposed  to  the  demands  of  modem 
humanity,  and  was  so  ill-suited  to  the  times  in  which 
we  live  that  it  was  bound,  in  the  long  run,  to  jeopardise 
the  peace  of  the  world. 

The  Hague  Conference  and  its  Consequences 
This  present  catastrophe  had  been  long  foretold. 
People  like  Tolstoy  and  Iwan  Bloch  in  Russia; 
Frederic  Passy,  d'Estournelles  de  Constant,  and  Jean 
Jaures  in  France;  Bertha  von  Suttner,  A.  H.  Fried, 
and  Bebel  in  Germany ;  Herbert  Spencer  and  Norman 
Angell  in  England,  etc.,  etc.,  had  again  and  again 
declared  that  Europe  was  in  an  unstable  condition; 
that  the  armaments,  which  were  ostensibly  intended 
to  secure  peace,  as  a  matter  of  fact  undermined 
peace,  and  that  the  time  was  at  hand  when  civilised 
Europe  must  finally  emancipate  itself  from  these 
barbaric  peace-guarantees  by  forcible  methods,  and 
through  the  development  of  international  law,  force 
its  way  to  a  peace  based  upon  the  principles  of  civil 
law.  This  modern  pacifist  idea,  which  was  expounded 
by  Grotius,  the  Dutchman,  and  the  French  abbot  de 
Saint  Pierre,  and  raised  by  Kant,  the  German,  to  a 
legal  science,  had  gradually,  in  spite  of  wars  and 
imperial    speeches,    found   enormous   support    in   the. 


122        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

world,  and  to  the  delight  and  surprise  of  the  universe 
was,  in  1898,  presented  to  civilised  humanity  for 
practical  discussion  by  a  dynasty. 

The  Czar  of  All  the  Russias,  Nicolas  IL,  on  August 
24th,  1898,  invited  the  Governments  of  all  the  States 
to  an  International  Congress,  in  order  to  discuss 
the  possibilities  of  general  disarmament  and  arbitra- 
tion. This  action  is  so  much  in  conflict  with  the 
main  thesis  of  this  book,  that  I  am  bound  to  mention 
it  as  a  laudable  exception  to  the  general  rule.  It 
was,  in  fact,  neither  the  French  Republic  nor  the 
English  democracy  that  offered  this  glad  hope  to  the 
world,  but  a  dynasty  by  divine  right,  which  was,  by 
reason  of  its  whole  tradition,  regarded  as  being  the 
most  reactionary  in  Europe,  and  from  which  we 
might  least  of  all  have  expected  such  a  step.  I  need 
hardly  say  that  we  democrats  and  pacifists  have  a 
deep  abhorrence  of  the  banishments  to  Siberia,  the 
pogroms  and  gallows  of  Russian  policy.  We  are  the 
first  to  be  horrified  at  the  sufferings  of  the  Russian 
people,  and  to  place  them  to  the  account  of  the  Russian 
dynasty.  Yet  all  this  cannot  prevent  us  from  recog- 
nising in  Nicolas  IL  a  man  who,  sympathising  with  the 
ideas  of  Tolstoy  and  Bloch,  clearly  perceiving  the  state 
of  the  world,  honestly  endeavoured,^  despite  all 
dynastic  traditions,  to  establish  peace  on  some  other 
basis  than  invincible  armaments,  sharpened  swords, 
and  dry  powder, 

*The  incorrigible  professor  of  "history,"  Schiemann,  whose 
oracular  sayings  are  repeated  by  the  whole  German  national 
Press,  demonstrates,  of  course  from  the  height  of  his  "science," 
that  the  Czar  summoned  this  Conference  only  out  of  fear  of 
England  (vide  '*Ein  Verleumder,"  Berlin,  1915,  p.  9  et  seq.). 
I  propose  that  in  the  future  treaty  of  peace  an  international 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     123 

The  Czar's  proposal  was  hailed  with  great  enthu- 
siasm by  the  civilised  world,  and  not  least  by  Germany, 
but  not  by  the  German  Government.  What?  Was 
there  to  be  any  other  basis  of  peace  than  armies  and 
battleships  ready  for  immediate  action?  Prussia's 
whole  tradition  and  political  conceptions  were  doomed 
if  such  were  the  case.  Hence,  our  dynasty  regarded  the 
Czar's  proposals  as  so  absurd  that,  from  the  first  day 
it  made  no  disguise  of  its  attitude.  Scarcely  two 
weeks  had  elapsed  from  the  Czar's  manifesto  when, 
on  September  7th,  1898,  William  II.  declared  at  Oyn- 
hausen :  "Believe  me,  peace  will  never  be  better  safe- 
guarded than  by  a  perfectly  organised  and  prepared 
German  army.  .  .  .  God  grant  that  it  may  always 
be  possible  for  us  to  preserve  the  world's  peace  with 
this  sharp  and  well-kept  arm."  This  was  a  categorical 
rejection  of  the  Czar's  ideas.  The  German  Press  was 
so  much  the  more  compelled  to  recognise  it  as  such 
in  that,  the  following  December,  a  new  Army  Bill 
was  introduced  in  the  new  Reichstag.  As  a  reply  to 
the  Czar's  proposal,  the  German  Government  demanded 
a  vote  of  about  2^  millions  more  for  the  equipment  of 
the  army.  There  is  an  almost  comic  contradiction 
in  the  fact  that  in  the  Imperial  Speech  at  the  opening 
of  the  Reichstag  (on  December  6th,  1898)  the  "press- 
ing necessity"  of  this  increase  in  the  new  army  budget 

agreement  shall  be  contained  to  this  effect :  "Whosoever,  as 
public  political  writer  or  speaker,  in  questions  of  foreign  pol- 
itics, knowingly  and  demonstrably  perverts  the  truth  shall,  in 
the  name  of  Peace,  be  punished  with.  .  .  ."  By  this  means  one 
would  checkmate  the  mischief-making  and  deliberate  instigators 
of  war,  and,  in  the  interests  of  peace,  free  Europe  from  a  danger 
which,  under  the  cloak  of  learning,  is  a  disgrace  to  civilised 
humanity. 


124        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

is  emphasised,  and ( following  it) ''the  warm  sympathy" 
with  which  William  II.  greets  "the  noble  suggestion  of 
my  dear  friend — His  Majesty  the  Czar  of  Russia — 
for  the  meeting  of  an  International  Conference." 

Acting  on  the  hints  conveyed  by  the  Imperial 
speech  at  Oynhausen,  the  German  Press  commenced 
to  treat  the  idea  of  disarmament  and  arbitration  as 
childish  utopianism,  or  a  cunning  trap  for  Germany. 
When,  in  spite  of  all  these  attempts  to  frustrate  it, 
the  Conference  proposed  by  the  Czar  nevertheless 
took  place  in  May,  1899,  the  German  delegates  were 
instructed  by  their  Imperial  Government  to  wreck  the 
whole  magnificent  plan.  These  delegates,  who,  be  it 
remembered,  did  not  represent  at  The  Hague  the  views 
and  wishes  of  the  German  people,  but,  as  the  personal 
nominees  of  the  German  Emperor,  only  those  of  the 
German  dynasty,  were  Count  Miinster,  the  German 
Ambassador  at  Paris,  the  Munich  professor,  Baron 
von  Stengel,  Privy  Councillor  Dr.  Zorn,  professor  at 
Konigsberg,  Colonel  Gross  von  Schwarzhoff,  and 
Captain  von  Siegel  of  the  Imperial  Navy. 

The  very  selection  of  these  delegates  was  equivalent 
to  a  mockery  of  the  idea  of  disarmament,  for,  only  a 
few  weeks  previously.  Professor  Stengel  had  published 
a  violent  pamphlet  against  the  Czar's  proposal. 

The  attitude  of  the  German  delegates  aroused  the 
indignation  of  the  other  members  of  the  Conference. 

At  the  fifth  sitting  of  the  Commission  (June  26th. 
1899)  Colonel  von  Schwarzhoff  replied  to  the  Russian 
proposal  that  the  Powers  should  pledge  themselves 
not  to  increase  their  armies  for  the  present,  and  then 
enter  into  an  agreement  not  to  increase  for  a  definite 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    125 

period  the  existing  strength  of  their  armies,  in  these 
terms : 

'The  German  nation  is  not  oppressed  by  the  burden 
of  armament  and  taxation;  it  is  not  sliding  down- 
wards on  a  steep  path;  it  is  not  advancing  towards 
ruin  and  exhaustion.  On  the  contrary;  both  public 
and  private  wealth  are  increasing,  the  general  w^ealth, 
the  standard  of  life  is  rising  year  by  year."  And  then 
he  shelters  himself  behind  technical  questions,  main- 
tains that  there  is  a  great  difference  between  a  domestic 
law  voting  the  army  for  five  years  and  a  binding 
international  convention,  etc.,  and,  finally,  ends  by 
declaring  categorically  that  he  cannot  accept  the 
proposal. 

In  the  question  of  obligatory  arbitration.  Pro- 
fessor Zorn  stated  his  views  in  the  seventh  meeting 
of  the  third  Commission  (July  20th,  1899)  as  follows  : 
''to  take  this  momentous  step  without  sufficient 
experience  seems  to  me  dangerous  and  likely  to  lead 
to  dissension  rather  than  to  harmony.  I  think  that 
the  German  nation  is  not  alone  in  regarding  the 
question  from  this  point  of  view."  And,  that  there 
should  be  no  mistake,  he  adds.  "Had  the  article 
(touching  obligatory  arbitration)  had  a  formal  juristic 
character,  it  would  have  been  unacceptable  to  me. 
In  this  case,  I  should  have  been  in  complete  accord 
with  the  objections  raised  by  the  representatives  of 
the  Balkan  States.  As  it  stands,  it  has  no  formal 
juristic  character  whatever,  it  only  contains  a  recom- 
mendation of  a  purely  moral  nature.  In  other 
words :  I  refuse  obligatory  arbitration,  but  I  willingly 
accept  optional  arbitration,  because  it  does  not  bind 
us  to  anything." 


126        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Professor  Zorn  further  advanced  in  the  commission 
of  inquiry  that  the  German  Government  could 
only  deliver  its  opinion  as  to  the  organisation  of  a 
permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  after  having  had 
previous  experience  of  a  temporary  one.  Zorn,  in 
obedience  to  his  instructions,  refused  to  be  talked 
round,  and  again  declared  that,  for  the  present,  he 
could  only  agree  to  a  ''temporary"  permanent  Court 
of  Arbitration.^ 

It  was  Professor  Zorn  also  who  resolutely  insisted 
on  the  removal  of  the  word  "Tribunal"  and  demanded 
the  title  "Cour  permanente  d'arbitrage,"  instead  of 
the  original  ''Tribunal  permanent  d'arbitrage."  We 
see  here  the  same  spirit  at  work  as  that  which,  fifteen 
years  later,  prompted  the  writing  of  the  arrogant 
words:  "It  is  impossible  for  us  to  drag  our  ally, 
in  its  dispute  with  Serbia,  before  a  European  court" 
(German  White  Book,  Exhibit  12).     The  actions  of 

^In  the  course  of  the  World  War,  Professor  Zorn,  in  a  con- 
troversy with  the  French  senator,  d'Estournelles  de  Constant, 
and  the  Swiss  professor,  O.  Nippold,  has  been  forced  to  confess 
that  the  attitude  of  the  German  representatives  at  The  Hague 
left  something  to  be  desired  (vide  Nos.  1134,  1171,  and  1278  of 
the  Neue  Zurcher  Zeitung,  1916).  Professor  Zorn,  who  is  still 
in  an  official  position,  cannot,  of  course,  admit  that  the  asser- 
tion of  d'Estournelles  de  Constant  and  Nippold  (that  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  German  Government  had,  in  obedience  to  in- 
structions, thwarted  the  endeavours  of  the  Conference)  is  in  all 
points  correct,  and  can  be  substantiated  by  numerous  documents. 
Yet  his  assurances  to  the  contrary  lack  the  note  of  sincerity. 
Moreover,  with  all  due  respect  to  Professor  Zorn's  scientific 
knowledge,  we  must  strongly  question  his  impartiality.  Pro- 
fessor Zorn  is  not  a  free  agent.  Anyone  who  is  capable  of 
writing  such  an  article  as  he  published  in  the  Woche  ("Un- 
serm  Kaiser,"  January  23rd,  1915) — a  specimen  of  the  most 
absolute  submission  and  servility — has  forfeited  the  right  to 
have  a  voice  in  the  republic  of  Letters. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    127 

God-ordained  dynasties  are  not  subject  to  the  juris- 
diction of  ordinary  mortals. 

It  is  impossible  here  to  enter  into  all  the  details  of 
the  negotiations.  But  I  cannot  forbear  to  cite  a  few 
passages  from  a  book^  by  the  President  of  the  Amer- 
ican delegation  to  The  Hague.  These  passages  have 
the  value  of  historical  documents.  Mr.  Andrew  White 
writes  on  May  24th : 

''Meeting  Count  Miinster,  who,  after  M.  de  Staal, 
is  very  generally  considered  the  most  important  per- 
sonage here,  we  discussed  the  subject  of  arbitration. 
To  my  great  regret,  I  found  him  entirely  opposed 
to  it,  or  at  least  to  any  well-developed  plan.  He 
did  not  say  that  he  would  oppose  a  moderate 
plan  for  voluntary  arbitration,  but  he  insisted  that 
arbitration  must  be  injurious  to  Germany;  that 
Germany  is  prepared  for  war  as  no  other  country 
is  or  can  be;  that  she  can  mobilise  her  army  in  ten 
days ;  and  that  neither  France,  Russia,  nor  any  other 
Power  can  do  this.  Arbitration,  he  said,  would  simply 
give  rival  Powers  time  to  put  themselves  in  readiness, 
and  would  therefore  be  a  great  disadvantage  to 
Germany." 

Again,  under  date  June  12th: 

''More  surprising  was  the  conversation  of  Count 
Miinster.  Bearing  in  mind  that  the  Emperor  William, 
during  his  long  talk  with  me  just  before  I  left  Berlin, 
in  referring  to  the  approaching  Peace  Congress,  had 
said  that  he  was  sending  Count  IMiinster  because  what 

*  Andrew  D.  White,  "My  Autobiography."  White  was  at  that 
time  American  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  and,  as  can  be  gathered 
from  his  book,  a  personal  friend  of  William  11.  and  was  well 
acquainted  with  and  a  sincere  admirer  of  Germany. 


128        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  Conference  would  most  need  would  be  ^common 
sense/  and  because,  in  his  opinion,  Count  Miinster 
had  'lots  of  it/  some  of  the  Count's  utterances 
astonished  me.  He  now  came  out,  as  he  did  the  day 
before  in  his  talk  with  me,  utterly  against  arbitration, 
declaring  it  a  'humbug,'  and  that  we  had  no  right  to 
consider  it,  since  it  was  not  mentioned  in  the  first 
proposals  from  Russia,  etc. 

*'It  is  clear  that,  with  all  his  fine  qualities — and  he 
is  really  a  splendid  specimen  of  an  old-fashioned 
German  nobleman  devoted  to  the  diplomatic  service 
of  his  country — he  is  saturated  with  the  ideas  of  fifty 
years  ago/' 

Again,  June  13th,  he  writes: 

"This  morning  come  more  disquieting  statements 
regarding  Germany.  There  seems  to  longer  any  doubt 
that  the  German  Emperor  is  opposing  arbitration 
and,  indeed,  the  whole  work  of  the  Conference,  and 
that  he  will  insist  on  his  main  allies,  Austria  and  Italy, 
going  with  him.  ...  I  had  learned  from  a  high 
Imperial  official,  before  I  left  Berlin,  that  the  Emperor 
considered  arbitration  as  derogatory  to  his  sovereignty, 
and  I  was  also  well  aware,  from  his  conversation,  that 
he  was  by  no  means  in  love  with  the  Conference  idea; 
but,  in  view  of  his  speech  at  Wiesbaden,  and  the  peti- 
tions which  had  come  in  to  him  from  Bavaria,  I  had 
hoped  that  he  had  experienced  a  'change  of  heart.' 

"Possibly  he  might  have  changed  his  ^  opinion 
had  not  Count  Miinster  been  here,  reporting  to  him 
constantly  against  every  step  taken  by  the  Conference. 
.  .  .  There  is  no  telling  what  stumbling  blocks  Ger- 
many and  her  allies  may  put  in  our  way;  and,  of 
course,  the  whole  result,  without  their  final  agreement, 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     129 

will  seem  to  the  world  a  failure  and,  perhaps,  a  'farce/ 
'The  immediate  results  will  be  that  the  Russian 
Emperor  will  become  an  idol  of  the  'plain  people' 
throughout  the  world,  the  German  Emperor  will  be 
bitterly  hated,  and  the  Socialists,  who  form  the  most 
dreaded  party  on  the  Continent  of  Europe,  will^  be 
furnished  with  a  thoroughly  effective  weapon  against 

their  rulers. 

"Some  days  ago  I  said  to  a  leading  diplomatist 
here:  The  Ministers  of  the  German  Emperor  ought 
to  tell  him  that,  should  he  oppose  arbitration,  there 
will  be  concentrated  upon  him  an  amount  of  hatred 
which  no  Minister  ought  to  allow  a  sovereign  to  incur/. 
To  this  he  answered:  That  is  true;  but  there  is 
not  a  Alinister  in  Germany  who  dares  tell  him.'  " 
June  15th: 

*'I  then  spoke  very  earnestly  to  him — more  so  than 

ever  before — about  the  present  condition  of  affairs.    I 

told  him  that  the  counsellors  in  whom  the  Emperor 

trusted— such    men    as    himself    and    the    principal 

advisers  of  His  Majesty— ought  never  to  allow  their 

young  sovereign  to  be  exposed  to  the  mass  of  hatred, 

obloquy,  and  opposition  which  would  converge  upon 

him  from  all  nations  in  case  he  became  known  to  the 

whole  world  as  the  sovereign  who  had  broken  down 

the  Conference  and  brought  to  naught  the  plan  of 

arbitration.     I  took  the  liberty  of  telling  him  what 

the  Emperor  said  about  the  Count  himself — namely, 

that  what  the  Conference  was  most  likely  to  need  was 

good  common  sense,  and  that  he  was  sending  Count 

Miinster  because  he  possessed  that.     This  seemed  to 

please  him,  and  I  then  went  on  to  say  that  he  of  all 

men  ought  to  prevent,  by  all  means,  placing  the  young 


130        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Emperor  in  such  a  position.  I  dwelt  on  the  gifts  and 
graces  of  the  young  sovereign,  expressed  my  feehng 
of  admiration  for  his  noble  ambitions,  for  his  abilities, 
for  the  statesmanship  he  had  recently  shown,  for  his 
grasp  of  public  affairs,  and  for  his  way  of  conciliating 
all  classes,  and  then  dwelt  on  the  pity  of  making  such 
a  monarch  an  object  of  hatred  in  all  parts  of  the 
world. 

"He  seemed  impressed  by  this,  but  said  the  calling 
of  the  Conference  was  simply  a  political  trick — the 
most  despicable  trick  ever  practised.  It  was  done,  he 
said,  mainly  to  embarrass  Germany,  to  glorify  the 
young  Russian  Emperor,  and  to  put  Germany  and  na- 
tions which  Russia  dislikes  into  a  false  position.  To 
this  I  answered,  'If  this  be  the  case,  why  not  trump  the 
Russian  trick?  or,  as  the  poker  players  say,  "go  one 
better,"  take  them  at  their  word,  support  a  good 
tribunal  of  arbitration  more  efficient  even  than  the 
Russians  have  dared  to  propose;  let  your  sovereign 
throw  himself  heartily  into  the  movement  and  become 
a  recognised  leader  and  power  here ;  we  will  all  support 
him,  and  to  him  will  come  the  credit  of  it.'  '* 

June  1 6th : 

"This  morning  Count  Miinster  called  and  seemed 
much  excited  by  the  fact  that  he  had  received  a  des- 
patch from  Berlin  in  which  the  German  Government — 
which,  of  course,  means  the  Emperor — had  strongly 
and  finally  declared  against  anything  like  an  arbitra- 
tion tribunal.  He  was  clearly  disconcerted  by  this  too 
literal  acceptance  of  his  own  earlier  views.  .  .  . 

"Later  Count  Miinster  told  me  that  he  had  decided 
to  send  Professor  Zorn  to  Berlin  at  once  in  order  to 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    131 

lay  the  whole  matter  before  the  Foreign  Office  and 
induce  the  authorities  to  modify  the  instructions.  I 
approved  this  course  strongly,  whereupon  he  suggested 
that  I  should  do  something  to  the  same  purpose,  and 
this  finally  ended  in  the  agreement  that  Holls  should  go 
with  Zom." 

Mr.  White  wrote  a  long  private  note  to  Herr  von 
Billow  (then  a  persona  grata  with  William  XL),  ex- 
plaining the  intricacies  of  the  case  and  imploring  him 
to  bring  the  Emperor  to  reason :  "I  present  them  to  you 
as  man  to  man,  not  only  in  the  interest  of  good  rela- 
tions between  Germany  and  the  United  States,  but  of 
interests  common  to  all  the  great  nations  of  the  earth — r 
of  their  common  interest  in  giving  something  like 
satisfaction  to  a  desire  so  earnest  and  widespread  as 
that  which  has  been  shown  in  all  parts  of  the  world  for 
arbitration." 

All  in  vain. 

On  June  21st  Mr.  White  had  to  make  the  following 
entry  in  his  diary : 

"Billow  has  sent  to  the  Emperor  my  long  private 
letter  to  himself,  urgently  urging  the  acceptance  by 
Germany  of  our  plan  of  arbitration.  Prince  Hohenlohe 
seems  to  have  entered  most  cordially  into  our  ideas, 
giving  Holls  a  card  which  would  admit  him  to  the 
Emperor,  and  telegraphing  a  request  that  His  Majesty 
see  him.  But  the  Emperor  was  still  upon  his  yacht  at 
sea,  and  Holls  could  stay  no  longer.  Biilow  is  trying 
to  make  an  appointment  for  him  to  meet  the  Emperor 
at  the  close  of  the  week.'' 

The  battle  was  lost.  White,  on  July  29th,  made  the 
following  ironical  entry  in  reference  to  the  solemn  final 
sitting  of  The  Hague  Conference : 


132        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

"Count  Miinster,  the  presiding  delegate  from 
Germany,  replied  in  French,  and  apparently  extempo- 
raneously. It  must  have  been  pain  and  grief  to  him, 
for  he  was  obliged  to  speak  respectfully  in  the  first 
place  of  the  Conference,  which  for  some  weeks  he  had 
affected  to  despise;  and,  secondly,  of  arbitration  and 
the  other  measures  proposed,  which  he  had  denounced 
as  humbug;  and,  finally,  he  had  to  speak  respectfully 
of  M.  de  Staal,  to  whom  he  had  steadily  shown  de- 
cided dislike.  He  did  the  whole  thing  quite  well,  all 
things  considered." 

No  progressively  inclined  German  reader  can  fail 
to  read  these  sketches  by  a  ("neutral")  high-minded 
American  without  a  pang.  They  afford  a  glimpse 
behind  the  scenes  of  the  workings  of  the  world's 
history.  Whilst  a  comedy  of  good  will  is  being  played 
upon  the  stage,  behind  it  the  powers  of  progress  are 
desperately  striving  against  the  forces  of  darkness.  As 
disarmament  is  impossible  in  face  of  the  dynastic 
power,  the  dynastic  conception  is  victorious  all  along 
the  line.  The  first  Hague  Conference  firstly  renounced 
the  idea  of  disarmament,  and,  secondly,  that  of  obliga- 
tory arbitration.  Its  whole  result  remained  a  possible 
arbitration  tribunal  which  in  practice  is  worthless. 

The  German  delegates,  in  conformity  with  their 
instructions,  and  owing  to  their  petty  bureaucratic 
objections,  rendered  a  question  of  vital  import  for  the 
world  at  large  null  and  void,  and  as  a  reward  for  this 
meritorious  work  Count  Miinster  received  the  title  of 
"Prince"  from  the  Emperor. 

Given  the  choice  between  medisevalism  and  modern- 
ism, that  is  to  say,  between  brute  force  and  the  modern 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    133 

civilised  conception  of  peace  guarantees,  the  dynasty, 
here  again  in  accordance  with  the  Imperial  Constitu- 
tion, declared  itself  for  ''the  maintenance  of  existing 
conditions."  How  could  it  be  otherwise?  For  the 
first  time  in  the  world's  history  The  Hague  Confer- 
ences endeavoured  to  create  that  "League  of  Nations" 
demanded  by  Kant  as  a  "fundamental  condition"  of 
eternal  peace.  But  Kant  clearly  stated :  "the  civil 
constitution  of  every  State  must  be  republican!"  In 
fact,  the  conception  of  peace  by  rightful  methods 
can  only  be  realised  when  all  States  have  a  more  or 
less  republican  form  of  government.  This  self-evident 
condition  of  international  understanding  has  hitherto- 
(for  obvious  reasons)  not  been  insisted  on  by  any 
leading  representative  of  the  science  of  pacifism,  but 
it  is  logically  contained  in  the  whole  idea.  For  the 
chief  aim  of  The  Hague  Conferences  was,  after  all, 
the  final  extirpation  of  the  divine  right  of  dynasties 
to  dictate  war  and  peace. 

We  do  not  know  how  Nicholas  II.,  in  a  given  case, 
would  have  responded  to  this  fundamental  demand 
expressed  by  Kant.  But  we  have  seen,  from  the 
conduct  of  the  German  delegates  at  The  Hague,  that 
William  II.  strongly  disapproved  of  it.  William  II. 
has  never  recognised  the  right  of  national  assemblies. 
And  even  supposing  that,  in  the  interests  of  the  world's 
peace,  he  had  been  prepared,  for  his  own  part,  to 
renounce  a  portion  of  his  sovereignty — that  is  to  say, 
in  questions  of  foreign  policy  to  admit  the  co-operation 
and  control  of  the  Reichstag — would  he  have  been  able 
to  do  so?  He  was,  in  fact,  bound  hand  and  foot  by 
that  Camarilla  which,  in  the  absence  of  a  controlling 


134        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

national  assembly,  always  surrounds  the  person  of 
an  absolute  ruler.  Wherever,  as  in  Prusso-Germany, 
the  responsible  advisers  and  popular  representatives 
are  reduced  to  mere  ciphers,  the  reins  of  power  pass 
into  the  hands  of  the  irresponsible. 

The  omnipotence  of  those  irresponsible  advisers, 
founded  on  Article  1 1  of  the  German  Imperial  Consti- 
tution, the  impotence  of  the  German  popular  assembly, 
and  the  absolute  belief  of  William  II.  in  his  divine 
mission;  these,  as  everywhere  else,  were  the  decisive 
factors  in  *'our"  attitude  at  The  Hague.  Hand  In  glove 
with  the  Turk,  we  had  demonstrated  to  the  world  that 
we  were  that  European  nation  which,  in  defiance  of  all 
democratic  tendencies,  obstinately  held  to  our  "shining 
armour"  and  our  "faultless  equipment;"  that  is  to 
say,  were  prepared  to  pit  our  military  might  against 
the  noblest  aspirations  of  civilised  humanity.  A  man 
of  a  world-wide  reputation,  like  Mommsen,  could  scoff 
at  The  Hague  Conferences  as  being  a  "printer's 
error"  in  the  world's  history,  and  gain  the  applause 
of  the  Government  Press.  The  National  Liberal 
leader,  Bassermann,  told  the  Reichstag  that  "a  more 
pacific  review  of  the  situation"  would  only  ensue  when 
The  Hague  Conferences  were  "happily  vanquished." 
No  less  ironic  and  contemptuous  were  the  expressions 
of  the  Prussian  Minister  of  War  of  that  time.^  All 
persons  of  reputation  and  influence  in  Germany  con- 
sidered themselves,  with  a  few  exceptions,  bound  to 
follow  the  Government's  lead  and  to  represent  The 

*  Vide,  A.  H.  Fried,  "Handbuch  der  Friedensbewegung,"  vol.  2, 
p.  174- 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    135 

Hague  Conferences  as  utoplanism  or  a  cunning  device 
on  the  part  of  Germany's  enemies. ■•■ 

Thus  Germany,  in  the  midst  of  a  world  filled  with 
new  aspirations  and  hopes,  deliberately  isolated  herself. 
Instead  of  here  taking  the  lead  (as  would  have  been 
only  becoming  in  the  Fatherland  of  Kant),  and  thus 
making  herself  a  link  between  Western  and  Eastern 
civilisation,  our  dynasty  insisted  that  in  the  future, 
as  hitherto,  the  Rhine,  and  not  the  Vistula,  should  be 
the  frontier  between  democracy  and  autocracy.  In 
sure  reliance  upon  its  military  invincibility,  our 
Government,  with  an  allusion  to  the  geographical 
position  of  Germany,  declared  for  the  perpetuation 
of  a  policy  which,  just  by  reason  of  this  geographical 
position,  was  the  most  dangerous  for  Germany  that 
could  be  conceived  of. 

For  what  was  the  result  of  The  Hague  Conferences? 
An  unconquerable  mistrust  of  Germany  by  all  other 
States  and,  as  a  consequence  of  this,  their  natural 
desire  for  union  and  protection.  Thus  it  was  our 
dynasty  that  itself  created  the  menace  of  which  it 
to-day  so  bitterly  complains. 

Republican  France  was  not  linked  to  imperial 
Russia  by  any  ties.  The  former  was  the  birthplace 
of  the  rights  of  civilisation  and  humanity,  the  land  of 
liberty  and  of  popular  government;  the  latter  a  still 

^  Moreover,  the  German  Press  and  the  German  White  Book 
relative  to  The  Hague  Conferences  were  forced  to  falsify  the 
account  of  the  negotiations  at  The  Hague ;  otherwise,  the 
German  reader  might  not  have  understood  the  brutally  unac- 
commodating attitude  of  the  German  delegates  (c/.  Schiicking, 
"Die  Organisation  der  Welt."  Alfr.  Kroner,  Leipzig,  1909,  p. 
605,  and  O.  Nippold,  "Die  zweite  Haager  Friedenskonferenz." 
Duncker  und  Humblot,  Leipzig,  vol.  2,  p.  201). 


136        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

semi-barbaric  police-  and  official-ridden  State,  devoid 
of  constitution  and  culture,  the  most  crying  contrast 
to  France.  It  was  Bismarck  who,  in  spite  of  the 
formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  contrived  for  two 
whole  decades  to  maintain  the  so-called  ''insurance 
policy"  with  Russia.  William  II.  embarked  upon  a 
new  course,  which  first  revealed  itself  in  the  dismissal 
of  the  Russophil  Chancellor.  Hardly  two  years  had 
elapsed,  when  the  Romanoffs,  who  had  always  been 
the  allies  of  the  HohenzoUerns,  became  the  allies  of 
republican  France.  This  unnatural  alliance,  as  we 
must  repeat  again  and  again  to  those  who  bemoan 
the  "encirclement  of  Germany,''  only  took  place  ten 
years  after  the  formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Until 
about  1900  it  had  remained  more  or  less  undefined. 
But  when  Germany  had  laid  Its  cards  on  the  table  at 
The  Hague,  it  took  such  a  positive  form  that  France, 
now  feeling  its  increased  security,  was  enabled  to 
realise  a  long-desired  popular  reform,  and  in  1905  in- 
troduced the  two-years'  military  service. 

But  the  lesson  of  The  Hague  influenced  England's 
policy  to  a  still  greater  degree.  Nothing  could  seem- 
ingly have  brought  the  English  and  the  French  to- 
gether. They  were  separated  by  quarrels  dating  cen- 
turies back.  Both  Louis  XIV. 's  colonial  aspirations 
and  those  of  Napoleon  I.  had  been  ruthlessly  annihi- 
lated by  the  English.  They  had,  in  league  with  Prus- 
sia, overthrown  the  aspiration  for  world-empire  of  the 
Capets  as  they  had  that  of  the  Great  Corsican.  The 
Boer  War  and  the  humiliation  of  Fashoda  had,  to- 
wards the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century,  so  aggra- 
vated the  Anglo-French  antagonism  that  numerous 
distinguished  French  politicians  had  declared :  "With 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     137 

Germany  against  perfidious  Albion!"  Professor 
Oncken^'  even  tells  us  that  France  and  Russia,  "when 
the  Boer  War  was  at  its  height  .  .  .  addressed  a  pro- 
posal to  the  German  Government  to  join  with  them 
in  forcibly  bringing  the  war  to  a  conclusion,  and 
thus  save  the  Boers  and  humble  England  to  the  dust." 
Now  it  was  doubtless  a  fact  that  William  II.  re- 
fused this  Franco-Russian  suggestion  in  order,  as 
Professor  Oncken  says,  *'not  to  come  into  conflict 
with  a  naval  Power  like  England."  But  Oncken, 
alas!  does  not  inform  us  why  William  11.  did  not  at 
least  utilise  this  splendid  chance  of  ameliorating  Ger- 
many's relations  both  with  France  and  Russia,  and 
of  aggravating  England's  dangerous  "splendid  isola- 
tion," at  any  rate  morally,  by  relieving  the  Franco- 
German  tension. 

Here,  as  always,  William  11.  followed  his  own 
•plans.  He  had  long  before  this,  by  his  sudden  initia- 
tion of  a  very  ambitious  naval  and  colonial  policy, 
converted  the  centuries-old  sympathy  of  England  for 
Prussia  into  silent  mistrust.  This  mistrust  turned  to 
indignation  when,  on  January  3rd,  1896,  William  II. 
dispatched  that  notorious  telegram  to  the  President  of 
the  South  African  Republic,  congratulating  him  on 
having  "annihilated  the  armed  forces  that  had  broken 
the  peace  and  invaded  his  country,  and  preserved  its 
independence  against  attacks  from  without."  Wil- 
liam 11.  certainly  endeavoured  to  make  good  this  pub- 
lic insult  by  conferring  the  Order  of  the  Black  Eagle 
upon  Lord  Roberts,  and  making  his  troops,  in  Sep- 
tember, 1897,  cheer  Queen  Victoria,  etc.  But  when 
at   Stettin    (September  23rd,    1898)    he  uttered  the 

'  '"Deutschland  und  der  Weltkrieg,"  p.  478. 


138        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

phrase  that  subsequently  became  a  winged  word  in 
Germany,  "Our  future  Hes  on  the  water!"  then,  even 
the  dullest  Englishman  understood  that  the  "new 
course"  was  a  zigzag  one,  the  aim  of  which  was  hid- 
den from  the  ordinary  mortal,  but  that  it  was  in  any 
event  a  course  hostile  to  England. 

Yet  in  vain  England  looked  around  for  friends. 
The  Russians  in  East  Asia  and  Persia,  the  French  in 
Morocco  and  Egypt,  were  against  her.  The  sym- 
pathies of  the  entire  world  were  then  on  the  side  of 
the  little  Boer  nation,  struggling  so  heroically  for  its 
independence.  No  one  wanted  to  have  anything  to 
do  with  the  Englishman.  Ever  since  Napoleon's  days 
he  had  been  decried  as  a  selfish,  brutal  shopkeeper, 
and  his  oversea  policy  brought  him  into  conflict  with 
the  whole  world.  Then  came  the  first  Hague  Con- 
ference. What  ten  years  of  English  friendliness  to- 
wards France  could  not  effect  was  achieved  in  a  few 
months  by  the  attitude  of  the  German  Government 
at  The  Hague  Conference,  namely,  the  Anglo-French 
rapprochementy  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  consolida- 
tion of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance. 

The  whole  perspective  was  changed  in  a  moment. 
Yesterday  isolated  and  hated,  to-day  England  pos- 
sessed two  powerful  friends:  "We"  had,  almost  by 
force,  driven  them  into  her  arms.  Yesterday  in  a  po- 
sition to  gain  Franco-Russian  sympathies,  or  at  any 
rate  to  keep  the  old  English  sympathies,  Germany  to- 
day found  herself  suddenly  isolated,  mistrusted  and 

feared  by  the  whole  world. 

***** 

The  German  dynasty  did  not  perceive  in  this  threat- 
ening aspect  of  things  the  fruits  of  her  military  co- 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     139 

ercive  policy.  The  Power  that  possesses  the  strongest 
army  in  the  world  is  infallible.  When,  in  1907,  the 
second  Hague  Conference  was  called,  in  order,  in  spite 
of  the  first  plain  refusal  of  the  German  Government, 
to  continue  nevertheless  the  difficult  task  of  securing 
a  democratic  guarantee  of  peace,  the  opportunity  was 
not  made  use  of  by  William  11.  in  order  to  conciliate 
and  to  disarm  the  democratic  coalition  of  Europe 
against  him  (it  would  have  been  such  an  easy  and 
graceful  task)  ;  but  he  continued  in  his  old  paths.  He 
did  not,  to  be  sure,  again  dispatch  the  same  uncouth 
delegates  to  The  Hague,  but,  on  this  occasion,  men 
with  better  manners  and  better  intentions;  but  he' 
would  not  recede  a  single  inch  from  his  conception  of 
peace  as  based  upon  force  of  arms.^ 

As  in  1899,  so  also  in  1907,  Germany  was  again  the 
sole  Great  Power  that  formally  rejected  the  institution 
of  compulsory  arbitration,  and  so  nullified  the  chief 
task  of  the  second  Hague  Conference.  Baron  Mar- 
shall von  Bieberstein,  president  of  the  German  dele- 
gation, in  the  fourth  sitting  of  the  first  Commission 
(October  5th,  1907),  in  reply  to  the  proposals  to  com- 

^  Even  before  Its  opening,  the  second  Hague  Conference  was 
treated  in  the  Reichstag  with  mockery  and  derision  (sittings 
of  April  23rd,  24th,  and  30th,  1907).  The  Prussian  Minister 
for  War,  von  Einem,  jeered:  "The  Governments  will,  in  any 
case,  put  forward  still  further  demands."  The  anti-Semitic 
Liebermann  von  Sonnenberg  remarked  contemptuously :  "This 
whole  peace  movement  is  only  a  matter  for  old  women  and 
degenerates.  We  place  our  trust  in  God  and  our  superlative 
army,  .  .  .  We  have  still  our  mailed  fist — let  them  only  come." 
The  Agrarian,  Oldenburg  von  Januschau,  said :  "If  we  Con- 
servatives had  our  way,  we  should  send  the  Minister  of  War 
to  The  Hague"  (applause  from  the  Conservative  benches), 
etc.,  etc. 


HO        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

pel  the  nations  to  submit  to  arbitration  by  means  of 
permanent  arbitration  treaties  (world-treaty),  stated 
that  he  had  first  to  regret  that  a  certain  unanimity 
prevailed  in  the  assembly  for  making  arbitration  ob- 
ligatory; he  was  sorry  to  be  in  the  minority;  but  he 
could  not  agree  to  the  system  of  a  compulsory  world 
arbitration  treaty.  Germany  had  since  1899  made 
satisfactory  application  of  the  optional  arbitration 
which  had  been  established  at  that  date,  and  had  al- 
ready concluded  two  treaties  of  this  character.  She 
would  continue  in  the  future  to  adhere  to  this  "in- 
dividual system,"  that  is  to  say,  to  conclude  only  such 
arbitration  treaties  as  she  desired.  But  Germany  would 
not  be  coerced  into  concluding  such  treaties  with  all 
the  nations  of  the  world.  Such  compulsion  would 
have  an  irritating  rather  than  a  calming  effect  upon 
the  world-situation.  One  must  not  always  be  snatch- 
ing at  moral  effects  and  momentary  successes ;  it  be- 
hoved one  to  seek  rather  after  practical  results,  etc., 
etc.  Equally  emphatic  w^as  Privy  Councillor  Kriege, 
when  he  declared  before  the  Commission  of  Exam- 
ination on  August  6th,  1907:  Germany  could  accept 
none  of  the  proposals  put  forward  for  making  ad- 
justment of  disputes  by  arbitration  universally  com- 
pulsory. Just  as  for  a  hundred  years  past  in  Ger- 
man internal  politics,  it  was  repeatedly  asserted  by 
the  German  delegates  at  The  Hague  in  1899  and  1907 
that  the  question  was  not  yet  ripe;  they  must  not  be 
precipitate ;  experience  must  first  be  collected ;  too 
hasty  action  might  effect  the  exact  opposite  of  what 
was  intended,  etc.  In  the  eyes  of  dynasties,  nations 
are  never  sufficiently  mature  to  decide  their  own 
destinies. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    141 

Owing  to  this  attitude  of  the  German  delegates,  the 
second  Hague  Conference  could  make  but  little  altera- 
tion in  the  resolutions  of  the  first.  In  fact,  it  only- 
supplemented  them  in  respect  of  a  few  minor  points 
(for  instance,  the  institution  of  a  legal  procedure). 

It  is  noteworthy  that  even  the  representative  of  an 
Asiatic  despotism  like  Persia  declared  that  the  advan- 
tages of  a  world  arbitration  treaty  were  so  great,  and 
the  guarantees  it  offered  to  the  whole  world  so  con- 
siderable, that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Conference  to 
remove  the  comparatively  insignificant  obstacles. 

All  in  vain ! 

When  the  final  vote  was  given  on  this  proposal," 
thirty-two  States  were  in  its  favour,  nine  against  it, 
and  three  (among  them  Italy)  refrained  from  voting. 
Those  against  the  proposal  were  Germany,  Austria- 
Hungary,  Turkey  (upon  principle),  Rumania  (out  of 
friendship  for  Germany),  Bulgaria,  Greece,  Monte- 
negro (because  they  were  at  that  time  already  pre- 
paring their  war  of  liberation  against  Turkey),  and 
finally  (for  purely  formal  reasons)  Switzerland  and 
Belgium.  Seeing  that  such  Conferences  do  not  act 
like  Parliaments,  that  is  to  say,  the  majority  does  not 
impose  its  will  upon  the  minority,  but  can  only  pass 
a  resolution  upon  the  basis  of  unanimity,  "the  great 
central  problem  of  the  whole  Conference"  (as  Pro- 
fessor Zorn  himself  styled  compulsory  arbitration) 
was  again  left  unsolved. 

The  aim  of  the  German  dynasty,  therefore,  was 
here,  as  everywhere  else  in  their  foreign  policy,  to  dis- 
credit the  whole  principle  of  international  law.  The 
same  mentality  that  approves  annexation  against  the 
will  of  the  annexed,  and,  in  foreign  policy,  system- 


142        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

atically  ignores  the  popular  will,  was  also  bent,  in  a 
diplomatic  discussion  of  this  principle  of  international 
law,  on  securing  its  absolute  rejection. 

Touching  the  result  of  this  second  Hague  Confer- 
ence, Professor  O.  Nippold  very  clearly  states:^  ''It 
appears  to  me  that  the  German  Imperial  Government 
should,  from  a  diplomatic  point  of  view,  have  ar- 
rived at  an  entirely  opposite  conclusion.  .  .  .  For  the 
impression  which  'the  irreconcilable  opposition'  of  the 
German  Delegation  was  bound  to  make  upon  the  other 
States  was  a  factor  impossible  to  underestimate. 
...  It  is  clear,  at  any  rate,  that  the  German  Delega- 
tion, in  the  case  in  question,  was  opposed  by  general 
opinion  at  The  Hague,  and  that  it  did  not  allow  itself 
to  be  influenced  by  this  fact  in  the  slightest  degree. 
The  delegates  of  the  other  civilised  States  left  The 
Hague  under  this  impression.  Will  not  this  fact  make 
itself  felt  politically?"  And  again,  p.  217:  *Twist 
and  turn  the  objections  to  the  Arbitration  Court  how 
you  will,  they  were  in  any  case  not  of  such  importance 
as  to  justify  a  nation  in  so  seriously  compromising  its 
whole  international  and  political  situation  for  their 
sake.'' 

It  had  been  already  sufficiently  compromised  by  the 
first  Hague  Conference!  Professor  Nippold  might 
have  added.  For  the  political  isolation  of  Germany 
had  been  accomplished  at  the  first  Hague  Conference. 
Instead  of  using  the  second  Conference  to  recover  lost 
ground  our  Government  completed  the  "work  of  en- 
circlement" of  King  Edward  VII. :  the  Franco-Russo- 
English  Entente  now  became  an  open  offensive  and 
defensive  alliance  against  Germany.  Germany  was 
*"Die  Zweite  Haager  Konferenz,"  Leipzig,  1908,  pp.  213-14. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    143 

now  surrounded  by  a  world  of  "silent  foes,"  less 
animated  by  a  desire  for  Germany's  military  humilia- 
tion than  by  a  common  desire  to  get  rid,  once  and 
for  all,  of  that  era  of  useless  and  yet  so  expensive 
competitive  armament,  which  since  Bismarck's  day 
had  descended  upon  Europe  and  stifled  all  healthy 
progress. 

Why    all    Attempts    at    Understanding    were 
WITHOUT  Result 

It  must  be  confessed  that  the  Chauvinists  and  war 
parties  in  France,  England,  and  Russia  took  full  ad- 
vantage of  the  new  situation  of  affairs  created  by 
the  attitude  of  the  German  dynasty,  and  that,  owing 
to  their  machinations,  the  warlike  mood  in  those  coun- 
tries became  intensified  as  much  as  in  Germany  itself. 
Germany  has  not  the  monopoly  of  warlike  feelings. 
It  is  true  that  no  modern  State  can  boast  of  a  j\Ioltke, 
who  regarded  war  as  part  of  the  divine  ordinance  of 
the  universe,  and  scoffed  at  the  idea  of  perpetual  peace 
as  a  dream,  "and  not  even  a  beautiful  dream."  It  is 
true  that  no  other  country  possesses  "thinkers"  w^ho, 
like  Hegel,  Treitschke,  Mommsen,  Lasson,  Schiemann, 
Liman,  Lamprecht,  Bernhardi,  Harden,  etc.,  etc., 
preach  war  as  being  the  supreme  aim  of  policy;  and 
still  less  do  other  countries  possess  celebrities  who, 
like  Clausewitz,  Hartmann,  Bronsart  von  Schellen- 
dorf,  von  der  Goltz,  Hindenburg  and  others,  declare 
a  brutal  mode  of  warfare  to  be  the  most  humane,  be- 
cause it  is,  so  they  say,  the  shortest.  But,  even  if 
other  countries  in  their  intellectual  glorification  of  war 
are  far  behind  the  country  of  Kant  and  Goethe,  yet 
in  them  also  there  were  and  are  a  great  number  who, 


144       THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

for  one  reason  or  another,  have  an  interest  in  war. 
France,  England,  and  Russia  have,  hke  Germany,  a 
"national  Press"  which,  as  has  been  proved,  stands  at 
the  service  of  the  manufacturers  of  war  materials  and 
methodically  moulds  popular  opinion  in  favour  of  war. 
They  have  a  war  budget,  great  industries  working  for 
war,  influential  officials,  traders,  and  financiers,  whose 
greed  of  gain  increases  with  the  increasing  desire  for 
war.  In  short,  they  also  possess  the  same  methods, 
developments,  and  influences,  which,  in  the  case  of  all 
Great  Powers,  foster  those  phenomena  and  activities 
that  we  collectively  style  Chauvinism,  Nationalism, 
and  so  forth. 

It  would  have  been  in  some  degree  unnatural  if 
these  people  and  this  Press,  now  that  the  German 
dynasty  had  for  the  second  time  flatly  refused  to  agree 
to  an  international  legal  organisation  for  safeguard- 
ing the  peace,  had  not  been  more  clamorous  than  ever ; 
but,  as  regards  the  assertions  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment that  the  Triple  Entente  was  a  cynical  land-par- 
titioning syndicate,  that  the  cause  of  the  war  was  envy 
of  Germany's  increased  prosperity,  and  so  forth,  it 
ought  in  fairness  to  be  mentioned  that  the  forces 
working  for  war  in  France,  England,  and  Russia 
were  dwindling  forces,  and  were  not  supported  by 
public  opinion,  and,  further,  that  in  no.  case  did  they 
possess  any  demonstrable  and  effectual  share  of  po- 
litical power. 

France,  in  particular,  studiously  endeavoured  to 
give  Germany  no  cause  for  mistrusting  her  or  her 
policy.  In  1905  she  dismissed  her  Minister  Delcasse, 
because  the  formation  of  the  Triple  Entente  seemed 
to  have  made  him  arrogant  and  eager  for  war.     In 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     145 

the  same  way  she  not  only  most  readily  agreed  to 
all  the  German  proposals  in  the  Morocco  affair,  but 
repeatedly  made  others  of  her  own,  as,  for  instance, 
in  July,  191 1,  when  Germany,  by  the  dispatch  of  the 
Panther,  insisted  on  her  claims  in  Morocco.  There  is, 
indeed,  in  the  whole  of  Germany  scarcely  a  single 
serious  poHtician  who  sincerely  attempted  to  assert 
and  prove  that  the  policy  of  France  had  during  the 
past  ten  years  been  defiant  and  warlike.  Even  our 
Government  has  never  gone  so  far  as  to  contend  that 
France  was  to  blame  for  the  outbreak  of  this  war. 

Germany  much  more  regards  England  as  responsible 
for  the  establishment  of  the  Triple  Entente  and  the. 
outbreak  of  the  World  War.  But  it  is  easy  to  show 
that  in  England  also  the  elements  favourable  to  war 
nowhere  exercised  any  appreciable  influence  upon  pub- 
lic opinion  or  even  upon  the  Government.  Allowing 
it  to  be  true  that  the  Triple  Entente  was  due  to 
England,  it  is  equally  true  that  England  only  regarded 
this  entente  as  a  defensive  alliance.  England's  en- 
deavours to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with  Germany 
as  regards  naval  armament  have  in  the  last  ten  years 
been  so  numerous,  so  energetic,  and  so  conciliatory, 
that  their  genuineness  cannot  be  impugned,  and  one 
can  only  wonder  how  responsible  German  politicians 
can  absolutely  ignore  them.  On  the  occasion  of  the 
World-Peace  Congress  in  London  (1908),  Lloyd 
George  made  an  enthusiastic  speech  in  favour  of  an 
Anglo-German  understanding,  as  did  also  the  Prime 
Minister  Asquith,  at  the  Lord  Mayor's  banquet  in 
London  of  the  same  year.  Even  more  clear  in  its 
intention  was  Asquith's  speech  in  the  House  of  Cor^- 
mons  on  March  i6th,  1909,  which  found  an  echo  in 


146        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  Reichstag,  but  was  dismissed  by  our  Imperial 
Chancellor  with  the  remark  that  he  anticipated  no 
tangible  results  from  negotiations  touching  the  limita- 
tion of  naval  construction. •"•  McKenna,  First  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty,  stated  in  the  House  of  Comm^ons  in 
July,  1909,  that  England  in  the  past  three  years  could 
show  not  only  words  but  deeds  towards  promoting 
an  Anglo-German  understanding. 

England's  unceasing  endeavours  to  bring  about  an 
understanding  with  Germany  were  openly  acknowl- 
edged in  a  sitting  of  the  Reichstag  on  December  loth, 
19 10,  by  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg,  who  said: 
"Regarding  our  relations  with  England  and  the  al- 
leged negotiations  with  her,  as  to  a  contractual  limita- 
tion of  naval  armaments,  I  must  at  once  say  that  it 
is,  certainly,  puhlici  juris,  that  the  British  Government 
has  repeatedly  expressed  the  wish  to  enter  into  a  treaty 
to  this  end.  The  English  Government  made  a  like 
suggestion  at  The  Hague,  and  has  since  then  repeatedly 
renewed  it,  without,  however,  formulating  any  definite 
proposals  which  could  form  a  basis  for  acceptance  or 
rejection."  It  is  thoroughly  characteristic  that  this 
text  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor's  speech  was  "modi- 
fied'* by  Wolffs  Bureau  by  substituting  the  words: 
"fixing  of  the  naval  strength"  for  "limitation  of  arma- 
ments."^ 

*In  July,  1906,  England  had  reduced  her  Naval  Estimates  by 
25  per  cent,  for  battleships,  by  60  per  cent,  for  destroyers,  and 
by  33  per  cent,  for  submarines,  and  this  voluntarily;  and,  more- 
over, expressly  declared  that  she  took  this  step  in  order,  before 
the  meeting  of  the  next  Hague  Conference,  to  show  the  world 
that  she  was  prepared  to  take  the  lead  in  disarmament,  in  the 
hope  that  other  nations  would  follow  suit. 

^Cf.  Bertha  von  Suttner,  "Der  Kampf  um  Vermeidung  des 
Weltkrieges,"  vol.  2,  p.  295  (Orell  Fiiszli,  Zurich,  1917.} 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    147 

The  more  the  English  Ministers  tried  to  press  our 
Government  for  a  public  discussion  of  the  problem, 
the  cooler  the  reception  they  found  at  the  hands  of  the 
German  Government  and  the  more  were  they  mocked 
at  by  our  Pan-German  Press.  In  reply  to  a  further 
request  on  the  part  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Herr  von 
Bethmann  Hollweg  clearly  stated  in  a  sitting  of  the 
Reichstag  on  March  30th,  191 1,  that  the  question 
of  disarmament  was  insoluble  "as  long  as  men  re- 
mained men  and  States  remained  States."  That  reads 
almost  like  a  sneer  at  the  repeated  English  proposals 
for  an  understanding.  But  England's  Liberal  Min- 
isters refused  to  be  discouraged;  and  at  the  begin-- 
ning  of  February,  1912,  dispatched  their  Minister  of 
War — Haldane — on  a  private  mission  to  Berlin,  in 
order,  in  a  private  audience,  to  consult  with  the  Em- 
peror and  Chancellor  as  to  the  possibilities  of  an  under- 
standing. We  are  aware  to-day,  from  the  Chancel- 
lor's speech  of  August  19th,  191 5,  that  our  Govern- 
ment then  suggested  to  England  that  she  should,  in 
the  event  of  a  Continental  war,  in  any  case,  remain 
neutral ;  in  other  words,  separate  from  the  Triple  En- 
tente. England  offered  to  give  Germany  the  formal 
assurance  that  she  would  not  attack  her,  but  Germany 
demanded,  in  addition,  the  assurance  of  English  neu- 
trality in  any  event.  Without  acting  the  traitor  to  her 
allies,  England  could  not  agree  to  these  terms. 

England  made  yet  more  advances.  The  new  Lord 
of  the  Admiralty,  Winston  Churchill,  stated  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  on  March  i8th,  191 2,  that  Eng- 
land was  prepared  to  repeat  the  experiment  of  the  vol- 
untary reduction  of  the  fleet,  as  in  1906;  if  Germany 
ceased  adding  to  her  armaments  or  even  reduced  them^ 

\ 


148        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

England  would,  in  any  case,  do  the  same,  "which 
would  be  a  blessing  for  both  countries.'* 

And,  finally,  Churchill,  on  March  26th,  19 13,  pro- 
posed to  Germany  a  naval  holiday  of  a  year  to  begin 
with,  during  which  time  both  countries  should  engage 
not  to  build  any  new  ships  of  war. 

All  to  no  purpose.  The  English  Ministers  were 
secretly  scoffed  at  in  Berlin.  How  could  they  pos- 
sibly, after  their  experiences  at  The  Hague,  seriously 
persist  in  clinging  to  the  Utopian  idea  that  Germany 
desired  any  other  peace-guarantee  save  that  of  ever 
more  formidable  armaments?  The  logic  of  our  lead- 
ing junkers  and  Pan-Germanists  absolutely  annihi- 
lated the  logic  of  the  most  enlightened  minds  in  Eng- 
land: if  England  built  ships,  the  Reventlows,  Rohr- 
bachs  and  Chamberlains  and  their  followers  exclaimed, 
Beware!  The  English  are  preparing  for  war!  Why? 
It  is  clear  that  they  intend  to  attack  us.  We  are  lost 
if  we  do  not  also  prepare.  But  if  England  built  no 
ships  and  voluntarily  reduced  her  naval  estimates, 
if  the  Czar  proposed  a  Peace  Conference,  and  the 
English  Admiralty  a  naval  holiday,  if  France  reduced 
her  period  of  military  ser^uce?  Then,  the  same  gen- 
tlemen vociferated  yet  more  noisily:  Beware!  We 
are  going  to  be  tricked !  These  English,  French,  and 
Russians  are  so  cunning,  that  they  will  speak  of  peace 
to  our  face  and  continue  to  make  preparations  for  war 
behind  our  back.  They  want  to  give  the  stupid  honest 
German  another  box  on  the  ear.  We  are  done  for,  if 
we  do  not  meet  these  deceitful  tricks  by  a  further 
increase  of  armaments! 

If,  finally,  the  responsible  leaders  of  the  Entente 
gave  way  in  despair  before  this  marvellous  logic,  which 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    149 

was  constantly  and  vigorously  re-echoed  in  the  Em- 
peror's speeches,  ajid  if,  consequently,  the  Belgian  Min- 
isters at  Petrograd,  London,  and  Paris  had  to  report^ 
a  certain  nervousness  and  warlike  mood,  who  was 
really  to  blame?  Who  did  actually  "encircle"  us? 
The  diplomacy  of  the  Triple  Entente,  which  offered 
"us"  not  only  one  but  a  hundred  opportunities  of  put- 
ting things  on  a  different  footing?  Or  was  it  not 
rather  our  dynasty,  which,  conscious  of  its  military 
might,  in  reliance  upon  its  old  German  God,  obstinately 
stuck  to  its  mediaeval  principles,  and  regarded  peace 

*It  may  be  mentioned  in  this  connection  that  the  Belgian  docu- 
ments found  in  Brussels,  and  since  published  by  JNIittler  &  Sohn, 
of  Berlin,  do,  as  a  fact,  afford  much  incriminating  evidence 
touching  the  policy  pursued  by  the  Triple  Entente.  The  majority 
of  writers  who  wish  to  exculpate  Germany  of  any  guilt  in  this 
war  studiously  avoid  reference  to  The  Hague  Conference  and 
to  the  account  given  by  the  American  Ambassador,  Mr.  Andrew 
White,  and  only  talk  of  the  Belgian  papers  and  documents,  about 
which  they  write  whole  reams.  But  it  is  evident  that  the  Ger- 
man Government  did  not  publish  all  the  documents  found  in 
Brussels.  Both  dates  and  numbering  show  that  a  careful  selec- 
tion was  made.  Moreover,  it  is  here,  as  in  most  diplomatic 
reports,  a  question  only  of  a  survey  of  transitory  moods  with- 
out reference  to  their  causes.  Diplomatists  are  not  his- 
torians. Otherwise,  they  would  in  the  case  before  us  have 
had  to  point  out  that  the  nervous  feelings  and  tendencies  in 
Paris,  London,  and  Petrograd  were  but  the  logical  outcome  of 
the  German  Governm.ent's  attitude  at  The  Hague  Conference. 
The  preliminary  history  of  the  war  in  the  narrower  sense 
begins  with  July  23rd,  1914,  but  the  preliminary  history  of  the 
war  in  the  wider,  more  general  sense  begins  with  August  24th, 
1898,  that  is  to  say,  with  the  Czar's  Conference  proposal. 
Whoever  writes  on  the  history  of  the  "encirclement"  with- 
out referring  to  The  Hague  Conferences  will  describe  effects 
without  causes.  And  it  is  only  considered  in  relation  to  this 
fact  that  the  reports  of  the  Belgian  Ministers  have  any  his- 
torical value. 


150        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

as  being  only  the  fruit  of  incessant  preparations  for 
war? 

And  what  authentic  evidence  do  the  German  his- 
torians possess  that  this  encirclement  was  part  of  a 
malicious  plan  to  compass  our  humiliation  in  the  field  ? 
I  have  sought  long  and  conscientiously  for  actual 
(that  is  to  say,  emanating  from  the  Governments  of 
the  Triple  Entente)  warlike  actions  or  threats;  to 
this  end  I  have  read  a  host  of  German  writing,  all 
of  which  promised  to  furnish  this  evidence.  But, 
alas!  here  again  I  had  the  same  experience  as  in  the 
case  of  the  Serbian  machinations,  the  invasions  of 
Cossacks,  the  bombs  on  Nuremberg,  and  other  crimes 
of  the  Triple  Entente.  That  is  to  say,  I  found  nothing 
but  assertions,  accompanied  by  citations  of  opinions, 
books,  speeches,  and  manifestoes  of  the  Chauvinists 
in  France,  England,  and  Russia,  but  never  of  respon- 
sible people  occupying  a  position  of  authority.  If 
books,  newspapers,  speeches  and  manifestoes  of  private 
people  are  to  be  taken  to  prove  anything  at  all  in  re- 
gard to  the  desire  for  war  of  a  Government,  then  this 
evidence  will  turn  out  to  our  overwhelming  disad- 
vantage. For  no  country  in  the  world  possesses  so 
abundant,  so  ponderous,  so  ''scientifically"  and  system- 
atically constructed  a  war-literature  as  the  Germany 
of  the  last  forty  years.  As  far  as  the  Press  and  the 
disposition  of  a  certain  circle  is  concerned,  we  too  ap- 
pear in  a  very  unfavourable  light.  Only  a  year  be- 
fore the  war  Professor  Nippold  published  a  little 
work,^  which  contains  a  most  alarming  collection  of 
Press  extracts  and  quotations  from  the  most  respected 

^Otfried   Nippold,    "Der   deutsche    Chauvinismus, '    Stuttgart, 
1913. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    151 

German  politicians  and  newspapers,  in  which  the  neces- 
sity of  a  war  of  conquest  is  frankly  alluded  to.  If 
there  was  a  League  of  Patriots  in  Germany  there  was 
a  Pan-German  League  quite  ten  times  as  strong,  both 
as  regards  membership  and  influence,  as  well  as  a 
Defence  League,  a  Naval  League,  an  Eastern  ]\Iarches 
League,  a  Peasants'  League,  and  other  powerful  asso- 
ciations, which,  protected  by  the  official  good  will, 
devoted  their  chief  energies  to  popularising  the  no- 
tion of  conquest,  and,  since  the  beginning  of  the  World 
War  have  clamoured  with  one  voice  for  annexations. 

Truly,  people  who  disregard  a  Crown  Prince,  a 
Bernhardi,  a  Pan-German  League,  with  their  enor- 
mous intellectual,  financial,  and  moral  resources,  in  or- 
der to  heap  abuse  upon  a  Delcasse,  a  Lansdowne,  or  an 
Iswolsky,  and  to  draw  attention  to  the  machinations 
of  the  French  League  of  Patriots,  give  the  impression 
of  people  who  trip  up  in  the  street  over  a  straw,  while 
in  their  room  is  a  beam,  which  they  do  not  choose  to 
see.^ 

It  looked  for  a  moment  as  though  the  German 
dynasty  had  at  length  realised  that  a  new  era  had 
dawned,  in  which  disputes  between  nations  could  be  as 

*  As  Germans,  we  have  no  cause  to  uphold  the  policy  of  Tvlon- 
sieur  Delcasse.  As  pacifists,  however,  we  may  perhaps  recall 
the  fact  that  on  January  23rd,  1893,  Delcasse  said  in  the  Chani- 
ber  that  France  had  been  the  first  nation  to  approve  the  Czar's 
proposal  for  disarmament.  And  he  added:  "Differences  must, 
unfortunately,  always  arise  between  great  States,  but  I  be- 
lieve (the  friends  of  peace  have  long  believed  it!)  that  there 
are  none  that  it  would  not  be  possible  to  settle  by  a  spirit  of 
conciliation.  And  in  this  spirit  I  settled  the  Fashoda  affair." 
Has  any  German  statesman  of  the  last  decade  ever  spoken  in 
this  way?  I  have  sought  for  an  instance,  but  I  have  not  found 
one. 


152        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

easily  referred  to  a  civil  tribunal  as  disputes  between 
individuals.  On  September  25th,  1908,  French  sol- 
diers forcibly  arrested  certain  deserters  from  the  For- 
eign Legion  under  the  protection  of  the  German  Con- 
sul at  Casablanca.  This  episode  threatened  a  serious 
conflict  with  France.  To  the  general  satisfaction  of 
Europe,  this  squabble  was  promptly  settled  by  a  de- 
cision of  The  Hague  Tribunal  (May  22nd,  1909). 

This  proves  that  the  German  dynasty  was,  in  spite 
of  its  unaccommodating  attitude  at  The  Hague,  ready 
to  adapt  itself  to  the  new  principle  of  arbitration. 
Moreover,  the  peaceful  adjustment  of  the  far  more 
momentous  Franco-German  difference  in  the  matter  of 
the  Agadir  warship  (at  the  beginning  of  June,  191 1) 
seemed  to  prove  that  Germany's  foreign  policy  had 
adopted  something  of  that  modern  spirit  which  the 
whole  world  was  so  anxious  to  see  in  her. 

In  the  years  Immediately  preceding  the  World  War 
the  Reichstag  had  become  a  mere  shadow  of  the  dy- 
nastic sun.  In  the  spring  of  19 12,  the  Minister  for 
War  had  solemnly  promised  that,  after  passing  the 
moderate  Army  Bill,  it  would  for  a  long  time  not  be 
asked  to  vote  any  new  Bill  for  increasing  the  military 
strength.  As  if  in  mockery  of  his  promise,  hardly  a 
year  later,  the  biggest  military  budget  in  the  history 
of  the  world  was  laid  before  it.  This  measure  at  one 
stroke  raised  the  strength  of  the  army  by  25  per  cent., 
and  demanded  of  the  German  citizen  that,  in  addition 
to  existing  taxation,  he  should  furnish  another 
£40,000,000.  Thus,  in  the  midst  of  peace,  a  demand 
was  made  upon  the  German  people  that  not  even  van- 
quished and  ruined  France  had  asked  her  citizens  to 
agree  to,  when  she  had  to  pay  £200,000,000  to  Ger- 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    153 

many.  It  was  manifest  to  persons  of  any  penetra- 
tion that  William  II.  on  the  one  side  and  the  Reichs- 
tag on  the  other  were  puppets  in  the  hands  of  the 
militarists  and  Pan-Germanists  and  their  preposterous 
requirements  (in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  had  only 
a  fraction  of  the  people  behind  them). 

After  the  passing  of  the  great  Defence  Bill,  a  lead- 
ing Pan-Germanist  paper  declared  triumphantly :  "The 
demands  of  the  Chauvinists  or  Super-Patriots  have 
been  accepted  in  official  circles;  and  these  demands 
have  been  approved  by  those  parties  that  six  months 
previously  had  more  or  less  condemned  them  as  ex- 
cessive. In  short,  people  were  now  brought  logically 
to  Chauvinism,  or  to  what  was  formerly  implied  by 
that  term"    (Tagliche  Rundschau,  May  23rd,   1913). 

This  sounded  like  mockery  and  scorn  of  the  "hesi- 
tating" Government,  like  open  exultation  that  the  Gov- 
ernment itself  had  now  become  "Chauvinist."  Under 
the  circumstances,  the  words  spoken  by  William  11. 
on  May  14th,  1891,  at  Diisseldorf,  evoke  only  a  tragic 
approbation:  "I  only  wish  that  the  peace  of  Europe 
lay  in  my  hand  alone;  I  would,  at  all  hazards,  take 
care  that  it  should  never  be  broken."  If  by  these 
words  he  undoubtedly  wished  to  express  that  he  was 
not  the  sole  arbitrator  of  the  destinies  of  Europe,  he 
was  now  made  to  feel  that,  in  reality,  he  no  longer 
possessed  any  power,  even  in  his  own  country,  that 
he  had  become  the  captive  of  the  military  party,  which 
he  had  himself  instinctively  created  and  supported. 

Premonitions  of  the  Storm 

From  this  time  on  matters  proceeded  without  a 
check.    The  year  1913  was  marked  by  the  celebration 


154        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

with  great  pomp  and  jubilation  of  the  centenary  of 
the  "Wars  of  Liberation."  Alas!  when  I  travelled 
through  Germany  in  this  year,  I  gazed  at  the  Battle 
of  the  Nations  monument  at  Leipzig,  and  I  then 
realised  clearly  what  Germany  was  and  what  she  in- 
tended. This  massive,  clumsy  symbol  of  imperialism 
confronting  the  world  was  the  sequel  of  that  Sieges- 
allee,^  in  which  Luther  and  Kant  appear  so  diminutive 
by  the  side  of  the  majestic  figures  of  their  princes 
that  they  have  the  appearance  of  being  their  hired 
underlings.  The  Siegesallee  glorifies  the  past;  the 
Leipzig  obelisk  the  German  present  and  future.  There 
is  nothing  in  this  pyramidal  work  that  is  not  awk- 
ward, clumsy,  huge,  and  overbearing. 

In  vain  one's  eye  attempted  to  discover  in  it  a  single 
trace  of  a  free,  noble,  or  even  delicate  line.  In  vain, 
amid  all  these  heavy  blocks  of  stone  and  gigantic 
figures,  did  one  endeavour  to  breathe  freely  and  to  re- 
joice in  the  ''Liberty"  it  was  supposed  to  symbolise! 
It  was  impossible!  One  is  conscious  of  something 
threatening,  unnatural,  and  oppressive  in  this  monu- 
ment. When  the  guide  described  the  dimensions  and 
the  ideas  underlying  these  massive  blocks  of  granite, 
I  became  quite  depressed.  I  still  only  saw  the  heavy 
melancholy  of  this  monument,  which  both  in  style  and 
purpose  contained  a  challenge  to  free  humanity,  a 
glorification  of  power,  a  mockery  of  free  art,  and  a 
terrible  menace  for  the  future  of  Germany.  The  fiat, 
huge  block  of  stone  that  crowns  the  edifice  took  away 
my  breath;  I  had  the  feeling  that  at  any  moment  it 
would  crash  down  and  bury  with  it  the  last  atom  of 

^  Cf.  p.  206. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY    155 

spiritual  liberty  we  still  possess  in  Germany.  No  free- 
dom, no  humanity,  no  distinction,  no  upward  point- 
ing spires  and  pinnacles ;  nothing  but  gigantic  figures, 
guardians  of  the  dead,  corners,  square  stones  and 
tombstones  put  together  without  grace  or  humanity. 
The  whole  thing  was  nothing  more  than  a  result  of 
forty  years  of  imperialism;  the  symbol  of  a  sinister 
military  despotism  and  a  living  testimony  to  the  fact 
that  we  have  now  delivered  over  our  German  soul  to 
the  Prussian  idea  that  force  triumphs  over  right  and 
utility  over  beauty. 

What  did  it  serve  that  Herr  von  Bethmann  HoUweg 
lamented  in  the  Reichstag  on  May  30th,  1913: 
"Nationalism  is  the  bitterest  foe  ...  of  our  whole 
policy,  and  every  measure  taken  to  hamper  the  work  of 
this  nationalism  promotes  the  welfare  of  the  country 
and  Empire."  It  was  too  late!  The  open  confession 
of  the  Imperial  Chancellor  that  Germany  was  in  dan- 
ger of  being  oppressed  by  nationalism  is  really  comic 
when  one  considers  that  it  was  this  very  Chancellor 
who,  according  to  the  instructions  of  his  imperial 
master,  did  all  he  could  to  deprive  the  Reichstag  of  its 
rights,  though  the  Reichstag  afforded  the  sole  possi- 
bility of  overcoming  this  danger. 

Nobody  will  deny  that  the  German  Crown  Prince 
was  the  declared  champion  at  the  Berlin  Court  of  a 
war  of  conquest.  His  attitude  during  the  Morocco 
crisis  of  191 1;  his  prohibition  of  Hauptmann's  Peace 
drama  at  Breslau;  his  interference  in  the  Brunswick 
question  in  1913;  his  contribution  of  a  preface  to  the 
book,  ''Deutschland  in  Waffen" ;  his  talk  about  a  "fresh 
and  joyful  war";  his  "By  heaven!  if  it  were  only 
the  real  thing";  his  attitude  in  the  Zabern  debate  in 


156        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  Reichstag,  and  his  famous  telegram  ''Immer  feste 
druff"^  to  the  Zabern  criminals;  these,  and  his  whole 
demonstrative  support  of  the  Pan-Germanistic  idea,^ 
had  made  him  the  centre  of  the  war  party  at  the 
Berlin  Court.  Harden's  Ziikunft,  and  the  Leipzig cr 
Neiiesten  Na-chrichten,  edited  by  his  friend,  Paul 
Liman,  were,  owing  to  their  warlike  sentiments,  re- 
garded in  the  whole  country  as  mouthpieces  of  the 
Crown  Prince.  Books  like  ''Der  Kronprinz,"  by  Paul 
Liman;  *'Wenn  ich  der  Kaiser  war!*'  by  Daniel  Fry- 
mann ;  *'Des  Deutschen  Reiches  Schicksalsstunde,"  by 
Frobenius ;  ^'Deutschland  und  der  nachste  Krieg,"  by 
Bernhardi  (only  to  select  a  few  of  the  more  impor- 
tant), were,  with  official  recommendation,  scattered 
in  hundreds  of  thousands  of  copies  among  the  Ger- 
man people,  and  criticised,  more  or  less  openly,  the 
Emperor's  ''immoderate  love  of  peace,"  which  they 
contrasted  unfavourably  with  the  bold  and  aggressive 
temper  of  the  young  Crown  Prince. 

The  Frankfurter  Zeitung  wrote  apprehensively  on 
February  12th,  1914:  "It  is  true  that  the  present 
Emperor's  love  of  peace  is  universally  recognised,  but 

"  "Stick  to  it !" 

^  For  instance,  the  Crown  Prince  telegraphed  his  admira- 
tion to  Lieut. -Col.  Frobenius,  author  of  "Des  Deutschen 
Reiches  Schicksalsstunde."  And  what  is  there  in  this  book? 
Very  much  the  same  as  in  Bernhardi's :  "Deutschland  und 
der  nachste  Krieg."  Among  many  other  startling  things,  Fro- 
benius definitely  warns  us  that  "France  must  in  1915  or  1916. 
under  any  circumstances,  press  for  war  with  Germany,"  and 
therefore  demands  that  Germany  shall  at  once  anticipate  her. 
Of  course,  the  publisher  made  immediate  and  skilful  use,  for 
purposes  of  advertisement,  of  the  Crown  Prince's  recommenda- 
tion, and  obtained  an  enormous  circulation  for  this  mischievous 
book. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  GERMAN  POLICY     157 

who  can  vouch   for  the  permanence  of  his  present 
frame  of  mind,  and  who  can  vouch  for  his  successor?" 

With  impatient  cynicism  the  intellectual  leader  of 
the  German  war-party,  General  von  Bernhardi,  wrote : 
"Wait  we  dare  not  .  .  .  ,  the  situation  in  the  world 
affords  us  numberless  points  to  which  we  can  apply 
the  lever/'^  And  Professor  Delbriick  wrote  in  191 3 
the  equally  cynical  and  impatient  words:  "Public 
opinion  in  Germany  is  to-day  full  of  impatience  and 
is  despairing  as  to  whether  any  ends  are  being  really 
pursued.  But  one  thing  is  certain,  if  such  ends  are 
being  pursued  they  cannot  be  attained  in  the  space  of 
twenty-four  hours;  not  only  must  our  armaments  be. 
sufficient,  but  we  must  also,  above  all,  choose  the  right 
moment.  And,  moreover,  it  is  self-evident  that  this 
policy  can  be  the  more  readily  carried  into  effect  if, 
as  in  our  case,  the  highest  authority  lies  in  the  hands 
of  those  who  look  far  ahead,  and  do  not  take  the  whole 
world  into  their  confidence/'^ 

This  means,  therefore,  that  the  whole  German  for- 
eign and  peace  policy  were  entirely  dependent  upon 
the  "feelings,"  views,  and  impulses  of  certain  human 
beings  only  responsible  to  God,  and  that  the  Frank- 
furter Zeitiing  nowhere  discovered  any  guarantee  for 
the  permanence  of  the  peaceful  feelings  of  these  in- 
dividuals. In  other  words,  we  must,  in  accordance 
with  Bernhardi's  view,  "regard  war  as  an  indispen- 
sable instrument  of  politics  and  culture  .  .  .  and  face 
it  manfully."  It  means,  further,  as  Professor  Del- 
briick points  out  with  patroitic  cynicism,  that,  thanks 

^  General  v.  Bernhardi,  "Germany  and  the  Next  War."     Ed- 
ward Arnold,  London. 

'Prof.  H.  Delbriick,  "Regierung  und  Volkswille,"  p.  i86. 


1158        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

to  the  supreme  merit  of  our  Constitution,  the  German 
people,  thank  God,  cannot  interpose  a  word  when  its 
lords  and  masters  deliberate  behind  closed  doors  on  the 
life  and  death,  the  liberty  and  welfare,  of  the  German 
nation. 

I  believe  that  if  an  Englishman  or  a  Frenchman 
were  to  get  up  and  assert  that  the  main  advantage  of 
a  national  policy  was  that  it  was  not  determined  by 
the  popular  will,  but  by  the  chance  opinions  of  a  God- 
appointed  dynasty,  he  would  quickly  incur  general 
contempt  and  have  to  retail  his  mediaeval  sentiments 
through  some  obscure  organ  of  the  Press.  Nothing 
of  the  kind  in  Germany.  We  Germans  are  powerless 
against  barbarians  posing  in  the  robes  of  scientific 
professors.  For,  thanks  to  the  dynasty,  the  Delbrucks 
hold  the  chief  offices  in  our  State,  educate  the  royal 
princes,  wear  the  highest  orders,  and  dispense  their 
imperialist  poison  in  the  leading  university  lecture- 
rooms  of  the  nation. 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  AND  THE  GERMAN 

NOTION    OF    CULTURE.      TO    WHICH     IS 

ADDED  A  STUDY  OF  THE  INTELLECTUAL 

ANTECEDENTS  TO  THE  WAR 

German  Philosophers,  Professors  and  Historians, 

Dynasties  could  not,  however,  despite  their  miH- 
tary  and  political  power,  become  the  embodiment  of 
great  States,  had  they  not  also  behind  them  the  sup- 
port of  intellectual  forces.  In  these  days  of  national 
schools,  franchise,  and  military  service,  rigid  military 
discipline  would  by  itself  have  given  a  far  too  despotic 
impression.  Since,  moreover,  the  gods  are  long  since 
dead,  that  is  to  say,  have  been  relegated  to  their  true 
empire,  heaven,  a  dynasty  can  no  longer  be  content 
merely  to  point  to  the  divine  ordering  of  the  universe. 

For  these  and  other  reasons,  the  dynasty  requires 
a  philosophical  and  scientific  justification  of  its  rule, 
which  will  prove  the  more  effectual  in  proportion  to 
the  skill  it  exhibits  in  making  the  views  of  the  mod- 
ern world  serve  the  private  ambitions  of  earthly  gods. 

Since  the  days  of  Kant,  Fichte,  Schleiermacher,  and 
Feuerbach,  the  divinity  hedging  round  the  dynasty  had 
in  Prusso-Germany,  as  elsewhere,  become  more  and 
more  a  fiction,  in  which  the  people  themselves  had  no 

159 


i6o        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

longer  any  faith.  But  in  contrast  to  France,  where  the 
philosophical  ideas  preached  by  Voltaire,  Diderot,  and 
Rousseau  were  consistently  converted  into  action, 
philosophical  doctrines  in  Germany  never  passed  be- 
yond the  stage  of  mere  theory.  In  France  the  restora- 
tion of  the  divine  ordering  of  the  world  completely 
collapsed.  Charles  X.  had  to  be  taught,  in  1830,  that 
the  gods  intended,  once  and  for  all,  to  insist  upon  the 
first  of  the  ten  commandments.  Louis  Philippe,  the 
successor  of  the  last  Bourbon,  was  no  longer  King  by 
God's  grace,  but  a  citizen-king,  "citoyen-roi.^'  Even 
Napoleon  III.,  although  he  had  founded  his  Em.pire 
upon  a  coup  d'etat  and  emphatically  supported  the 
hegemony  of  Rome,  refrained  from  insisting  too  much 
on  his  divine  origin.  Even  in  the  days  of  the  most 
acute  reaction  (1851-1869)  the  spirit  of  Voltaire 
dominated  the  French  intellectual  world.  Napoleon 
possessed  the  strongest  army  in  Europe,  he  ruled  over 
the  most  bigoted  country  in  Europe,  but  he  had  no 
power  over  the  consciences  of  the  French  Intellectuals 
of  the  day.  That  is  to  say,  he  did  not  control  the 
national  sense  of  right  and  was  incapable  of  fettering 
the  free  play  of  science  by  Bonapartist  laws. 

Not  so  in  Prusso-Germany.  The  storms  of  the 
revolutions  were,  in  our  case,  only  storms  in  the  heads 
of  professors  and  students.  Consequently,  the  nat- 
ural aspiration  of  all  despots  (to  gain  popularity  by 
suppressing  intellectual  forces)  was  bound,  in  the 
country  of  ''pure  reason"  and  critical  methods,  to  give 
vent  to  itself  in  a  more  brutal  and  systematic  man- 
ner than  elsewhere.  Even  Kant,  who  had  for  a  mo- 
ment forgotten  himself  and  spoken  as  a  Republican, 
was  severely  reprimanded  by  the  King  and  had  to 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  161 

promise  amendment.  Fichte,  who  had  only  dared  to 
express  his  Republican  ideas  under  the  French  regime^ 
held  his  peace  after  the  Wars  of  Liberation.  Politi- 
cal and  military  democrats,  like  Baron  vom  Stein, 
Wilhelm  von  Humboldt,  Jahn,  Scharnhorst,  Gnei- 
senau,  etc.,  were  merely  made  use  of  to  assist  the  King 
in  recovering  his  power;  and  afterwards  fell  into 
disgrace.  The  German  republicans,  Schiller  and  Klop- 
stock,  died  at  the  right  time;  and  so  did  not  witness 
the  intellectual  ignominy  which  followed  the  *'Libera- 
tion."  Goethe,  who  himself,  a  Minister,  exercised  dy- 
nastic power,  was  adroit  enough  to  hold  his  peace  on 
all  political  topics,  but  he  ill  concealed  his  antipathy 
to  Prussia.  Goethe,  the  two  Humboldts,  Jean  Paul, 
Uhland,  and  a  few  others  were  the  last  heroes  of  the 
waning  glory  of  classic  Germanism.  From  this  time 
forth,  Metternich  undertook  the  political  and  Hegel 
the  intellectual  leadership  of  Germany. 

George  William  Frederick  Hegel  is  the  great  man 
whose  merit  it  is  to  have  secularised,  that  is  to  say, 
modernised,  the  dynastic  idea.  He  did  not  attempt 
to  re-establish  on  earth  the  gods  that  the  French  En- 
cyclopaedists and  Kant  had  hurled  to  the  ground.  He 
created  a  new  divinity,  which  ostensibly  followed  in 
the  steps  of  the  achievements  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion and  Kant's  doctrines,  namely.  The  State.  Hegel's 
doctrine,  that  the  State  is  a  divine  entity  and  that  man 
is  not  an  end  in  himself,  but  only  a  brick  in  the  fabric 
of  the  State,  and  that  the  people  is  that  portion  of 
the  State  that  does  not  know  what  it  wants,  became 
the  root  idea  of  that  Prussianism  which  finally  tri- 
umphed under  Bismarck.  In  his  learned  and  elegant 
though  obscure  style,  Hegel  supplemented  to  such  good 


i62        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

purpose  the  somewhat  brutal  and  mediaeval  principles 
of  Metternich,  that  he  was  made  a  Prussian  State 
philosopher  and  overwhelmed  with  honours. 

Hegel's  philosophy  has,  not  without  reason,  been 
called  an  intellectual  force.  A  doctrine  may  be  ever 
so  obscure  and  ever  so  pedantic,  yet,  if  it  obtains 
official  sanction,  it  is  sure  to  find  a  host  of  youthful 
enthusiasts  and  be  proclaimed  in  the  journals,  uni- 
versities, and  drawing-rooms  as  the  acme  of  political 
wisdom.  Such  was  the  case  with  Hegel's  philosophy 
in  Prussia.  Everyone  in  Germany  was  henceforth, 
in  one  shape  or  another,  compelled  to  acknowledge 
Hegel's  principle,  that  the  State  is  everything  and  the 
individual  nothing.  That  is  to  say,  all  those  German 
intellectuals  who  sympathised  with  the  French  Revolu- 
tion and  regarded  the  individual  as  an  end  in  himself, 
and  political  freedom  as  the  foundation  of  all  culture, 
were  outlawed  and  persecuted,  had  to  leave  their 
country  or  renounce  all  their  activity  in  the  field  of 
political  science.  Heine  and  Borne,  Herwegh  and 
Freiligrath,  Prutz  and  Pfau,  and  a  hundred  other 
German  thinkers  and  poets  fled  before  the  Prusso- 
German  reaction,  and,  from  foreign  lands,  hurled  their 
scorn  and  derision  against  Germany  in  cries  of  anguish 
and  revolt.  Uhland,  the  last  poet  in  Germany  to 
celebrate  the  democratic  idea  of  freedom,  kept  silent 
until  1848.  "Young  Germany"  never  reached  man's 
estate.  Metternich,  the  merciless  gaoler  of  the  intel- 
lectual prison  of  three  dynasties,  was  everywhere  tri- 
umphant. He  placed  a  muzzle  upon  the  German  in- 
telligence, such  as  has  seldom  been  worn  by  a  nation, 
and  one  which  Bismarck  found  very  apt  to  his  pur- 
poses after  the  ill-starred  Revolution  of  1848. 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  163 

We  find  Schopenhauer  ironically  remarking  that  a 
Government  will  never  appoint  professors  who  teach 
the  opposite  of  that  which  forms  the  foundation  of 
their  governing  authority.  And  he  adds,  with  biting 
sarcasm,  that  our  official  professors  of  philosophy, 
such  as  Hegel  and  Schelling,  do  not  live  "for  but  by 
philosophy,"  and  that,  therefore,  they  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  unprejudiced  investigators  of  the  truth. 

Schopenhauer  might  have  added,  further,  that  there 
exists  nowhere  a  body  of  professors  and  scholars  under 
such  strict  supervision  as  in  Germany.  The  Prussian 
State  has  always  possessed  the  indisputable  monopoly 
of  education.  She  has  never  tolerated  free  schools 
and  universities,  such  as  exist  in  France,  Belgium, 
England,  Switzerland,  etc.  All  professorial  chairs  are, 
without  exception,  in  the  nomination  of  the  State. 
German  professors  are  State  officials.  In  1898,  for 
instance,  a  so-called  "Privat-dozent"'^  law  was  passed 
for  Prussia,  placing  even  these  lecturers  under  Minis- 
terial discipline.  In  the  same  year,  disciplinary  pro- 
ceedings were  instituted  against  Professor  Delbriick 
(whom  we  have  already  referred  to  as  a  loyal  sup- 
porter of  the  Emperor).  In  his  capacity  of  a  Prussian 
State  official  he  had  in  his  Preiissische  Jahrhiicher  at- 
tacked the  brutal  expulsion  policy  directed  against 
Danish  subjects,  and,  in  consequence,  in  March,  1899, 
received  from  the  Disciplinary  Court  a  reprimand  and 
an  order  to  pay  a  fine  of  £25.  Prussian  royal  officials, 
or  any  who  aspire  to  become  such,  are  thus  not  en- 
titled to  their  independent  opinions  in  politics   (wit- 

*A  Privat-dozent  is  an  unsalaried  lecturer  at  a  German  uni- 
versity, who  receives  only  the  students'  fees. 


164        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

ness  the  cases  of  Lohning,  Willlch,  Arons,  Michels, 
Delitzsch,  Traub,  Jatho,  etc.). 

German  professors  have  unlimited  liberty  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  their  calling,  with  the  exception  of  the  liberty 
to  differ  from  the  Government.  Provided  that  they 
regard  the  Prussian  State  as  a  model  State,  the  dynasty 
as  appointed  by  God,  and  the  existing  Constitution 
as  the  highest  expression  of  civic  bliss,  they  have  even 
the  liberty  to  rebel  against  the  Almighty  (Hackel, 
Ostwald,  Eucken)  or  to  criticise  the  existing  economic 
order  from  a  socialistic  point  of  view  (Schmoller, 
Sombart,  etc.).  Hence,  among  the  German  profes- 
sors, we  find  extraordinarily  bold  spirits — Free- 
thinkers, Freetraders,  pedants  of  Reform,  theorists  of 
Socialism,  sexual-reformers,  and  even  intellectual 
anarchists;  but  there  are  among  them  no  actual  Dem- 
ocrats, Republicans,  or  apostles  of  popular  liberty.  In 
other  countries,  professors,  after  quitting  the  lecture- 
room,  again  become  citizens  and  take  their  place,  as 
such,  in  the  political  world,  without  regard  to  the 
Government.  Professors  who  belong  to  the  Socialist 
party  and  openly  acknowledge  the  fact,  are  not  un- 
known in  England,  France,  Italy,  Switzerland,  etc. 
In  Germany  such  a  state  of  things  is  unthinkable, 
because  there  professors,  in  their  private  life,  still  re- 
main Government  officials.  A  century  of  intellectual 
drilling  has  reduced  them  to  such  a  condition  of  ab- 
solute dependence  upon  the  State,  as  bread-giver,  that 
the  dynasty  can  blindly  rely  upon  them.  They  are 
never  guilty  of  an  act  of  lawlessness;  they,  in  duty 
bound,  combat  "revolution,"  write  huge  folios  in  praise 
of  science,  and  in  a  few  years  become  Privy  Council- 
lors and  only  seldom,  and  then  as  mouthpieces  of  the 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  165 

Government,  intermeddle  with  politics.^  But,  as  a 
general  rule,  they  remain  aloof  from  politics.  I  be- 
lieve that  there  is  not  in  the  whole  of  England  and 
France  a  single  professor  who  is  not  acquainted  with 
the  main  principles  of  his  country's  constitution  and 
who  would  not,  at  any  moment,  in  obedience  to  a 
natural  impulse,  be  prepared  to  break  a  lance  for  the 
inviolability  of  civic  rights  and  liberties.  In  Germany, 
on  the  other  hand,  there  are  professors  of  world-wide 
renown  {e.g,  Hackel),  who  have  not  the  slightest  ac- 
quaintance with  politics,  which  they  regard  as  an  oc- 
cupation unworthy  of  a  man  of  learning. 

The  German  professors  have  been  styled  "the  in- 
tellectual bodyguard  of  the  Hohenzollerns,"  and  in- 
deed, if  they  are  not  an  ornament  of  free  science, 
they  are  certainly  a  source  of  satisfaction  to  our  Gov- 
ernment. 

In  order  rightly  to  estimate  the  spirit  and  ideals 
animating  the  development  of  German  culture  during 
the  past  century,  these  peculiarities  must  be  borne  in 
mind.  For  example,  our  labours  in  the  field  of  his- 
tory   and    international    law,     eminently     important 

'That  there  are  laudable  exceptions  to  this  rule  can  be 
proved  by  the  case  of  the  Munich  Professor,  Ludwig  Quidde, 
who  pubhshed  at  the  beginning  of  the  'nineties  a  pamphlet 
"Caligula"  (a  study  of  Roman  Cassar  madness).  In  this  he 
characterised  the  person  and  acts  of  the  young  Roman  Emperor 
in  a  manner  that  left  no  room  for  doubt  as  to  the  reason  of  his 
presenting  the  German  public  at  this  time  with  this  study.  The 
pamphlet  ran  through  more  than  thirty  editions  and  made  a 
great  sensation  (it  is  to-day  even  more  worth  reading  than  it 
was  then).  Accused  of  lc3C  majeste  and  asked,  in  cross-exam- 
ination, "Whom  do  you  mean  by  Caligula?"  Professor  Quidde 
repHed,  with  astonishment :  "Whom  do  you  mean,  Mr.  Attorney- 
General?"  The  proceedings  had  to  be  dropped  for  want  of 
evidence. 


i66        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

factors  in  the  guidance  of  coming  generations,  have 
always  been  confided  to  the  safe  hands  of  Privy  Coun- 
cillors and  Excellencies.  It  is  not  surprising,  there- 
fore, that  the  volumes  on  history  which  Hegel,  Ranke, 
Sybel,  Treitschke,  Mommsen,  Lamprecht,  Delbriick, 
Schiemann,  etc.,  have  bequeathed  to  us  always  have  at 
bottom  the  same  idea,  viz.,  that  the  logical  significance 
of  the  world's  history  must  be  sought  in  the  rise  of 
the  Hohenzollerns  to  the  German  Imperial  dynasty. 
Although  differing  in  scope,  form,  and  method,  the 
work  of  the  German  historians  is  terribly  monotonous 
in  its  treatment  of  this  fundamental  idea.  The  theory 
that  the  old  German  dream  of  the  Emperor  Barbarossa 
has  been  finally  realised,  thanks  to  Bismarck's  astute- 
ness, for  the  happiness  of  the  German  people,  has  with 
innumerable  variations  formed  the  constantly  recur- 
ring theme  of  all  the  German  historians  since  1870. 

The  French  historians,  such  as  Michelet,  Taine, 
Blanc,  Thiers,  etc.,  differentiated  between  the  interests 
of  the  dynasty  and  those  of  the  people,  and  finally 
even  went  the  length  of  asserting  that  the  interests 
of  a  dynasty  could  only  be  promoted  or  the  reverse 
at  the  expense  of  the  people;  and  consequently  they 
have  always  inspired  a  secret  horror  in  our  'Trivy 
Councillor  historians."  In  the  eyes  of  the  latter,  his- 
tory is  nothing  but  a  collection  of  the  martial  deeds 
of  a  handful  of  men,  towering  above  the  formless 
and  ineffectual  mass  of  the  people,  and  endowing  it 
with  life  and  significance  by  means  of  their  wars.  No 
doubt,  these  historians  have  achieved  wonders  in  in- 
vestigating and  elucidating  ancient  civilisation;  the 
science  of  historical  research  has  ever  stood  high  in 
Germany.    But  the  idea  that  populations  exist  as  well 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  167 

as  dynasties,  and  that  these  populations  are,  after  all, 
entitled  to  the  same  consideration  as  their  God-ap- 
pointed lords,  is  one  which,  though  now  and  again  it 
dawns  upon  the  German  historians,  they  are  forbidden 
to  express  in  connection  with  Germany.  In  France, 
where  even  the  dynastic  power  of  the  last  Napoleon 
was  unable  to  stifle  the  consciences  of  scholars,  his- 
torians could  entertain  other  ideals.  The  whole  of 
Michelet's  historical  work  is,  for  instance,  nothing  but 
a  psean  of  praise  for  the  vigour  of  the  people  and 
their  enthusiasm  for  liberty.  But  if  a  German  were 
to  write  a  history  of  the  German  nation  in  which  he 
proved  that  the  greater  the  power  and  glory  of  the 
Hohenzollern  dynasty  the  greater  the  loss  of  the  Ger- 
man nation  in  respect  of  political  dignity  and  liberty, 
he  would  never  become  professor  and  Privy  Council- 
lor and  never  be  allowed  to  attain  celebrity.  Uhland 
was,  in  fact,  the  last  German  professor  of  history 
holding  democratic  views.  And  even  Uhland,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  he  laboured  in  South  Germany,  and 
not  In  Prussia,  only  continued  in  his  appointment  for 
three  years.  Then  he  gave  up  the  struggle,  or  he 
w^ould,  like  so  many  of  his  colleagues,  have  had  to 
reflect  behind  prison  bars  that  the  history  of  the  Ger- 
man people  must  perforce  be  a  glorification  of  the 
ruling  dynasty. 

In  the  same  way  that  Metternich  found  In  Hegel  a 
philosopher  after  his  own  heart,  so  did  Bismarck  dis- 
cover in  Treitschke  an  intellectual  partner  for  the 
furtherance  of  his  diplomacy.  Treitschke  was,  like 
Hegel,  loaded  with  the  highest  Prussian  honours  and 
offices  and  proclaimed  a  German  national  genius.  His 
influence   upon   modern    Germany    was    tremendous. 


i68        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Any  one  in  the  new  German  Empire  who  laid  claim 
to  education  must  sit  at  the  feet  of  this  half-deaf  Ex- 
cellency. He  may,  without  exaggeration,  be  styled 
the  intellectual  father  of  the  present  German  genera- 
tion. He  and  his  pupils  (e.  g.  Delbriick,  Lamprecht, 
Schiemann,  and  General  von  Bernhardi)  furnished 
Pan-Germanism  and  the  idea  of  conquest  with  that 
scientific  constitutional  basis  which  (say  what  one 
will)  became  the  theoretical  forcing-bed  for  the 
policy  of  war  and  armaments  of  the  Court  Camarilla, 
which  now  rules  over  Germany. 

International  Law — on  this  Side  and  on  That 

No  less  than  did  Bismarck  as  the  successor  of 
Metternich  in  the  sphere  of  politics,  Treitschke,  as  the 
successor  of  Hegel  in  the  sphere  of  history  and  inter- 
national law,  revealed  himself  the  inveterate  opponent 
of  all  the  democratic  ideas  and  ideals  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  *'The  State  is  Power."  This  phrase  is  the 
essence  of  Treitschke's  teaching,^  and  is  in  the  sharpest 
contradiction  to  the  idea  proclaimed  by  the  French 

*This  phrase  is  the  idea  underlying  Treitschke's  leading  work, 
"Politics"  (London:  Constable  &  Co.),  lectures  delivered  in 
Berlin  (1875-1895  and  1898-99).  These  lectures  have  become 
in  Germany  a  sort  of  political  gospel.  Treitschke's  funda- 
mental idea,  "The  State  is  Power,"  denotes,  first,  the  ignoring 
of  all  international  treaties  and  possibilities  of  amicable  under- 
standings, and,  secondly,  as  a  positive  result,  the  glorification 
of  war.  The  whole  of  the  domestic  and  foreign  policy  of  the 
German  Empire  has,  since  Bismarck's  day,  been  dominated  by 
this  leading  idea.  Had  Treitschke  himself  been  Germany's  rep- 
resentative at  The  Hague  Conferences,  he  could  rot  have  ex- 
pressed this  view  better  than  did  Count  Miinster  and  Marshall 
von  Bieberstein. 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  169 

Revolution:  "The  State  is  Justice."  It  is  true  that 
Treitschke  also  affirms  that  justice  is  one  of  the  main 
functions  of  a  State,  but  anyone  who  takes  the  trouble 
to  dip  beneath  the  surface  of  his  teachings  immedi- 
ately perceives  that  the  other  function,  namely,  the 
conduct  of  war,  is  by  far  the  more  important. 

In  Treitschke's  writings  there  is  not  the  faintest 
trace  of  the  spirit  of  classical  Teutonism.  For  in- 
stance, Wilhelm  von  Humboldt's  doctrine  that  the 
main  task  of  the  modern  State  is  the  conservation  of 
individual  liberty  was  regarded  in  "modern"  Germany 
as  antiquated  and  "long  since  superseded."  Might 
and  War;  War  and  Might;  this  after  1870  became  the 
password,  which  Hegel  had  still  named  "State  and 
PoHtics,"  and  Humboldt  "Liberty  and  Justice." 

All  the  English  and  French  philosophers  of  the  past 
two  centuries  have  been  yearning  and  striving  for  an 
ideal  Constitutional  State.  Justice  and  popular  liberty 
were  also  the  aspirations  of  our  classical  philosophers: 
Leibnitz,  Kant,  Lessing,  Herder,  Humboldt,  Fichte, 
Feuerbach,  and  Schleiermacher  all  maintained  this — 
each  in  his  own  way.  But  with  Hegel  began  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  State  and  of  the  striving  for  Power. 
In  the  field  of  politics  the  existence  of  these  mutually 
opposing  tendencies  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  both 
English  and  French  philosophers  were  coming  to  re- 
gard war  more  and  more  as  a  thing  of  the  past,  in  the 
last  resort  as  a  terrible  necessity,  but  always  as  some- 
thing immoral,  from  which  the  civilised  world  must 
emancipate  itself.^ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  German  philosophers,  f  ollow- 

^A  few  exceptions,  like  Ruskin  in  England,  Jules  De  Maistre, 
J.  P.  Proudhon  and  others,  have  not  altered  the  general  trend 


lyo        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

ing  the  example  of  Hegel,  glorified  war  as  a  neces- 
sary means  towards  a  continual  increase  of  Power, 
as  a  source  of  national  progress,  and,  in  short,  as  a 
divine,  holy,  normal,  and  moral  law  governing  the 
development  of  the  human  race.  In  his  "Politics," 
Treitschke  devotes  a  whole  chapter  to  the  holiness  of 
war,  declaring  it  to  be  the  "most  potent  force  in  the 
shaping  of  nations,'*  and  "the  sole  cure  for  decaying 
nations,' '  and  demonstrates  his  direct  relationship  with 
Hegel  by  adding:  "And  herein  lies  the  grandeur  of 
war,  that  the  mere  individual  is  lost  sight  of  in  face 
of  the  great  ideal  of  the  State." 

If  Hegel  be  compared  with  Treitschke,  and  the  lat- 
ter again  with  Bernhardi,  we  can,  step  by  step,  trace 
the  increase  in  brutality  which  German  ideas  of  culture 
have  suffered  under  Prussian  leadership.  In  Hegel, 
after  all,  the  doctrine  of  universal  citizenship  of  the 
Kant  and  Goethe  period  is  still  discernible,  but  we 
find  in  Treitschke  only  the  narrow-minded,  power-in- 
toxicated nationalist;  whilst  Bernhardi  appears  to  be 
nothing  better  than  a  Red  Indian,  save  for  the  fact 
that  he  is  able — most  unfortunately  for  us — to  read 
and  write,  and  that  he  has  the  entree  at  the  court  of 
an  absolute  ruler. 

The  French  Revolution  had  thrown  overboard  every 
idea  of  a  dynastic  State  and  proclaimed  the  sovereignty 

of  intellectual  progress  in  these  countries.  It  is  true  that 
Proudhon,  "the  father  of  Anarchism/'  celebrated  war  in  two 
thick  volumes  and  fulminated  against  the  "jurists,"  Grotius, 
Vattel,  Kant,  etc.  Yet  the  final  result  of  all  his  researches 
is  the  assertion :  Mankind  will  not  tolerate  war  any  longer ! 
Moreover,  Proudhon  conceived  of  war  as  being  entirely  a  "chiv- 
alrous duel."  In  this  sense,  he  is  in  direct  opposition  to  Clause- 
witz  and  his  followers,  who  scoff  at  legalised  warfare  as  weak 
and  puerile. 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  171 

of  the  people.  It  was  the  origin  of  that  science  which 
all,  with  the  exception  of  German  professors  and  in 
spite  of  the  present  World  War,  name  ''International 
Law."  In  a  legal  sense,  International  Law  is  the 
codification  of  legal  principles  touching  the  attitude 
and  relations  of  civilised  States  to  each  other.  Now 
the  French  Revolution  had  set  up  an  entirely  new 
morality  in  respect  to  these  relations  between  State 
and  State.  This  morality  culminates  in  the  proposi- 
tion (but  tell  it  not  to  any  German  professor!)  that 
every  country  has  the  Incontestable  right  to  administer 
its  own  affairs. 

It  is  clear  at  a  glance  that  an  International  Law- 
resting  upon  this  basis  is  a  negation  of  the  former 
divine  constitutional  right  of  dynasties,  as  Machiavelli 
taught  it,  and  as  it  has  been  modernised  by  Hegel  and 
by  Treitschke. 

The  people  had  been  hitherto  the  absolute  chattels 
of  their  princes,  and  could  by  war,  barter,  treaty,  or 
marriage  be  transferred  at  will  from  one  dynastic 
house  to  another.  Now,  however,  the  Revolution  de- 
clared the  nations  to  be  independent  individuals  and 
collective  souls,  and  exhorted  them  to  govern  them- 
selves. Mirabeau  proudly  stated  in  the  Constituent 
Assembly  that  henceforth  Right  was  the  sovereign  in 
the  world;  no  longer  that  right  which  a  dynasty  pos- 
sesses only  so  long  as  it  is  in  a  position  to  defend  it 
against  all  comers  vi  et  armis,  but  that  hallowed,  un- 
written Right  common  to  every  being  born  into  the 
world  which  slumbers  in  the  collective  consciousness 
of  every  people  under  the  sun. 

These  new  theories  of  the  free  right  of  nations 
to  control  their  own  destinies  were  immediately  put 


172        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

into  practice  by  the  Revolution.  When  Alsace  de- 
manded its  incorporation  with  the  French  Republic, 
the  new  French  Government  ordered  first  of  all  a 
plebiscitum  of  the  Alsatians.  When  Savoy  made  a  like 
application  it  submitted  to  the  National  Convention  a 
popular  resolution  in  these  words:  "The  Nation  of 
Savoy,  seeing  that  the  deposition  of  Victor  Amadeus 
and  his  heirs  has  been  proclaimed,  declares  itself  a 
free  and  sovereign  nation,"  and,  as  free  and  sovereign, 
"it  unanimously  desires  to  be  united  to  the  French 
Republic."  The  National  Convention  replied  that  it 
gladly  conformed  with  this  wish,  since  it  had  been 
shown  that  "the  free  and  unfettered  desire  of  the  sov- 
ereign people  of  Savoy,  as  expressed  in  their  com- 
munal assemblies,  was  that  they  should  be  united  to 
the  French  nation."  The  Mayor  of  Annecy  an- 
nounced to  his  compatriots  that  they  were  hence- 
forth citizens  of  the  French  Republic  and  proudly 
added :    "We  are  not  a  conquered,  but  a  free  people." 

What  "International  Law"  imports  is  visible  yet 
more  clearly  in  a  report  that  Carnot  laid  before  the 
French  Government  in  regard  to  the  incorporation 
of  Monaco: 

"It  is  the  inalienable  right  of  every  nation  to  live 
apart  from  others,  if  it  so  pleases,  or,  for  the  vindica- 
tion of  their  common  interests,  to  unite  with  others,  if 
such  be  its  desire.  We  French,  who  know  no  other 
sovereigns  save  the  peoples  themselves,  have  fraternity 
and  not  lordship  as  our  system.  We  worship  the  prin- 
ciple that  every  nation,  be  the  territory  it  occupies 
ever  so  small,  is  absolute  master  in  its  own  house, 
and  must,  as  regards  its  rights,  be  treated  as  equal 
with  the  greatest;  and  that  nobody   can  justifiably 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  173 

violate  its  independence,  unless  its  own  is  manifestly 
imperilled."^ 

This  new,  clearly  formulated,  and  eminently  logical 
right  of  the  nations  to  free  self-government,  which 
forms  the  basis  of  our  present  international  law,  was, 
it  is  triTC,  frequently  infringed  by  France  herself;  not- 
withstanding, it  still  shines,  as  a  guiding  star  of  Eu- 
ropean popular  aspirations,  above  the  realm  of  politics. 
The  whole  European  history^  of  the  past  century  is 
characterised  by  a  striving  for  national  forms  of  gov- 
ernment. The  nations  no  longer  intend  to  be  ruled 
by  alien  conquerors,  but  themselves  intend  to  control 
their  own  fate. 

After  nearly  a  hundred  years  of  conflict,  the  Balkan 
States  emancipate  themselves  from  the  Turkish 
domination  of  the  last  four  centuries.  Greece,  Rou- 
mania,  Bulgaria,  and  Serbia  gain  their  independence, 
thanks  to  French  and  partly  also  to  English  and  Rus- 
sian aid.  Poland  is  maintaining  a  stout,  though  an 
alas !  indecisive  struggle  against  the  domination  of  the 
foreigner.  Italy,  Hungary,  and  Prussia  throw  off  the 
Hapsburg  yoke.  The  Teutonic  States,  after  having 
in  1848  vainly  striven  to  attain,  in  a  peaceable  way,  a 
democratic  empire,  had,  after  two  bloody  wars,  con- 
solidated their  national  unity.  Popular  liberty  was  the 
cry  from  one  end  of  Europe  to  the  other.  But  it  was 
not  everywhere  understood  in  the  same  sense.  The 
people  meant  by  it  their  national  and  their  political 
liberty.  Not  so  the  dynasties;  these  (mostly  unin- 
vited) were  astute  enough,  in  this  struggle,  to  pose  as 
advocates  and  champions  of  the  popular  will,  while  all 

*C/.  Gabr.  Seailles,  "L' Alsace-Lorraine,"  Paris,  1915,  pp. 
15-17. 


174        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  time  they  only  meant  by  liberty  the  freedom  of 
their  States  outside  their  borders.  For  instance,  the 
Prussian  dynasty  wages,  in  the  name  of  this  principle 
of  nationality,  three  successive  wars,  but,  at  once,  pro- 
ceeds to  annex  foreign  territory,  and,  by  its  treatment 
of  the  annexed  peoples,  to  trample  this  very  principle 
of  nationality  under  foot. 

Only  France  remained,  to  some  extent,  faithful  to 
that  idea  of  popular  and  international  liberty  pro- 
claimed to  mankind  by  the  Great  Revolution.  It  is 
a  feather  in  the  cap  of  Napoleon  III.  that,  despite 
the  fact  that  he  was  the  most  powerful  sovereign  in 
Europe,  he  always  respected  this  right  of  the  people 
to  autonomy.  Before,  in  1859,  annexing  Savoy  and 
Nice,  he  required  their  inhabitants  to  approve,  by 
vote,  the  treaty  which,  as  a  result  of  the  Italo- Austrian 
War,  ceded  these  countries  to  France.  Modern  Italy 
came  into  being  (between  1859  ^^^  1871),  partly 
through  Napoleon's  aid,  only  by  virtue  of  the  popular 
vote.  Even  if  it  were  really  the  fact,  as  has  been 
often  asserted,  that  these  plebiscites  were  only  com- 
edies, yet  the  fact  remains  that  Napoleon  III.  recog- 
nised the  new  International  Law,  at  all  events  in  prin- 
ciple, as  a  political  theory,  although  by  virtue  of  his 
dynastic  power  he  was  never  obliged  to  do  so.  After 
the  war  of  1866  Napoleon  III.  went  actually  so  far 
as  to  have  a  clause  inserted  in  the  Treaty  of  Prague 
by  w^hich  Prussia  pledged  herself  only  to  incorporate 
Schleswig-Holstein  in  the  German  Confederation  after 
it  had  signified  its  consent  to  this  course  by  popular 
vote.  Prussia  endorsed  this  pledge  but  with  the  firm 
resolve  never  to  abide  by  it.  For  the  right  of  nations 
to  free  autonomy,  proclaimed  by  the  Great  Revolu- 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  175 

tion,  though  opposed  in  Europe  by  Austria-Hungary, 
Russia,  and  Turkey,  found  its  bitterest  enemy  of  all 
in  Prussia. 

Yet  Prussia,  unlike  Austria  and  Russia,  did  not 
support  its  antagonism  to  international  law  by  the 
bloody  arbitrament  of  war,  but  by  very  edifying 
juristic  and  philosophical  theories.  Prusso-Germany 
was  not  and  is  not  a  State  bent  on  bloody  conquest; 
no!  it  is  the  home  of  jurisprudence,  of  progress,  and 
of  popular  liberty!  In  contrast  to  Russia,  it  possesses 
a  Constitution  and  a  democratic  popular  assembly  and 
army,  and  it  likewise  possesses  a  culture  that  hence- 
forth envelops  it  with  the  nimbus  of  a  modern  and" 
progressive  State! 

Prussia  never  makes  conquests;  she  acts  either  in 
self-defence  or  in  virtue  of  higher  rights.  Any  one 
who  is  backed  by  a  victorious  army  and  is  executing 
the  will  of  Providence  is  entitled  to  claim  for  himself 
both  a  special  standard  of  right  and  a  special  wisdom. 
An  act  that,  in  the  case  of  a  private  individual,  would 
be  called  either  thieving,  swindling,  or  extortion  be- 
comes, thanks  to  a  victorious  army,  a  praiseworthy  act 
of  self-preservation  and  higher  justice. 

It  was  the  task  of  Treitschke  and  his  apostles  to 
condense  Bismarck's  diplomacy  and  the  invincibility 
of  the  Prusso-German  army  into  a  philosophical  and 
legal  system.  Although  this  problem  seems,  at  first 
glance,  rather  difficult,  they  solved  it  admirably. 

In  contrast  to  the  "revolutionary"  right  of  nations 
to  free  autonomy,  Treitschke  and  his  school  were  the 
champions  of  "historical"  right.  Thus,  if  a  country 
like  Alsace,  after  having  been  for  centuries  a  possession 
of  Germany,  is  then  snatched  from  it,  the  latter  coun- 


176        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

try  has  an  historic  right  to  the  portion  wrested  from  it. 

So  much  the  more,  when  to  its  historic  right  is 
added  an  ethnographic  one.  Supposing  a  race,  such 
as  the  Alsace-Lorrainers,  the  Swiss,  the  Flemings,  the 
Baltese,  etc.,  are  actually  of  German  descent,  use  the 
German  tongue,  and  have  German  customs  and  habits, 
then  the  great  community  to  which  it  thus  belongs 
has  a  sacred  right  to  absorb  it,  in  the  interest  of  the 
cultural  unit,  and  to  draw  it  into  the  great  racial  fam- 
ily of  which  it  is  a  member. 

Again  to  this  historic-ethnographic  right  may  be 
added  an  etymological  one,  which  will  carry  us  a  good 
step  further.  Nancy,  for  instance,  is  a  patent  mutila- 
tion of  the  good  old  Imperial  city  Nantzig,  and  Dun- 
kirk can  only  be  derived  from  Diinkirchen;  down  to 
the  present  day  the  Bretons,  in  the  north-west  of 
France,  employ  an  affirmative  that  sounds  like  the 
German  ''J a'' ;  and  so  forth.  Whence  it  not  only  fol- 
lows that  all  territories  and  races  whose  language  and 
local  and  proper  names  show  Celtic-Germanic  roots 
were,  originally,  German  peoples  and  territories,  but 
that  Prusso-Germany  has  also,  in  the  name  of  Ger- 
man culture,  a  sacred  right  to  make  them  German 
once  more. 

The  French  professor  of  international  law  says: 
Alsace  is  certainly  German,  it  belonged  to  Germany 
for  centuries,  and  Strassburg,  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
was  a  Mecca  of  Teutonism.  Yet  Germany  has,  on 
that  account,  no  right  to  lay  claim  to  Alsace  as  its 
own  property.  Everything  depends  upon  the  wishes 
of  the  Alsatians.  Since,  in  bygone  days,  out  of  af- 
fection for  our  Republic,  Alsace  voluntarily  chose  to 
become  a  part  of  France,  and  since  every  people  is 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  177 

the  sovereign  master  of  its  destiny,  there  can  be  here 
no  other  "right"  than  the  right  of  the  Alsatian  people. 
What  concern  is  it  of  Prussia  that  Neuenburg  was 
once  upon  a  time  Prussian?  What  concern  is  it  of 
us  French  that  French  is  spoken  in  Geneva,  and  that 
we  can  trace  thousands  of  French  roots  in  the  lan- 
guages of  England,  Spain,  Italy,  and  even  Roumania, 
if  we  trouble  to  investigate  the  matter?  A  community 
governed  by  the  principle  of  nationalities  does  not 
build  up  its  rights  upon  excavations,  linguistic  roots, 
popular  customs,  and  historical  events  and  investiga- 
tions. For  such  a  community  the  sole  question  is : 
What  does  the  Neuenburger  want?  What  does  the- 
Genevese  desire?  Does  he  wish  to  be  a  Swiss  citizen? 
His  will  is  law  and  "right";  and  when  once  he  has 
clearly  expressed  it,  all  further  discussion  is  superflu- 
ous. For  us  French  there  are  no  other  rights  save 
the  universal  right  of  all  nations  to  their  autonomy. 

"It  is  difficult" — so  writes  the  French  historian 
Ernest  Lavisse-^ — "to  get  foreigners  to  understand  why 
France  cannot  forgive  the  loss  of  her  provinces.  The 
Germans  say  *it  is  the  law  of  war/  In  the  eighteenth 
century,  such  a  view  would  have  caused  no  surprise; 
and,  even  now,  it  appears  quite  natural  to  the  poli- 
ticians of  the  old  regime.  But,  in  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, France  stands  for  quite  another  policy.  Among 
the  nations  of  the  world,  France  is  conspicuous  by  her 
rationalism  and  her  sense  of  right  and  wrong.  She 
maintains  that  a  human  community  is  not  to  be  treated 
like  a  flock  of  sheep.  She  believes  in  the  existence 
of  a  national  soul.  She  has  sympathised  deeply  with 
the  sufferings  of  the  victims  of  force.     She  wept  over 

*G.  Seailles,  "L' Alsace-Lorraine,"  p.  21. 


178        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Athens,  Warsaw,  and  Venice,  and  she  gave  the  *op- 
pressed'  something  more  tangible  than  tears.  The 
Peace  of  Frankfort  did  not  only  leave  us  the  humilia- 
tion of  defeat;  it  did  not  merely  violate  our  frontiers 
and  bring  our  country  into  a  condition  of  unendurable 
insecurity.  It  was  when  the  victor  robbed  us  of  souls 
who  were  ours,  and  wished  to  remain  so,  that  he 
outraged  our  religion.  And  this  is  at  the  bottom  of 
the  Alsace-Lorraine  question.  It  brings  two  civilisa- 
tions face  to  face,  and  in  our  defeat  we  have  a  con- 
soling honour :  that  the  reparation  of  the  wrong  done 
us  would  be  a  satisfaction  to  the  most  lofty  sentiments 
and  to  the  spirit  of  the  age." 

"You  appeal  to  the  principle  of  nationalities,  but 
you  interpret  it  differently  from  the  rest  of  Europe," 
wrote  the  French  international  jurist  Fustel  de  Coul- 
anges  to  Mommsen.  *'In  your  view,  this  principle 
entitles  a  powerful  State  to  forcibly  annex  a  province, 
without  other  justification  than  the  fact  that  this  prov- 
ince is  peopled  by  the  same  race  as  is  the  annexing 
State.  According  to  normal  public  opinion  in  Europe, 
and  in  the  civilised  world  at  large,  the  principle  of 
nationalities  simply  forbids  a  province  or  a  people  to 
obey  a  foreign  dictator  against  its  will.  I  will  give 
an  example,  by  way  of  illustration;  the  principle  of 
nationalities  did  not  permit  Piedmont  to  forcibly  annex 
Milan  and  Venice,  but  it  allowed  Milan  and  Venice 
to  emancipate  themselves  from  Austria  and  volun- 
tarily to  join  themselves  to  Piedmont.  You  perceive 
the  difference.  Consequently  this  principle  may  well 
give  Alsace  a  right,  but  it  cannot  give  you  a  right 
over  Alsace.  It  creates  a  right  for  the  weak,  but  it 
affords  no  pretext  for  the  ambitious.     The  principle 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  179 

of  nationalities  is,  by  no  manner  of  means,  the  old 
right  of  the  stronger,  under  a  new  name."^ 

Treitschke  and  the  German  School  of  International 
Philosophers  were  not  tardy  with  their  reply: 

The  Alsatians  are  German;  they  have  been  forcibly 
wrested  from  the  great  German  family.  Hence,  we 
Germans  have  not  merely  a  mission  of  culture  to 
execute  in  Alsace,  but,  considering  that  we  are,  ob- 
viously, the  more  highly  organised  and  civilised  race, 
we  have  to  secure  the  peace  of  the  world. 

"Who  can  plead,  in  the  face  of  our  duty  to  secure 
the  world's  peace,  that  the  Alsace-Lorrainers  do  not 
want  to  belong  to  us  ?  Confronted  by  the  sacred  neces- 
sity of  these  great  days,  the  doctrine  of  the  autonomy 
of  all  German  races,  that  alluring  theme  of  outlaw 
demagogues,  will  come  to  a  miserable  end.  These 
lands  are  ours  by  the  right  of  the  sword  and  we  will 
deal  with  them  by  virtue  of  a  higher  right,  by  the 
right  of  the  German  nation  not  to  allow  its  sons  for 
ever  to  estrange  themselves  from  the  German  Em- 
pire."2 

As,  then,  according  to  the  Prusso-Hegelian  doctrine, 
nations  themselves  never  know  what  they  want,  they 
must  be  made  happy  against  their  will.  Treitschke 
solemnly  declared :  *'We  Germans,  who  know  both 
Germany  and  France,  know  what  suits  the  Alsatians 
far  better  than  that  miserable  people  knows  itself.  .  .  . 
We  wish  to  restore  to  them,  against  their  will,  their 
own  real  self."^ 

*C/.  Gabr.  Seailles,  "Alsace-Lorraine,"  Paris,  1915,  p.  11. 
*  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  Juli,  1870.    H.  v.  Treitschke :   "Was 
fordern  wir  von  Frankreich?" 
'  Ibidem. 


i8o        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

"By  the  right  of  the  sword!"  'That  miserable 
people!"  "Against  their  will!"  Here  we  find  our- 
selves in  the  midst  of  the  neo-German  notion  of  con- 
stitutional law  and  culture.  Hegel's  fundamental  idea 
of  the  stupidity  of  the  people  is  brilliantly  demon- 
strated to  us  by  Treitschke  with  reference  to  those 
"miserable"  Alsace-Lorrainers.  It  is  apparent,  at  the 
first  glance,  that  this  "modern"  German  conception  of 
constitutional  and  international  law  is  not  only  very 
convenient  for  the  dynastic  will  to  power,  but  is  really 
nothing  else  than  a  learned  term  for  it.  The  funda- 
mental difference  in  the  legal  conceptions  of  the  two 
hostile  nations  is  now  rendered  apparent,  and  also  the 
reason  why  this  antagonism,  which  has  troubled  Eu- 
rope for  forty  years  past,  could  never  be  adjusted. 

The  whole  history  of  France  and  Italy  during  the 
last  century  is  entirely  animated  by  the  new  religion 
of  popular  rights.  England  accorded  to  all  its  colonies 
having  a  white  population  (even  to  the  Boer  Republic 
it  had  vanquished)  free  autonomy;  that  the  Irish  have 
no  Home  Rule  is  not  England's  fault,  but  the  fault  of 
the  religious  differences  obtaining  in  Ireland  itself.^ 

^  It  is  a  proof  either  of  ignorance  or  of  deliberate  calumny 
that,  since  the  beginning  of  the  World  War,  it  has  frequently 
been  asserted  in  Germany  that  England  treated  the  Irish  no 
better  than  Prussia  has  treated  the  Poles,  the  inhabitants  of 
Alsace-Lorraine,  and  the  Danes.  During  the  last  decade  Eng- 
land has  given  generous  proof  of  her  respect  for  the  right 
of  the  Irish  to  control  their  own  destinies.  In  1898  Ireland 
received  from  the  English  Government  the  so-called  "Local  Gov- 
ernment Act,"  in  1899  a  special  department  for  agricultural  and 
technical  instruction,  in  1903  the  Wyndham  "Land  Purchase 
Act"  (the  direct  antithesis  of  Prussia's  Polish  Eviction  Acts), 
in  1908  a  national  university  (just  imagine  a  Polish  university 
at  Posen  or  a  French  university  at  Strassburg),  and  finally, 
in    191 1,    the    possibility    of    political    self-government    (Home 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  181 

Even  Russia  granted  the  Finns  and  Baltese  a  kind  of 
self-government,  such  as  German  Poland  and  Alsace- 
Lorraine  have  never  known.  Russia  was  even  a 
pioneer  in  this  new  international  law  and  helped  the 
Bulgarians  and  Roumanians  to  their  national  inde- 
pendence. 

But  in  Prusso-Germany  there  was  nothing  but  a 
policy  of  ''Blood  and  Iron  in  the  hands  of  potentates 
and  princes."^     Not  even  theoretically  might  the  new 

Rule).  What,  in  spite  of  this,  caused  that  disaffection  in  Ire- 
land which,  in  Easter  week  of  1916,  found  expression  in  armed 
and  open  revolt?  Because  a  quarter  of  Ireland  (the  province 
of  Ulster)  declared  that  they  would  rather  die  ^than  submit 
to  such  a  Home  Rule  Act,  and  thereupon  raised  up  the  vol- 
untary army  and  the  revolutionary  movement  of  1912-13.  Be- 
cause a  small  but  very  active  group  of  propagandists  (the 
Gaelic  League)  demanded  complete  separation  from  England, 
and  the  revival  and  forcible  introduction  of  the  long-dead 
Gaelic  language,  and  because  (O  temporal  O  mores!  Herr 
v.  Biilow)  the  English  Government,  until  Easter  week,  1916, 
not  only  did  nothing  to  cope  with  this  movement  but  even 
indirectly  encouraged  it  (by  financial  contributions  towards  the 
teaching  of  the  Gaelic  language  in  Irish  schools,  by  tolerating 
the  more  than  revolutionary  propaganda  of  the  Gaelic  League, 
by  not  opposing  the  formation  of  a  voluntary  army  in  Ulster, 
designed  to  resist  the  Home  Rule  measure  proposed  by  the 
Government,  etc.,  etc.).  England's  policy  toward  Ireland  is  thus 
the  direct  opposite  of  the  policy  of  Prussia  towards  the  Poles, 
the  Danes,  and  the  inhabitants  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  treat- 
ment of  Ireland  by  the  English  Government  may  not  always 
have  been  above  reproach,  but  the  chief  offenders  were  in  this 
case  the  Irish  politicians,  the  Gaelic  League,  and  the  fomenters 
of  religious  hate. 

^The  proclamation  of  the  Allied  Emperors  (November  5th, 
1916)  touching  Poland's  autonomy  is  a  striking  instance  of  this. 
The  new  "independent  State  with  an  hereditary  Monarchy 
and  a  Constitution"  does  not  arise  by  reason  of  any  suffrage 
or  parliamentary  deliberation.  It  is  solely  the  will  of  two 
God-ordained  dynasties,  by  right  of  the  sword  and  as  the  tool 
of  dynastic  interests.    The  term  autonomy  is  here  but  the  mod- 


i82        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

doctrine  of  international  law  raise  its  head  among  us. 
It  is  remarkable  that  even  our  German  Social  Dem- 
ocrats (with  a  few  exceptions)  ignored  it.^ 

ernised  phrase  for  annexation.  For  this  is  what  it  actually 
means.  If  it  be  realised  that  this  proclamation  of  an  inde- 
pendent Poland  is  only  a  pretext  for  the  raising  of  a  Polish 
army,  then,  viewed  from  a  democratic  standpoint,  it  can  only 
be  regarded  as  a  sheer  mockery  of  the  international  law  of 
modern  times.  A  similar  mockery  is  contained  in  the  very 
style  of  the  proclamation:  in  order  to  show  plainly  that  the 
population  have  no  voice  in  the  matter  of  the  creation  of 
States,  William  II.  here  again,  as  is  his  wont,  confronted  the 
German  Reichstag  and  Poland  with  a  fait  accompli.  By  a 
Cabinet  order  he  adjourned  the  Reichstag  on  November  4th, 
and  then,  on  the  5th,  without  giving  an  opportunity  for  any 
discussion  on  the  matter,  proclaimed  the  creation  of  a  new 
kingdom  and  simultaneously  announced  that  the  Prussian  Poles 
would  still  remain  Prussians,  and  that  there  was  no  thought  of 
a  change  in  Prussia's  brutal  Polish  policy.  Truly,  the  Middle 
Ages  and  Prussia  in  all  their  glory! 

^When,  a  year  after  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War,  I 
translated  a  book  by  Gustav  Herve,  in  which  he  advocated 
for  the  better  assurance  of  world-peace,  the  autonomy  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  and  thereby  a  Franco-German  understanding, 
this  proposal  was  rejected  with  scorn  in  Germany  at  large, 
and  by  the  Socialists  in  particular.  The  work  of  the  former 
Revolutionist,  Paul  Lensch,  "Die  Sozial  Demokratie,  ihr  Ende 
und  ihr  Gliick,"  openly  scoffs  at  the  idea  of  the  right  of  na- 
tions to  autonomy.  German  Social  Democracy  was,  theoret- 
ically, the  champion  of  the  autonomy  of  nations.  But  it  re- 
garded this,  according  to  schedule,  as  "civic  ideology,"  and 
only  awaited  its  realisation  as  a  result  of  the  great  anti- 
capitalist  revolution,  without  which  no  social  amelioration  was 
thinkable.  Social  democracy  regarded  the  eight-hour  day 
movement  as  more  important  than  all  the  "petty"  ideals  of 
the  revolutions  of  1789  and  1848  taken  together.  Marx  alone 
is  a  praiseworthy  exception  to  this  narrow-minded  party  pro- 
gramme. Writing  from  London  in  1870,  in  the  name  of  true 
internationalism,  he  protested  against  the  annexation  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  and  with  extraordinary  perspicacity  foretold  the  pres- 
ent war. 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  183 

How  little  the  Franco-English  notion  of  interna- 
tional law  was  known,  as  a  theory,  in  Prusso-Germany 
is  apparent  from  the  correspondence  which  David 
Friedr.  Strauss  had  with  Renan,  and  Mommsen  with 
Fustel  de  Coulanges.  The  French  savants  might  ex- 
plain to  their  German  colleagues  a  thousand  times 
over  that  it  was  not  their  grief  at  the  military  down- 
fall of  France  which  led  them  to  protest  against  the 
annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  but  the  fact  that,  in 
the  nineteenth  century,  no  territory  ought  to  be  an- 
nexed unless  the  population  declared  themselves  in 
favour  of  the  change.  All  to  no  purpose.  The  Ger- 
man philosophers  either  regarded  this  only  as  a  fur- 
ther proof  of  their  claim,  that  the  stronger  is  always 
in  the  right,  and  that  the  French  standpoint  was  only 
the  hypocrisy  of  the  weaker,  appealing  in  the  name  of 
international  law  only  so  long  as  he  felt  himself  im- 
potent to  try  fresh  conclusions  on  the  battlefield.  Or 
else,  if  they  felt  the  justice  of  the  French  claim,  they 
held  their  peace.  Bebel,  Liebknecht,  and  Jacoby  were, 
in  modern  Germany,  the  sole  upright  men  who  dared 
to  speak  in  the  name  of  the  free  autonomy  of  nations, 
that  is  to  say,  to  call  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine a  crime  against  international  law.  For  this 
boldness  they  had  to  suffer  within  prison  walls,  and 
their  fate  awed  all  those  who  secretly  disapproved  the 
Bismarck-Treitschke  modernisation  of  dynastic  des- 
potism. 

Accordingly,  an  idea  that  in  most  civilised  countries 
had  passed  into  political  practice  remained,  in  Prusso- 
Germany,  punishable  even  as  a  theory.  And  this  ex- 
plains to  us  the  fact  why,  during  the  past  forty  years 
in  Germany,  not  a  single  voice  has  been  raised  to  tell 


184        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

us  Germans  what  "International  Law"  really  means. 
At  all  the  international  pacifist  and  socialist  con- 
gresses hitherto  held,  in  which  a  mutual  understanding 
between  nations  has  been  aimed  at  as  the  goal,  there 
was  ever  an  oppressive  silence  regarding  this  funda- 
mental principle  of  international  policy.  All  the  truly 
progressive  German  authors  and  politicians  of  the  past 
forty  years  who  took  part  In  these  proceedings  were 
not  free  agents.  A  condemnation  of  the  Hegel- 
Treltschke  legal  doctrine  would  be  equivalent  to  a  con- 
demnation of  the  Bismarck  policy  of  conquest,  i.e.,  a 
condemnation  of  the  dynasty,  or  High  Treason. 

There  was,  and  still  is,  among  the  Germans  a 
secret  barrier  to  our  flights  of  thought.  And  this  is 
the  dread  of  certain  penal  paragraphs  in  our  Code. 
While  we,  sitting  at  our  firesides,  may,  as  private  in- 
dividuals, entertain  the  same  views  and  ideals  as  the 
French  and  English,  directly  we  begin  to  speak  and 
write  for  the  public  we  become  learned  metaphysicians 
and  sophists,  and  execute  veritable  egg-dances  in  order 
to  escape  the  necessity  of  speaking  the  truth.  French 
representatives  at  international  congresses  have  often 
expressed  to  me  their  astonishment  that  the  Germans, 
while,  in  private  conversations,  condemning  the  Ger- 
man point  of  view  as  being  at  variance  with  consti- 
tutional law,  actually  defended  it  in  public  meetings. 
As  if  we  dared  to  profess  any  other  Ideas  concerning 
international  law  save  those  prescribed  for  us  by  our 
Constitution  and  laws! 

For  all  these  reasons,  there  exists  in  Germany  down 
to  the  present  day  only  a  caricature  of  true  inter- 
national law.  That  is,  the  German  savants  of  to-day 
understand  by  ^'international  law"  only  such  rules  as 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  185^ 

have  been  mutually  agreed  upon,  with  the  humane 
purpose  of  lessening  the  horrors  of  war,  as,  for  in- 
stance, those  embodied  in  the  Paris  Declaration  con- 
cerning Maritime  Warfare,  in  the  Geneva  Convention, 
or  in  the  various  Hague  agreements.  A  German  pro- 
fessor of  international  law  who  should  declare  in- 
ternational law  to  mean  the  unfettered  right  of  na- 
tions to  autonomy,  and  to  therefore  denounce  the  an- 
nexation of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  of  Bosnia,  or  even 
the  violation  of  Belgium,  as  being  crimes  against  the 
law  of  nations,  would  at  once  be  arraigned  on  a  charge 
of  high  treason. 

The  logical  thinking  out  of  the  principle  of  the  free 
right  of  nations  to  autonomy,  which  was  proclaimed 
by  the  French  Revolution  and  has  been  acknowledged 
by  the  whole  civilised  world  as,  at  least,  a  theory  of 
international  law,  is  a  crime  in  Germany,  because  it 
inevitably  leads  to  a  condemnation  of  the  whole 
Prusso-German  policy.  And,  therefore,  such  a  logical 
thinking  out  has  never  been  publicly  attempted  in  the 
Fatherland  of  Logic.  Is  it  likely  that  a  Government 
will  appoint  and  pay  professors  who  condemn  its  policy 
as  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations?  In  the  same  way 
that  Schopenhauer's  colleagues  did  not  live  for,  but  by 
philosophy,  so  Schiicking's^  colleagues  live  not  for,  but 

*  Prof.  W.  Schiicking  Is  almost  the  sole  teacher  of  inter- 
national law  in  modern  Germany  who  has  had  the  courage 
to  take  his  stand  upon  the  ground  of  true  international  law 
and  has  not  left  it  even  since  the  war  began.  His  treatment  of 
the  Polish  question  in  "Das  Nationalitaten-problem"  (Dresden, 
1908),  his  ideas  on  "Die  Organisation  der  Welt"  (Leipzig,  1909), 
his  "Neue  Ziele  der  Staatlichen  Entwicklung"  (]\Iarburg,  1913), 
and  finally,  his  masterly  treatise,  "Das  Werk  vom  Haag"  (Leip- 
zig,  1912),  are  ail  written  in  the  spirit  of  democracy  and  th§ 


i86        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

by  international  law.  "I  stick  up  for  my  master" — this 
is  applicable  to  newspaper  editors,  Privy  Councillors 
and  Excellencies  alike. 

German  Racial  Science  and  Deductions 
Therefrom 

The  German  constitutional  and  international  law 
we  have  just  described  was  the  scientific  complement 
of  Bismarck's  policy  of  conquest.  And  here,  in  the 
realm  of  science  and  philosophy,  we  are  confronted 
by  a  phenomenon  similar  to  that  of  the  Reichstag  in 
the  domain  of  politics.  In  the  same  way  that  the 
latter  looks  modern  and  democratic,  so  also  does  this 
science,  with  its  numerous  foreign  words,  awake  a 
feeling  of  respect  and  modernity.  However,  the 
Reichstag  is  really  only  the  democratic  mask  of  an 
autocratic  regime,  and,  similarly,  historical  right  and 
the  philosophy  of  the  divinity  of  the  State  are  but  the 
modern  veneer  of  mediaeval  despotism. 

But,  after  the  foundation  of  the  German  Empire 
there  arose,  side  by  side  with  this  Hegel-Treitschke 
philosophy  of  constitutional  law  (which,  after  all,  has 
historical  tradition  behind  it),  quite  a  new  science, 
which  complements  it.  Its  reaction  upon  the  German 
foreign  policy  of  the  past  twenty  years  is  so  manifest 
that  it  cannot  be  dismissed  without  some  notice.  It 
is,  moreover,  an  integral  part  of  German  culture. 

This  science  was  originally  called  Aryan  anthro- 
pology, and  on  its  further  development  was  split  up 
into  various  subsections:    craniometry,  Germanistics, 

true  science  of  international  law,  and  thus  have  not,  unfor- 
tunately, in  modern  Germany,  met  with  the  appreciation  they 
deserve. 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  187 

etymology,  ethnography,  philology,  etc.,  etc.  Certain 
of  these  sciences  had  already  been  in  existence,  but, 
after  the  war  of  1870-71,  they  were  given  an  entirely 
new  form  and  significance. 

The  father  of  this  completely  new  science  was  Gobi- 
neau,  a  Frenchman  who  made  his  mark  in  the  'fifties 
of  last  century.  His  work  ''Essai  sur  I'inegalite  des 
Races,"  published  in  many  volumes  (1854)  was  prac- 
tically Ignored  in  France,  but  its  German  translation 
was  eagerly  bought  and  became  the  theme  of  much 
discussion.  This  Count  Gobineau  did  us  Germans 
an  inestimable  service.  Firstly,  he  established  the 
contrast  between  the  long-skulled,  blue-eyed,  and 
fair-haired  Germans  (the  Aryans)  and  the  round- 
skulled,  black-eyed,  and  black-haired  Latins,  the  latter 
saturated  with  Jewish  blood;  and,  secondly,  the 
intellectual  superiority  of  these  fair-haired  Aryans 
over  the  decadent  Latins. 

This  doctrine,  which  this  highly  imaginative  French- 
man, with  characteristic  French  facility,  reeled  lightly 
off  from  his  finger-tips,  is  the  most  wonderful  rubbish 
of  modern  days,  and,  down  to  1870,  was  never  taken 
seriously,  even  in  Germany;  but  it  fitted  in  so  well 
with  the  German  military  successes  from  1864  to 
1870,  that  it  was  at  once  raised  to  the  rank  of  a 
science.  Had  the  German  not  proved  in  these  wars 
that  the  Latin  "races"  had  actually  played  their 
last  role  in  the  world,  and  that  the  fair-haired  German 
was  stronger,  more  moral,  and  more  capable  of  higher 
culture  than  his  Western  neighbours?  Yes,  the  war 
of  1870-71  was  a  glorious  proof  of  the  decline  of  the 
Latin  races,  and  this  Gobineau  was  now,  in  truth,  not 
only  a  great  thinker,  but  also  a  prophet. 


i88        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Thousands  of  German  savants  now  began  to  dig  up 
and  measure  skulls,  to  invent  Aryan  aboriginal  lan- 
guages, religions,  and  civilisations,  to  determine  the 
first  home  of  this  early  Teutonic  stock,  and  to  formu- 
late no  end  of  theories  as  to  the  rise  and  fall  of  races. 
Down  to  1870  this  "science'*  had  been  quietly  laughed 
at  and  Gobineau  regarded  as  a  wag  who  was  bam- 
boozling the  poor  honest  Teuton  for  the  amusement  of 
serious  science.  Now,  however,  the  whole  thing  gained 
a  politico-scientific  background,  and,  instead  of  being 
a  wag,  this  Gobineau  is  really  the  Inspirer  of  the 
present  World  War. 

For  if,aftenvards,Mommsen,Woltmann,Driesmans, 
Relmer,  Bopp,  Chamberlain,  and  a  thousand  other 
"Germanists"  were  zealous  in  developing  this  racial 
science,  it  was  done  with  the  secret  intention  of  prov- 
ing that  the  Teuton  was  the  highest  type  of  man  and 
consequently  the  only  trustworthy  creator  of  culture. 

The  demonstration  was  brilliantly  successful.  The 
German  savants  unanimously  proved  that  the  brachy- 
cephalists  {i.e.,  the  flat-heads)  were  the  Inferior  and 
the  dolychocephalists  (the  oval-heads)  the  higher 
intellectual  element  in  Europe.  The  former,  as  the 
war  of  1870  showed,  had  finished  playing  their  part, 
and  thus  the  oval-heads  have  the  divine  right  to 
dominate  and  (if  they  resist)  to  exterminate  them. 
The  fair-haired  German  is  the  born,  God-appointed 
vehicle  of  European  civilisation.  To  him  alone  be- 
longs the  world's  future.  Science  has  proved  it!  God 
has  willed  It ! 

Thus  arose  those  superman  and  super-race  theories 
to  which  not  merely  a  Richard  Wagner  fell  a  victim, 
but  to  a  certain  degree  even  Nietzsche,  with  the  result 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  189 

that  in  foreign  countries  these  great  Germans  have, 
very  unjustly,  been  placed  in  the  same  category  with 
Treitschke  and  Bernhardi. 

As  in  German  politics  one  Armament  Bill  ousted  its 
predecessor,  so  also,  in  this  field,  one  scientific  theory 
dispossessed  the  other,  and  the  last  always  excelled 
the  preceding  one  in  learned  mystification.  Reimer, 
Driesmans,  Woltmann,  and  Chamberlain  proved  to  the, 
listening  world  not  only  the  superiority  of  Teutonism  in 
the  present  but  also  in  the  past.  All  the  glorious 
achievements  of  mankind  are, beyond  question, those  of 
the  German  race.  Woltmann' s  works,  "Die  Germanen 
und  die  Renaissance  in  Italien"  and  "Die  Germanen 
in  Frankreich,"  will  in  future  days  be  marvelled  at  as 
monuments  of  German  learned  stupidity.  Every 
sentence  in  these  books  is  an  invitation  to  satire; 
if  Heine  were  alive  to-day,  he  would  have  wrung 
from  us  tears  of  laughter  over  this  "colossal"  science. 
And  his  sound  common  sense  would  have  discovered 
in  Reimer's  "Ein  Pan-Germanistischer  Deutschland" 
and  in  Chamberlain's  epoch-making  work,  "The 
Foundations  of  the  Nineteenth  Century"  (in  the 
circulation  of  which  William  II.  took  a  personal 
interest),  an  equally  inviting  target  for  his  wit. 

We  are  confronted  here  by  a  development  similar  to 
that  we  have  just  been  obliged  to  recognise  in  the  case 
of  the  political  philosophy  of  the  State.  Hegel  was  as 
little  an  Imperialist  as  Gobineau  was  a  Pan-Germanist ; 
Mommsen's  Racial  Science  can,  like  Treitschke's 
doctrine  of  Constitutional  Law,  still  claim  to  be  based 
upon  logic  and  historical  facts.  But  in  the  cases  of 
Reventlow,  Bernhardi,  etc.,  we  are  face  to  face  with 
fanatics  such  as  Hegel  would  scarcely  have  dreamed 


190        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

of.  In  the  same  way,  Gobineau  would  be  utterly 
indignant  and  astonished  could  he  perceive  what 
Reimer,  Woltmann,  Driesmans,  and  Chamberlain  have 
made  of  his  theories.  After  these  leading  spirits  of 
a  literally  world-subverting  science  had  proved 
that  all  the  celebrated  men  of  the  Middle  Ages 
and  of  recent  times  were  of  German  origin  (La- 
fayette ='^a  typical  representative  of  Germanism"; 
Murillo  =  a  palpable  mutilation  of  the  German  Moerl; 
Da  Vinci's  forebears  were  called  Wincke;  Diderot  = 
corrupted  from  Tietercth;  Briand  ^  Brandt,  etc., 
etc.),  one  can  readily  understand  that  Reimer 
arrived  at  the  scientific  conclusion  that  Jesus  of 
Nazareth  must,  if  he  ever  existed,  have  been  a 
German ! 

Our  German  eggs  (to  the  glory  of  German  science 
laid  by  a  Frenchman  and  hatched  by  an  Englishman) 
have  in  contradistinction  to  other  eggs  two  yolks : 
an  ordinary  yolk,  and  a  special  yolk  created  expressly 
by  the  Lord  God  for  us  Germans,  from  which  all 
civilisation  has  been  born  and  which  gives  the  whole 
world  a  Germanic  character ! 

Such  scatterbrained  theories  were  not,  as  one  would 
expect,  confined  to  the  narrow  circles  of  professional 
philosophers,  but  attained  universal  popularity.  Their 
political  deductions  found,  for  instance,  an  energetic 
expression  in  the  Pan-German  League:  this  Pan- 
German  League  was  not,  be  it  marked,  a  political 
party,  but  had  Its  influential  representatives  among 
almost  all  parties  (even,  it  is  said,  among  Social 
Democrats).  Although  the  fundamental  ideas  of  this 
pseudo-science  remained  entirely  unknown  to  the 
common  herd,  yet  in  freemason,  military,  intellectual. 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  191 

and  exclusive  circles  they  were  warmly  welcomed,  and, 
like  the  Hegel  and  Treitschke  doctrines,  enjoyed  official 
esteem  and  approbation.  The  imperialistic  application 
of  this  racial  and  craniological  science  was  popularised 
in  the  text-books  of  our  schools  and  in  the  encyclo- 
paedias,^ and  was  the  secret  inspiration  of  German 
foreign  policy.  More  frequently  than  was  pleasant  to 
the  citizen  of  cosmopolitan  sympathies,  it  was  openly 
expressed  in  imperial  speeches. 

On  February  24th,  1892,  William  II.  said  in  the 
Provincial  Diet  In  Berlin :  "To  this  is  added  the  feeling 
of  responsibility  towards  our  All  Highest  Lord  above 
and  my  irrefragable  conviction  that  our  ally  of  Ross- 
bach  and  Dennewitz  will  not  leave  me  in  the  lurch. 
He  has  taken  such  infinite  pains  with  our  Mark  and 
our  House  that  we  cannot  believe  that  he  has  done 
this  to  no  end.  No;  on  the  contrary,  Branden- 
burgers,  we  are  destined  to  higher  things,  and  I  shall 
lead  you  to  more  glorious  days  in  the  future."  On  the 
celebration  of  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  the 
foundation  of  the  German  Empire  (January  i8th, 
1896),  as  also  in  the  famous  imperial  speech  of  June 
19th,  1902,  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  there  is  also  a  Pan-Ger- 

*For  example,  IMeyer's  "Konversations-Lexikon"  contains  a 
graphic  map  of  the  distribution  of  the  Germans  in  Central 
Europe,  which  inchides  the  whole  of  Belgium  and  Holland  (thus 
regarding  both  countries  as  legally  appertaining  to  Germany). 
Another  chart  illustrating  German  dialects  denotes  the  vulgar 
tongue  as  spoken  from  Antwerp  to  Dunkirk  and  from  Liege 
to  Brussels  as  "low-Frankish/'  while  the  language  spoken  in 
Holland  is  partly  "Frisian"  and  partly  "Westphalian."  That  is 
to  say  there  is  not,  in  fact,  a  Dutch  nation  or  a  Dutch  language ; 
when  Verhaeren  and  Maeterlinck  wrote  in  French,  they  were  in 
error,  because  scientific  investigations  have  established  that  Bel- 
gium does  not  speak  French,  but  Lower-Frankish ! 


192        THE  COMING  DEMOCK\CY 

manistic  undercurrent  perceptible,  appealing,  in  the  one 
case,  more  to  the  commercial,  in  the  other  to  the  moral 
and  religious  superiority  of  Teutonism,  yet  on  both  oc- 
casions every  idea  of  a  war  of  conquest  was  relegated 
to  the  Greek  Calends;  and  stress  was  laid  upon  the 
necessity  for  peace.  Again,  in  his  speech  to  the  Berlin 
Academy  of  Arts  (December  i8th,  1901),  he  says: 
"For  us  Germans  great  ideals  have  become  permanent 
blessings,  whereas  other  nations  have  more  or  less  lost 
them.  There  only  remains  the  German  nation,  which 
has  been  called  upon  to  guard,  foster,  and  perpetuate 
these  grand  ideals."  But,  in  the  notorious  Bremen 
speech  (I\Iarch  22nd,  1905),  the  Woltmann-Chamber- 
lain  theories  are  very  evident :  ".  .  .  to  abandon  our- 
selves to  the  firm  conviction  that  our  Lord  God  would 
never  have  given  Himself  so  much  trouble  about  our 
German  Fatherland  and  its  people,  had  He  not  destined 
us  for  higher  things.  We  are  the  salt  of  the  earth, 
but  we  must  be  worthy  of  being  so."  The  famous 
toast  on  the  105th  anniversary  of  the  birth  of  Moltke 
(October  26th,  1905) at  Berlin  was  less  inspired  by  the 
Pan-Germanic  theories  than  by  the  resulting  imperial- 
istic conception  of  war.  "^ly  second  glass  is  drained  to 
both  the  future  and  the  present.  You  have  seen,  gen- 
tlemen, how  it  stands  with  us  in  the  world.  Therefore, 
powder  dry;  sword  sharpened,  the  aim  in  view;  our 
energies  at  tension,  and  down  with  pessimists !"  On 
August  31st,  1907,  he  again  said  at  Miinster :  ''Then 
our  German  nation  will  become  a  block  of  granite, upon 
which  our  Lord  God  can  erect  and  complete  His  civilis- 
ing work  in  the  world.  Then  the  words  of  the  poet 
will  be  realised,  who  wrote :   Teutonism  will  one  day 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  193 

prove  the  salvation  of  the  world/  "^  Few  comments 
are  necessary.  It  is,  besides,  known  how  much  William 
11.  interested  himself  in  the  investigations  of  Aryan 
anthropology.  The  racial  scientist,  Houston  Stewart 
Chamberlain,  who  is  of  English  birth,  was  his  favour- 
ite author.  ''I  particularly  advise  you  to  read  what 
Chamberlain  has  so  admirably  said  in  the  preface  to 
his  'Foundations  of  the  Nineteenth  Century*  on  this 
point,"  said  William  II.  to  the  masters  and  first  form 
of  the  Friedrich  PubHc  School  at  Cassel  on  August 
29th,  191 1.  In  the  fourth  chapter  of  this  book  I  have 
already  shown  how  such  lines  of  thought  were  turned 
to  practical  use  by  German  foreign  poHcy.  In  particu- 
lar, the  attitude  of  our  dynasty  at  The  Hague  Confer- 
ences is  a  clear  proof  that  the  German  foreign  policy 
was  not  only  permeated  by  the  tacit  presumption  of 
Germanic  superiority,  but  also  by  the  fact  that  by 
"superiority"  nothing  else  was  meant  than  the  brute 
force  of  the  stronger. 

*  "An  deutschem  Wesen  wird  einmal  noch  die  Welt  genesen." 
Geibel  had  written  this  verse  cited  by  the  Emperor  as  early  as 
1861.  But  Geibel  was,  like  his  colleague,  Hoffmann  von  Fallers- 
leben  (the  author  of  "Deutschland  iiber  AUes"),  by  no  manner 
of  means  a  Pan-Germanist,  but  a  democratic  patriot,  who  ex- 
pected the  regeneration  of  the  world  from  the  union  of  German 
races  and  the  resulting  political  liberty  of  the  German  people. 
It  is  strange  that  the  song  "Deutschland  iiber  Alles"  was  first 
sung  in  Hamburg,  on  the  occasion  of  a  manifestation  in  favour 
of  the  liberty  of  the  Press.  Now,  however,  since  the  unity  of 
the  German  races  has  been  effected  in  a  manner  so  utterly  dif- 
ferent from  that  which  our  democratic  national  poets  ever  imag- 
ined, their  words  have  been  given  another,  namely,  an  imperialis- 
tic meaningr. 


(194        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Concerning  the  Freedom  of  German  Culture 

It  may  possibly  be  suggested  here  that  I  am  confus- 
ing cause  with  effect,  and  it  will  certainly  be  suggested 
that  every  nation  has  the  culture  that  it  deserves.  Is 
the  dynasty  really  to  blame  for  the  fact  that,  during  the 
last  hundred  years,  we  have  developed  a  constitutional, 
a  military,  and  a  racial  science,  that  has  earned  us 
the  hatred  of  the  whole  world?  Was  it  not  rather 
the  theories  and  researches  of  Hegel,  Treitschke, 
Chamberlain,  and  Bernhardi  that  exercised  a  decisive 
influence  on  the  attitude  of  the  dynasty?  And,  if 
Germany  failed  to  produce  any  effective  antidote  to 
these  teachings,  is  not  this  a  proof  that  the  German 
people  were  at  fault  ?  How  came  it  that  the  teachings 
of  Hegel,  Treitschke,  Gobineau,  and  Chamberlain  won 
such  an  enormous  following?  How  was  it  that 
Schopenhauer — a  far  more  distinguished  thinker — 
did  not  become  a  "spiritual  force"  in  Germany, 
instead  of  Hegel?    And  so  forth. 

We  do  not  put  these  questions,  and  we  do  not  fall 
back  on  the  popular  assertion  that  every  nation 
possesses  what  it  deserves.  Perhaps  at  some  future 
time,  when  we  have  nothing  better  to  do,  we  may 
argue  the  question  whether  man  is  a  product  of  his 
environment,  or  whether  the  environment  is  a  product 
of  man,  or  whether  mediaeval  scholasticism  was  dic- 
tated by  the  Papacy,  or  whether  the  power  of  the  Pa- 
pacy was  the  fruit  of  a  scholasticism.  But  we  have  lit- 
tle desire  to  argue  the  question  whether  the  nature  and 
direction  of  German  culture  in  the  nineteenth  century 
was  dictated  by  the  dynasty,  or  whether  the  dynasty 
was  a  fruit  of  German  culture,  because  the  matter  is  so 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  195 

perfectly  clear.  Just  as  it  is  obvious  that  neither 
Germany's  gigantic  armaments  nor  her  aggressive 
foreign  policy  are  the  products  of  the  will  of  the  Ger- 
man nation,  so  also  the  German  culture  of  Treitschke, 
Chamberlain,  Bernhardi,  and  their  school,  with  its 
glorification  of  war  and  conquest,  is  not  a  result  of  the 
national  spirit  of  Germany,  but  a  result  of  the  thirst 
for  power  of  the  dynasty.  It  is  this  thirst  for  power  of 
the  dynasty,  and  not  any  national  ideal,  which  has  been 
the  animating  and  directing  force  behind  all  the  German 
intellectuals  since  Kant,  Goethe,  and  Humboldt.  It 
has  been  the  German  dynasty  which,  for  the  last  hun- 
dred years,  for  the  safeguarding  of  its  existence,  has 
brutally  and  systematically  stifled  all  free  expression 
of  opinion,  all  sound  criticism,  all  democratic  senti- 
ments and  aspirations.  It  has  been  the  German  dy- 
nasty which  has  always  stood,  watchful  and  suspicious, 
behind  its  professors.  Over  the  most  distiguished 
professors  no  less  than  the  most  insignificant  school- 
teachers it  has  exercised  relentless  control. 

As  Germans,  we  can  only  reflect  with  secret  melan- 
choly upon  the  fact  that  since  the  age  of  Goethe  the 
dynasty  has  lain  like  a  gravestone  over  the  Intelligence 
and  the  aspiration  for  freedom  of  Germany.  Every 
German  who  since  that  time  has  felt  himself  to 
possess  the  right  and  the  talent  to  come  forward  as 
the  champion  of  democratic  liberties  has  always  been 
confronted  with  the  choice  either  of  wearing  himself 
out  in  fruitless  opposition,  or  of  taking  refuge  in  a 
foreign  country,  or  of  bowing  to  circumstances,  that 
is  to  say,  becoming  tacitly  or  openly  a  panegyrist  of 
the  dynasty. 

In  this   struggle   with   their   conscience   and   their 


196        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

better  self,  very  many  talented  Germans  have 
succumbe'd.  In  their  youth  they  have,  for  the  most 
part,  nourished  democratic  and  international  sympa- 
thies, but  sooner  or  later  they  have  given  up  the 
struggle  and,  in  order  not  to  be  compelled  to  stifle 
their  talent  and  their  longing  for  recognition,  they 
have  decided  to  serve  the  dynasty.  This  dynasty, 
which,  in  Prusso-Germany,  disposes  of  every  dignity, 
title,  and  office,  has  exercised  over  the  nation  for  the 
last  hundred  years  an  intellectual  terrorism  which 
scarcely  weighs  upon  the  present  generation,  which 
outwardly  is  scarcely  perceptible,  and  which  it  is  quite 
impossible  for  foreign  nations  to  understand. 

Therefore,  almost  everything  that  has  been  said 
about  German  culture  In  France,  England,  and  Italy, 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  is  false;  because  it  is 
impossible  for  the  people  of  those  countries  to  con- 
ceive that  the  national  idea  of  right  and  of  culture  can 
be  a  dictate  f rom^  above  and  consequently  they  believe 
that  it  emanates  from  the  people.^ 

*  When,  in  October,  1914,  that  notorious  "Appeal  to  the  Civil- 
ised World"  was  published,  about  which  we  shall  speak  later,  the 
famous  French  Socialist,  Gustav  Herve,  in  his  indignation,  cried 
to  the  French  soldier:  "Now  fire  into  their  ranks  without  any 
scruple!"  Questioned  concerning  his  point  of  view,  said  Anatole 
France,  Herve  gave  in  this  phrase  the  only  possible  answer. 
Since  then,  the  conviction  that  the  idea  of  culture  expressed  in 
the  manifesto  is  that  of  the  whole  German  people  has  in  France 
(and  to  some  extent  also  in  England,  Italy  and  the  neutral 
countries)  become  almost  a  dogma,  which  every  good  patriot  is 
bound  to  accept.  In  the  interest  of  the  German  people  and  of 
the  coming  peace,  this  notion  is  all  the  more  to  be  regretted, 
in  that  it  will  be  extraordinarily  difficult  to  demonstrate  to  those 
who  are  at  present  our  enemies  how  the  case  really  stands.  For 
supposing  that  the  German  dynasty  is  conquered  in  this  war  and 
that  Germany  produces  a  thousand  new  representatives  of  cul- 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  197 

Many  French  and  English  chauvinists  went  so  far 
as  to  assert  that  it  was  this  culture  emanating  from 
the  German  people,  with  its  sinister  dream  of  world- 
power,  which  had  urged  on  our  Government  in  its 
dangerous  world-policy.  The  fact  is,  however,  that 
we  Germans  for  the  last  hundred  years  have  not  dared 
to  be  what  we  actually  are  and  would  like  to  show 
ourselves,  namely,  the  descendants  and  the  upholders 
of  the  classical  Germanism  of  Leibnitz,  Herder, 
Goethe,  Schiller,  Kant,  Humboldt,  Uhland,  etc. — that 
is  to  say,  eminently  peaceful  natures, perhaps  somewhat 
heavy,  but  always  of  cosmopolitan  sympathies. 

It  was  our  dynasty  that  compelled  us  to  become 
Prussianised.  Even  Bismarck,  as  is  discernible  oh 
the  first  page  of  his  ^'Reflections  and  Reminiscences," 
was,  as  a  youth,  a  Republican,  although  he  would 
never  have  become  Bismarck  had  he  not  betimes  dis- 
carded his  youthful  follies.  Until  his  mature  years, 
Moltke  was  a  devotee  of  the  old  German  idea  of  eternal 
peace,  which  is  developed  by  Kant,  but  as  soon  as  he 
perceived  that  Kant  and  Peace  were  in  Prussia  less 
estimated  than  war  and  conquest,  he  became  our  most 
famous  strategist,  and  glorified  war  (by  w^hich  he 
gained  £45,000  and  recognition  as  a  national  hero)  as 

ture,  who  unanimously  condemn  the  present  regime  and  uphold 
democracy  and  internationalism,  then  it  is  to  be  feared  that  they 
will  be  received  in  France  (and  elsewhere)  much  in  the  same 
way  that  in  their  time  Renan,  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  and  other 
distinguished  Frenchmen  were  received  by  the  German  intellec- 
tuals. That  is  to  say,  they  will  be  told  that  their  sudden  dem- 
ocratic and  international  sympathy  is  merely  the  hypocrisy  of 
the  vanquished,  and  so  forth.  For  decades  the  German  intellec- 
tuals will  have  lost  their  credit  in  the  world.  This  is  a  tragedy, 
the  full  bitterness  of  which  will  only  be  tasted  by  our  children 
and  our  children's  children. 


198        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY, 

the  spring  of  healing  for  nations  and  an  element  in  the 
divine  order  of  the  world.  Treitschke  was  feted  in 
Paris  in  1864  by  the  Republicans  there  as  a  spirited 
opponent  of  Prussian  despotism;  but  when  he  saw 
that  the  future  belonged  tO'  Prussian  despotism,  he 
altered  his  course,  and  became  our  most  uncompromis- 
ing philosopher  of  War  and  the  State,  receiving  as  his 
reward  the  coveted  title  of  Prussian  "Wirklicher 
Geheimrath"  (Privy  Councillor).^  The  same  hap- 
pened in  the  case  of  Sybel,  the  historian,  in  his 
younger  years  a  great  opponent  of  Bismarck,  and 
who  later  became  one  of  the  most  reliable  of 
"Geheimrathe."  Likewise,  the  author  Arnold  Ruge, 
who  in  the  'forties  instigated  a  revolution  against  Prus- 
sia and,  later,  became  one  of  Bismarck's  great  ad- 
mirers. David  Friedrich  Strauss  wrote  in  his  youth- 
ful days  a  learned  pamphlet  against  *'the  Romanticists 
on  the  throne,"  and,  after  the  war  of  1870,  defended 
against  Renan  the  conquering  romanticism  of  the 
Hohenzollerns  as  a  divine  right.  Even  a  man  like 
Ferdinand  Freiligrath,  the  spirited  champion  and  poet 
of  the  Revolution  of  1848,  received  unexpectedly,  the 
protection  of  Bismarck,  and  in  1870  made  mock  of 
his  whole  past  career  by  pouring  out  verses  lauding 
the  glorious  German  victories. 

So  it  went  on  and  sO'  it  still  goes  on  in  Prusso- 
Germany  to-day.  When  the  philosopher  Kant  had  a 
severe  snub  administered  him  by  the  King  of  Prussia 
for  his  revolutionary  writings ;  when  the  antiquarian 

*A  title  not  really  translatable  into  English.  It  carries  the 
further  appellation  of  "Excellency,"  perhaps  equivalent  to  "Sir," 
the  Knight's  title.  The  author  sets  these  titles  out  at  length, 
post.     [Translator.] 


THE  GERAIAN  DYNASTY  199 

Delitzsch  was  sternly  reproved  by  William  II.  (Letter 
to  Admiral  von  Hollmann,  February  15th,  1903) 
because  he  had  permitted  himself  to  publish  the 
results  of  his  Babylonian  investigations  in  the  sense 
demanded  by  true  science;  or  when  charges  of  Use 
majeste  have  been  based  on  pure  suppositions,  pastors 
like  Traub  and  Jatho  deprived  of  their  offices  for  a 
liberal  phrase,  trivial  comedy-writers  like  Blumenthal 
honoured,  and  genuine  poets  like  Hauptmann  severely 
reprimanded :  always  and  everywhere  the  same  spirit 
and  the  same  will  were  predominant.  Nothing  manly 
and  democratic  could  be  tolerated;  and,  instead,  the 
shallow,  self -seeking,  and  subservient  were  extolled. 

Not  even  in  Russia  or  China  are  there  so  many  or- 
ders, titles,  and  official  berths  as  we  possess  and  there- 
fore there  are  in  those  countries  fewer  sycophants, 
lickspittles,  and  intellectual  lackeys.  Prusso-Germany 
is  the  happy  hunting  ground  for  titles,  uniforms,  and 
orders.  From  the  Iron  Cross,  Second  Class,  to  the 
Red  Eagle,  First  Class  with  diamonds,  it  is  a  long,  long 
way.  The  badges  of  servility  (so-called  orders)  at  the 
disposal  of  our  Government  might  well  be  used  to 
embellish  the  corridors  of  the  Reichstag,  and  so  effec- 
tively stifle  in  our  popular  representatives  any  taste  for 
opposition.  With  us,  much  adroitness  is  required  in 
order  not  to  sin  against  etiquette.  Even  the  number 
of  ^'councillors"  makes  a  novice  giddy.  There  are 
provincial  government,  engineering,  juristic,  account- 
ant, medical,  court,  ambassadorial,  commercial,  and 
other  councillors,  all  of  whom,  in  reward  for  the 
faithful  discharge  of  their  duty,  await  their  advance- 
ment   to    'Trivy"    and    thence    to    "acting    Privy" 


200        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

councillors.  If  the  novice  has  contrived  to  understand 
all  these  distinctions  of  rank,  and  is  then  actually 
introduced  into  the  presence  of  a  representative  of  the 
realm  of  Excellencies,  he  has,  meanwhile,  become  very 
humble  and  asks  himself  whether  on  God's  earth  there 
can  possibly  be  anything  grander  than  to  be  ''acting 
Privy  Councillor  of  a  Legation,  with  the  prefix  Excel- 
lency." But  even  this  exalted  station  is  surpassed  by 
that  of  a  lieutenant  in  the  reserves;  for  the  latter  is 
admissible  at  Court,  even  more  admissible  than  the 
nobility  itself. 

*The  gross  extent  to  which  the  position  of  officer  in 
the  German  Army  is  overestimated  is  not  in  the  least 
realised  by  the  people  at  large.  Among  all  the  varied 
ambitions  which  throng  about  the  Court,  it  is  only  the 
military  ambitions  which  are  practically  unrealisable. 
Herr  Friedlander,  for  instance,  might  become  Privy 
Councillor  of  Commerce  {Geheimer  Kommerziensrat) ; 
he  might  be  raised  to  the  nobility;  he  might  even 
receive  the  Order  of  the  Red  Eagle,  Second  Class,  with 
diamonds,  but  never  will  he  be  created  lieutenant  in 
the  reserves.  Herr  Dernburg  was  nominated  Acting 
Privy  Councillor  (Wirklicher  Geheimrat),  with  the 
prefix  "Excellency,''  without  any  hesitation,  but  he 
will  have  to  perform  wonders  in  his  new  office  before 
he  will  achieve  promotion  from  vice-colour-sergeant 
{Vizefeldwehel)  to  lieutenant  in  the  reserves."^ 

"Prince  von  Biilow,  whose  disposition  is  so  entirely 
unmilitary,  had  to  become  General  in  the  Hussars,  in 
order  to  hold  his  own  against  the  toadies  of  the  Court.''^ 

No  one  in  Germany  can  boast  of  a  full  understand- 

*"Unser  Kaiser  und  sein  Volk,"  p.  109. 
*  Ibidem,  p.  107. 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  201 

ing  of  these  matters.  Merely  to  acquire  a  knowledge 
of  all  the  new  uniforms,  badges,  chains,  ribbons,  oak- 
leaves,  order-clasps,  medals,  titles  and  other  decorations 
which  have  sprung  into  existence  during  the  reign  of 
William  11.  has  become  a  veritable  science,  demanding 
special  study  of  the  most  arduous  nature.  In  the  mat- 
ter of  etiquette  and  of  heraldry  we  have  reached  a  per- 
fection which  a  Chinaman  would  by  no  means  envy  us. 
For  the  feature  of  it  all  which  would  arouse  the  laugh- 
ter of  a  Chinaman,  namely,  the  fact  that  the  wives 
proudly  claim  for  themselves  any  title  possessed  by 
their  husbands,  no  matter  how  insignificant,  is  a  bit- 
terly serious  matter  in  Prusso-Germany.  Just  as  the 
German  Crown  Prince  was  indignant  that  the  Czar 
should  take  precedence  of  his  father,  so  every  Frau 
Oberpostdirektor  (i.e.,  wife  of  a  manager  of  a  District 
Post  Office)  will  deprive  you  of  her  friendship  if  you 
address  her  merely  as  Frau  Postdirektor  (i.e.,  wife  of 
a  postmaster),  and  if  you  should  address  her  merely 
as  Frau  Schulze,  then  her  husband  will  challenge  you 
to  a  duel  with  pistols. 

The  German  fondness  for  titles  has  always  excited 
the  merriment  of  the  world.  The  great  philologists 
of  other  nations  have  vainly  endeavoured  to  find 
English,  French  or  Russian  equivalents  for  expressions 
like  ''Allerhochstdieselben,"  ''Unterthanigst,"  ''Durch- 
lauchtigst,"  ''in  Gehorsam  ersterben,"  etc.,  etc.  No 
other  language  in  the  world  possesses  like  word- 
combinations.  For  even  if  the  spirit  of  etiquette  and 
caste  apparent  in  such  expressions  is  to  be  taken  as 
characteristic  of  every  monarchic  community,  yet  this 
science  exists  nowhere  in  such  servile  perfection  as  it 
does  in  Germany. 


202        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

In  order  to  avoid  any  errors  in  passing  Judgment 
on  the  German  people,  we  must  be  quite  clear  on  the 
point  that  all  this  is  not  a  product  of  genuine  Teuton- 
ism,  but  is  only  the  fruits  of  dynastic  culture.  The 
servility  and  class-distinction  it  has  so  magnificently 
nurtured,  coupled  with  the  most  petty  intellectual 
tutelage  and  the  most  reactionary  policy  any  country 
has  ever  known,  explain  how  it  happens  that  all  the 
really  great  Germans  of  the  last  century  (great  not 
only  in  talent,  but  in  character)  have  either  fled  to 
foreign  countries,  or  have  risen  to  fame  and  have 
laboured  in  foreign  countries,  or  have  studiously  held 
aloof  from  all  political  activity. 

Wagner  laboured  in  Paris  and  in  Switzerland,  and 
finally,  after  renouncing  his  republican  ideals,  found  a 
home  at  the  Court  of  a  small  dynasty  which  had,  at 
least  with  regard  to  art,  remained  liberal.  Like  the 
poets  of  the  Young  German  school,  Marx  fled  from 
Prussian  reaction  and  spent  the  greatest  part  of  his  life 
in  Paris  and  London.  Nietzsche  lived  in  Italy  and 
Switzerland  and  called  himself  a  "good  Swiss."  Scho- 
penhauer remained  in  Germany,  and  virulently  at- 
tacked Hegel,  but  he  had  to  wait  fully  thirty  years  for 
recognition,  and,  moreover,  carefully  avoided  descend- 
ing from  his  high  pedestal  in  order  to  wage  that  war 
against  the  political  powers  which  in  other  countries 
was  receiving  the  support  of  Victor  Hugo,  John  Stuart 
Mill,  Herbert  Spencer,  etc.  Friedrich  Albert  Lange, 
one  of  those  quiet  German  savants  who,  like  Karl  Vogt, 
combine  knowldege  with  conscience,  proceeded,  like 
the  latter,  to  Switzerland,  from  which  country  he 
vainly  protested  against  the  shrieks  of  victory  set  up 
by  the  Bismarck  fanatics. 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  203 

There  is,  I  believe,  no  other  State  in  the  world  that, 
like  Prusso-Germany,  has  driven  continually  its  best 
men  into  foreign  lands,  leaving  us  only  broken  reeds 
and  strictly  tutored  Privy  Councillors.  A  Tolstoi,  who 
was  possible  in  Russia,  would  have  had  to  emigrate 
had  he  been  a  German.  As  far  as  Prussia  itself  is  con- 
cerned, it  has  not,  since  Kant,  produced  a  man  of 
genius  and  character  who  would  have  held  out  in 
Prussia.  A  man  like  William  von  Humboldt  may  suc- 
ceed for  a  time  in  remaining  near  the  throne  and  yet 
in  energetically  championing  popular  liberty,  but  he 
cannot  remain  there  long.  Even  Humboldt  fell  into 
disgrace  and  had  to  smother  his  bitterness  of  soul  in 
foreign  travel ;  his  brother,  Alexander  von  Humboldt, 
a  genius  of  whom  Prussia  may  well  be  proud,  held 
aloof  from  all  political  activity  (which  did  not  prevent 
his  intervening  with  Frederick  William  IV.  for  a  poet 
like  Prutz),  and  so  forth. 

German  Culture,  Then  and  Now 

The  matadors  of  the  divine  order  of  things  (Metter- 
nich,  Hegel,  Bismarck,  Treitschke)  ruthlessly  sundered 
the  threads  woven  from  the  German  classic  epoch 
to  modern  days.  When,  in  1859,  the  centenary  of 
Schiller's  birth  was  celebrated  as  a  German  national 
fete-day,  the  public  jubilation  rang  out  like  a  cry  of 
yearning  for  the  return  and  continuation  of  that 
genuine  culture  as  embodied  in  Schiller  and  his  era. 

It  was  too  late!  Schiller  and  his  epoch  were  offi- 
cially outlawed.  Their  works  still  lived  on,  but  not 
their  free,  German  ideals.  In  the  classical  sense, 
liberty,  progress,  and  public  weal  had  vanished  in  Ger- 


204        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

many.  Within  the  past  forty  years  we  have  managed 
to  banish  the  free  ideas  and  cosmopolitanism  of  our 
classical  school  so  utterly  that  we  have  been  obliged  to 
import  cosmopolitans.  Despite  all  official  discourage- 
ment, the  instinctive  demand  of  German  readers  and 
theatre-goers  for  cosmopolitans  was  so  strong,  and 
German  cosmopolitanism  was  so  thoroughly  dis- 
heartened by  the  German  Empire,  that  people  like 
Ibsen,  Tolstoi,  Gorki,  Zola,  Maupassant,  Anatole 
France,  Wilde,  Bergson,  Maeterlinck,  Verhaeren,  and 
others  became  our  gods. 

The  roles  were  changed.  The  country  of  poets 
and  philosophers  had,  at  the  beginning  of  last  century, 
become  the  intellectual  teacher  of  the  world;  we 
were  the  fountain-source  of  ideas.  Our  philosophers 
and  musicians,  our  poets  and  men  of  science,  were 
admired  and  quoted  in  foreign  lands.  Madame  de 
Stael  drew  for  her  countrymen  an  enthusiastic  and 
sympathetic  picture  of  the  Germany  of  Weimar  days, 
and  all  the  world  then  spoke  with  the  highest  respect  of 
our  intellectual,  artistic,  and  scientific  culture. 

But  now  foreign  countries,  with  astonishment  and 
apprehension,  interested  themselves  only  in  the 'Views" 
of  our  ''racial  scientists"  and  military  authors. 
Nietzsche  was  the  last  German  cosmopolitan 
that  foreigners  translated  into  their  languages  and 
discussed.  With  silent  amazement  our  neighbours 
heard  (on  November  loth,  1908)  from  the  Emperor's 
lips  that  Count  Zeppelin  was  the  greatest  German  of 
the  twentieth  century.  General  Bernhardi  became 
Germany's  most  lamentable  celebrity;  his  books 
were  translated  into  most  civihsed  languages,  and, 
together  with  other  productions  of  our  *'Realpolitik," 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  205 

were  everywhere  regarded  as  the  symbols  of  modern 
Teutonism.  A  nation  of  philosophers  and  poets, 
which  had  now  apparently  become  a  greedy  race  of 
fire-eaters  and  w^arriors.  In  all  the  innumerable 
speeches  William  II.  has  made  during  his  twenty-eight 
years'  rule,  names  like  Goethe  and  Schiller  occur  at 
most  two  or  three  times  (not  to  mention  Kant,  Herder, 
and  Lessing).  Bombast  and  arrogance  had  taken  the 
place  of  the  Weimar  peaceful  liberty  of  thought. 
We  were  no  longer  the  disciples  of  our  classicists,  but 
the  devotees  of  Bismarck  and  Treitschke.  Politically 
isolated  by  our  policy  of  the  ''mailed  fist,"  we  had, 
intellectually  and  artistically,  sunk  to  the  level  of  the 
tolerated  and  rapacious.  The  cleverest  of  our 
so-called  ''moderns"  were  not  equal  to  the  task  of 
dimming  the  lustre  of  a  Count  Zeppelin  or  lessening 
the  influence  of  the  w-orks  of  a  Chamberlain,  a  Liman, 
or  a  Frymann. 

A  general  cloud  of  uneasiness  brooded  over  the  land 
of  poets  and  philosophers.  We  w^ere  discontented 
with  ourselves,  stood  in  our  own  light,  and  did 
not  quite  know  why.  We  had  a  sort  of  misgiving 
that  we  were  loathed  by  the  rest  of  the  world,  and 
a  dim  sense  of  how-  little  we  could  now  offer 
it  compared  with  formerly.  Of  course,  we  were 
comforted  to  some  degree  by  the  reflection  that  we 
had  become  the  leading  merchants,  men  of  science, 
chemists,  and  organisers  in  the  world,  yet,  after  all, 
we  instinctively  felt  that  this  could  not  be  the  true 
role  we  had  to  play  in  the  world.  Everyone  spoke 
sentimentally  of  German  culture,  but  no  one  knew 
really  what  this  implied.  But,  in  our  innermost 
hearts,   we   wanted  this   culture  to   be   actuated   by 


2o6        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

cosmopolitan  ideals.  Openly,  however,  we  scoffed 
(even  in  the  halls  of  German  Freemasonry)  at  this 
''cosmopolitanism"  of  our  ancestors.  Ridicule  of 
the  ideal  of  a  thoroughly  German  and  democratic 
period  was  considered  good  taste  under  a  monarchical 
regime.  But  here,  as  always,  we  spoke  without  real 
conviction.  We  would  so  gladly  have  become  what  we 
really  are,  by  virtue  of  our  national  gifts  and  tradition, 
but  could  we  ever  become  it  ?  Not  even  in  the  province 
that  is  furthest  removed  from  any  dynastic  influence, 
namely,  in  art,  were  we  allowed  liberty.  ''An  art 
that  disregards  the  laws  and  limits  I  have  laid  down 
is  no  longer  an  art,"  said  William  II.  to  the  Berlin 
artists,  who,  under  his  direction,  had  sculptured  the 
statues  of  the  Siegesallee  (December  i8th,  1901). 
And  he  added :  'This  much  I  can  tell  you :  the  im- 
pression the  Siegesallee  makes  upon  the  foreigner  is 
quite  overpowering;  everywhere  we  find  an  enormous 
respect  for  German  sculpture.  I  trust  you  will  main- 
tain this  high  reputation.  .  .  ." 

What  William  11.  here  said  about  the  Siegesallee  is 
generally  applicable  to  German  culture;  the  impression 
it  made  upon  the  foreigner  was  overwhelming,  and 
everywhere  in  the  world  it  was  regarded  with 
the  greatest  respect.  Yet  only  externally.  Secretly, 
the  foreigner  was  amazed,  perturbed,  and  depressed  at 
the  sight  of  its  uniformity  and  stiffness.  The 
foreigner  was  as  far  as  the  German  people  itself  from 
guessing  that  in  Prusso-Germany  everything  is  shaped 
on  the  same  last,  and  that  this  is  a  dynastic  last. 
Political  Constitution,  Siegesallee,  or  German  culture — 
it  is  all  one;  all  alike  are  inspired  by  the  dynasty, 
executed  according  to  orders,  and   forced  upon  the 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  207 

German  people  as  a  glorification  of  the  hereditary 
despotic  house. 

But  Heaven  has  granted  the  German  people  the 
gift  of  good  temper;  vexed,  at  times,  about  this  excess 
of  military  discipline,  it  yet  secretly  admired  the  versa- 
tility of  a  ruler  who  not  only  interested  himself  in 
soldiers  and  battleships,  but,  also,  in  art  and  artists. 

To  be  sure  the  German  people  failed  to  realise  how 
matters  really  stood.  For  just  as  it  yearned  in  secret 
for  a  really  national  government,  army,  and  policy, 
without  actually  attaining  it,  so  it  dared  not  foster 
a  really  national  culture  that  would  have  satisfied 
the  true  German  ideal.  As,  in  the  realm  of  politics, 
our  constitution  and  army  were  only  a  semblance, 
and  not  the  reality  of  true  German  thought,  so  since 
Hegel  our  official  German  culture  had  long  ceased  to 
be  a  product  of  true  Germanism,  and  had  become 
merely  the  will-to-power  of  the  dynasty  expressed  in 
scientific  and  artistic  forms. 

This  fact,  realised  only  by  a  few  (among  them, 
Nietzsche),  was  revealed  to  us  with  the  most  unmis- 
takable clearness  on  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War. 
When  in  October,  19 14,  that  appeal  ''An  die  Kultur- 
welt"  was  issued,  which  was  signed  by  ninety-three 
of  the  leading  German  intellectuals,  and  caused  so 
much  amazement  and  excitement  in  the  civilised  world 
(even  in  the  real  though  muzzled  Germany),  then 
this  German  culture  threw  off  the  mask  and  showed 
itself  in  its  true  form,  a  protective  bulwark  of  the 
dynasty. 

There  is  no  longer  any  question  here  of  that  scien- 
tific logic  which  in  Kant's  days  had  its  home  in  Ger- 
many:   "It  is  untrue!"    "It  is  untrue!"    This  is  not 


2o8        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  language  of  logicians,  scientists,  and  free  Ger- 
mans, but  of  lackeys,  whose  views  may  well  be  dis- 
counted. 

Investigation  of  truth,  reflection  and  objectivity, 
once  the  hall-marks  of  German  science,  are  foreign 
to  this  modern  culture.  ''Often  enough,  during  his 
reign  of  twenty-eight  years,  has  William  II.  proved 
himself  the  protector  of  the  world's  peace  .  .  .  And 
only  when  a  superior  enemy  long  lurking  at  our 
frontiers  fell,  from  three  sides,  on  our  nation  did  it 
arise  as  one  man."  Thus  do  people  speak  who,  for 
a  century  past,  have  been,  drilled  to  express  them- 
selves not  in  accordance  with  their  convictions  but 
in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  their  Government. 
Whenever  the  dynastic  Government  is  assailed,  all 
sense  of  honour  and  scientific  evidence  is  for  such 
persons  non-existent. 

The  quintessence  of  this  appeal,  the  spiritual  bal- 
ance, as  it  were,  of  a  hundred  years  of  intellectual 
tutelage,  is  contained  in  the  following  sentence,  which 
will  bring  a  blush  to  the  cheek  of  our  grandchildren 
and  great-grandchildren:  "But  for  German  mili- 
tarism, German  culture  would  long  since  have  been 
wiped  off  the  face  of  the  earth."  After  this,  all  doubt 
must  cease.  Everyone  who  feels  within  himself  a 
spark  of  true  Germanism  will  be  forced  to  admit  that 
this  sentence  amounts  to  a  declaration  of  the  bank- 
ruptcy not  only  of  classical  Germanism,  but  of  every 
human  aspiration  towards  culture.  Even  though  we 
were  able  to  emerge  victorious  from  this  war,  and  to 
build  up  a  German  world-empire  from  Antwerp  to 
Bagdad,  this  sentence  would  proclaim  us  eternally 
vanquished.    It  is  a  Sedan  of  the  German  spirit. 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  209 

Militarism  as  the  pre-requisite  and  basis  of  German 
culture!  It  looks  as  if  these  ninety-three  champions 
of  culture  had  struck  themselves  in  the  face,  in  order 
then  with  blushing  cheeks  to  confess  that  a  free  man 
does  not  allow  himself  to  be  struck  in  the  face,  he 
only  performs  the  act  himself — on  command. 

The  fact  that  these  ninety-three  intellectuals  include 
not  only  official  professors  and  dignitaries,  but  also 
persons  who,  before  the  war,  were  honoured  as  citi- 
zens of  the  world  and  as  affording  the  highest  hopes 
for  a  free  Germany — Dehmel,  Eucken,  Eulenburg, 
Wilhelm  Forster,^  Hackel,  the  two  Hauptmanns,  Ost- 
wald,  Sudermann,  Ludwig  Thoma,  etc.,  etc.,  whose 
signature  is  thus  a  voluntary  act — is  only  a  fresh  proof 
that  the  official  control  of  the  German  idea  of  culture 
had  already  demoralised  a  great  many  of  the  free 
German  writers  and  artists,  and  that  they  too,  in  re- 
turn for  titles  and  decorations,  are  now  ready  to  sell 
their  consciences.^ 

That  true  culture  can  only  be  born  in  a  world  out- 
side the  prejudices  of  countries  and  dynasties,  of  this, 
as  the  appeal  shows,  the  ''champions  of  culture"  in 
modern  Germany  have  no  idea.  Talk  to  the  world- 
renowned  jurists  Laband  and  Liszt  about  the  aggres- 
sion in  Serbia  and  the  violence  done  to  Belgium,  and 
they  will  only  reply,  not  as  unprejudiced  jurists,  but 
as  staunch  patriots :  German  necessity  knows  no  law ; 
and  be  very  cautious  not  to  seek  any  valid  evidence 
of  such  necessity.     Speak  to  our  Dehmel  and  Fulda 

*  Not  to  be  confused  with  his  son,  the  Munich  Professor  F.  W. 
Forster. 

*  Hauptmann,  Sudermann,  and  others  have  meantime  received 
the  Fourth  Class  of  the  Red  Eagle,  the  lowest  m  that  series. 


210        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

of  the  destruction  of  invaluable  libraries  and  churches, 
and  it  would  not  surprise  me  if  they  dilated  on  the 
tragical  beauty  of  a  cathedral  blazing  in  the  service  of 
German  culture.  Complain,  again,  to  Hauptmann 
about  Germany's  questionable  methods  of  warfare, 
and  he  will,  like  any  chance  German  lieutenant  of 
the  Guard,  tell  you  that  any  desecration  is  not  more 
than  Germany's  power  and  dignity  demand.  Speak 
to  Scheidemann  and  Siadekum  of  the  necessity  of  at 
last  bringing  the  European  nations  under  a  democ- 
racy, and  of  utilising  the  potentialities  of  this  World 
War  for  the  acquisition  of  new  international  rights, 
and,  with  scarcely  veiled  admiration  for  the  model 
German  social  legislation,  they  will  reply  that  even 
the  most  liberal  republic  conceivable,  considering  that 
it  is  always  controlled  by  accursed  capitalists,  is  no 
better  for  the  labouring  man  than  an  absolute  mon- 
archy. 

For  Emperor  and  Empire!  Between  these  ever- 
lasting blinkers,  our  historians  view  their  documents, 
the  professors  their  antiquities,  the  freemasons  their 
corner  stones,  the  classical  scholars  their  Pegasus,  and 
the  Social  Democrats  the  ark  of  the  covenant  of  the 
sacred  Marx. 

German  culture  in  the  German  Empire?  No!  A 
Ptolemaic  cosmic  system  of  superstitious  theories, 
which  circle  round  the  stationary  level  of  their  dy- 
nasty; a  graciously  tolerated  cloak  of  militarism;  a 
puerile  phantom  machine  with  ''energetic  imperatives" 
and  thousands  of  empty  phrases ;  a  Ptolemaic  religion 
of  fawning  mandarins ;  at  the  best,  a  musing  on  pious 
sentiments  and  a  splendid  naivete  of  prophetic  souls; 


THE  GERMAN  DYNASTY  211 

here  and  there,  perchance,  a  subservient  attempt  to 
curb  the  war-thirsty  beast.    Nothing  more. 

The  German  ''champions  of  culture"?  Among  a 
hundred  there  is  hardly  one  who  dares  to  play  the 
man:  slaves,  who  carry  their  master's  whip;  pedants, 
who  belaud  as  liberty  what  all  the  rest  of  the  world 
has  long  felt  to  be  serfdom;  acrobats  and  court  jesters, 
who  are  permitted  by  their  grand  lords  to  present 
all  manner  of  burlesques  of  freedom  to  the  people; 
occasionally  an  earnest  eccentric  who  has  heard  it  said 
that  dynasties  are  not  indispensable  in  our  modern 
world;  but  the  overwhelming  majority  of  them,  in- 
tellectual lieutenants  in  the  Hohenzollern  Guard,  ready 
to  obey  at  the  word  of  command. 

Learning  without  character,  knowledge  without  con- 
science, organisation  without  humanity,  discipline 
without  liberty,  ideal  without  dignity;  such  is  the  re- 
sult of  a  mental  development  that,  commencing  with 
the  disappearance  of  the  Weimar  Germanism,  and  po- 
litically trained  by  Metternich,  Bismarck,  and  Wil- 
liam 11. ,  and  intellectually  by  Hegel,  Treitschke,  and 
their  disciples,  could  only  play  its  part  as  a  protecting 
power  of  the  dynasty.  The  World  War  is  the  absolute 
proof  of  this.  It  has  shown  the  culmination  of  this 
development  in  a  complete  victory  of  Potsdam  over 
Weimar.  I  believe  that,  after  this  catastrophe,  we 
require  an  entirely  new  generation  of  men  to  answer 
by  entirely  new  conduct  this — for  Germany — entirely 
new  question,  namely,  what  Culture  really  means. 


VI 

THE  GERMAN'S  FATHERLAND 

In  the  foregoing  pages  we  have  embarked  on  a 
strictly  judicial  voyage  of  discovery  through  modem 
Prusso-Germany,  basing  all  our  observations  upon 
actual  facts.  As  a  subject  of  the  Fatherland  of  scien- 
tific logic  my  aim  was  to  apply  this  logic,  as  far  as 
in  me  lay,  and  without  prejudice  or  malice,  to  a  topic 
hitherto  totally  excluded  from  free  German  investiga- 
tion— namely,  the  legal,  military,  political,  and  intel- 
lectual relation  of  our  dynasty  tp  our  country.  I  do 
not  claim  completeness  for  my  studies.  The  materials 
I  have  collected  on  these  subjects  would  have  suf- 
ficed to  fill  a  book  of  fully  threefold  the  volume  I 
now  present  to  my  readers.  In  Germany  things  exist 
which  afford  the  most  valuable  evidence  in  support 
of  the  views  here  urged, ^  concerning  which,  however, 

^The  reader  will,  perhaps,  have  noticed  that  I  have  said  noth- 
ing about  the  Prussian  Constitution,  the  Prussian  franchise  and 
Upper  House,  the  privileged  position  of  the  Junkers  in  the 
Prussian  political  system,  the  infamous  Prussian  Polish  policy, 
etc.  I  have  also  left  unmentioned  numerous  expressions  of 
William  II.  which,  though  indubitably  uttered,  have  not  been 
officially  confirmed.  A  special  chapter,  which  really  belongs 
here,  and  would  do  much  to  elucidate  the  psychology  of  dynas- 
ties, would  be  an  honest  account  of  those  numerous  scandals 
at  the  Berlin  Court  (Stocker,  Schrader-Kotze,  Hammerstein, 
Waldersee,  Eulenburg,  etc.)  which,  since  Bismarck's  fall,  have 
disclosed  the  secret  workings  of  the  Berlin  Camarillas  and  exer- 
cised an  unsuspected  influence  upon  German  politics. 

212 


THE  GERMAN'S  FATHERLAND     213 

a  good  patriot  prefers  to  keep  silence.  Yet  the  little 
evidence  I  have  above  adduced  will,  I  trust,  suffice. 

If,  for  instance,  by  the  word  "fatherland"  we  mean 
what  all  civilised  nations  to-day,  except  the  Russians 
and  Turks,  mean  by  it,  then  by  the  light  of  our  in- 
vestigations we  arrive  at  the  result  that  we  Germans 
have  no  Fatherland  at  all.  For  what  the  French, 
English,  Swiss,  Americans  understand  by  ''father- 
land," namely,  the  country  in  the  government  of  which 
they  have  a  voice,  does  not  exist  in  Germany. 

The  modern  notion  of  'Tatherland"  was  first  cre- 
ated by  the  French  Revolution  and  is,  essentially,  an 
ideal  of  public  weal  and  justice;  it  is  (let  Germans 
realise  this  fact)  inseparable  from  the  notion  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people.  The  Frenchman,  the 
Italian,  the  Englishman,  and  the  Swiss  (lately,  per- 
haps, the  Chinese)  is  willing  to  give  his  life  for  his 
country,  because  he  feels  himself  a  responsible  part 
of  a  sovereign  whole,  a  member  of  a  national  organism 
striving  towards  a  continually  higher  ideal  of  justice 
and  welfare — in  short,  free  citizens;  possessing  equal 
rights  in  a  political  and  constitutional  community. 

But  we  Germans  are  not  permitted  to  attach  such  a 
meaning  to  the  word  ''fatherland,"  since,  as  already 
shown,  the  antecedent  conditions  to  such  a  conception 
are  wanting.  Any  German  who  honestly  investigates 
this  question  must  admit  this  fact.  Both  as  a  function 
and  in  its  effects,  our  electoral  right  is  only  a  pretence. 
Wq  have  neither  ruling  statesmen  nor  responsible  min- 
isters, neither  a  legally  guaranteed  position  as  against 
our  Government,  nor  soldiers,  sworn  to  uphold  our 
Constitution.  Thus,  we  are  not  the  free  citizens  of 
a   constitutional   State,    but,    as   William    11.    in    hii 


214        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

speeches  has  again  and  again  insisted,  the  subjects  of 
a  God-appointed  ruler. 

First  of  all,  there  is  no  question  with  us  of  real 
spiritual  liberty.  There  are  many  Germans  who 
proudly  boast  of  our  liberty  of  the  Press;  but,  alas! 
the  German  liberty  of  the  Press  is  the  same  demo- 
cratic illusion  as  the  German  Reichstag  and  the  Ger- 
man popular  army.  As  German  policy  is  exclusively 
the  business  of  the  German  Emperor,  and  the  speeches 
and  actions  of  the  Emperor  may  not  be  criticised  (the. 
mere  supposition  of  an  intention  to  insult  the  sov- 
ereign^ suffices,  in  Germany,  to  get  anyone  into 
prison),  in  Germany  our  much  vaunted  liberty  of  the 
Press  stops  just  where,  in  other  countries,  it  begins, 
that  is  to  say,  where  it  begins  to  fulfil  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  founded.  There  is  nothing  worse  and 
more  stupid  than  liberties,  which  are  counted  upon, 
and  yet,  at  the  very  moment  when  they  ought  to  prove 
their  use,  become  crimes.  Liberties  that  prove  value- 
less, as  soon  as  they  are  to  be  employed  for  the  pur- 
poses for  which  they  were  ostensibly  created,  are,  in 
truth,  Hegelian  speculations  on  the  stupidity  of  the 
people.  If  we  made  no  pretence  of  having  liberty  of 
the  Press,  then  we  should,  at  least,  know  how  we 
stood.     But  as  things  are,  one  has  to  take  infinite 

^  One  instance  out  of  a  hundred.  In  January,  1899,  the  editor 
of  a  Magdeburg  SociaHst  paper  was  sentenced  to  four  years 
and  one  month's  imprisonment  for  an  article  written  in  the 
form  of  a  legend,  but  which,  unfortunately  for  him,  the  Court 
held  to  bear  upon  German  politics.  By  the  aid  of  that  suppo- 
sition (that  German  politics  were  intended),  the  Attorney-Gen- 
eral made  out  a  case  of  Icse  majeste  of  the  Emperor  and  the 
twelve-year-old  Prince  Eitel  Fritz  and  was  entirely  success- 
ful. 


THE  GERMAN'S  FATHERLAND     215 

trouble  to  bring  a  German  to  comprehend  that  liberty 
of  the  Press,  absolute  government,  and  lese  majeste 
are  three  things,  like  surgeon,  sickness,  and  belief  in 
miracles,  i.e.^  the  last  produces  the  second  and  scoffs 
at  the  first. ^ 

As  far  as  human  despotic  power  can  reach,  the  Ho- 
henzollern  dynasty  is  in  Germany  politically  omnipo- 
tent. Despite  all  advances  in  civilisation,  the  words  ad- 
dressed in  171 7  by  Frederick  William  I.  to  the  Prus- 
sian Estates — *'the  authority  of  the  Junkers  will  go 
to  the  wall;  but  I  establish  the  'souverainete'  as  a 
'rock  of  bronze'  " — and,  again,  to  the  General  Di- 
rectory, on  December  20th,  1722 — "we  are,  after  all, 
the  King  and  we  do  what  we  please" — have  180  years 
subsequently  been  repeated  emphatically  by  William 
11.  in  countless  speeches :  thus,  *'my  course  is  the  right 
one  and  I  shall  go  on  steering  it"  (February  24th, 
1892) ;  or  again,  "the  descendant  of  him  who  by  his 
own  right  became  sovereign  duke  in  Prussia  will  pur- 
sue the  same  paths  as  his  immortal  ancestor;  just  as 
once  the  first  King  said  'ex  mea  nata  corona'  (my 
crown  I  have  myself  created),  and  his  illustrious  son 
established  his  authority  as  a  'rocher  de  bronze/  so 
do  I,  like  my  imperial  grandfather,  represent  the  mon- 
archy by  divine  right."     (Konigsberg,  September  6th, 

1894). 

*This  criticism  refers,  of  course,  to  the  constitutionally  guar- 
anteed liberty  of  the  Press  before  the  war.  That  since  the  out- 
break of  war  we  have  been  completely  deprived  of  even  the 
semblance  of  liberty  of  the  Press,  and  that  (despite  solemn 
undertakings  to  the  contrary)  it  has  not  been  restored,  is  well 
known.  Moreover,  it  is  only  in  England,  among  all  the  belliger- 
ent countries,  that  any  real  liberty  of  the  Press  has  survived 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 


2i6        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

The  sovereignty  by  Divine  Right  is  not,  in  Germany, 
a  meaningless  phrase,  not  a  dynastic  fiction,  and,  cer- 
tainly, not  an  imagination,  as  alleged,  of  so-called  un- 
patriotic subjects.  It  is  an  absolute  fact;  and  two 
centuries  of  human  development  have  not  altered  it  a 
jot.  As  we,  as  good  Christians,  have  to  believe  that 
God  created  the  world  in  six  days  and  rested  the 
seventh,  so  have  we,  as  good  patriots,  to  believe  that 
the  dynasty  with  God's  help  arranges  everything  for 
the  best.  Come  what  may,  and  be  it  ever  so  much  in 
conflict  with  the  times,  we  know  that  it  is  a  part  of 
the  Divine  order  and  that  behind  it  is  concealed  a 
higher  plan. 

We  Germans  are,  in  truth,  born  critics;  we  have 
probed  the  mysteries  of  the  universe,  established  the 
limits  of  human  knowledge,  and  conceive  ourselves  to 
be  the  cleverest  and  most  highly  educated  people  in 
the  world;  yet,  in  matters  of  political  government,  we 
have  been  struck  blind  by  the  gods  and  by  Hegel. 
And,  our  dynasty  has,  to  simplify  matters,  forbidden 
the  nation  of  thinkers  to  think  about  these  matters. 

What  then  have  we  Germans  left?  Upon  what  do 
we  found  our  German  patriotism  ?  As  a  fact  we  base 
it  upon  our  affection  for  the  imperial  house.  Any 
other  devotion  to  country  would  be  senseless.  William 
II.,  Professor  Delbriack,  and  other  authorities  assure 
us,  and  with  truth,  that  the  army  "is  the  basis  of  our 
political  system."  But,  since  this  army  is  sworn  to 
allegiance  not  to  our  country  and  its  Constitution,  but 
to  the  person  of  the  Emperor-King,  it  follows,  by 
mathematical  logic,  that  our  whole  German  political 
system  does  not  exist  for  the  behoof  of  us  German 
citizens,  but  is  merely  a  creation  and  possession  of 


THE  GERMAN'S  FATHERLAND     217 

the  German  dynasty.  And  so  it  is;  Emperor  and 
Fatherland  are  in  Germany  one  and  the  same.  The 
Emperor  is  not  only  the  supreme  authority  under  the 
Constitution,  but  the  born  incorporation  of  our  po- 
litical system,  the  leader  of  our  national  fortunes  in 
peace  and  war,  umpire  in  matters  of  art  and  science, 
and  sovereign  plenipotentiary  of  the  German  people — 
in  short,  the  sole  initiating  and  guiding  force  of  the 
German  Empire  within  and  without. 

As  he  is  all  this,  the  notion  of  Fatherland  implies 
for  the  German  only  the  person  of  the  German  Em- 
peror. Our  devotion  to  him  is  our  love  of  country.  If 
a  German  were  to  love  his  country,  as  other  civilised 
nations  do  theirs  (as  a  political  community  of  which 
he  is  an  active  member),  he  would  be  a  revolutionary. 
Even  to-day  the  idea  of  a  Fatherland  belonging  to  the 
German  nation  is  regarded  as  a  crime. 

Of  course,  it  may  certainly  be  disputed  which  no- 
tion of  Fatherland  is  the  higher,  that  of  the  French, 
the  English,  and  so  forth,  or  that  of  the  Germans. 
But  it  cannot  possibly  be  disputed  that  on  this  point, 
as  on  most  others,  we  have  sundered  ourselves  from 
the  rest  of  the  civilised  world,  that  is  to  say,  we  have 
placed  ourselves  in  diametrical  opposition  to  it.  For 
State  and  Fatherland,  which  elsewhere  form  a  natural 
entity,  are  in  our  case  only  notions  artificially  welded 
together.  In  reality,  the  Prussian  conception  of  the 
State  is  the  absolute  negation  of  the  conception  of 

the  Fatherland  obtaining  in  other  countries. 

*  *  *  *  * 

It  has  been  shown  that  in  all  vital  questions  Ger- 
man domestic  and  foreign  policy  has  been  guided  not 
with  the   co-operation   of,   but   in  opposition   to,   the 


2i8       THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

German  people,  and  that,  therefore,  logically,  where 
the  policy  "of  Germany"  is  referred  to,  it  ought  rather 
to  be  described  as  the  policy  of  the  German  dynasty. 
I  wish  here,  once  more,  to  emphasise  that  in  all  im- 
portant questions  in  which  the  German  people  have 
been  allowed  to  have  a  voice.  They  have  invariably 
given  it  against  the  policy  of  their  Government.  The 
fable  that  the  German  people  are  one  heart  and  one 
soul  for  their  dynasty  ought  to  be  finally  discredited. 
Foreign  countries,  who  have,  as  a  rule,  no  idea  how 
things  stand  in  a  country  where  Use  majeste,  tele- 
grams from  the  Crown  Prince,  and  adoration  of  the 
military  uniform  are  taken  for  granted,  have  an  idea 
that  the  German  people  are  delighted  with  their  dy- 
nasty. At  this  crisis,  no  stone  must  be  left  unturned  to 
dispel  this  illusion.  Had  the  dynasty  been  really  so 
assured  of  the  support  of  its  people,  it  would  long  since 
have  dispensed  with  those  protective  laws  behind  which 
it  has  so  carefully  shielded  itself.  But  during  the  last 
twenty  years  those  laws  have  become  both  more  se- 
vere and  more  frequently  applied  than  ever.  The 
dynasty  went  yet  further.  It  demanded  the  applica- 
tion of  these  laws  to  the  Reichstag  and  forbade  any 
discussion  of  speeches  from  the  throne.  Finally,  de- 
nunciations for  Use  majeste  had  become  such  a  public 
nuisance,  that  William  II.  (1907)  reduced  the  period 
of  limitation  for  actions  of  the  kind  from  five  years 
to  six  months  (without,  however,  making  the  crime 
dependent  upon  publicity).  This  shows  that  the  dy- 
nasty was,  in  Germany,  only  popular  because  by  every 
available  resource  it  enforced  this  popularity  and  ruth- 
lessly suppressed  every  other  sentiment.  It  further 
shows  that  the  proverbial  obedience  of  the  German 


THE  GERMAN'S  FATHERLAND     219 

is  not  a  natural  trait  in  his  character,  but  only  the 
result  of  brutal  and  long  compulsion.  A  monarchical 
Government  that  has  never  tolerated  the  smallest 
openly  republican  association  within  its  realms  may 
easily  assert  that  its  citizens  are  loyal  to  the  back- 
bone. As  no  counter-evidence  is  allowed,  and  as  this 
fealty  has  not  sprung  from  the  soil  of  liberty  and 
free  will,  it  may  be  regarded  with  suspicion. 

There  is  no  large  party  in  Germany  which  desires 
the  monarchy  for  the  monarchy's  sake.  The  funda- 
mental factor  in  genuine  monarchical  fealty,  namely, 
unselfishness,  is  to  be  sought  for  in  vain  among  our 
so-called  monarchical  parties.  We  have,  in  Germany, 
men  who  regard  monarchy  as  a  political  ideal,  disin- 
terested politicians,  journalists  and  scholars,  who  are 
anxious  to  further  this  ideal,  but  no  political  party, 
supported  by  a  popular  majority,  disinterestedly  serv- 
ing the  monarchy  in  its  present  form.  Those  very 
parties,  who  are  reckoned  pillars  of  the  throne  and 
the  Church,  support  the  throne  not  for  the  sake  of 
God  and  King,  but  only  because  God  and  King  serve 
their  own  ends  best.  That  is  the  plain  truth,  which 
is  naturally  contradicted  most  vehemently  by  those 
who  live  by  and  not  for  the  monarchy. 

The  Prusso-German  people,  as  a  whole,  have  for 
decades  past  regarded  the  divine  right  of  the  monarchy 
with  some  scepticism.  Whenever  opportunity  offered, 
they  have  protested  against  this  divine  right.  In  the 
National  Assembly  of  October  12th,  1848,  Schultze- 
Delitzsch  declared  in  the  discussion  of  the  Constitu- 
tional Charter :  "It  is  usual,  when  a  commercial  house 
goes  bankrupt,  not  to  make  use  of  the  old  name  for 
the  new  business.    Now  I  believe  that  in  past  history 


220        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

absolutism  has  come  to  complete  bankruptcy  under  the 
old  title  'by  God's  Grace/  Accordingly,  I  suggest  that 
we  do  not  adopt  this  old,  bankrupt  name  for  our  new 
business."  And  by  217  to  143  votes  the  "bankrupt 
God's-grace  firm"  was  then  struck  out  of  the  Draft 
of  the  Constitution.  Was  it  the  fault  of  the  Prussian 
nation  that  Frederick  William  IV.  forcibly  dissolved 
this  assembly,  and,  in  defiance  of  all  popular  demands, 
forced  upon  it  a  Constitution  (which  has  continued  to 
this  day)  beginning  with  the  words  "We,  Frederick 
William,  by  God's  Grace,  etc."  ? 

Had  the  spirit  of  the  German  people  been  really  as 
monarchical,  slavish,  and  imperialistic  as  our  enemies 
of  to-day  allege,  then  it  could  never  have  come  into 
conflict  with  its  Government.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
these   conflicts  have  been    frequent   and   numerous.^ 

*  Some  of  the  acutest  conflicts  of  the  past  decade  between 
the  Government  and  the  people  have  already  been  noted  in 
the  fourth  chapter  of  this  work.  How  strong  is  the  opposition 
of  the  German  people  to  its  Government  is  evidenced  not  only 
by  these  conflicts,  not  only  by  the  unconstitutional  character 
of  the  German  popular  assembly,  a  character  which  has  been 
preserved  in  defiance  of  every  protest,  but,  in  particular,  by  the 
attitude  of  the  Reichstag  since  the  commencement  of  this  World 
War.  The  so-called  "Burgf  rieden"  and  the  boasted  "sacred  unity 
of  all  parties"  have  not  been  able  to  prevent  the  Reichstag  from 
protesting,  almost  unanimously,  and  vigorously,  against  protec- 
tive detention  and  censorship,  against  the  exclusion  of  Jews  and 
dissenters  from  the  corps  of  officers,  against  the  disregard  of  the 
German  popular  representation  in  matters  of  foreign  policy,  etc. 
All  in  vain.  What  in  England,  in  1629,  was  abolished  by  the 
so-called  Petition  of  Rights  (namely,  the  arbitrary  power  of 
the  royal  officials  and  the  unprotected  state  of  the  citizens)  the 
German  citizen  demanded  the  Imperial  Government  to  abolish 
(unanimously  but  fruitlessly)  at  the  end  of  October,  1916.     The 


THE  GERMAN'S  FATHERLAND     221 

That  the  German  people  never  emerged  from  them 
victorious  was  not  their  fault,  but  rather  a  consequence 
of  that  law  of  the  world's  history  which  ordains  that 
the  people  only  begin  to  gain  the  upper  hand  when 
the  dynasty  has  suffered  a  loss  of  prestige  outside. 
But  Prussia  has  suffered  no  such  loss  of  prestige  since 
the  period  from  1806  to  1813. 

Our  democratic  neighbours  and  present  foes,  who 
tax  us  with  not  being  ripe  for  democracy  and  declare 
that  we  have  slavish  minds  and  no  understanding  of 
liberty,  should  give  a  little  consideration  to  their  own 
history.  The  French,  especially,  who  are  regarded 
as  the  most  revolutionary  nation  in  the  world,  should 
reflect  that  they,  too,  in  the  past,  and  under  like  cir- 
cumstances, possessed  almost  the  same  (apparent) 
faults  as  those  they  tax  us  with  to-day.  For  instance, 
so  long  as  the  two  Napoleons  returned  from  their 
campaigns  flushed  with  victory,  the  French  never 
dreamt  of  a  revolution.  And,  at  that  time,  they  were 
just  as  hated  and  feared  in  the  world  as  we  Germans 
have  been  for  the  last  few  decades.  Since  the  French 
dynasty  was  boastful  and  eager  for  war,  the  story  was 
spread  about  the  world  that  the  whole  of  France  was 
intoxicated  with  militarism  and  vanity  and  was  a  men- 
ace to  Europe.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  the  faults  and 
errors  of  the  victorious  dynasty  were  thoughtlessly 
placed  to  the  account  of  the  people. 

A  French  revolution  between  1798  and  18 10,  or 
between   185 1  and  1869,  might  have  saved  us  from 

tragi-comic  element  of  the  whole  business  is  that,  with  the  same 
unanimity,  the  same  Reichstag  voted  all  war  credits,  which  were 
demanded  under  the  plea  that  Germany  was  fighting  a  crusade 
against — Czarism. 


222        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  catastrophes  that  the  Bonaparte  dynasty  brought 
upon  the  world,  just  as  a  German  revolution  could 
have  saved  us  from  this  present  war.  Why  did  not 
the  French  revolt  at  that  time  ?  The  answer  is  simple : 
because  they  could  not.  The  course  of  events  is  every- 
where alike;  victorious  dynasties  bring  despotism; 
against  this  despotism  arises  a  secret  revolt,  which, 
however,  is  shouted  down  by  the  loud  praises  of  those 
who  live  in  the  pay  of  dynasties  and  wield  the  power. 
The  louder  these  praises  resound  in  the  land,  the 
stronger  and  the  more  embittered  becomes  the  silent 
dissatisfaction  of  the  real  nation.  In  order  to  exer- 
cise the  growing  popular  discontent,  dynasties  must 
have  recourse  to  war  as  the  sovereign  remedy.  And 
only  when  it  is  proved  that  their  calculations  were 
wrong,  and  when  the  eagle  flutters  wounded  to  the 
ground,  can  this  popular  indignation  burst  out  and 
be  victorious.  Jena  and  Auerstatt,  which  strengthened 
the  dynastic  rule  in  France,  were  for  Prussia  the  sig- 
nal for  a  popular  uprising  culminating  in  a  conspiracy 
against  the  Prussian  King.  But  as  the  Prussian  Rev- 
olution of  those  days  needed  for  its  victory  both  the 
Russian  and  the  Austrian  dynasties,  it  could  not,  un- 
fortunately, gather  its  fruits.  On  the  other  hand, 
Sedan  marked  the  birth  of  the  German  Empire  "with 
its  Prussian  summit,"  and  in  France  the  birth  of  the 
Third  Republic. 

There  are,  after  all,  rigid  laws  in  history.  One  of 
these  ordains  that  dynasties  which  are  victorious  out- 
side their  realms  are  at  the  same  time  victorious  at 
home  over  the  politics,  logic,  science,  and  liberal  as- 
pirations of  their  peoples.    When  Lamartine  said,  "It 


THE  GERMAN'S  FATHERLAND     223 

is  not  the  country,  but  liberty  that  is  most  imperilled 
in  war,"  he  should  have  said  "in  victorious  war."  For 
every  victorious  war  means  for  the  victorious  nation 
a  loss  of  political  liberties,  whilst  for  the  vanquished 
it  is  a  fountain  of  inspiration  and  democratic  progress. 
Had  there  been  no  Koniggratz,  Austria  would  still 
be  without  a  Constitution  and  Hungary  still  under 
the  Austrian  scourge ;  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  without 
a  Koniggratz  the  National-Liberals  in  Prussia  would 
not  have  unexpectedly  become  ''Reptiles."  Without 
a  Sedan,  no  Bismarck  regime  but,  also,  no  Gambetta. 
Had  Russia  been  victorious  over  Japan,  the  Russian 
people  would  to-day  have  no  Constitution.  And  so  on. 
Hence,  just  as  the  victories  of  Wagram,  Austerlitz, 
Jena,  Sebastopol,  and  Solferino  could  not  unchain 
revolutions  in  France,  so  from  us  Germans  no  revolu- 
tions could  be  expected  after  Duppel,  Koniggratz, 
Sedan  and  Paris.  Victorious  revolutions  are  only  ren- 
dered possible  by  lost  campaigns,^  and  it  is  the  mis- 
fortune of  us  Prussians  that  we  have  not  lost  a  cam- 
paign since  Jena.  Yes,  my  dear  readers,  it  was  in 
truth  a  misfortune,  for  had  Prussia  been  only  once 
overcome,  "the  old  bankrupt  firm"  would  have  been 
long  since  extinguished  and  the  present  war  would 
not  have  come  to  pass.     For  then  there  would  not 

*We  must  lay  stress  here  upon  the  term  "victories."  The 
Revolutions  of  1848  were  not  begotten  of  wars  and  not  waged 
against  dynasties  conquered  in  the  field.  But  in  France,  as  also 
in  Germany  and  Austria,  they  were  victorious  for  a  moment 
only,  and  immediately  after  made  room  for  a  fresh  reaction. 
Something  similar  can  be  said  of  the  great  French  Revolution, 
which  dethroned  a  King  in  order  to  bring  home  an  Emperor  who 
set  all  Europe  in  a  ferment, 


224        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

have  arisen  the  arrogant  dream  of  a  German  world- 
empire  and  the  Pan-Germanism  of  the  present  day. 

Rather  more  historical  logic  is  seriously  needed  by 
our  friends  across  the  Vosges  and  the  Channel.  They 
would  then  realise  that  we,  as  a  people,  have  done 
what  we  were  able  to  do.  They  would  no  longer 
reproach  us  on  account  of  faults  and  bad  habits  which, 
under  similar  circumstances,  they  themselves  evidently 
possessed,  and  which  are  merely  due  to  the  dictates  of 
victorious  dynasties.  The  recognition  of  this  fact 
would  be  of  vital  importance  in  securing  a  sensible 
conclusion  of  peace. 

So  far  as  the  militarism  and  foreign  policy  of  the 
German  Empire  is  especially  concerned,  I  have  al- 
ready indicated  that  it  is  quite  correct  to  say  of  the 
German  people  that  it  has  been  militarised  to  the  mar- 
row. But  one  ought  not  to  confound  militarism  with 
eagerness  for  war.  The  indubitably  strong  (arti- 
ficially created)  military  spirit  of  the  German  people 
was  no  menace  to  peace,  but,  as  our  nation  honestly 
believed  and  was  again  and  again  assured  by  William 
11.  in  his  speeches,  a  means  of  maintaining  the  peace. 
This  is  to  say,  the  German  people,  like  all  other  peo- 
ples, considered  militarism  as  a  necessary  evil  for  the 
defense  of  the  Fatherland.  It  could  not,  would  not, 
dared  not  realise  the  fundamental  idea  of  the  dynas- 
tically  nurtured  German  militarism — that  is  to  say,  its 
eagerness  for  war. 

This  was  strikingly  proved  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war.  In  the  first  chapter  of  this  book  I  have,  by  the 
light  of  German  documents,  unearthed  a  few  of  the 
numerous  contradictions  and  forgeries  to  which  the 


THE  GERMAN'S  FATHERLAND     225 

German  Government  was  obliged  to  have  recourse  in 
order  to  represent  a  patently  offensive  war  as  a  holy 
war  of  self-defence.  It  would  not  have  needed  these 
very  compromising  contradictions  and  forgeries,  had  it 
not  been  well  aware  that  any  policy  of  war  as  a  means 
of  conquest  was  absolutely  repugnant  to  the  German 
people  as  a  whole  (in  spite  of  all  attempts  to  militarise 
them).  But  after  the  Government  had  spoken  of 
Cossacks  in  East  Prussia  and  bombs  on  Nuremberg 
and  all  this  had  been  expressly  confirmed  by  ''official" 
reports;  after  it  had  suppressed,  in  the  Press  and  the 
Reichstag,  the  mediation  proposals  of  the  Czar  and 
those  of  the  English  Foreign  Office,  it  was  a  mere 
trifle  to  announce  solemnly :  ''Envious  foes  compel  us 
to  a  just  defence.  The  sword  has  been  forced  into 
our  hand"  (speech  of  William  II.  on  July  31st,  1914, 
delivered  from  the  balcony  of  the  Palace).  Thanks 
to  these  imperial  and  official  announcements,  German 
patriots  believed  themselves  faced  with  that  sacred 
need  of  self-protection  and  self-preservation  which  in 
the  view  of  every  civilised  nation  is  always  the  justi- 
fication for  armament;  the  sacred  wish  and  will  to 
defend  one's  country.  When,  then,  the  German  peo- 
ple, proudly  and  as  one  man,  rushed  to  arms  in  August, 
1914,  what  were  the  objects  of  its  enthusiasm?  The 
plans  of  conquest,  as  enunciated  by  Bernhardi,  Harden, 
Reventlow,  Keim,  Frobenius,  and  their  like?  Was  it 
the  world-power  policy  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  the 
"Greater  Germany,"  the  "liberation"  of  the  Flemish, 
the  Baltic  races,  etc.?  Not  a  bit  of  it.  Anyone  w^^ 
imputes  this  kind  of  enthusiasm  for  war  to  the  m^ 


226        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

jority  of  the  German  people  is  doing  them  injustice. 
If  so  many  and  such  mad  plans  of  annexation  crop 
up,  at  the  present  time,  everywhere  in  Germany,  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  protests  against  them  are  both  few 
and  far  between,  and  then  only  shyly  expressed,  that  is 
no  proof  whatsoever  that  our  politicians  who  desire 
conquest  have  the  majority  of  the  German  people  be- 
hind them.  This  alleged  lust  of  the  German  people 
for  conquest  is  on  a  par  with  its  loyalty  to  the  Crown. 
The  Government  will  not  suffer  any  counter  argu- 
ment, and  anyone  who  at  present  should  advocate  an 
immediate  conclusion  of  peace  without  annexations 
would  be  compelled  to  hold  his  tongue.  For  instance, 
the  Berliner  Tagehlatt  was  suppressed  for  several  days 
because  it  ventured  to  describe  the  demands  for  an- 
nexation of  the  six  agricultural  unions  as  calculated 
to  prolong  the  war.  In  this  way,  the  impression  can 
readily  be  engendered  abroad  that  the  whole  German 
people  is  dominated  by  a  barbaric  lust  of  conquest. 

Here  again,  as  everyw^here  in  considering  this  Ger- 
man problem,  appearances  must  be  distinguished  from 
actualities.  The  actuality  is  that  the  German  people 
in  August,  1 91 4,  waxed  enthusiastic  for  the  patriotic 
idea  of  defence  of  country.  We  should  not  have  de- 
served to  remain  a  nation  had  we  not  been  animated 
by  this  idea.  As  soon  as  our  national  honour  and 
independence  are  assailed,  we,  like  all  other  nations, 
become  bellicose;  and  on  the  authority  of  the  official 
German  description  of  the  causes  of  the  war  we  were 
compelled  to  believe  that  this  was  what  had  happened. 
What  German,  in  the  confusion  of  those  days,  could 
for  a  moment  conceive  that  in  Prusso-Germany  of  the 


THE  GERMAN'S  FATHERLAND     227 

twentieth  century  those  theories  of  divine  constitu- 
tional right  still  prevailed  which  Machiavelli  com- 
mended to  the  princes  of  mediaeval  times?  The  most 
vigilant  democrats,  the  staunchest  opponents  of  war, 
could  not  believe  in  such  a  monstrosity;  even  persons 
like  Liebknecht,  Haase,  and  Bernstein  voted  the  war 
credits  in  honest  belief  that  it  was  for  the  defence  of 
their  country. 

In  this  way,  and  no  other,  can  the  psychology  of  the 
German  war  enthusiasm  be  explained.  It  was  en- 
gendered by  the  aid  of  falsifications  and  the  solemn 
assurance  that  'Sve  enter  upon  war  with  a  clear  con- 
science and  in  the  conviction  that  we  did  not  wish  for 
war"  (speech  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor  to  the  popu- 
lace on  August  1st,  1 9 14). 

It  is  a  simple  task  (and,  perchance,  a  not  unwelcome 
one  to  foreign  lands)  to  refute  the  correctness  of  this 
account.  Let  us,  for  this  purpose,  suppose  for  the 
nonce  a  Germany  under  parliamentary  rule.  Let  us 
suppose  that,  in  Articles  11  and  68  of  the  German 
Imperial  Constitution,  the  phrase  "German  Reichs- 
tag" is  substituted  for  that  of  ''German  Emperor," 
or  else  that  to  the  latter  are  added  the  words  "by 
consent  of  the  German  Reichstag."  Then,  in  the 
realm  of  German  politics,  there  would  be  no  longer 
room  for  the  insolent  application  of  the  doctrines  of 
Machiavelli.  In  their  place  there  would  be  an  army 
subservient  to  the  popular  will.  Ministers  responsible 
to  Parliament,  and  who  could  be  impeached,  reason- 
ably formed  electoral  divisions,  that  is  to  say,  a  Reichs- 
tag with  about  660  deputies  (instead  of  397,  as  to- 
day). Then  let  the  election  results  of  19 12  be  ex- 
amined.   Out  of  a  total  of  twelve  million  votes,  almost 


228        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

eight  million  are  in  manifest  opposition  to  the  Pan- 
Germanistic  idea  of  conquest.^  These  eight  million 
of  German  electors,  all  of  more  or  less  democratic 
sympathies,  would  have  to  be  represented,  in  this  rea- 
sonably constituted  Reichstag,  by  about  440  deputies, 
whereas  the  real  Pan-Germanists,  for  whom,  in  the 
elections  of  19 12,  about  four  million  votes  were  given, 
would,  in  such  a  Reichstag,  have  secured  about  220 
seats. 

Now  imagine  the  outbreak  of  the  Austro-Serbian 
dispute.  This  Parliament  is  convened  in  accordance 
with  the  Constitution,  and  there  is  presented  to  it  not 
only  the  Austrian  Ultimatum  to  Serbia  together  with 
the  latter's  almost  obsequious  reply,  but  also  Grey's 
proposal  for  a  Conference  of  the  four  Powers  (Nos. 
67  and  84  of  the  English  Blue  Book),  the  telegram 
of  the  Czar  to  William  II.  of  July  29th,  vrhich  sug- 
gested the  settlement  of  the  dispute  by  The  Hague 


^  The  following  can  obviously  not  be  regarded  as  Pan-Ger- 
manist :  Social  Democrats,  Liberals,  Poles,  Alsatians,  Guelphs, 
and  Lorrainers.  On  the  other  hand,  the  following  are  con- 
fessedly Pan-Germanist : — National-Liberals,  Conservatives,  the 
Imperial  Party,  Anti-Semites.  The  Catholic  '"Centre"  occupies 
an  intermediate  position.  It  secured  over  two  million  votes  in 
the  election  of  1912.  As  the  supporters  of  this  party  are  mostly 
people  in  humble  circumstances  and  the  candidates  of  this  "Cen- 
tre Party"  in  many  electoral  districts  (such  as  the  Rhine  Prov- 
inces, Alsace-Lorraine,  and  Upper  Silesia)  hold  definitely  dem- 
ocratic views  (the  Centre  has  more  than  once  voted  against  the 
Army  Bills,  it  opposed  the  Polish  policy,  and  was,  in  1907,  even 
the  ally  of  the  Social  Democrats),  we  shall  not  be  far  wrong  if 
we  halve  the  Centre  votes,  and  allow  about  one  million  as  being 
non-Pan-Germanist.  Had  the  plain  question  been  put  to  them, 
Do  you  wish  for  a  war  of  conquest?  four-fifths  of  the  Centre 
Party  of  1912  would  have  responded  with  a  loud  ''Na" 


THE  GERMAN'S  FATHERLAND     229 

Tribunal,  and,  finally,  also,  the  further  mediation  pro- 
posals of  Sazonow  (Russian  Orange  Book,  Nos.  50 
and  6y)  and  of  Grey  (Nos.  loi  and  103  of  the  Eng- 
lish Blue  Book).  Instead,  then,  after  the  declaration 
of  war,  of  acquainting  an  unconstitutionally  organised 
and  constitutionally  impotent  Reichstag  four  full  days 
after  the  declaration  of  war  with  accomplished  facts 
and  grossly  deceiving  it  with  fables  of  Cossack  in- 
vasions, bombs  dropped  by  aviators,  and  by  the  sup- 
pression of  the  most  vital  proposals  for  mediation, 
etc.  (which,  be  it  repeated,  is  only  possible  under 
Articles  11  and  68  of  the  German  Imperial  Constitu- 
tion), our  Reichstag,  reconstituted  upon  a  rational 
basis,  and  endowed  with  full  powers,  would,  consti- 
tutionally, have  had  to  decide  on  war  or  peace. 

Realise  this  fact,  and  then  honestly  reply:  Would 
the  German  Government,  in  the  face  of  these  pro- 
posals for  mediation,  have  ever  been  empowered  by 
such  a  Parliament  to  deliver  to  Russia  on  July  31st, 
1 914,  that  twelve-hour  ultimatum  which  rendered  war 
unavoidable  ? 

I  reply  to  this  question  most  emphatically,  and  I 
believe  that  all  who  possess  any  logical  sense  will  also 
reply,  ''No  I"  With  the  same  determination  with 
which  the  German  nation,  deceived  by  falsifications 
and  suppressions  of  the  truth,  embarked  upon  a  holy 
war  of  self-defence,  it  would  then  have  demanded 
(seeing  that  two-thirds  of  the  German  electors  are  not 
Pan-Germanists)  that  all  the  endeavours  and  proposals 
for  a  reconciliation  should  first  be  discussed,  and  that 
all  possibilities  of  maintaining  the  peace  compatible 
with  the  dignity  and  independence  of  the  nation  should 
first  be  exhausted,  before  the  General  Staff  was  sum- 


230        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

moned  and  entrusted  with  the  continuation  of  politics 
*'hy  other  means/' 

As  a  German  patriot,  I  am  proud  to  state  here  in 
the  name  of  my  country  that  two-thirds  of  the  Ger- 
man electorate  have  a  horror  of  a  war  of  conquest, 
they  secretly  condemn  the  crimes  committed  against 
Belgium,  and  can  only  conceive  the  World  War  as  the 
result  of  Cossack  invasions,  bombs  dropped  by  avi- 
ators, and  "actual  attacks/*  Two-thirds  of  the  Ger- 
man soldiery  have  taken  the  field  with  "a  clear  con- 
science," in  the  proud  conviction  that  they  are  defend- 
ing their  country  and  in  the  firm  belief  that  'Sve" 
did  not  want  the  war. 

I  only  wish  that  this  fact  could  at  length  be  clearly 
realised.  The  constant  reproach  that  we  are  a  servile 
nation,  unripe  for  self-government  and  craving  for 
world-dominion,  has  not  been  levelled  at  us  only  by 
foreign  nations,  but,  alas !  even  by  those  few  German 
Socialists  and  Democrats  who  are,  to-day,  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  German  Government.  They  shrug  their 
shoulders  and  inquire:  What  do  you  expect?  The 
whole  German  people  stands  behind  its  dynasty.  It 
is  poisoned  with  militarism.  If  William  II.  had  not 
declared  war  on  August  ist,  19 14,  our  people  would 
have  forced  him  to  do  so. 

The  election  results  of  1907  and  1912  show,  at  a 
glance,  the  criminal  absurdity  of  such  a  statement,  and 
it  is  a  gross  insult  to  our  peaceable,  industrious  Ger- 
man people.  A  people  that  dreams  only  of  booty  and 
robbery  need  not  be  worked  up  to  enthusiasm  for  Em- 
peror and  Empire  and  defence  of  the  Fatherland  by 
means  of  laws  concerning  lese  majeste  and  violations 
of  constitutional  rights,  and  certainly  not  by  "actual 


THE  GERMAN'S  FATHERLAND     231 

attacks."  On  the  contrary,  such  a  people  might  have 
been  calmly  told,  what  our  Pan-Germanists  had  al- 
ready vociferously  proclaimed,  "We  are  stifled.  We 
need  more  space  under  the  sun!  As  we  possess  the 
strongest  army  and  the  highest  civilisation,  we  have  a 
sacred  right  to  expand."  But  the  Government  took 
good  care  not  to  approach  our  people  in  this  way  (al- 
though they  would  thereby  have  avoided  the  respon- 
sibility for  those  subterfuges).  Sufficient  proof  has 
been  adduced  to  show  that  w^e  Germans  are,  at  heart, 
as  peace-loving  as  other  nations,  but  that  we  were 
artificially  and  forcibly  inoculated  with  a  belief  with- 
out which  our  Government  could  not  have  carried  on 

this  war. 

***** 

To  sum  up :  the  German  Fatherland  is  embodied  in 
a  God-appointed  dynasty — that  is  to  say,  a  dynasty 
ruling  with  all  the  mediaeval  attributes  of  power.  Be- 
lief in  this  dynasty  is  a  patriotic  dogma,  to  which  the 
Prusso-German  people  assents  not  of  free  will  but  by 
coercion.  The  true  German  national  sense  has  long 
ago  declared  the  old  firm  "by  God's  grace"  bankrupt. 
That  is  to  say,  the  dynasty  has  not  been  able  to  prevent 
our  nation  passing  through  the  same  development  and 
evolving  the  same  democratic  ideals  of  culture  as  other 
nations.  And,  as  far  as  war  in  particular  Is  con- 
cerned, it  thoroughly  abhors  any  idea  of  conquest  and, 
like  every  other  civilised  nation.  Is  only  moved  to  en- 
thusiasm for  the  sacred  ideal  of  defence  of  the  Father- 
land. 

But,  unfortunately  with  us  Germans,  this  sacred 
ideal  fares  In  the  same  way  as  other  political  ques- 
tions.    As  our  idea  of  the  Fatherland,  in  accordance 


232        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

with  the  Constitution,  culminates  in  the  dynasty,  as 
German  soldiers,  in  accordance  with  the  Constitution, 
fight  not  for  their  country  but  for  their  War  Lord, 
so  our  sense  of  nationality  is  regarded  by  our  rulers 
only  as  a  means  to  "higher  ends,"  which  we  have  the 
less  right  to  know  or  to  criticise,  in  that  it  is  our 
bounden  duty  to  come  whenever  the  King  calls.  Since, 
then,  the  sum  of  the  German  national  sense  is  simply 
the  patriotic  sum  of  the  dynastic  dogma,  it  follows 
mathematically  that  our  own  desire  and  will  are  in 
such  matters  both  immaterial  and  troublesome  to  our 
masters,  and  that  hence  they  obtained  from  the  gods 
the  right  to  deal  with  them  according  to  their  pleasure. 
This  is  then  the  unvarnished  constitutional  and  (by 
the  aid  of  the  German  documents)  scientifically  proven 
truth.  We  are  not  to  blame  if  to-day  it  sounds  mon- 
strous and  revolutionary.  It  none  the  less  remains 
the  truth,  and  it  has  to  be  said. 


VII 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  AND  MEANING  OF  THE 

WAR 

The  Opinions  of  German  Pacifists  and 
Socialists 

Having  discussed  the  Germany  dynasty  and  the 
World  War  from  the  German  point  of  view,  let  us 
now  essay  to  treat  succinctly  the  dynastic  problem  from 
the  European  point  of  view  and  to  realise  the  universal 
import  of  this  World  War.  First  of  all,  we  must  be 
perfectly  clear  in  our  minds  that  all  wars  arise  from 
a  dynastic  craving  for  power.  In  these  days  of  "mod- 
ern ideas,"  this  truth  seems,  it  is  true,  somewhat  "anti- 
quated," and  many  intellectuals  will  dismiss  it  with  a 
superior  smile.  We  have  seen  that  intellectuals  do 
not,  by  any  means,  always  follow  their  inward  craving 
for  truth.  Here,  in  particular,  where  the  investiga- 
tion of  truth  is  compelled  to  respect  certain  legal  para- 
graphs and  patriotic  dogmas,  the  True,  the  Simple, 
and  the  Obvious  easily  come  under  the  heading  of 
Revolutionary.  Consequently,  the  question  as  to  the 
origin  of  wars  has  been  needlessly  complicated.  The 
views  held  by  our  German  official  philosophers  and 
other  intellectuals  rarely  satisfy  present-day  common- 
sense  and  frequently  give  the  impression  of  avoiding 

233 


234        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  truth.  Only  our  great  Kant  had  the  courage  sim- 
ply and  straightforwardly  to  characterise  "insensate 
war-waging"  "as  the  affair  of  the  monarchs,  who  are 
never  tired  of  war.''  A  confirmation  of  this  state- 
ment of  Kant  has  been  furnished  by  his  diametrical 
opposite,  Bismarck,  whose  authority,  it  may  be  hoped, 
no  one  will  question.  "The  majority  has,  as  a  rule, 
no  inclination  for  war;  war  is  kindled  by  minorities 
or,  in  absolute  States,  by  Sovereigns  or  Cabinets,"  he 
said  with  laudable  frankness  in  his  speech  in  the 
Reichstag  of  February  2nd,  1876. 

In  fact,  war  has  always  been  the  business  of  mon- 
archs. And  so  it  will  continue  as  long  as  the  latter 
remain  endued  with  divine  power. 

Accordingly,  w^hoever  sets  himself  the  task  of  de- 
nouncing war  (and  who  would  not  do  so  to-day?) 
must  first,  if  he  be  honest,  commence  with  an  attack 
upon  the  dynasties.  Yet  since  Kant's  day  few  have 
undertaken  this.  In  Germany,  in  particular  and  for 
obvious  reasons,  nobody  has  dared  to  develop  Kant's 
doctrines.  The  more  numerous,  during  the  past 
twenty  years,  the  "scientific"  pacifists  in  Germany,  be- 
came, the  more  carefully  did  they  avoid  Kant's  re- 
publican thesis.  Instead  of  dwelling  upon  the  dynastic 
will  for  power,  they  only  criticised  its  external  phe- 
nomena (armament  policy,  militarism,  secret  diplo- 
macy. Chauvinism,  Pan-Germanism,  inflammatory 
Press,  etc.,  etc.).  The  chief  German  exponent  of  so- 
called  German  Pacifism,  Dr.  A.  H.  Fried,  nowhere, 
for  instance,  in  his  voluminous  writings  speaks  of  dy- 
nasties, constitutional  powers,  supreme  control  of  the 
army,  universal  military  service,  autonomy  of  nations, 
etc.,  but  has  a  great  deal  to  say  on  the  topic  of  "inter- 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        235 

national  anarchy,"  of  the  workings  for  force,  of  the 
irrational  organisation  of  international  society  and 
other  matters,  concerning  the  origin  and  effects  of 
which  he  tells  us  a  great  deal,  but  he  does  not  tell  us 
who  originates,  develops,  and  employs  them.  Thus, 
Fried  and  his  school  do  not  pose  as  politicians,  demo- 
crats, or  even  revolutionaries,  but  only  as  cautious 
scientists,  rhetoricians,  or  (as  Fried  likes  best  to  de- 
scribe himself)  ^'pioneers  of  peace." 

When,  shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  I 
privately  inquired  of  a  distinguished  German  pacifist 
what  he  honestly  believed  to  be  the  real  cause  of  war, 
he  replied,  with  the  candour  that  we  Germans  only 
dare  to  display  in   our  private   conversations,   "Oh, 
we  have  long  known  that : — the  dynasties !"    He  gave 
me    certain   information   touching   the   already   very 
threatening  world-situation  at  that  time  (which  I  can- 
not repeat  here),  and  when  I  said  to  him  that,  under 
these  circumstances,  it  was  essential  to  make  our  strug- 
gle firstly  a  political  one,  that  is  to  say,  to  oppose  the 
dynastic   principle   of   power,   he   replied    dejectedly, 
"What  can  we  do?    If  we  were  to  say  in  public  who 
and  what  drives  us  into  war  we  should  be  got  rid 
of  on  the  spot.     We  have  to  be  glad  that  we  are 
suffered  to  remain  as  we  are.     The  initiated  know  all 
the  same  that  we  are  Republicans."    This  conversation 
made  such  a  deep  impression  upon  me  that  it  finally 
induced  me  to  write  this  book.     From  that  time  forth 
it  became  clear  to  me  that  every  German  fighting  for 
peace,  popular  liberty,  and  democratic  progress  must 
perforce  employ  a  special  kind  of  phraseology,  so  as 
not  to  offend  the  "powers  that  be"  in  Germany. 


236        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

What  Dr.  Fried,  for  instance,  cautiously  styled  "in- 
ternational anarchy"  is,  when  it  is  thought  out  to  a 
logical  conclusion  and  clearly  expressed,  "dynastic  will 
to  power."  The  advantage  of  the  term  "interna- 
tional anarchy"  lies  in  its  scientific  sound,  w^hich  does 
not  afford  the  Attorney-General  the  pretext  of  look- 
ing behind  it  for  any  "revolutionary"  meaning. 

Whom  does  the  army  obey?  To  put  this  question, 
examine  it,  answer  it,  and  extract  from  it  any  prin- 
ciple which  may  be  used  to  serve  the  maintenance  of 
peace,  has,  as  far  as  I  know,  never  occurred  to  the 
German  Pacifists.  W^oe  to  the  German  who,  whether 
Democrat  or  Republican,  ever  posed  this,  the  most  vital 
of  all  questions. 

And  so  modern  Germany  might  be  instanced  as  a 
proof  of  the  fact  that,  in  a  State  ruled  entirely  by 
technical  science,  the  dynasty  need  not  abate  one  jot 
or  tittle  of  its  divine  and  military  powers.  A  closer 
investigation  has  proved  to  us,  moreover,  that  in  mod- 
ern Germany  our  much  boasted  "culture"  is  entirely 
subservient  to  dynastic  will-power,  and,  instead  of  be- 
coming a  counterpoise  to  war,  it  in  fact  became  its 
secret  tool.  What  does  Dr.  Fried  make  of  the  fact 
that  in  modern  Germany,  despite  its  highly  perfected 
technical  science.  Articles  11  and  6S  of  the  German 
Imperial  Constitution,  based  as  they  are  upon  mediaeval 
ideas,  remain  unaltered?  How  was  it  possible  that,  in 
spite  of  the  continuous  development  of  commercial 
science  and  the  resulting  desire  for  political  freedom, 
any  demand  for  such  a  democratic  modification  of  the 
Constitution  as  would  secure  this  was  punished  as  lese 
majeste ! 

It  was  possible  because,  as  we  see,  the  most  modem 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        237 

technical  science  is  absolutely  compatible  with  the 
darkest  political  medievalism.  The  more  "scientifi- 
cally/* that  is  to  say,  the  more  timidly,  the  leaders  of 
the  intellectual  and  political  opposition  protest  against 
it,  the  easier  it  is  for  the  rulers  of  the  country  to  bring 
about  this  strange  harmony.  As  long  as  the  "scien- 
tific" pacifists  are  afraid  of  openly  becoming  demo- 
crats, so  long  will  that  technical  science  which  is  sup- 
posed to  promote  international  brotherhood  be  a  curse 
rather  than  a  blessing  to  mankind.  For,  under  these 
circumstances,  modern  technical  science  labours  en- 
tirely in  the  interest  of  war;  the  World  War  proves 
that  the  horrors  of  warfare  have  increased  to  a  degree 
that  fills  us  with  loathing,  ^^'hoever,  like  Dr.  Fried  and 
his  disciples,  expects  true  culture — that  is  to  say, 
peace — as  a  result  of  technical  science,  and  holds  aloof 
from  all  constitutional  questions  and  the  fundamental 
demands  of  democracy,  will,  like  Ostwald  (who,  more- 
over, also  styles  himself  a  pacifist,  and  is  one  In  his 
own  way),  regard  culture  merely  as  technical  organisa- 
tion and  social  discipline.  But  true  culture  is  no  ideal 
for  mechanicians  and  technical  scientists ;  man  did  not 
invent  the  machine  in  order  afterwards  to  be  enslaved 
by  it.  No!  the  essential  condition  of  every  true  culture 
is  and  remains  the  political  liberty  and  dignity  of  the 
citizen. 

Sovereignty  of  the  people,  human  dignity,  and  in- 
tellectual liberty — where  these  are  lacking  there  is  no 
culture  whatever,  and  pacifism,  Socialism,  etc.,  be- 
come mere  caricatures.  The  collectivist  war  economy 
prevailing  in  Germany  to-day  furnishes  a  proof  that 
even  Socialism  (so  long  as  it  is  only  a  question  of  the 
needs  of  the  stomach,  and  confines  its  demands  to 


238        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

questions  of  household  economy)  can  perfectly  well 
subsist  by  the  side  of  an  absolute  dynasty.  If  there 
exist  people  who  give  the  name  "Culture"  to  this 
blending  of  a  seemingly  most  revolutionary  principle 
(collectivism)  with  the  most  arbitrary  feudal  dictator- 
ship (Btirgfrieden) — and  some  people  have  in  fact 
been  heard  to  declare  that  it  is  only  necessary  to  trans- 
plant the  present-day  war  economy  into  the  coming 
state  of  peace,  in  order  to  realise  the  chief  aims  of 
Socialism — we  must  beg  to  differ  from  them  most 
emphatically.  For  as  long  as,  in  the  midst  of  the  most 
gigantic  technical  and  economic  organisation,  dynasties 
are  left  in  possession  of  their  divine  privileges,  so 
long  will  this  culture  be  not  the  work  of  man,  but  a 
gift  of  the  gods;  a  constant  threat  of  war  will  hover 
above  it,  and  a  bomb  dropped  from  an  aeroplane  upon 
Nuremberg  will  be  able  to  bring  the  whole  structure 
to  the  ground. 

Is  earthly  culture  in  general,  and  the  German  in 
particular,  any  longer  to  depend  upon  the  incalculable 
caprices  of  the  gods  and  the  god-ordained?  We  ask 
this  question  of  all  who,  like  Dr.  Fried,  expect  ''cul- 
ture" to  bring  about  a  pacifist  ordering  of  the  world, 
without  first  inquiring  as  to  the  political  and  constitu- 
tional foundation  of  this  culture.  The  antecedent  his- 
tory and  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War  show  that 
our  much  vaunted  culture  is  not  ours,  but  belongs  to 
others.  So,  my  dear  Dr.  Fried,  nations  look  for  their 
happiness  as  the  result  first  of  all  of  political  Constitu- 
tions, and  not  of  technical  science,  culture,  and  organi- 
sation; these  and  other  similar  blessings  are,  after  all, 
of  no  value  for  safeguarding  the  world's  peace,  so  long 
as  they  are  under  the  control  of  "God's  grace." 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        239 

Peace  and  war  are,  after  all,  not  so  much  the  results 
of  foreign  policy  as  (strange  though  it  may  appear) 
the  inevitable  consequences  of  the  inward  constitu- 
tion of  the  State.  "International  anarchy"  is  not  a 
thing  apart,  but  only  the  natural  consequence  of  feudal- 
military  Constitutions!  Hence  away  with  these  Con- 
stitutions, All  else  is  only  puling  pacifist  quackery. 
What  have  they  to  do  with  our  great  Kant  ?  Cherches 
la  dynastie!  My  dear  Doctor,  wars  are  never  de- 
clared by  "international  anarchies/'  but  only  by  dy- 
nasties.    Cherchez  la  dynastie! 

^  :ki  ^  :^  * 

The  Socialists  attack  war  with  equal  prudence. 
Whenever  they  bring  themselves  to  speak  of  dynasties 
(and  they  do  it  charily  and  unfrequently),  they  de- 
clare them  to  be  the  representatives  of  the  capitalist 
interests  of  the  ruling  classes,  and  maintain  that  wars 
will  be  inevitable  as  long  as  that  evil  thing,  capital, 
rules  the  world.  If  anyone  speaks  to  them  of  the 
dynastic  will  to  power,  they  smile  at  this  "plebeian 
ideology"  and  prove  from  the  height  of  their  "ma- 
terialistic conception  of  history"  that  this  so-called 
dynastic  will  to  power  is  only  a  small  portion  of  that 
"capitalist  spirit"  to  which  we  are  indebted  for  all 
(yes,  absolutely  all)  the  evils  in  this  world. 

Yet,  merely  to  represent  universal  military  service 
as  an  outcome  of  the  "capitalist  spirit"  is  in  itself  a 
big  undertaking.  For  universal  military  service  is  an 
achievement  of  the  French  Revolution  and  has  evi- 
dently not  the  least  connection  with  capitalism.  For 
those  very  wars  which  are  waged  in  the  interests  of 
capitalists  (namely,  Colonial  wars)  are  waged  without 
resort  to  universal  military  service.     Very  highly  de- 


240        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

veloped  capitalist  States,  such  as  the  United  States 
and  England,  had  no  universal  military  service  at  all, 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  undeveloped  capitalist  States, 
such  as  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary,  possessed  it. 

And  then,  if  war  is  really  the  necessary  consequence 
of  capitalist  interests,  why,  I  ask,  have  very  highly 
developed  capitalist  countries,  like  the  United  States, 
England,  Switzerland,  Sweden,  Australia,  etc.,  not 
waged  any  wars  for  the  past  hundred  years, ^  whilst 
it  was  those  very  European  States  whose  capitalist 

*C/.  note  to  p.  'i'7 — England's  wars  since  Waterloo  have  been 
all  Colonial  wars  and  waged  by  volunteers.  Wars  fought  by- 
volunteers  (as  the  war  of  the  North  American  Union  against 
Spain)  are  never  really  national  affairs,  but  capitalist  under- 
takings. Whether  a  contractor  sends  workmen  into  a  mine,  or 
whether  a  syndicate  dispatches  for  its  own  purposes  mercenary 
troops  to  the  Transvaal,  Cuba,  etc.,  it  is,  really,  all  the  same. 
Although,  of  course,  we  strongly  condemn  a  bellicose  Colonial 
policy,  yet  we  cannot  quarrel  with  a  person  who,  for  good  pay, 
is  ready  to  risk  his  life  for  the  interests  of  others.  Our  hope  is 
that,  henceforth,  no  mercenary  soldiers  will  be  found  available 
for  such  capitalist  marauding  expeditions.  ]\Ioreover,  England's 
past  history  affords  a  very  apposite  instance  of  the  incorrectness 
of  the  Socialist  thesis.  In  the  course  of  the  past  century,  Eng- 
land has  allowed  numerous  and  frequently  very  serious  disputes 
to  be  adjusted  by  arbitration,  despite  the  fact  that  she,  more 
than  any  other  State  in  the  world,  possessed  the  means  of  com- 
pelling a  settlement  favourable  to  her  own  interests.  In  1863, 
the  King  of  Belgium  settled  a  dispute  between  England  and 
Brazil;  in  1869,  the  President  of  the  United  States  another 
between  England  and  Portugal;  in  1872,  the  Court  of  Arbitra- 
tion at  Geneva  that  pending  between  the  United  States  and 
England;  in  1893,  the  Paris  Court  of  Arbitration  determined 
the  differences  between  England  and  North  America  touching 
the  seal  fishery;  in  1904,  The  Hague  Arbitration  Tribunal  ad- 
justed the  serious  dispute  between  England  and  Russia  in  the 
matter  of  the  Hull  affair,  etc.     Whence  comes  this  predilection 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        241 

economy  is  a  hundred  years  behind  the  others,  namely, 
Russia  and  Turkey,  who,  in  the  nineteenth  century, 
waged  the  most  numerous  and  the  most  sanguinary 
wars? 

The  attentive  reader  who,  as  in  my  case,  scrutinises 
without  prejudice  the  actual  causes  of  war  will  in- 
stinctively feel  that  the  Socialist  theory  that  capitalism 
is  at  the  root  of  war  contains,  it  is  true,  a  grain  of 
truth  (especially  in  relation  to  Colonial  wars),  but  is 
in  the  main  nothing  but  a  web  of  sophistry,  which,  like 
the  scientific  pacifists,  they  wish  to  weave  round  the 
core  of  the  problem. 

^h  *|*  *1f  ^  3|C 

One  great  curse  of  our  days  is  that  erudition  which 
intermeddles  with  matters  with  which  it  is  not  in  the 
least  concerned.  War  is  a  blackguardly  and  irrational 
thing  and  requires  no  learned  exposition.  But  our 
age  so  revolts  against  the  natural  brutality  of  certain 
things  which  have  been  taken  over  from  the  Middle 
Ages,  that  it  demands  "scientific"  investigations  and 
justifications  even  where  they  cannot  possibly  be 
found.  And,  therefore,  our  professors  narrate  to  us 
the  most  extraordinary  stories  as  to  the  origin  and 
purpose  of  wars.  The  scholar,  who  is  diametrically 
opposed  to  the  philosopher,  may,  it  is  true,  have  a 
good  grasp  of  things  lying  within  his  own  domain,  but 
he  is  timid  and  circumscribed  in  his  views,  that  is  to 
say,  incapable  of  bringing  his  special  knowledge  into 
relation  with  the  world  and  mankind  at  large.    Thus, 

for  arbitration  in  a  country  wholly  controlled  by  capitalism? 
The  answer  is  clear.  In  England  the  dynastic  will  to  power 
was  wanting.  If  England  is  economically  ruled  by  capital,  yet 
politically  it  is  ruled  by  Parliament  and  Liberalism. 


242        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  biologist  proves  that  the  stern  law  of  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  race  and  the  individual  is  the  cause  of 
war;  the  Marxist  bewails  the  evils  of  capitalism,  the 
"civilian"  national  economist  the  aspirations  for  eman- 
cipation of  the  Fourth  Estate,  the  theologian  the  lack 
of  religion  in  the  world,  the  scientific  pacifist  the  in- 
ternational anarchy,  and  the  vegetarian,  perchance, 
the  wantonness  of  a  fiesh-eating  society,  as  the  origin 
of  war.  There  are  even  in  Germany  representatives 
of  the  so-called  "yellow"  trade-unions  who  seriously 
maintain  that  the  English  trade-unions  have  been  the 
impelling  force  towards  war! 

Thus,  every  party  and  sect  enlightens  us  with  its 
own  particular  fad  as  to  the  origin  and  import  of 
wars;  and  while  Europe  is  passing  through  a  catas- 
trophe, the  simple  causes  of  which  every  man  in  the 
street  knows  full  well,  our  professors,  with  pathetic 
helplessness,  present  us  with  their  theories,  like  the 
Byzantines,  who  at  the  very  moment  when  the  Turks 
had  made  the  first  breaches  in  their  walls  spoke  in 
oracles  concerning  the  light  of  Tabor. 

Smiling  and  exalted,  the  world  of  the  dynasties 
stands  above  this  learned  chatter.  It  is  quite  content 
that  a  thousand  theories  should  be  invented  as  to  the 
causes  of  war,  for  the  express  purpose  of  avoiding  the 
mention  of  the  real  causes.  In  this  way,  the  people 
are  sustained  in  that  belief  in  the  unavoidability  of 
wars,  which  is  just  what  the  dynasties  require  for  the 
maintenance  of  their  absolute  rule.  Should  a  new 
Kant  one  day  arise,  who,  with  his  brilliant  simplicity, 
will  merely  call  things  by  their  right  name,  then  the 
dynasty  will  find  a  way  to  bring  him  to  reason.  Even 
in  the  case  of  Kant,  it  has  succeeded  to  such  an  extent 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        243 

that  our  Konigsberg  philosopher  is  to-day  not  known 
at  any  university  as  a  Republican  and  champion  of 
international  law;  his  name  is  associated  only  with 
the  theory  of  knowledge. 

Whenever  I  talk  with  a  socialist,  and  he  explains 
that  capital  is  at  the  root  of  all  evil,  that  wars  will 
cease  as  soon  as  the  villainous  capitalist  domination 
is  got  rid  of,  etc.,  I  always  think  of  an  incident  which 
befell  an  officer's  orderly. 

He  brought  his  master's  sick  horse  to  a  veterinary 
surgeon  for  advice.  After  examination  the  surgeon 
gave  him  a  powder  with  the  following  instructions: 
*'Take  a  piece  of  thick  paper,  make  a  roll  of  it,  put  the 
powder  inside,  put  the  roll  into  the  animal's  mouth, 
and  then  vigorously  blow  the  powder  into  its  throat." 
The  following  day  the  servant  came  back  with  a  woe- 
begone, sallow  face,  and,  when  the  veterinary  surgeon 
inquired  whether  he  had  carried  out  his  instructions, 
faintly  replied:  "Yes,  doctor,  but  the  animal  blew 
first."  For  years  the  Social  Democrats  boasted  of 
their  powder  for  the  sick  horse.  Two  years  before 
the  outbreak  of  war,  in  Berne  and  Bale,  they  threat- 
ened it  with  a  terrible  Revolution  by  way  of  a  laxative. 
But  when  it  came  to  action,  the  Junkers — blew  first. 
Yes,  and  since  then  the  Scheidemanns,  Davids,  Heines, 
Lensches,  Siidekums,  and  their  associates  have  been 
running  about  the  country  with  sallow  faces  and  hid- 
ing their  chagrin  under  loud  abuse  of  the  capitalism — 
of  others. 

Dynastic  Statesmanship  and  War 
If  wars,  as  is  proved  by  universal  history,  arise, 
on  the  one  side,  from  a  dynastic  will  to  power,  yet 


244        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

they,  on  the  other,  demand  justification  in  the  eyes 
of  the  people.  Before  the  introduction  of  universal 
military  service,  when  wars  were  still  the  unquestioned 
private  concern  of  monarchs,  the  people  (excepting 
perhaps  those  inhabiting  the  theatres  of  war)  were 
mostly  disinterested  lookers  on.  But  since  every  citi- 
zen has  become  liable  to  general  military  service,  a 
dynasty  can  only  wage  such  wars  as  have  the  consent 
of  their  peoples.  This  consent  it  creates  by  an  appeal 
to  the  need  of  defence  and  the  patriotism  of  its  citi- 
zens. 

If,  then,  wars  are,  on  the  one  hand,  the  means  of 
existence  and  the  object  in  life  of  dynasties,  they  are, 
on  the  other  hand,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
peoples,  struggles  for  safeguarding  the  national  exis- 
tence. That  is  to  say,  what  for  the  dynasties  is  only 
a  pretext  for  the  attainment  of  their  secret  ends  is,  in 
the  eyes  of  the  people,  a  sacred,  serious  actuality. 

Dynasties  have  been  commissioned  by  the  gods  to 
look  after  the  happiness  and  independence  of  the  peo- 
ples under  their  sway.  Hence,  they  pose  as  guardians 
and  promoters  of  national  interests,  and  the  people 
have  all  the  greater  confidence  in  them,  in  that,  in  the 
hour  of  peril,  any  opposition  is  made  a  penal  ofYence. 
In  principle,  therefore,  the  policy  of  every  dynasty  is 
directed  to  the  end  of  proving  to  its  subjects  their 
incapacity  for  self-defence  and  self-government,  while 
holding  itself  up  as  the  indispensable  instrument  of 
national  independence.  This  policy,  which  is  summed 
up  under  the  name  of  ^'Statesmanship,"  is  only  in 
the  rarest  cases  dictated  by  the  demands  of  the  general 
welfare.  When,  for  example,  a  war  breaks  out,  it  is 
always  concluded  with  an  eye  to  dynastic  interests. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        245 

Intentionally,  or  accidentally,  but  in  any  event,  in- 
stinctively, the  demands  of  the  common  weal  are 
passed  over,  so  that  the  peace  just  concluded  contains 
the  germ  of  a  fresh  conflict,  by  the  successful  settle- 
ment of  which  the  dynasties  may  reap  fresh  laurels 
and  once  more  demonstrate  their  indispensability. 

Let  us  adduce  a  few  instances:  After  the  Russo- 
Turkish  war,  Bismarck  prevented  the  absorption  by 
Bulgaria  of  Macedonia,  though  the  latter  was  Bul- 
garian both  in  language  and  sentiment.  He  thus  ran 
counter  to  the  justifiable  aspirations  of  the  Mace- 
donians, who  remained  under  the  detested  Turkish 
yoke.  Why  did  Bismarck  act  thus?  He,  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  dynastic  interests,  regarded  the  national 
aspirations  of  the  Macedonians  as  an  absolutely  un- 
important matter.  His  purpose  was  not  to  pacify  the 
Balkan  States  and  to  group  the  peoples  according  to 
the  principle  of  nationalities.  No!  his  chief  object 
was  not  to  weaken,  to  any  great  extent,  the  friendly 
Osmanli  dynasty  as  against  the  semi-inimical  Roma- 
noff dynasty.  This  pre-eminently  important  object 
was  worth  several  wars,  and  Bismarck  attained  it  by 
reversing  the  Peace  of  San  Stefano,  which,  to  some 
degree,  satisfied  the  principle  of  nationalities,  and  by 
restoring  Bulgarian  Macedonia  to  Turkey.  The  prac- 
tical issue  of  this  statesmanship  was  three  sanguinary 
revolutions  of  the  Macedonians  against  the  loathed 
Turkish  despotism  and  almost  half  a  dozen  Balkan 
wars.  Had  the  Macedonians  and  Bulgarians  been  ac- 
corded their  due  rights  on  the  previous  occasion,  the 
notorious  Balkan  problem  would  have  been  practically 
settled  and  there  would  no  longer  have  been  a  "witches' 
cauldron"  in  Europe.     But  would  not  the  ''Russian 


246         THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

predominance"  in  the  Balkans  have  then  become  in- 
tolerable? Could  the  Hapsburgs  and  Hohenzollerns 
tolerate  that?  No!  the  important  thing  was,  on  the 
one  hand,  to  prevent  the  Romanoff  trees  from  grow- 
ing too  high,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  keep  the 
"witches'  cauldron"  seething  in  the  Balkans.  For, 
if  the  diplomacy  working  for  dynastic  ends  no  longer 
possessed  such  a  "witches'  cauldron,"  this  would  in- 
volve the  loss  of  a  number  of  things  without  which 
politics  would  be  very  tedious,  for  instance,  the 
"menace  to  the  Austrian  sphere  of  interest  in  the 
Balkans,"  or  the  "peril  of  Russian  preponderance," 
or  the  "machinations  of  Panslavism,"  etc.,  etc.  This 
cauldron  had  to  be  kept  boiling  in  Europe.  It  afforded 
occupation  for  the  diplomats,  provided  the  nations  with 
endless  disputes  and  occasions  for  mutual  abuse,  and 
finally  served  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg,  in  1913, 
with  a  pretext  for  his  tremendous  Army  Bill.  All 
this  is  infinitely  more  important  than  all  the  interests 
of  the  Macedonians,  Bulgarians,  Serbs,  and  Greeks 
put  together! 

In  1 87 1,  Bismarck  annexed  Alsace-Lorraine  in  spite 
of  the  protests  of  its  inhabitants.^     The  consequences 

*  Bismarck  was  no  blind  enthusiast  for  annexation  in  the  sense 
of  our  modern  Pan-Germanists.  In  1866  he  prevented  the  in- 
tended annexation  of  Austrian  territories,  not  merely  in  the 
hope  of  a  subsequent  alliance,  but,  as  he  writes  in  his  "Reflec- 
tions and  Reminiscences":  "I  asked  myself,  as  regards  terri- 
torial aggrandisement  at  the  expense  of  Austria  and  Bavaria, 
whether  it  was  probable,  in  any  future  wars,  that  after  Prussian 
officials  and  military  had  been  withdrawn  they  would  yet  remain 
faithful  to  Prussia  and  receive  orders  at  its  hands."  Similarly, 
in  1871,  he  vigorously  (though  in  vain)  raised  his  voice  against 
the  incorporation  of  the  French-speaking  part  of  Lorraine.  This 
attitude  of  Bismarck  does  not  alter,  but,  rather,  on  the  contrary, 
confirms  the  fact  that  his  policy  was  everywhere  only  determined 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        247 

are  well  known:  the  French  thirst  for  revenge  (which, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  really  a  demand  founded  on  inter- 
national law).  From  that  time  forth,  Germany  was 
haunted  by  a  terrible  bogey ;  each  time  that  the  Reichs- 
tag makes  a  show  of  resisting  the  arch-reactionary 
policy  of  its  rulers,  this  bogey  is  brought  up  and  it 
never  fails  in  its  effect.  Triple  Alliance,  Dual  Al- 
liance, colossal  armaments,  encirclement,  etc.,  are,  as 
it  were,  developed  automatically  by  the  agency  of  this 
bogey,  and  make  it  more  formidable  every  day.  Thus, 
we  must  be  grateful  that  v/e  have  the  strongest  army 
in  the  world,  and  must  take  care  that  it  remains  the 
strongest.  For  "our  peace  only  depends  upon  our 
mihtary  equipment."  In  view  of  this  constantly  in- 
creasmg  insecurity,  we  must,  as  Professor  Delbriick 
tells  us,  be  more  than  glad  that  "the  decision  lies  with 
those  who  look  far  ahead."  Who,  in  the  face  of  this 
serious  situation,  would  dare  to  prate  about  democratic 
constitutional  changes,  less  severe  military  discipline, 
etc.?  Alas!  for  us,  if  we,  like  France,  possessed 
a  miserable  "Parliamentary  Arnjy";  immediately  the 
French  revanche  would  destroy  us.  Every  German 
feels  that  under  such  circumstances  the  dynastic  su- 
preme control  of  army  and  policy  is  an  iron  necessity 

by  regard  for  dynastic  interests  and  future  wars.  He  does  not 
protest  against  the  annexations  in  the  name  of  the  peoples  con- 
cerned, but  only  in  the  interest  of  his  lord  and  master.  He  fears 
not  the  hate  of  the  annexed  or  the  disapproval  of  the  civilised 
world,  but  only  the  possibility  of  disastrous  wars  in  the  future. 
Thus,  from  the  democratic  standpoint,  Bismarck  can  only  be 
regarded  as  the  most  violent  opponent  of  the  modern  ideal  of 
international  arbitration,  that  is,  as  the  most  thorough  and  most 
successful  regenerctor  of  the  dynastic  policy  of  power  in  the 
last  century. 


248        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

for  Germany.  Thus,  in  the  most  natural  manner  in 
the  world,  these  continual  menaces  from  without  be- 
come the  most  cogent  reasons  against  all  reforms  from 
within,  and  the  astutest  statesman  is  the  man  who 
knows  how  to  furnish  a  constant  supply  of  fresh 
menaces. 

In  1908,  in  defiance  of  the  existing  treaties,  Austria 
annexed  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  thereby  caused 
in  Serbia  an  irritation  similar  to  that  caused  in  France 
by  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  In  the  same  way 
as  the  French  thirst  for  revenge  hangs  like  a  perpetual 
threat  above  the  head  of  Germany,  so  have,  hitherto, 
"Serbian  intrigues"  hung  like  a  millstone  round  the 
neck  of  Austria-Hungary;  they  finally  imperilled  the 
existence  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  to  such  an  extent 
that  the  latter  was,  in  dire  necessity,  compelled  to 
appeal  to  arms.  Had  Bismarck,  in  1878,  humoured 
the  national  aspirations  of  the  Bulgarians,  had  not  Aus- 
tria annexed  Bosnia,  and  by  the  artificial  creation  of 
Albania  blocked  out  Serbia  from  the  seaport  she  had  so 
painfully  won, then  this  whole  policy  Avould  have  found 
a  simple  solution,  in  accordance  with  the  national  weal 
and  the  principle  of  nationalities.  But  then  the  business 
of  the  world-power  politicians  would  have  been  at  an 
end:  the  Austrian  politicians,  with  their  brazen-faced 
falsifications  (vide  the  Fried jung  case,  the  Agram 
case,  the  Prochaska  case,  etc.),  would  not  have  been  in 
a  position  to  testify  to  the  Serbian  intrigues,  and 
everything  would  have  become  very  dull. 

The  obvious  result  of  these  simple  solutions  would, 
however,  have  been  that  the  nations  living  at  peace 
would  eventually  have  demanded  democratic  reform, 
and  might,  perchance,  have  asked  whnt  purpose  was 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        249 

served  by  divine  dynasties,  standing  armies,  etc.,  when 
there  was  no  menace  to  be  feared  from  without.  Na- 
tions who  have  nothing  else  to  do  begin  philosophising. 
But  philosophising  nations  are  revolutionary,  danger- 
ous nations.  IMetternich  and  Bismarck  knew  this  full 
well.  They  and  their  successors  took  good  care  to 
stifle  this  threatening  development.  The  simplest 
method  for  the  purpose  is  never  to  allow  the  people  to 
enjoy  peace  of  mind,  to  keep  them  by  perpetual  threats 
in  constant  apprehension,  and  so  prove  to  them  contin- 
ually that  they  are  incapable  of  self-government. 

Hence,  the  most  marked  feature  of  dynastic  state- 
craft is  the  art  of,  from  time  to  time,  conjuring  up  new 
bogeys,  which  are  held  up  before  the  people  on  suitable 
occasions,  in  order  to  keep  them  in  a  state  of  sub- 
mission, to  wean  them  from  all  democratic  aspirations, 
and,  one  fine  day,  to  utilise  the  artificially  created 
witches'  cauldron  and  bogeys  as  pretexts  for  fresh 
wars.  It  is  all  a  policy  of  poking  the  fire  with  the 
sword.  In  the  same  way  as  beasts  of  burden  are,  in 
North  Africa,  goaded  on  by  having  their  festering 
wounds  constantly  tickled  with  a  stick,  so  are  the  peo- 
ples of  Europe  ever  driven  forward  into  new  dangers 
of  war  and  armaments  by  never  allowing  the  old 
wounds  to  heal,  but  always  opening  and  irritating  them 
afresh.  Hence  it  results  that  w^ars  are  an  imavoidable 
and  indispensable  element  of  the  divine  order  of  things. 

Down  almost  to  1900,  Germany's  bogey  was 'Trench 
revanche";  then  it  was  the  ''encirclement"  brought 
about  at  The  Hague,  or  the  'Tanslavist  danger"  threat- 
ening in  the  Balkans.  Poor  Austria,  on  the  contrary, 
had  constantly  to  struggle  against  the  Russian  designs 
in  the  Balkans  and  against  "Serbian  intrigues."      A^ 


250        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

length  this  ''higher  policy"  became  a  wondrous  chain 
of  effects,  and  these  effects  became  causes,  until  the 
ordinary  human  intelligence  was  absolutely  bewildered. 
For,  as  it  is  almost  invariably  forbidden  by  the 
police  to  call  the  secret  ambitions  and  ideals  of  this 
dynastic  secret  diplomacy  by  their  right  names,  at 
length  they  come  to  be  regarded  as  merely  instances 
of  ''superior  judgment,"  and  the  humble  citizen  bows 
respectfully  before  the  high  authorities  who  "look  so 
far  ahead." 

But,  by  means  of  this  statecraft,  the  dynasties,  as 
clearly  pointed  out,  also  secure  the  internal  political 
conditions  requisite  for  the  maintenance  of  their 
despotism.  It  is  clear  that  dynasties  faced  by  loud 
threats  of  and  preparations  for  war  cannot  possibly 
have  either  time  or  money  for  democratic  reforms. 
Armaments  become,  under  such  circumstances,  the 
first  law  for  the  safety  of  the  State,  the  Alpha  and 
Omega  of  all  financial  and  taxation  policy.  A  State 
which  argues  logically  (and  Germany  has  in  this  re- 
spect remained  the  fatherland  of  logic)  is  bound,  under 
such  conditions,  to  devote  all  its  energies  to  the  perfect- 
ing of  its  armaments ;  whoever  now  talks  of  democratic 
and  social  and  political  reforms  is  a  traitor  and  wants 
to  reduce  us  to  a  state  of  defencelessness,  etc. 

What,  then,  is  the  secret  of  this  God-inspired  dynas- 
tic policy,  which  is  constantly  engendering  quarrels 
and  war?  What  is  its  position?  A  terribly  simple 
and  commonplace  one.  It  is  the  purely  instinc- 
tive impulse  of  dynasties  for  self-preservation  and  self- 
aggrandisement;  the  very  same  impulse  that  causes  the 
artisan  to  demand  such  an  increase  of  wages  as  he 
deems  necessary  for  his  existence  and  general  comfort 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        251 

is,  mutatis  mutandis,  the  cause  of  wars.  Were  the 
dynasties  no  longer  the  rulers  of  the  nations,  were 
they,  for  their  higher  wages,  compelled  to  rely  upon 
their  own  resources,  then  wars  would  be  impossible. 

If  the  concern  of  the  dynasties  for  their  own  exist- 
ence and  for  the  extension  of  their  power  were  not  the 
secret  mainspring  of  European  politics,  that  is  to  say,  if 
politics  were  guided  in  conformity  with  the  views  of 
the  people,  we  should  no  longer  have  in  Europe  an 
Alsace-Lorraine,  a  Polish,  a  Macedonian,  or  an  Irrer 
dentist  question  to  deal  with.  The  peoples  would  long 
since  have  settled  these  points  comformably  with  their 
own  interests  and  wishes,  and  not  troubled  their  heads 
about  "spheres  of  interests"  and  "world-power 
poHcy."  Europe  would  have  long  since  become  a 
gigantic  Switzerland  with  a  thousand  cantons,  a 
hundred  tongues,  terrible  wars  of  the  pen,  amazingly 
revolutionary  "modern  ideas,"  serious  collisions  be- 
tween Capital  and  Labour — would  be,  in  short,  engaged 
in  a  heated  and  continuous  struggle  for  progress,  but 
yet  would  be  a  Europe  of  true  culture  living  in  peace. 
But  all  this  would  have  been  too  human,  too  simple, 
and  too  beautiful.  In  a  Europe  constituted  on  such 
lines  the  dynasties  would  have  become  superfluous. 
And  so  it  is  only  they  who  have  thwarted  this  free 
autonomy  of  the  nations,  that  is  to  say,  have  obstructed 
the  beautiful  policy  of  simple  solutions  and  have 
promoted  the  welfare  of  the  people  after  their  own 
fashion.  Everything  may  be  demanded  of  a  man  and 
even  of  a  dynasty,  save  only  the  renunciation  of  the 
basis  of  its  existence.  Whoever  attacks  this  will 
always  meet  with  the  most  bitter  resistance.  This 
free  autonomy  of  the  nations  is  not,  to  be  sure,  a  direct 


252        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

attack  upon  the  existence  of  the  dynasties  (England, 
Italy,  Denmark,  Sweden,  etc.,  are  proofs  of  this),  but 
it  is,  none  the  less,  a  step  in  this  direction,  that  is  to 
say,  it  is  a  limitation  of  their  powers  and  influence. 
Hence  their  open  or  secret,  but  always  embittered, 
resistance  against  International  Law  and  everything  to 
do  with  it.^ 


The  Meaning  of  the  Present  World  War 

We  have  formulated  the  conditions  under  which 
war  must  remain  an  inevitable  and  periodically  recur- 


*C/.  here  note  to  p.  i8i.  The  Proclamation — in  defiance  of 
every  conception  of  International  Law  and  of  Nationality — of 
the  Kingdom  of  Poland  on  November  5th,  1916,  is  a  fresh  proof 
of  the  fact  that  the  dynasties  now  as  ever  are  intent  upon  pur- 
suing their  arbitrary  policy  of  self-interest,  despite  the  fact  that 
this  is  bound  to  bring  about  fresh  wars.  Owing  to  the  fact  that 
the  Prussian  Poles — as  expressly  set  out  in  that  manifesto — 
remain  Prussians,  and  the  Austrian  Poles  remain  Austrians,  the 
new  kingdom  (if  it  ever  materialises)  by  its  composition  and 
situation  will  present  grave  dangers.  Instinctively  and  inevi- 
tably it  would  strive  for  the  emancipation  of  its  brothers  "op- 
pressed" by  Prussia  and  Austria.  In  this  it  would,  of  course, 
be  able  to  reckon  upon  the  open  or  covert  assistance  of  the — 
in  this  case,  defeated — Entente.  There  would  be  no  end  to  in- 
trigues, and  these  would,  of  course,  immediately  be  made  a  pre- 
text for  reprisals  on  the  part  of  the  Central  Powers.  Thence 
would  ensue,  on  the  part  of  Germany,  the  same  policy  against 
Russia  that  Austria  has  hitherto  pursued  against  Serbia,  and 
Germany  against  France.  Fresh  conflicts  and  frictions  would 
be  the  inevitable  result,  until,  one  day,  the  sword  would  again 
have  to  ward  off  those  machinations,  and  secure  the  peace  of 
the  world.  An  absolutely  free  Poland  would  be  one  of  the  most 
powerful  guarantees  for  the  peace  of  Europe.  But  a  free  and 
united  Poland  would  comprise  not  only  Warsaw,  but  also  Lem- 
berg,   Cracow,  Ratibor,  Beuthen,  and  Posen. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        253 

ring  evil.  Yet  many  a  monarch  has  gone  to  war  under 
the  pretext  of  furthering  his  people's  good,  and  with 
the  secret  intention  of  adding  a  fresh  pearl  to  his 
crown,  but,  instead  of  this,  has  secured  the  victory  of  a 
principle  which  had  served  him  only  as  a  pretext. 
Thus,  Gustavus  Adolphus  was  desirous  of  increasing 
the  fame  and  power  of  his  dynasty,  and  became  in  fact 
the  executor  of  the  Reformation.  It  was  Napoleon's 
dream  to  become  Emperor  of  Europe  and  make  vassal 
kings  of  all  the  members  of  his  dynasty.  As  a  result  of 
this  endeavour,  he  became  the  pioneer  of  the  new 
social  principles  established  by  the  Revolution. 

The  present  World  War  affords  a  perfect  instance 
of  this  "dualism"  of  war.  At  its  root  is,  manifestly,' 
the  world-power  dream  of  the  HohenzoUerns.  Like  all 
dynasties  which  have  acquired  power  and  prestige,  the 
HohenzoUerns  became  intoxicated  with  the  idea  of 
world-power.  This  is  so  logical  and  is  so  grounded  in 
the  verv  nature  of  all  dvnasties,  that  we  have  not  the 
smallest  right  to  upbraid  the  HohenzoUerns  on  this 
account.  Take  whatever  dynasty  you  please  (includ- 
ing the  Papacy  of  the  Aliddle  Ages)  :  they  all  had  their 
dream  of  world  dominion,  which  they  sought  to  realise, 
sword  in  hand.  Only  Rome  succeeded  in  attaining  it, 
for  a  few  centuries.  But  always  a  military  defeat  was 
necessary  in  order  to  induce  the  dynasties  to  forego 
their  aims.  The  Alerovingians  and  the  Lancasters,  the 
Hapsburgs  and  the  Capets,  the  Hohenstaufens  and 
the  Bonapartes,  the  Caliphs  and  the  Popes,  had  first 
to  be  convinced,  on  sanguinary  fields  of  battle,  that 
world-empires  have  no  place  in  the  plans  of  Divine 
Providence. 

But   side  by  side  with  this  Hohenzollern  bid   for 


254        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

world-power,  the  present  war  presents  another  aspect, 
given  it  by  the  peoples  concerned.  In  fact,  if  we  leave 
the  privy  dynastic  ambitions  out  of  account  for  a 
moment,  and  only  view  this  war  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  nations,  it  presents  itself  to  us  as  a  terrible 
collision  between  two  conceptions  of  the  world  which 
are  now  striving  together  for  predominance  in  Europe. 
This  antagonism  which  is  now  being  brought  to  a 
sanguinary  issue  may  be  expressed  in  a  great  many 
equally  correct  formulae.  For  instance,  the  Right  of 
Might,  or  the  Might  of  Right?  Machiavelli  or  Kant? 
Sparta  or  Athens?  The  nation  which  possesses  an 
army,  or  the  army  which  possesses  a  nation?  Bis- 
marck or  Jaures?  The  right  of  the  nations  to  free 
autonomy,  or  the  right  of  the  dynasties  to  their  policy 
of  self-interest?  Idealism  or  Materialism?  The  pol- 
icy of  nationalities  or  of  despotic  rulers?  A  Civil  or 
a  Military  Constitution?    And  so  on. 

Any  one  of  these  antitheses  might  be  used  to  sym- 
bolise the  cause  of  the  World  War. 

For  us  democrats  and  pacifists,  this  World  War 
represents  the  final  struggle  of  the  dynastic  coercive 
policy  against  the  demands  of  modern  humanity.  It 
was  not  these  demands  of  modern  humanity  that 
brought  about  this  war,  but  the  arrogance  of  the  dynas- 
tic idea.  This  war,  like  others  before  it,  might  have 
been  avoided,  had  dynasties  only  understood  their  age 
and  made  concessions  to  it.  But  what  dynasty  has 
ever  understood  the  age?  What  dynasty  has  ever 
made  concessions  at  the  right  moment  ?  It  is  they  and 
they  alone  who,  with  their  divine  rights  and  powers, 
have  always  and  everywhere  opposed  the  spirit  of  the 
age  and  have  made  a  sanguinary  settlement  inevitable. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        255 

One  would  have  to  be  a  narrow-minded  partisan,  a 
half-dead  Pan-Germanist,  or  a  professor  grown  with- 
ered in  the  service  of  the  State,  in  order,  in  the  face  of 
this  conflict  of  principles  now  being  decided  in  Europe 
with  all  the  infernal  devices  of  the  modern  science  of 
murder,  to  represent  side-issues  as  being  the  real 
origins  of  the  war,  and  to  say,  for  instance :  English  or 
German  world  commerce?  English  naval  supremacy 
or  the  freedom  of  the  seas?  Economic  throttling  or 
economic  expansion  of  Germany?    And  so  forth. 

Every  book  published  in  Germany,  in  the  course  of 
this  World  War,  has  repeated  the  same  old  theme. 
German  scholars  and  statesmen,  with  their  ingrained 
dynastic  conceptions,  are  simply  incapable  of  seeing 
anything  in  a  war  except  plain,  material  questions  of 
power.  And  they  always  employ  the  term  ''power" 
in  the  most  material  sense  of  the  word.  Thus,  for 
example,  Herr  von  Biilow  writes  : — 

"Germany  will  in  future  require  protection  against 
hostility  and  desires  for  revenge,  both  old  and  new,  in 
the  West,  the  East  and  beyond  the  Channel ;  such  pro- 
tection can  only  be  found  in  the  increase  of  her  own 
power.  .  .  .  Only  if  our  power,  political,  economic 
and  military,  emerges  from  this  war  so  strengthened 
that  it  considerably  outweighs  the  feelings  of  enmity 
that  have  been  aroused,  shall  we  be  able  to  assert  with 
a  clear  conscience  that  our  position  in  the  world  has 
been  bettered  by  the  war."^ 

In  an  essay  on  "The  Meaning  of  the  War,"  Profes- 
sor Otto  Hintze  says^ :     'The  two  Central  Powers  of 

^Prince  von  Biilow,  "Imperial  Germany."    London:  Cassell  & 
Co.,  p.  xlii. 
'  "Deutschland  und  der  Weltkrieg,"  pp.  678  et  seq. 


256        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

Europe  are  in  danger  of  being  crushed  by  the  sur- 
rounding countries  of  our  continent.  .  .  .  Everything 
must  be  directed  towards  frustrating  this  attempt.  We 
intend  to  maintain  our  place  in  the  sun ;  we  intend  not 
to  allow  ourselves  to  be  squeezed  out  of  the  rank  of  the 
World  Powers  in  spite  of  our  closed-in  position.  .  .  . 
The  predominance  of  Britain  must  be  broken.  ...  In 
this  struggle  against  the  British  naval  and  world  domi- 
nation, we  are  fighting  in  the  interests  of  the  free 
intercourse  of  all  nations,"  and  so  on. 

Questions  of  material  power,  aims  of  domination, 
increased  hostility  on  every  side  and  immediate  prep- 
arations for  another  war;  such,  according  to  our 
statesmen  and  philosophers,  is  the  meaning  and  natural 
result  of  all  wars.  They  are  as  delighted  as  children 
as  long  as  we  are  the  strongest.  And  although  they 
maintain  that  the  stronger  is  always  in  the  right,  they 
bewail  the  ill-success  of  their  country's  arms  as  a  na- 
tional shame  and  a  crying  wrong.  They  are  incapable 
of  discarding  for  a  moment  their  narrow,  nationalist 
conception  of  the  world  and  of  taking  a  wider  view  of 
the  world's  history.  If  they  did  so,  they  would  be 
forced  to  recognise,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  dream  of 
power  has  been  fatal  to  every  nation  (increase  of 
material  power  has  always  involved  both  the  prepara- 
tion for  fresh  conflicts  and  also  decadence)  ;  and,  in 
the  second  place,  that  the  military  defeat  of  a  nation 
is  invariably  followed  by  a  progressive  development  in 
respect  of  freedom  and  culture,  by  means  of  which  it 
recovers  its  former  political  significance.  (France, 
after  1870,  is  the  latest  and  most  glorious  example  of 
this.)  The  fact  that,  in  war,  it  is  really  not  nations  but 
only  dynasties  that  are  vanquished, and  that  vanquished 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        257 

dynasties  imply  victorious  nations,  finds  abundant 
proof  in  the  world's  history,  but  it  has  never  been 
admitted  by  our  scholars,  and  for  very  obvious  reasons. 
For  them  war  is,  what  it  has  always  been  for  the 
dynasties,  a  duel  between  brutal  appetites  for  power. 
Or  if,  Hke  Professor  Ostwald,  they  regard  it  as  a  duel 
between  two  Cultures,  the  word  "culture"  is  used  in 
such  a  revolting  materialistic  sense  that  those  who  re- 
spect human  dignity  and  freedom  are  alarmed  and  dis- 
tressed. 

But  only  the  mediocre  intelligence  can  be  content 
with  such  Central  European  ideas.  No!  the  World 
War  is  not  a  question  of  the  larder !  It  is  not  waged, 
as  our  Pan-Germanists  and  Social  Democrats  imagine, 
for  the  sake  of  a  few  thousand  square  miles  of  terri- 
tory, for  seaports,  colonies,  commercial  outlets,  or,  in 
fact,  for  any  material  benefits.  Like  all  wars,  this  one 
will  result  in  alterations  in  the  map  and  new  commer- 
cial treaties.  But  these  are  only  the  most  obvious 
among  its  secondary  issues. 

The  World  War  of  to-day  is  actually  a  struggle 
between  two  conceptions  of  the  world.  Dynasties, 
which  always  go  to  war  with  the  secret  intention  of 
increasing  their  material  and  moral  power,  are,  in 
reality,  the  puppets  of  the  world's  history.  Against 
their  wish  and  will,  they  invariably  bring  about  the 
triumph  or  defeat  of  some  conception  of  the  world. 
The  victorious  nation  gains  a  new  or  rejuvenated 
dynasty  (with  all  its  reactionary  consequences) ;  the 
vanquished  nation  gains  a  new  liberty  and  a  fairer 
human  ideal.  And  this  triumph  or  defeat  of  a  con- 
ception of  the  world  is  the  real  meaning  of  wars  and 


258        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

their  significance  in  relation  to  the  progress  and  culture 
of  mankind. 

Not  that  we  share  the  opinion  of  Bernhardi  and 
Treitschke  that  war  is  one  of  the  principal  instruments 
in  effecting  human  civilisation.  On  the  contrary: 
since  war  brings  reaction  to  the  one  and  liberty  to  the 
other,  its  results  are,  from  the  point  of  view  of  world- 
citizenship,  to  promote  strife  and  disunion  and  to  hin- 
der the  progress  of  civilisation.  During  the  last  forty 
years  there  have  existed,  side  by  side,  two  powerful 
States,  which,  as  a  result  of  war,  not  only  developed  on 
diametrically  opposite  lines,  but  were  in  every  sense 
hostile  to  one  another :  France  and  Germany.  On  the 
one  side,  liberty  and  progress;  on  the  other,  reaction 
and  decadence  in  all  the  true  human  values.  Sedan 
brought  France  liberty,  it  brought  us  reaction;  and  it 
was  inevitable  that  this  contrast  should  result  in  the 
present  World  War.  Thus  the  culture  gained  as  a 
result  of  war  by  the  vanquished  nation  (that  is  to  say, 
by  the  nation  that  has  been  freed  from  the  yoke  of  its 
dynasty)  is  always  intensely  national  and  not  uni- 
versal. From  the  point  of  view  of  world-citizenship 
(and  we  emphatically  repudiate  any  other)  war  is  con- 
sequently the  enemy  of  culture. 

5|C  57C  3j€  ^  ^ 

"The  history  of  the  world  is  the  judgment  of  the 
world."  This  statement  of  Schiller  is  one  of  the  few 
truths  that  our  scholars  and  journalists  have  been 
energetic  in  popularising  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  and  we  unconditionally  ourselves  endorse  it. 

It  seems  to  be  a  divine  and  undeviating  law  of  the 
world  that  in  every  war  victory  falls  to  the  protagonist 
possessing  the  higher   right  and  the  nobler  culture. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        259 

Kant  declares  emphatically:  "We  see  then  that 
Nature  is  absolutely  determined  that  right  shall 
conquer  in  the  end."  And  the  history  of  the  past 
century  Is  a  striking  proof  of  the  truth  of  these  sayings 
of  Schiller  and  Kant. 

But  what  is  Right?  We  have  already  compared 
the  dynastic  and  the  democratic  conceptions  of  the 
world  and  we  have  seen  that  all  civilised  communities, 
with  the  exception  of  Germany,  Austria,  Russia,  and 
Turkey,  have  developed  in  accordance  with  the  demo- 
cratic idea  outlined  by  the  great  French  Revolution. 
We  may  therefore  assume  that  "Right"  Is  where  the 
majority  of  civilised  mankind  feel  it  to  be,  hence,  in 
this  case,  undoubtedly,  where  the  right  of  the  nations 
to  self-government  is  recognised,  if  only  in  theory.  In 
like  manner,  the  nobler  culture  must  be  sought  for 
where  this  right  to  celf-government,  both  within  and 
without,  is  felt  to  be  the  unalterable  basis  (or,  at  all 
events,  the  ideal)  of  the  modern  State. 

If  we  examine  the  results  of  the  chief  wars  of  the 
past  century  in  relation  to  this  question,  we  can  easily 
prove  that,  in  every  case,  dynastic  and  historical  right 
has  had  to  lay  down  Its  arms  before  the  right  of  the 
nations  to  self-government. 

The  newly  founded  French  Republic  was  victorious 
all  along  the  line,  against  the  coalition  of  the  European 
dynasties.  And  why?  It  was  defending  the  principle 
of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  which  It  had  itself 
proclaimed.  Similarly,  Napoleon  remained  victorious 
over  his  opponents  so  long  as  he  remained  the  cham- 
pion of  the  rights  of  humanity  proclaimed  by  the  Great 
Revolution;  but  as  soon  as  he  deserted  the  cause  of 
.freedom  and  scoffed  openly  at  the  new  principle  of 


26o        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

nationalities,  the  national  sense  of  honour,  both  in 
Prussia  and  elsewhere,  was  stirred  to  such  indignation 
that  his  fall  became  inevitable.  In  all  the  Balkan  wars 
of  the  past  century  the  principle  of  nationalities 
prevailed  over  the  dynastic  idea  of  absolutism.  From 
1827  down  to  19 12,  the  Turks  were  worsted  in  almost 
every  campaign  and  forced  to  yield  their  independence 
to  Greeks,  Bulgarians,  Serbians,  and  Roumanians  in 
succession.  Similarly,  Prussia,  in  1866  and  1870,  found 
herself,  as  against  Austria  and  France,  playing  the  role 
of  a  champion  of  a  national  ideal.  Granted  that  God  be 
omniscient.  He  could  scarcely  have  foreseen  that  the 
Prussian  dynasty  would  subsequently  take  advantage  of 
the  German  ideal  of  national  unity  in  order  to  outrage 
the  principle  of  nationalities ;  although  Bismarck  had, 
-after  1866,  presented  us  with  a  Reichstag,  and  from 
1866  until  1870  ruled  on  fairly  liberal  lines.  At  that 
time,  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty  represented  the  higher 
right  as  against  the  craving  for  domination  of  the 
Hapsburgs  and  the  Bonapartes;  the  latter  had  to 
succumb  because  they  disputed  this  higher  right.^ 
Consider  the  militar}^  histor}^  of  Russia.  Why  has  she 
been  vanquished  in  all  the  wars  of  the  past  century? 
Because,  both  within  and  without,  she  was  revealed  as 
the  bitter  foe  of  popular  autonomy.  And  why  w^as  she 

*We  have  already  seen  (pp.  112-4)  to  what  extent  the  wars 
of  1864-1871  served  "purely  dynastic  interests."  The  assertion 
that  none  the  less,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  principle  of  na- 
tionalities, they  had  right  on  their  side  does  not  entail  contra- 
diction. It  is,  on  the  contrary',  a  striking  illustration  of  what 
we  have  said  above  (p.  253)  concerning  the  "dualism"  of  wars. 
If  the  German  idea  of  unity  was  a  deeply  serious  matter  for  the 
German  races,  for  the  German  dynasty  (as  the  events  of  1848 
prove)  it  was  only  a  pretext  for  the  furtherance  of  their  ambi- 
tions by  means  of  war. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        261 

victorious  in  1877-78  over  Turkey?  Because,  in  this 
case,  she  chanced  to  come  forward  as  the  Hberator  of 
oppressed  races  and  helped  Bulgaria  and  Roumania  to 
their  independence. 

Yes,  the  history  of  the  world  is  the  judgment  of  the 
world ;  and  Kant's  saying  will  remain  eternally  true. 

Dear  readers!  We  have  seen  what  ideas  and 
principles  the  German  dynasty  represents  in  this 
World  War,  They  are  manifestly  not  such  as  lie  in  the 
direction  of  the  higher  progress  of  mankind.  He  who 
stands  face  to  the  sun  loses  the  battle.  Alas!  We 
Germans  in  this  war  stand  face  to  the  sun  of  inters 
national  law  and  liberty.  Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 
and  Turkey  have,  for  the  last  forty  years,  held 
themselves  aloof  from  the  movement  for  popular 
self-government.  From  Armenia  to  Alsace-Lorraine, 
from  Schleswig-Holstein  to  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  they 
have,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  by  word  and 
by  deed,  opposed  to  the  right  of  the  nations  to  free 
self-government  their  divine  rights  and  despotic  prin- 
ciples, which  are  the  very  abnegation  of  all  popular 
liberty.  The  good  God  may  have  been  "our  Ally  of 
Rossbach  and  Dennewitz,"  and  may  love  us  dearly; 
but  He  cannot  make  any  exception  in  our  favour  from 
the  eternal  laws  of  His  world. 

I,  as  both  democrat  and  pacifist,  must  confess  that  I 
do  not  desire  that  He  should.  For  what  would  happen 
if  we  Germans  emerged  victorious  from  this  war? 
Our  victory  would  only  mean  a  strengthening  of  the 
dynastic  principle  of  arbitrary  power  all  along  the  line. 
Those  of  us  who  bewail  the  political  backwardness  of 
our  Fatherland  must  realise  that  a  "German"  victory 


262        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

would  prolong  this  backward  condition  for  centuries. 
And  not  only  Germany  but  the  whole  of  Europe  would 
have   to   suffer   the   consequences.     All   the   political 
liberties  painfully  achieved  during  two  centuries  would 
give  way  before  the  omnipotence  of  the  victorious 
dynasty  and  only  their  shadow  would  remain.      Our 
Polish  policy,  which  even  Professor  Delbriick  severely 
censured,  would  be  extended  to  the  newly  conquered 
territories  and  in  an  even  more  brutal  form.     There 
would  be  in  Europe  only  as  mxuch  liberty  of  thought 
and    of    the    Press    as    the    German    dynasty   would 
allow ;  and  we  are  well  aware  how  little  it  does  allow. 
The  Burgfrieden,  which  has  been  developed  into  a 
systematic  negation  of  all  citizen  rights,  would  (just 
like  the  Socialist  law  after  1871)  become  a  perm.anent 
institution  in  the  land  of  intellectual  liberty.      And, 
just  as  Professor  Delbriick  blessed  Bismarck  because 
he  had  known  how  to  mutilate  the  Ems  telegram  in  the 
interests  of  German  unity,  so  now  a  hundred  Delbriicks 
would  rise  up   and   glorify   the  man  who  invented 
Cossack    invasions    and    bombs    from    aeroplanes    in 
order  to  win  popularity  for  this  victorious  war.     The 
victor  is  not  accountable  to  anybody;  in  his  honour, 
new  sciences  and  new  codes  of  morals  are  Invented, 
applauding  nations  wait  upon  his  wishes,  and  whoever, 
amid  this  lofty  enthusiasm,  ventures  a  word  as  to  the 
universal  morality  is  at  once  outlawed  and  imprisoned. 
To  talk  of  a  right  of  nations  to  self-government 
would  be  Use  majcste.     States  such  as  Switzerland, 
Holland,  and  Denmark  would  only  with  the  greatest 
difficulty  preserve  their  national  independence,   and, 
at  most,  for  ten  years.     For  a  thousand  learned  pro- 
fessors, following  in  the  footsteps  of  Treitschke  and 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        263 

Chamberlain,  would  perpetually  demonstrate  that  the 
Dutch,  the  Swiss,  the  Danes,  etc.,  are  but  "lost  sons 
of  the  great  Germanic  family,''  until  these  unhappy 
nations  would  themselves  believe  in  it  at  last,  or  be 
compelled  "by  the  right  of  the  sword"  to  believe  in  it. 

All  republican  ideas  would  pale  before  the  brilliancy 
of  the  divine  dynasty  now  ruling  in  Europe.  Europe 
would  become  a  China  (and  not  even  a  modem 
China),  in  which  learned  Mandarins,  after  the  manner 
of  Ostwald,  would  realise  their  "energetic  impera- 
tive"— in  other  words,  succeed  in  subordinating  all 
human  activities  to  the  higher  honour  of  the  dynasty, 
in  a  kind  of  Taylorian  theorem. 

And  all  this  glorious  technical  culture  would  be 
under  the  supervision  of  the  noble  officer,  with  his 
divine  privileges.  Whenever  anyone  dared  open  his 
mouth  in  the  name  of  intellectual  liberty  and  human 
dignity,  as  being  outside  the  dynastic  sphere,  he 
would  soon  bring  the  "reptiles"  to  their  senses  and 
receive  congratulatory  telegrams  and  decorations  from 
Berlin.  What  little  Switzerland  dared  do  in  the 
'eighties,  namely,  to  reject  forthwith  Bismarck's 
insolent  demands  (the  affair  Wohlgemuth),  she  would 
now  have  to  suffer  for.  And  not  only  this  "nest  of 
democracy"  (as  Bismarck  then  called  Switzerland) 
would  be  at  once  cleared  out  and  lose  all  its  indepen- 
dence ;  but  all  other  European  States  in  which  "demo- 
cratic intrigues"  could  be  detected  would  have  to 
expect  a  second  Wohlgemuth  or  Prochaska  affair, 
and,  probably,  an  Ultimatum..  Democracy  would  be 
dead  in  Europe,  and  any  reference  of  it  would  be  a 
crime. 

AA^here  would  there  be  any  check  upon  this  dynasty 


264        THE  COMING  DEMOCK\CY 

ruling  from  Antwerp  to  Bagdad  absolutely,  and  from 
Haparanda  to  Gibraltar  morally?  Perhaps  German 
Social  Democracy?  The  very  idea  provokes  a  smile. 
The  noisy  champions  of  revolution  have,  owing  to 
a  few  bombs  from  aeroplanes  and  inroads  of  Cos- 
sacks, become  so  submissive,  that  a  dynasty  returning 
triumphant  from  the  war  would  not  need  a  new 
Socialist  law  to  keep  them  in  subjection. 

There  would,  in  fact,  be  no  longer  checks  upon  the 
dynasty.  France,  to  which,  for  a  hundred  years  past, 
the  nations  have  looked  up  with  quiet  hopes,  would 
now  be  utterly  crushed.  England,  the  home  of 
Liberalism,  would  be  forced,  in  order  not  to  lose  her 
independence,  to  expend  aU  her  energies  on  armam.ents 
(that  is  to  say,  to  renounce  Liberalism) .  Neighbourly 
relations  would  be  opened  up  with  Russia,  and  the 
whole  of  Europe  would  be  forced  into  a  fresh,  terrible 
armament  policy  (as  foretold  by  Herr  von  Biilow). 
On  the  one  hand,  under  England's  leadership,  the 
nations  great  and  small  (which  are  to-day  neutral) 
which  had  been  entirely  or  partially  annexed,  as  well 
as  the  threatened  States,  would  be  thirsting  for 
revenge,  that  is  to  say,  for  liberty;  and,  on  the  other, 
the  new  German  AA^orld-power,  which  in  another 
twenty  years  would  be  encompassed  with  so  many 
fresh  threats,  intrigues,  jealousies,  and  witches'  caul- 
drons, that,  once  again,  with  a  "clear  conscience," 
she  would  be  compelled  to  take  the  field  in  order  to 
safeguard  the  world's  peace. 

And  do  you,  dear  reader,  wish  us  to  take  this 
terrible  backward  step  into  the  ^Middle  Ages?  You 
wish  Napoleon's  prophecy,  "Europe  will  within  a 
centurv    be    either    democratic    or    Cossack,"    to    be 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR        265 

realised  In  the  sense  of  this  latter  possibility?  Can 
we,  as  Germans,  really  desire  that?  But  whether 
we  wish  it  or  not,  the  world's  history  takes  its  own 
inexorable  course.  And,  since  it  is  impossible  that  a 
Cossack  Europe  should  form  part  of  the  design  of  the 
world's  histor}^,  the  German  dynasty  cannot  and  will 
not  be  victorious  in  this  war.  Europe  will  be  demo- 
cratic! 

That  the  victory  of  democracy  need  not  imply 
the  annihilation  of  the  German  people  and  its  future 
part  in  the  world  is  also  vouched  for  by  the  history 
of  the  world.  Vanquished  dynasties  are  not  only  not 
vanquished  nations,  but  even  emancipated  nations. 
This  was  not  only  the  case  in  England,  France,  Hol- 
land, and  Switzerland,  but  even  in  China.  Why  should 
it  not  be  equally  the  case  in  Germany?  Is  universal 
history  to  make  an  exception  in  our  case?  Are  we 
more  stupid  than  the  Chinese? 

And  supposing  we  were :  the  world's  history  is 
remorseless;  it  would  cut  off  our  pigtails,  however 
much  Scheidemann  and  Siidekum  might  bewail  that 
our  nation  was  being  destroyed. 

"It  is  the  implacable  will  of  Nature  that  right  should 
finally  prevail." 

"The  history  of  the  world  is  the  judgment  of  the 
world.'' 

We  should  be  interested  to  know  whether  all  the 
gentlemen  who  at  the  commencement  of  the  war 
triumphantly  shouted  this  sentence  will  still  testify 
to  its  truth  when,  as  Is  inevitable,  the  German  people, 
as  the  result  of  this  war,  will  be  found  to  have 
conquered  not  provinces  but  only  liberties.  Will  they 
have  the  courage  to  admit  that  our  dynasty  could  not 


266        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

conquer  because  she  was  not  defending  the  higher 
right  and  the  nobler  culture?  Or  will  they  have  the 
effrontery  to  contest  the  logic  of  the  world's  history 
which  they  themselves  only  yesterday  proclaimed, 
merely  because  the  history  of  the  world  is,  in  fact, 
the  judgment  of  the  world? 


VIII 

ONWARD!    TO    DEMOCRACY? 

Dynasty  or  Humanity? 

To  THE  German  Reader! 

You  may,  for  the  first  moment,  feel  that  the 
freedom  with  which  I  have  spoken  of  German  condi- 
tions, and  of  the  origin  and  meaning  of  the  World 
War,  shows  a  want  of  patriotism.  And  even  if,  as  I 
know  is  bound  to  happen,  your  own  investigation  of 
the  Constitution  and  politics  of  Germany  completely 
confirms  the  above  conclusions  (for  there  can  be  no 
refutation  of  actual  facts),  yet  you  will  perhaps  still 
hesitate  to  give  me  your  countenance.  Our  German 
Constitution  is  so  wreathed  about  with  democratic 
garlands,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  respect  for  the 
dynasty  is  so  deeply  rooted  in  the  German  spirit,  that, 
although  at  bottom  we  have  the  same  democratic 
yearnings  as  other  nations,  we  instinctively  oppose  the 
logical  establishment  of  the  real  truth. 

This  has  been  my  own  experience.  That  one  should 
maintain,  as  the  result  of  studies  in  history  and  consti- 
tutional law,  that  we  really  possess  not  a  Fatherland 
but  only  a  dynasty,  and  this  at  a  time  when  millions 

267 


268        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

of  Germans  are  bleeding  and  dying,  weeping  and 
wasting,  for  this  supposed  Fatherland?  Is  this  not 
betrayal  of  the  Fatherland?  Is  this  justifiable  in  any 
German  at  the  present  time  ? 

While  I  was  still  weighing  this  question  in  my  mind, 
I  thought  of  Bernhardi,  Ostwald,  Chamberlain, 
Schlidemann,  Frymann,  Liman,  Harden,  Georg  Bern- 
hard,  Leimdorfer,  Lasswitz,  who  are  among  the  most 
famous  people  in  Germany.  I  was  even  so  lacking  in 
modesty  as  to  compare  myself  for  a  moment  with  these 
celebrities.  I  admired  their  patriotism,  their  deep 
understanding  of  culture,  their  style,  in  short,  all  their 
profoundly  flaunted  Germanism,  and  I  began  to  lose 
confidence  in  myself.  For  to  my  shame  I  must  admit 
that  I  am  neither  so  learned  nor  yet  of  such  exotic 
origin  as  they.  For  all  these  gentlemen  are  of  Russian 
or  Polish  or  English  origin,  and  as  it  has  become  an 
established  custom  in  our  country  that  foreig^ners 
and  Jews  should  represent  pure  and  undefiled  Ger- 
manism, I  have  really  no  right,  under  these  circum- 
stances, to  speak  as  a  German  to  Germans. 

It  is,  then,  to  some  extent  an  act  of  presumption 
if  a  German,  who  is  neither  Russian  nor  English  nor 
Slav  nor  Jew,  but  a  Prussian  who  In  his  youth  excelled 
his  schoolmates  in  the  enumeration  of  the  Prussian 
kings  and  their  battles,  should  to-day  present  himself 
before  his  countrymen  with  the  intention  of  speaking 
to  them  about  Germany.  The  development  of  German 
culture  has  raised  the  intellectual  charlatans  and  half- 
castes  to  such  high  consequence  among  us  that,  at 
the  present  day,  in  the  German  Fatherland,  the  true 
German  wears  a  somewhat  pitiable  aspect. 

It  seems  to  me  that  here,  more  than  anywhere,  we 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       269 

have  indeed  been  "actually  attacked'';  attacked  in 
our  true  Germanism,  our  most  sacred  feelings  and 
traditions.  And  it  was  just  because  I  felt  that,  from 
the  standpoint  of  classical  Germanism,  we  have  to 
wage  a  sacred  defensive  war  against  the  representatives 
of  culture  in  present-day  Germany,  that  the  examina- 
tion which  I  have  made  in  this  book — ^however  revo- 
lutionary it  may  appear  at  the  first  glance — seemed 
to  me  necessary  for  the  restoration  to  health  of  the 
German  nation. 

Is  it  necessary  or  possible  or  right  that  to-day, 
when  the  World  War  has  slaughtered  and  crippled 
and  ruined  millions  of  men,  and  has  destroyed 
innumerable  cultural  values,  we  should  accord 
unconditional  approval  to  the  wisdom  of  these  intel- 
lectual celebrities?  Ought  we  to  look  upon 
this  world-drama  (the  greatest  in  the  history  of  the 
world)  with  that  enforced  respect  for  the  dynasty 
which  has  been  drilled  into  us?  Must  we  give 
credence  to  the  official  description  of  a  "maliciously 
attacked  Germany,"  despite  all  the  documentary 
evidence  and  the  conduct  and  traditions  of  Prussia 
during  the  last  decade  ?  Is  it  right  that,  following  the 
example  of  certain  pacifists  and  socialists,  we  should 
explain  the  World  War  with  learned  phrases,  merely 
in  order  to  evade  the  painful  necessity  of  calling  the 
true  cause  of  the  war  by  its  right  name? 

Our  Government  may  possibly  have  succeeded,  by 
the  aid  of  its  foreign  and  Jewish  champions  of  culture, 
in  breeding  among  our  nation  a  kind  of  fetish  belief 
in  the  dynasty;  but  we  remain  none  the  less  a  people 
who  have  learnt  to  think  logically,  and  who,  like  all 
genuinely  civilised  nations,  strive  instinctively  towards 


270        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

democracy.  In  the  end,  as  Napoleon  said,  the  spirit 
always  triumphs  over  the  sword.  And  even  supposing 
that  our  dynasty  were  to  emerge  completely  victorious 
from  this  war,  none  the  less  it  could  not  prevent 
inexorable  logic  from  bringing  us  at  last  to  the  bitter 
recognition  that  in  this  war  the  dynasty  set  itself 
against  our  nation  and  against  the  whole  of  humanity. 

Dynasty  or  Humanity?  That  is  the  question  here. 
That  is  the  meaning  of  the  World  War. 

And  being  confronted  with  this  question,  we  declare 
ourselves  frankly  for  Humanity.  For  a  dynasty  is 
never  more  than  an  accident  in  the  world's  history. 
Even  if  it  be  descended  from  the  gods,  it  is 
prone  to  error  and  to  evil  purposes.  But  Humanity 
is  not  an  accident;  Humanity  too  is  descended  from 
the  gods,  and  with  this  advantage  over  the  dynasties, 
that  it  can  neither  err  nor  fulfil  evil  purposes. 
Humanity  is  the  meaning  of  the  world;  and,  what- 
ever Prussian  Privy  Councillors  may  say.  Humanity 
is  also  the  meaning  of  history. 

The  conscience  of  Humanity  is  eternal  and  infallible. 
Even  for  dynasties  the  fatal  saying  is  true,  that  man 
is  longer  under  the  earth  than  on  it.  But  this  is  not 
true  of  Humanity.  A  hundred  dynasties,  fatherlands, 
and  nations  pass  away;  Humanity  remains.  Un- 
touched by  catastrophes  and  individual  purposes,  it 
marches  on.  Slowly  but  surely,  Humanity  marches 
ever  onwards  and  upwards,  towards  more  light,  free- 
dom, happiness,  and  human  dignity. 

In  the  light  of  this  truth,  what  are  high  treason, 
unpatriotic  sentiments,  and  the  like?  Merely  the 
conception  of  a  moment,  a  crime  in  a  space  of  a 
few  square  miles,  the  anger  of  a  government  of  a  few 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       271 

years.  Certainly  it  is  our  duty,  as  members  of  a 
fatherland,  to  serve  it  and  obey  its  laws.  But  when, 
as  here,  our  Fatherland  obeys  an  alien  will,  thereby 
setting  itself  in  opposition  to  the  eternal  laws  of 
humanity,  we  have  no  longer  the  right  to  affront 
humanity  with  patriotic  stubbornness. 

The  dynasties  have,  in  fact,  always  set  themselves 
against  humanity.  Every  other  page  of  the  world's 
history  furnishes  proof  of  it.  At  the  very  beginning, 
when  we  were  still  half  brutes,  when  you  and  I  still 
instinctively  fell  upon  one  another,  whenever  we 
encountered  each  other  at  some  turn  of  the  road,  the 
chiefs  and  the  dynasties  which  sprang  from  them  may, 
have  exercised  a  certain  influence  on  humanity  in  the 
direction  of  order  and  civilisation.  It  is  possible  to 
go  further  and  to  say  that  (with  the  possible  exception 
of  the  United  States)  national  unity  has  in  every  case 
been  due  to  the  dynasties.  The  proudest  French 
republicans  admit  that  it  was  the  Capets  who  made 
their  Fatherland  great,  so  that  the  Revolution  was 
able  to  take  it  over  from  them  on  behalf  of  the  people. 
Even  though  Switzerland  was  never  actually  ruled  by 
a  dynasty,  its  national  unity  was  indirectly  brought 
into  being  by  dynasties. 

But  at  the  present  day,  when  the  national  develop- 
ment has  been,  as  it  were,  accomplished  entirely, 
and  when  it  is  only  a  question  of  rounding  off  the 
national  unities  in  accordance  w4th  the  wishes  of  the 
people,  and  of  securing  their  political  independence? 
To-day,  when  throughout  the  civilised  world  we 
find  organised  administrative  bodies?  What  higher 
meaning  and  function  can  the  d}Tiasties  by  divine 
right  have  in  this  modern  world?     In  ancient  times, 


272        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

when  they  themselves,  at  the  head  of  their  tribe,  were 
the  first  to  go  forth  to  battle  and  the  last  to  come 
home,  they  might  still,  with  some  justification,  claim 
the  governing  authority.  For  then  they  lived,  fought, 
thought  and  spoke  in  the  midst  of  their  tribe;  they 
had  grown  up  with  them,  they  knew  their  feelings  and 
needs,  and,  in  virtue  of  their  spiritual  and  physical 
superiority,  they  had  a  natural  right  to  leadership  and 
authority.  But  the  times  have  changed.  Among  the 
old  Germans,  leadership  conferred  upon  the  man  not 
only  dignity,  but  also  an  obligation;  at  the  present 
day,  on  the  contrary,  it  confers  dignity  on  the  man 
but  relieves  him  from  all  obligation.  The  dynasty 
of  the  Hohenzollerns  is  a  warrior  dynasty  of  the 
first  rank,  yet  every  member  of  it  has  died  in  his 
bed.  Your  grandfather  and  mine  perchance,  though 
members  of  no  warrior  dynasty,  have  yet  died  a 
soldier's  death.  And  although  the  World  War  is  not 
yet  ended,  we  know  already  that  the  Imperial  family 
will  have  been  the  only  family  in  all  Germany  who 
will  have  sent  six  sons  to  the  field,  and  not  have  lost 
one  of  them  at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  unless,  of 
course,  through  some  unforeseen  mishap.  Progress 
and  the  resultant  modernisation  of  war  have  brought 
it  about  that  the  members  of  the  dynastic  families  no 
longer  fight  in  person,  and  that  their  quarrels  and 
ambitions  have  become  national  concerns.  If,  in 
former  days,  it  was  their  duty  and  their  ambition  to 
fight  at  the  head  of  their  armies,  in  these  stern  days 
of  ours  it  is  their  highest  duty  to  preserve  themselves 
for  their  peoples! 

But  not   only  on  the  field   of  battle  has  a  new 
morality  superseded  the  old.  In  other  respects  progress 


ONWARD  I  TO  DEMOCRACY  I       273 

has  wrought  important  changes.  In  ancient  days 
and  in  the  Middle  Ages  it  was  easy  for  a  dynasty  to 
reign  with  absolute  power.  Their  States  were  for  the 
most  part  small,  their  subjects  numerically  incon- 
siderable, superstitious,  maintained  in  serfdom,  and 
indifferent  to  politics.  The  rulers  had  only  to  settle 
their  affairs  with  the  nobility  and  the  priesthood, 
and  governing  was  therefore  a  straightforward  and 
humanly  possible  operation,  which  even  now  and  then 
might  bear  good  fruits,  as  in  the  case  of  Henry  IV. 
in  France,  Henry  I.  in  Germany,  and  the  Great  Elector 
in  Brandenburg.  In  the  meantime  men  and  conditions 
developed.  At  the  present  day  Germany  alone  contains 
as  many  inhabitants  as  the  whole  of  Europe  in  the 
time  of  Charlemagne.  The  populations  are  no  longer 
superstitious;  they  are  no  longer  in  a  state  of  serfdom, 
and  they  are  no  longer  indifferent  to  politics.  Numer- 
ous discoveries  have  revolutionised  our  commerce,  our 
ideas,  and  our  needs,  and  have  brought  into  being  that 
which  we  describe  collectively  as  culture.  In  such  an 
age,  with  such  States  and  ideas,  the  greatest  genius  of 
all  the  centuries  would  no  longer  have  been  capable  of 
ruling  and  deciding  absolutely  in  all  things.  We  have 
been  gratified  to  observe  from  the  various  speeches  of 
William  II.  that  he  understands  all  things,  and  that 
all  things  are  subject  to  his  direction  and  rule!  We 
have  stood  amazed  before  that  proficiency  both  in 
peace  and  war  which  borders  on  universality !  Yet  we 
are  compelled  to  recognise  in  his  case  also  that  which 
applies  to  every  dynasty  at  the  present  day  ruling  by 
divine  right :  they  live  in  a  world  completely  separated 
from  the  nation  at  large;  they  are  so  hedged  aboul 
with  an  artificial  barrier  that  they  are  deprived  of  any 


274        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

free  outlook  upon  the  world  and  mankind;  and  they 
are  maintained  by  their  advisers  in  a  more  or  less 
complete  ignorance  of  the  spirit  of  the  age  and  of  the 
real  needs  and  demands  of  humanity. 

All  our  present-day  science  and  technology  is  op- 
posed to  the  idea  of  the  divine  and  the  arbitrary.  In 
such  a  world,  is  it  possible  that  a  God-appointed 
dynasty  should  be  the  rational  embodiment  of  the 
whole  life  of  a  great  State? 

To  put  this  question  is  to  answer  it.  In  fact,  the 
cultural  development  of  humanity  tends  in  all  depart- 
ments towards  the  elimination  of  arbitrary  rule  and 
of  capricious  divinity.  Culture  is  the  elimination  of 
individual  despotism,  and  the  subduing  and  utilisation 
of  the  divine  natural  forces  to  the  service  of  humanity. 
And  we  Germans,  in  particular,  have  rendered  impor- 
tant service  in  this  field.  We  have  even,  apart  from 
politics,  become  one  of  the  most  democratic  nations  in 
the  world.  Our  whole  organisation  in  respect  of  jus- 
tice, finance,  local  government,  taxation,  insurance,  co- 
operation, is  so  democratic  that  it  has,  at  any  rate  in 
part,  become  the  model  for  other  countries.  No  other 
nation  (least  of  all  France,  the  fatherland  of  democ- 
racy) can  boast  such  a  democratically  organised  in- 
come-tax as  we.  Nowhere,  save  in  England,  have  the 
co-operative  societies  and  the  democratic  organisation 
connected  with  them  attained  such  proportions  as  in 
Germany.  No  one  claims  that  our  courts  of  justice 
are  perfect,  but  everyone  in  Germany  is  of  opinion 
that  they  afYord  the  best  guarantees  against  possible 
bias  and  arbitrariness  on  the  part  of  the  judges,  and 
that  they  are  one  of  the  most  excellent  achievements 
of  civiHsation.     Our  German  town  councils  are  for 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       275 

the  most  part  organised  on  thoroughly  democratic 
Hnes.  None  of  my  German  readers  would  buy  shares 
in  a  society  unless  he  knew  that  it  submitted  every 
year  a  clear  balance-sheet  of  its  proceedings.  None 
of  my  German  readers  would  feel  disposed  to  join  an 
association  which  did  not  vouchsafe  to  its  members 
at  the  least  a  voting  right  in  return  for  their  subscrip- 
tions, or  whose  managing  committee  were  sedulous  in 
inventing  a  whole  philosophy  respecting  the  stupidity 
of  its  members,  and  endeavoured  to  prove  that  they 
were  empowered  by  God  to  make  whatever  use  they 
might  see  fit  of  the  funds  of  the  society. 

All  these  things  we  Germans  treat  as  a  matter  of 
course.  The  most  inveterate  supporter  of  the  monarchy 
would  not  have  them  otherwise.  Now  the  State  is, 
as  it  were,  the  biggest  joint-stock  company  and  the 
biggest  association.  We  belong  to  it  not  of  our  choice 
and  will,  but  because  we  were  born  in  it.  This  State 
demands  from  us  not  only  taxes,  obedience,  and 
patriotism,  but  also,  in  cases  of  necessity,  our  lives. 
It  might  have  been  imagined  that,  under  these  circum- 
stances, the  State  would,  as  a  matter  of  course,  be 
subject  to  the  control  of  its  members,  and  that  every- 
thing would  be  done  to  fulfil  their  wishes  as  far  as 
possible.  But,  in  fact,  just  the  opposite  is  the  case: 
the  State  recognises  no  duties  whatever  towards  us. 
That  which  for  the  board  of  directors  of  a  joint-stock 
company  or  the  committee  of  management  of  an 
association  is  a  matter  of  course,  namely,  the  voting 
right  acquired  by  the  shareholders  or  members  in 
virtue  of  their  subscription,  it  is  a  crime  on  the  part 
of  the  German  citizen  even  to  ask  for.    The  dynasty, 


276        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

which  is  the  embodiment  of  the  State,  rules  by  divine 
right,  that  is  to  say,  arbitrarily. 

Dynastic  Politics  and  Culture 

Dynasties  which  plead  divine  authority  for  the 
conduct  of  their  political  affairs  and  obstinately  reject 
any  popular  control  can  have  but  one  motive  for  their 
attitude,  namely,  that  their  interests  are  not  coincident 
with  those  of  the  popular  weal. 

In  fact,  between  "politics"  as  understood  and 
desired  by  nations  and  politics  as  conceived  by  dynas- 
ties there  is  a  deep  gulf  which  apparently  can  in  no 
way  be  bridged  over. 

Ever  since  Plato  there  has  existed  the  idea  of  a 
polity  based  primarily  upon  justice  and  liberty  and 
having  as  its  supreme  goal  the  attainment  of  the 
greatest  possible  general  well-being  for  the  greatest 
possible  number  of  human  beings.  Since  the  days 
of  ancient  Greece  there  has  existed  in  the  w^orld  a 
conception  of  justice  and  liberty  that  is  sufficient  for 
all  purposes  and  is  the  real  criterion  of  civilisation. 
This  conception  is  not  dependent  upon  any  political 
power;  its  blessings  descend  upon  the  just  and  the  un- 
just; it  is  not  bound  to  any  time  or  to  any  circum- 
stances, and  ought  not  to  be  diminished  or  destroyed 
for  the  sake  of  any  advantage  or  in  the  face  of  any 
peril.  With  the  immortal  proclamation  of  human  and 
citizen  rights,  it  again  became  the  guiding  motive  of 
State-policy  and  was  proclaimed  to  the  nations  as  the 
goal  of  all  political  endeavour. 

Were  dynastic  interests  compatible  with  those  of 
human  welfare,  the  dynasties  would  have  approved 
this   conception  of  human  dignity  and   international 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       277 

right.  But  history  teaches  us  that  they  always  opposed 
it  with  all  their  power.  Why?  Because  their  divinely 
inherited  right  is  really  incompatible  with  this 
humanly  created  right,  that  is  to  say,  because  their 
whole  existence  was  menaced.  Therefore  they  stood 
on  their  defence  and  marred  and  interrupted  the  work 
of  the  Great  Revolution.  Even  if,  here  and  there, 
they  had  to  make  certain  concessions,  yet  we  have 
seen  that  their  fundamental  rights  (and  particularly 
in  Germany)  have  remained  entirely  unaffected. 
These  fundamental  rights  are,  above  all,  a  danger 
to  Peace.  Hitherto  political  life  has  been  controlled  by 
dynasties;  the  history  of  the  world  has  been  not 
the  work  of  nations,  but  a  "give  and  take,  and  hither 
and  thither"  of  dynastic  interests,  and  thus  entirely 
the  work  of  individuals.  Wars  are  the  "inevitable," 
that  is  to  say,  the  entirely  natural,  consequences  of 
this  state  of  things.  And  they  will  remain  so  as  long 
as  European  politics,  instead  of  being  directed  with  a 
view  to  the  welfare  of  the  nations,  continues  to  serve 
only  dynastic  ambitions  and  intrigues. 

The  secret  aims  of  all  dynastic  politics  are  its  own 
aggrandisement  or  the  prevention  of  the  aggrandise- 
ment of  a  neighbouring  dynasty.  These  aims  are 
served  by  the  military-political  organisation  of  their 
States,  by  diplomacy  and  its  continuation — war. 

"Augustus  drank,  and  Poland  became  drunk !"  The 
history  of  the  past  century  proves,  alas!  that  the 
dynasties,  in  spite  of  all  revolutions,  have  dipped  deeper 
into  their  cups  and  have,  moreover,  kept  their  peoples 
in  a  state  of  intoxication.  And  in  the  case  of  us 
Germans  they  scored  a  success,  in  that  we,  like  most 
drunken   people,   always   maintained   we   were   quite 


278        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

sober.  We  have  been  told  by  a  thousand  professors 
that  we  are  the  freest  people  in  the  world  because  the 
dynasty  was  nowhere  freer  than  it  is  with  us.^  But 
one  must  have  long  enjoyed  freedom  in  order  to 
understand  and  love  freedom.  Alas!  the  dynasties 
never  gave  us  time  to  become  sober  and  to  attain  a 
true  perception  of  freedom.  It  is  both  their  mission 
and  their  divine  right  to  think  only  of  continual 
aggrandisement,  to  keep  the  nations  uneasy  by  a  dis- 
play of  their  power,  and  to  wean  them  from  their 
natural  civilising  occupations.  What  right,  what  lib- 
erty, what  peace  is  possible,  when  the  Fatherland  is  in 
danger  and  we  have  continuously  to  protect  it,  by  in- 
cessant increase  of  armaments,  against  future  attacks? 

The  dynasties  oppose  their  ideal  of  a  State  based 
upon  Power  to  the  democratic  ideal  of  a  constitutional 
State.  Whenever  the  nations  dreamt  for  a  moment  of 
the  solidarity  of  all  human  interests,  of  justice,  peace, 
of  a  constitution  and  autonomy,  straightway  the  dynas- 
ties, in  the  name  of  their  eternally  menaced  Father- 
land, replied  with  a  demand  for  veneration  of,  blind 
obedience  to,  and  confidence  in  the  God-appointed 
rule.  In  the  place  of  Constitutions,  they  gave  us 
conquered  provinces,  thereby  flattered  our  national 
vanity,  and  compelled  us  to  look  to  the  preservation 
of  the  conquered  lands. 

Despite  all  the  achievements  of  the  last  century, 
they  contrived  in  this  way  to  keep  alive  among  their 
peoples  that  sense  of  ^'enmity"  which  is  a  necessary 

^  "We  feel  ourselves,"  says  Professor  Ernst  Troltsch,  "Deutsch- 
land  und  der  Weltkrieg"  (p.  71,  Berlin,  1915),  "in  any  event 
freer  and  more  independent  in  many  respects  than  the  citizens 
of  the  great  democracies."  We?  Professor  Troltsch  speaks,  no 
doubt,  in  the  name  of  his  colleagues. 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       279 

factor  in  their  politics,  but  which,  in  our  modern 
world,  has  no  longer  any  natural  foundation.  The 
various  nations  exhibit  differences  of  ideas,  customs, 
temperaments,  languages  and  religions,  in  the  same 
way  as  they  exhibit  contrasting  interests  and  aims. 
[But  it  is  only  the  dynasties  who,  with  their  primitive 
and  mystic  policy  of  force,  have  persuaded  us  that 
war  must  always  be  the  natural  consequence  of  this 
peaceful  rivalry.^ 

^'Quidquid  delirant  reges,  plectunfur  Achivi"  so  said 
Horace,  and  Heine  has  expressed  it,  in  his  own  way, 
in  German:  "If  princes  itch,  nations  must  scratch 
themselves."  And,  hitherto,  the  world's  history  has' 
been  nothing  but  an  everlasting  itching  of  dynasties 
and  a  scratching  of  the  nations  for  their  sake.    Inter- 

*How  often  have  not  our  racial  scientists  and  statesmen  em- 
phasised the  natural  enmity  that  is  supposed  to  exist  between 
Germans  and  Slavs,  and  is  bound  to  culminate  in  war.  This 
"natural  hostility"  between  Germans  and  Slavs  was  nothing  but 
a  dogma  of  our  racial  science,  and,  when  the  World  War  broke 
out,  it  was  declared  in  Germany  (at  all  events  at  first)  to  be  a 
crusade  against  "arrogant  Panslavism."  Compare  with  this  the 
fact  that  it  was  German  thinkers  and  poets  who  showed  the 
deepest  sympathy  with  the  tragic  fate  of  Poland.  On  the  first 
division  of  Poland,  Schubert,  Zacharias  Werner,  and  J.  G.  Seume 
lamented  in  inspired  verse  the  sorrows  of  our  Polish  neighbours 
and  found  a  grateful  echo  in  the  German  people.  In  the  'thirties 
of  last  century,  in  consequence  of  the  ill-starred  Polish  revolu- 
tion, and  its  sequel,  there  sprang  up  in  Germany  a  whole  poetical 
literature  on  the  subject  of  Poland:  Grabbe,  Holtei,  Lenau, 
Platen,  Hebbel  (only  to  name  the  more  important  lyricists) 
wrote  moving  verses  on  Poland  and  its  unhappy  people.  The 
whole  of  Germany  applauded  them,  and  some  of  these  poems 
are,  even  to-day,  popular  in  Germany.  This  German  poetry  in 
celebration  of  Poland  is  not  merely  a  noble  monument  for  the 
land  of  poets,  but  is  likewise  a  striking  proof  that,  despite  the 
learned  polemi'cs  and  intrigues  of  dynastic  State  politics,  no 
natural  feeling  of  enmity  exists  between  the  peoples  concerned. 


28o        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

national  history  was  like  a  long-continued  serial  story 
of  brigandage.  In  each  part,  for  the  furtherance  of 
''higher  aims,"  some  crime  was  committed,  and  at 
the  end  of  each  part  stood  the  words:  ''to  be  con- 
tinued." 

War  engenders  war.  Until  now  almost  every  peace 
has  been  concluded  in  accordance  with  dynastic  views, 
and  therefore  has  contained  within  it  the  germ  of  a  new 
war.  If  nations  regarded  and  waged  every  war  only 
as  a  step  towards  peace,  dynasties,  on  the  contrary, 
regarded  it  only  as  a  step  towards  another  war.  In 
ancient  days  the  exercise  of  power  was  limited  to  the 
duration  of  war;  can  we  be  surprised,  therefore,  that 
the  leaders  continued  the  wars  as  long  as  possible, 
and  then  used  all  the  means  at  their  disposal  to  conjure 
up  fresh  wars?  Their  rank  and  very  existence  were 
at  stake.  No  war  without  leaders,  no  leaders  without 
war.  Dynasty  and  war:  the  one  is  inconceivable 
without  the  other.  The  world's  history  shows  us  on 
every  page  that  not  peace  but  war  is  the  aim  of 
dynasties.  Peace  is  for  them  not  an  ideal,  but  only 
the  natural  intermediate  stage  before  the  next  war. 

A  wolf  cannot  be  expected  to  fill  the  part  of 
shepherd.  It  is  in  the  nature  of  sheep  to  keep  the 
peace  and  to  seek  good  feeding-ground.  It  is  in  the 
nature  of  wolves  to  keep  the  sheep  in  perpetual  fear, 
and  to  devour  them  till  they  can  devour  no  more. 
Civilised  nations  are,  without  exception,  peace-loving, 
and  even  if  they  desire  to  protect  their  feeding-ground, 
they  have,  by  the  aid  of  international  commerce,  so 
organised  the  world  that  the  feeding  problem  has  long 
since  been  solved,  and  is  no  longer  a  motive  for  war 
enterprises.     The  much-talked  of  "craving  for  expan- 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCK\CY!       281 

sion"  of  this  or  that  people,  even  if  it  existed,  would 
nowhere  lead  to  war.  But  it  does  not  exist;  like  the 
"enmity"  between  peoples,  it  is  an  artificial  product 
of  dynastic  sophistry  and  politics.  The  most  densely 
populated  countries  (China  in  Asia,  and  Belgium  in 
Europe)  have  ever  been  the  most  peaceful. 

But  dynasties,  by  their  very  nature,  have  always 
been  soldiers  and  conquerors.  In  the  House  of  Hohen- 
zollern,  for  example,  royal  princes  are  made  lieutenants 
of  the  Guard  on  the  completion  of  their  tenth  year.^ 
Can  it  be  marvelled  at  that  all  their  later  actions  and 
thoughts  are  controlled  by  military  conceptions  ?  Men 
with  such  an  education  and  habit  of  thought  would, 
of  necessity  feel  themselves  very  superfluous  in  a  world 
of  unbroken  peace.  A  world  without  war  and  adven- 
ture would  necessarily  seem  to  them  an  insipid  and 
tedious  world.  One  who  is  dubbed  a  soldier  in  his 
cradle  and  surrounded  his  whole  life  through  by  none 
but  soldiers  is  led  finally  to  believe  that  the  whole 
world  was  only  created  for  soldiers.  And  what  is  to 
become  of  soldiers,  if  matters  are  so  arranged,  that 
henceforth  they  will  find  no  employment  ?  A  man  who 
regards  the  organisation  of  armies  and  the  elaboration 
of  strategic  plans  as  his  life-work  is  naturally  de- 
pressed at  seeing  all  his  work  and  genius  become  only 

^  Still  more  pronounced  is  the  military  tradition  of  the  House 
of  Hapsburg.  One  of  the  first  orders  issued  by  Emperor  Charles 
I.  of  Austria  on  his  recent  accession  to  the  throne  was  that  of 
November  28th,  1916:  *'I  desire  that  my  first-born  son,  sent  me 
by  God's  grace,  shall  from  now  be  a  member  of  my  brave,  heroic 
army,  and  I  therefore  make  him  honorary  Colonel-in-Chief  of 
my  Infantry  Regiment  No.  17,  which  henceforth  shall  bear  the 
title  'Crown  Prince.' "  This  new  Colonel-in-Chief  was  then  but 
four  years  old. 


282        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

of  theoretical  importance.  ''Heavens !  If  it  were  only 
the  real  thing!"  exclaimed  the  German  Crown  Prince 
on  the  occasion  of  a  sham  cavalry  charge.  What  else 
should  he  say?  It  must  necessarily  appear  absurd 
to  him  that  an  army  should  always  remain  a  plaything. 
How  galling  then  it  must  be  to  generals  and  diplomats 
to  see  their  splendid  genius  packed  away  as  of  no 
further  practical  use. 

If  the  world  were  organised  for  peace,  it  would  at 
length  inquire,  Why  all  these  armies  and  generals? 
Why  these  manoeuvres  for  the  delight  of  Crown 
Princes?  But  the  world  is  not  organised  for  peace. 
^'Should  anyone  attempt  to  assail  or  violate  our  good 
right,  then  strike  out  with  the  mailed  fist !  And,  if  God 
wills,  wreathe  about  your  young  brow  with  laurels, 
that  no  one  in  the  German  Empire  will  begrudge  you." 
These  were  the  words  of  William  II.  to  his  brother 
Henry  on  his  expedition  (December  15th,  1897)  to  East 
Asia.  And  God  wills  it  always !  The  old  German  god 
has  never  allowed  eternal  peace  to  last  eternally.  Al- 
ways there  comes  a  day  on  which  the  dynasty  is  in  the 
sad  necessity  of  having  to  show  that  army  and  navy 
are  in  truth  no  playthings  and  that  it  has  been  sum- 
moned by  God  to  wreathe  laurels  round  its  brow. 
''Diplomacy  is  traffic  in  human  flesh";  so  said  Bis- 
marck, who  must  have  known. 

We  are  no  Jacobins  and  fanatics.  It  would  be 
absurd  to  reproach  us  with  hating  the  monarchy  per  se. 
The  lessons  of  history  have  not  been  lost  on  us. 

And  it  was  in  fact  a  Hohenzollern  who  defined 
monarchy  in  a  way  that  we  democrats  and  pacifists 
would  subscribe  to  with  alacrity.  Frederick  II., 
named  the  Great,  wrote  in  the  year  1738:    "Here  lies 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       283 

the  error  of  most  princes.    They  believe  that  God  has 
created  this  multitude  of  men,  whose  welfare  is  com- 
mitted to  their  charge,  expressly  and  out  of  special 
consideration  for  their  greatness,  their  happiness  and 
their  pride,  and  that  their  subjects  are  only  destined 
to  be  the  tools  and  servants  of  their  lower  passions. 
Since  the  principle  from  which  one  starts  is  itself  false, 
all  the  consequences  from  it  must  also  be  unsound: 
for  instance,  the  craving  for  false  glory,  the  burning 
desire  to  conquer  everything,  the  burdening  of  the 
people  with  crushing  taxation,  the  sloth  of  the  princes, 
their  pride,   their  injustice,   their  inhumanity,    their 
tyranny  and  all  those  other  vices  which  degrade  human 
nature.    If  princes  would  only  be  persuaded  to  emanci- 
pate themselves  from  such  erroneous  views  and  to 
recognise  once  again  the  purpose  for  which  they  were 
instituted,    they   would    perceive   that   this    office    of 
which  they  are  so  proud,  and  their  elevation  to  it,  has 
been   purely   the   work    of    the   peoples;   that    these 
thousands  of  human  beings  committed  to  their  charge 
by  no  means  made  themselves  the  slaves  of  a  single 
man  in  order  to  make  him  more  terrible  and  more 
powerful  still!  that  they  by  no  means  subjected  them- 
selves to  a  fellow  citizen  in  order  to  be  the  victims  of 
his  caprices  and  the  plaything  of  his   fantasy;  but 
that  they  chose  from  their  midst  him  whom  they 
considered  the  most  upright,  to  rule  over  them  for 
their  good,  and  to  care  for  them  like  a  father;  him 
whom  they  deemed  the  most  humane,  that  he  should 
sympathise  with   and   aid   them  in  their  afflictions; 
him  whom  they  deemed  the  strongest,  that  he  should 
protect   them   against   their    foes;    him   whom   they 
deemed  the  shrewdest,  that  he  might  not  involve  them 


284        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

at  a  wrong  time  in  destructive  and  ruinous  wars;  in 
short,  the  man  whom  they  deemxed  fittest  to  repre- 
sent the  whole  body  politic,  whose  sovereign  power 
should  be  a  pillar  of  law  and  justice  and  not  a  means 
of  committing  crimes  and  practising  tyranny  with 
impunity/'-'-  Thus  wrote  Frederick  the  Great  175 
years  ago.  Let  us  now  compare  these  truly  kingly 
words  of  a  Hohenzollern  with  the  imperial  words 
of  another  Hohenzollern  and  note  that  between 
the  two  lies  a  period  of  150  years  of  democratic 
development : 

*'As  he  (William  I.)  thought,  so  do  I  also  think 
and  I  see  in  the  people  and  country  which  I  have 
inherited  a  talent  entrusted  to  me  by  God,  which — 
as  it  is  written  in  the  Bible — it  is  my  duty  to  increase, 
and  concerning  which  I  shall  one  day  have  to  render 
account.  I  intend  to  devote  all  my  energies  to  putting 
out  this  talent  to  such  good  usury  that  I  shall  add  to 
it,  I  trust,  many  talents  more.  Those  who  desire  to 
aid  me  in  my  task  are  heartily  welcome,  whoever  they 
may  be;  but  those  who  oppose  me  in  this  work  I 
will  crush"    (Berlin,   March   5th,   1890). 

*'I  may  remark,  moreover,  that  the  fact  that  we 
have  been  enabled  to  achieve  what  has  been  achieved 
is  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  in  our  House  the 
tradition  prevails,  that  we  regard  ourselves  as  ap- 
pointed by  God,  to  rein  over  the  peoples  whom  we  have 
been  called  to  rule,  and  to  guide  them  in  accordance 
with    their    welfare    and    the    furtherance    of    their 

*"K6nigliche  Gedanken  und  Ausspriiche  Friedrichs  des 
Grossen,"  published  by  the  Deutsche  Bibliothek  in  Berlin,  pp. 
5  and  6. 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       285 

material  and  spiritual  interests"  (Bremen,  April  21st, 
1890). 

"I  do  not  believe  that  the  Mark  of  Brandenburg 
will  hesitate  to  follow  me  on  the  paths  I  am  treading. 
You  know  that  I  regard  my  whole  position  and  my 
mission  as  one  entrusted  to  me  by  God,  and  that  I 
am  called  to  execute  the  mandates  of  a  Higher  Being 
to  whom  I  shall  hereafter  have  to  render  account" 
(Berlin,  February  20th,  1891). 

''He  (William  I.)  came  forth  from  Coblence,  on 
ascending  the  throne,  as  a  chosen  vessel  of  the  Lord, 
and  as  such  he  regarded  himiself .  For  us  all,  and 
especially  for  us  Princes,  he  has  once  more  lifted  on 
high  a  jewel  and  endowed  it  with  greater  brilliancy, 
a  jewel  that  we  must  keep  high  and  holy;  I  mean,  the 
monarchy  by  God's  grace.  The  monarchy  with  its 
heavy  duties,  its  never  ending,  ever  continuing  toil  and 
labour,  with  its  fearful  responsibility  to  the  Creator 
alone,  from  which  no  man,  no  minister,  no  house  of 
deputies  and  no  people  can  relieve  its  prince" 
(Coblence,  August  31st,  1897). 

I  do  not  believe  that  there  are  many  Germans  who, 
comparing  these  views  of  two  Hohenzollerns,  would  be 
inclined  to  give  the  preference  to  that  of  William  U. 
For,  just  because  Frederick  the  Great  regards  the 
monarchy  as  the  work  of  the  people  and  the  King  as  a 
citizen  among  citizens,  he  appears  to  us  more  human, 
greater  and  nobler  than  his  imperial  successor,  who  no 
longer  speaks  as  the  "first  servant  of  the  State"  and 
as  a  man  to  his  fellow-men,  but  convulsively  clings  to 
that  divine  authority  so  vigorously  denounced  by 
his  great  ancestor,  belauds  the  monarchy  as  the 
work  of  Heaven,  and  speaks  to  us,  on  every  occasion, 


286        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

as    the    governor    of    the    State,    the    ruler    of    his 
subjects. 

To  repeat:  We  are  not  Jacobins  and  demagogues. 
We  are  writing  without  hatred  and  passion,  as  uphold- 
ers of  free  States  and  free  peoples.  We  leave  to  the 
dynasties  what  belongs  to  dynasties.  Frederick  the 
Great  found  no  imitators,  least  of  all  in  his  own  house. 
For  humanity,  genius,  and  liberalism  are,  on  thrones 
as  elsewhere  in  hfe,  only  exceptions.  The  average  in- 
telligence of  dynasties  will  always  regard  the  monarch 
as  the  earthly  representative  of  God  and  thus  always 
choose  out  of  two  possible  solutions  the  one  that  is 
the  less  liberal  and  the  less  well  disposed  towards  the 
people.  The  limitations  of  human  dynasties  will 
always  lead  them  to  discover  in  Liberalism  a  direct 
menace  to  their  existence.  Kant  says  ironically: 
*'It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  kings  should  become 
philosophers  or  philosophers  kings,  nor  is  it  to  be 
wished;  because  the  possession  of  power  inevitably 
renders  the  mind  incapable  of  free  judgment."  And 
Nietzsche  adds  (in  reference  to  Germany  and  the 
Germans)  :  *'The  cost  of  power  is  high;  power 
destroys  the  intelligence.'' 

The  possession  of  power  does  actually  rob  dynasties 
of  their  free  judgment,  of  a  noble  sense  of  justice,  and 
of  a  rational  regard  for  the  interests  of  others.  It  is, 
accordingly,  only  what  might  have  been  expected  if 
they  recognise  no  limits  and  laws,  in  respect  to  the 
satisfaction  of  their  own  energies  and  ambitions,  and 
if  they  view  the  world's  history  as  merely  a  chain  of 
glorious  martial  achievements,  for  the  renewal  of 
which  they  must  constantly  provide,  inasmuch  as 
they    are    the    representatives    of    God    and    wars 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       287 

are  an  element  of  the  Divine  ordering  of  the  world. 

In  the  eyes  of  dynasties  a  nation  is  a  mere  rude  mass 
and  chaos  which  God  has  placed  in  the  world  for  their 
sole  pleasure.  Dynasties  may  have  the  best  inten- 
tions, but  they  are  and  remain  the  prisoners  of  their 
origin  and  upbringing.  Even  Frederick  II.  is  not 
styled  "the  Great"  because  he  was  a  philosopher 
and  poet,  a  friend  of  Voltaire  and  the  author  of  the 
"Antimachiavell,"  but  because,  in  spite  of  his  philo- 
sophical and  liberal  ideas,  he  became  a  great  strategist 
and  the  conqueror  of  new  provinces.  And,  in  our  own 
times,  we  have  the  case  of  William  II.,  which,  like 
so  many  others,  furnishes  a  striking  proof  of  the  fact 
that  a  dynasty,  even  where  it  regards  peace  as  a 
good  thing  in  principle,  is  none  the  less,  as  a  result 
of  its  mystical,  in  some  degree  practical,  but 
always  profoundly  traditional  policy  of  armaments 
and  provocations,  finally  driven  into  yet  another 
war. 

As  long  as  there  are  dynasties  endued  with  divine 
prerogatives,  they  will  remain,  what  they  must  be 
from  their  very  origin,  adventurers  and  not  statesmen. 
When  their  adventures  are  successful  they  become 
heroes;  when  they  fail,  they  forfeit  a  portion  or  the 
whole  of  their  power.  But,  in  any  event,  their  concep- 
tion of  the  world  and  humanity  will  remain  primitive, 
mystic,  pagan  and  romantic.  He  who  enjoys  inter- 
course with  the  gods  can  claim  a  separate  moral  code 
for  himself.  Perfidy,  deceit,  treachery  and  brutality 
are  the  necessary  accompaniments  of  all  statecraft 
which  serves  dynastic  interests.  Military  victory 
hallows    everything.      Guilt    is    here    the    necessary 


288        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

condition  of  greatness;  honour  and  truth  a  subject 
for  mockery. 

The  craving  for  power  knows  no  other  limit  than 
the  power  of  another.  In  the  realm  of  dynastic  policy 
everything  is  a  question  of  brute  force.  The  theory  of 
all  dynastic  policy  is  competition  for  the  greater  power, 
its  practice — the  butt-end  of  the  musket.  The  question 
Who  is  the  stronger,  the  more  influential,  the  wealthier, 
you  or  I?  dominates  all.  Popular  weal  and  progress 
are  merely  a  phrase  and  a  pretext.  Their  true  phi- 
losophy is  the  cannon,  their  right  the  right  of  the 
stronger,  who  remains  a  darling  of  the  gods  so  long  as 
he  does  not  meet  one  stronger  than  himself.  The  right 
of  the  brigand  too  is  divine,  as  long  as  he  does  not 
allow  himself  to  be  caught ;  he  too  can  pose  as  a  darling 
of  the  gods  as  long  as  he  can  defend  himself  success- 
fully against  the  police. 

Why  should  one  blame  dynasties  for  this?  The 
thirst  for  power  and  riches  is  in  all  of  us.  It  is  a  law 
of  our  existence;  without  which  there  would  be  no 
progress  in  the  world.  In  order  to  keep  this  "will  to 
power"  within  such  bounds  as  are  essential  to  civil 
order  and  security  we  established  codes  and  courts  of 
law.  These  set  limits  to  the  "will  to  power"  in  private 
life  and  create  what  we  call  "Culture,"  administration 
of  justice,  civilisation,  morals,  and  so  forth. 

But,  thanks  to  their  divine  origin  and  calling, 
dynasties  stand  beyond  and  above  all  legal  control. 
For  them,  there  are  neither  laws  nor  judges,  and,  even, 
in  most  cases  not  even  critics.  They  prescribe  laws  for 
themselves,  they  alone  control  their  actions  and  are 
only  responsible  to  the  "Almighty,"  to  whom  they 
will  "one  day"  have  to  render  account.     Altogether, 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       289 

a  most  envious  position,  from  which,  as  they  them- 
selves say,  "no  Minister,  no  Parliament,  no  people" 
can  release  them.  Hence,  everything  that  they  do  is 
"done  well,"  for  all  their  acts  are  done  in  accordance 
with  directions  from  above.  Why  then  should  it 
surprise  us  if  the  dynasties,  in  order  to  satisfy  their 
craving  for  power,  resort  to  means  which  we,  in  pri- 
vate life,  should  call  criminal ?  The  idea  of  guilt  and 
crime  does  not  exist  for  a  dynasty,  or,  rather,  only  be- 
gins to  exist  when  its  vital  interests  are  imperilled.  If, 
for  example,  it  is  a  crime  to  doubt  the  divinity  of  the 
dynasty,  it  is  not  a  crime  to  violate,  in  the  higher 
interests  of  the  State,  treaties  that  have  been  solemnly 
ratified,  and  to  send  hundreds  of  thousands  of  citizens 
to  their  death  for  a  matter  that  in  reality  is  of  quite  a 
different  complexion  from  that  in  which  it  has  been 
represented  to  them. 

We  must,  once  and  for  all,  make  clear  to  ourselves 
that  the  "dynasty  by  God's  grace"  is  nothing  else 
than  lawlessness  reduced  to  legal  forms.  What  is 
prohibited  to  the  citizen  is  enjoined  upon  the  soldier; 
where  the  one  is  punished,  the  other  is  rewarded,  and 
vice  versa.  The  dynasty  has  the  right  to  change  the 
highest  into  the  lowest,  the  common  into  the  sacred, 
and  lies  into  truth,  without  anyone  having  the  right 
to  protest.  There  is  something  of  an  adjuration  in 
the  words  that  Gustav  Freytag  used  with  regard  to 
the  Hohenzollerns — "To  stand  above  others,  as  God 
of  Battles  and  as  the  earthly  Fate  of  hundreds  of 
thousands,  renders  the  best  and  noblest  man  at  last 
susceptible  to  the  hateful  idea:  I  am  the  State!" 
Freytag  forgets  that  this  thought  is  never  hateful 
to  dynasties;  it  rather  belongs  to  the  logic  of  their 


290       THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

case,  it  is  noble  and  God-ordained.  For  the  "will  to 
power"  is  a  law  of  life  that  cannot  disappear  until 
the  world  ceases  to  be  a  world.  It  would  be  folly  to 
attempt  to  deny  or  suppress  this  will  to  power.  It 
is  sufficient  to  reckon  with  its  existence  and  to  pre- 
scribe for  it  those  limits  that  must  be  prescribed  in  the 
interest  of  the  common  weal. 

Just  as  a  servant  girl  who,  by  her  good  looks  and 
coquetry,  has  come  to  dress  in  silk  will  at  once 
want  to  become  a  countess,  so  a  dynasty  that,  with 
wars  and  victories,  has  arrived  at  the  purple  will  be 
at  once  possessed  by  the  idea  that  it  has  not  its  due 
place  in  the  sun.  A  dynasty  without  a  dream  of 
power  would  be  as  absurd  as  an  artisan  without  the 
desire  for  increased  wages.  And  every  dynasty  which 
has  in  part  realised  its  dream  of  power  has  imme- 
diately transformed  it  into  a  dream  of  world  power. 
And  yet  every  dynasty  has  suffered  shipwreck  through 
this  dream  of  world-domination;  at  last,  the  eagle  is 
brought  low  by  the  arrow  its  own  feathers  have 
furnished. 

All  this  is  so  logical  that  we,  as  psychologists  and 
historians,  have  not  the  right  to  make  it  a  reproach 
against  the  dynasties.  At  the  most,  it  is  the  nations 
who  deserve  reproaches  because  they  were  not  willing 
or  able  to  perceive  at  the  right  time  the  "will  to 
power"  of  their  dynasties,  and  so  to  restrict  it  in 
accordance  with  the  general  ideas  of  justice  that  it 
could  no  longer  menace  the  general  weal.  This  restric- 
tion— wherever  it  has  been  carried  into  effect — has 
rarely  been  a  free  and  voluntary  act,  dictated  by  deep 
philosophical  or  moral  conviction,  but,  for  the  most 
part,  the  result  of  external  circumstances  and  bitter 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY  I       291 

economic  necessity.  The  curse  of  an  avenging  God 
seems  to  lie  upon  the  nations.  They  must  wade 
through  a  Red  Sea  of  blood  and  tears  before  they  can 
escape  from  the  Pharaohs.  In  the  days  of  Moses 
our  Lord  God  mercifully  divided  the  Red  Sea  for  the 
benefit  of  the  Israelites,  so  that  they  could  cross  on 
dry  foot  into  the  Promised  Land,  but  to-day,  alas! 
He  no  longer  performs  miracles.  It  appears  to-day, 
as  it  did  in  the  days  of  Napoleon,  as  if  the  nations  of 
Europe  would  drown  in  the  Red  Sea.  But  this  is  only 
appearance.  The  nations  will  reach  the  further  shore, 
and  above  the  bloodstained  and  hideous  fields  of  battle 
the  sun  of  the  Promised  Land  of  Liberty  will  at  length 
rise. 

Every  dynasty  once  dwelt  in  a  fisherman's  cottage 
and  was,  like  Frau  Ilsebill  in  Grimm's  well-known 
fairy-tale,  discontented  with  its  fate.  In  the  fisher- 
man's hut  she  dreamt  of  ducal  and  royal  thrones  and 
ordered  her  husband  to  tell  the  flounder,  which  he  had 
set  at  liberty,  of  her  desire.  And  scarcely  was  it 
fulfilled  when  Frau  Ilsebill  in  her  new  royal  palace 
dreamt  of  an  imperial  palace.  When  she  had  procured 
this  also  from  the  flounder  and  had  dreamt  for  some 
time  of  boundless  realms  on  which  the  sun  never  set, 
she  next  wanted  to  become  like  the  Lord  God  Himself, 
and  demanded  of  the  flounder  that  he  should  find  her 
a  place  in  Heaven.  And  so  her  husband  had  to  go 
once  again  and  beg  the  wrathful  flounder  to  satisfy 
his  wife's  ambition,  as  otherwise  his  house  would  be 
a  hell.  And  whenever  Frau  Ilsebill  secured  a  higher 
rank,  the  sea  surged  high  and  became  dark  and  violet 
and  blood-red,  until  the  wrathful  flounder  at  length 


292        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

caused  the  imperial  and  papal  palace  to  be  destroyed 
with  thunder  and  lightning,  and  the  good  fisherman 
found  his  Frau  Ilsebill  once  more  back  in  the  wretched 
fisherman's  hut  on  the  shore. 

Thus  it  was  in  China  and  in  Rome,  in  Persia 
and  Spain,  in  Egypt  and  Mexico,  in  the  Papal 
States  and  in  France.  Thus  it  was,  has  remained, 
and  will  always  remain,  as  long  as  there  are  dynasties 
which  enjoy  direct  intercourse  with  God  and  are  sensed 
by  an  obliging  fisherman  who  is  always  ready  to  defy 
the  elements  in  order  to  satisfy  his  wife's  vanity. 

For,  in  contrast  to  the  servant  girl  who  wants  to 
become  a  countess  and  thereby  at  the  worst  ruins  a 
few  lovers,  the  history  of  Frau  Ilsebill  is  at  the  same 
time  the  history  of  nations;  she  does  not  dream  her 
dream  of  power  like  other  mortals  at  her  own  risk  and 
peril,  but  for  the  use  and  delectation  of  her  subjects. 
Almost  twenty  years  of  war  and  a  Red  Sea  of  human 
blood  were  necessary  in  order  to  extinguish  the  dream 
of  power  of  the  great  Corsican  and  to  bring  him  back 
again  to  the  fisherman's  hut  whence  he  had  come. 

:|s  ii«  ^  ^  ^ 

We  might  now,  when  we  consider  the  rise  and  the 
disastrous  fall  of  every  dynasty,  say  with  Nietzsche 
that  "history  is  an  eternal  repetition,"  and  this 
would,  at  the  close  of  our  investigation,  bring  us  back 
to  the  standpoint  of  the  Treitschkes,  Moltkes,  and 
Bernhardis.  That  is  to  say,  we  should  join  with  them 
in  declaring  war  to  be  a  law  of  nature  and  a  civilising 
and  educational  force  and  in  regarding  its  perpetual 
recurrence  as  a  matter  of  course. 

Fortunately,  however,  history  can  only  remain  an 
eternal  repetition  so  long  as  the  essential  conditions 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!        293 

remain  the  same.  Hitherto,  as  we  have  seen,  dynasties 
have  been  an  essential  condition  of  the  world's  history. 
But  are  they  to  remain  so  in  the  future?  We  say 
frankly,  No!  The  Revolutions  in  England,  France, 
and  elsewhere,  the  declaration  of  human  and  civic 
rights  and  their  more  or  less  successful  application 
to  politics,  have  furnished  the  proof  that  dynasties 
have  long  ceased  to  be  an  essential  condition,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  are  only  an  artificially  fostered  attri- 
bute of  modern  humanity.  For  example,  the  history 
of  Germany  during  the  past  century  may  be  taken  as 
a  proof  that  dynasties  constantly  force  their  peoples 
into  opposition  to  the  great  aspirations  of  humanity, 
and  are  thus  only  a  hindrance  to  the  only  progress 
of  mankind  that  is  desirable. 

Destruction  by  lightning  was  an  ^'eternal  repeti- 
tion" until  the  lightning-conductor  was  discovered. 
But  man  set  a  limit  to  the  divine  and  abso- 
lute power  of  the  lightning,  and  since  then  no 
one  asserts  any  longer  that  destruction  by  lightning  is 
inevitable,  divine,  and  the  will  of  Nature.  The  heated 
room  and  the  fur  cloak  are,  as  it  were,  a  protest  against 
the  Divine  order,  which  intends  that  we  shall  feel  cold 
in  winter.  We  invented  insurance  companies  as  a 
protection  against  fires,  damage  by  hail,  disease, 
robberies,  etc.,  all  of  which  latter  are  also  divine 
institutions.  That  is  to  say:  Whenever  mankind 
felt  the  eternal  recurrence  of  certain  events  to  be  both 
painful  and  avoidable,  it  contrived  to  get  rid  of  many 
divine  institutions.  Consider,  for  instance,  the  Plague, 
against  which,  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the  only  remedies 
were  fast  days  and  processions. 

Though  dynasties  by  God's  grace  are  not  the  Plague, 


294        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

they  are,  like  the  Plague,  an  eminently  divine  institu- 
tion, the  very  existence  of  which  is  in  direct  antago- 
nism to  everything  that  modern  humanity  must  de- 
mand for  the  security  of  its  existence  and  liberty. 

The  present  World  War  is  in  every  sense  so  terrible 
that  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  it  has  thoroughly  disgusted 
nations  with  this  "eternal  repetition"  of  history. 
The  desire  for  final  emancipation  from  this  scourge 
of  mankind  was  never  more  general,  more  ardent,  and 
more  urgent  than  it  is  to-day.  And  therefore  the 
nations  will  derive  from  this  World  War  a  sacred 
right  to  exclaim  to  the  dynasties: 

''Enough,  more  than  enough!  Your  day  is  over. 
We  need  you  no  more.  You  are  adventurers  and  not 
statesmen.  We  wish  at  length  to  be  ourselves.  Avray 
with  your  divine  rights !  Away  with  all  the  sacred 
trumpery  of  bygone  days!  We  wish,  at  length,  to 
have  a  policy  of  our  own  choosing.  For  we,  and  not 
you,  express  the  meaning  of  the  world.  We,  and  not 
you,  are  vessels  of  God's  grace.  Hitherto  we  have 
been  your  chattels.  We  believed  that  you  meant  well 
by  us.  We  now  perceive  that  (less  out  of  malice  than 
by  instinct  and  tradition)  you  have  remained  as  you 
were,  that  you  can  never  possibly  entertain  that  idea 
of  general  weal  and  culture  that  we  must  demand  at 
the  present  day.  That  which  increases  your  fame 
increases  our  unhappiness;  that  which  seems  to  you 
an  element  of  the  divine  order  of  things  seems  to  us 
a  crime  against  humanity  and  civilisation.  You  wish 
to  make  us  happy  by  means  of  war?  To-day  we  have 
other  tasks.  We  are  no  longer  barbarians,  for  whom 
war  meant  livelihood,  glory  and  sport.  We  desire 
peace.    If  your  lust  for  adventure  can  only  be  satisfied 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!        295 

by  war,  go  to  the  Indians  and  the  negroes.  Europe 
is  no  longer  an  arena  for  swashbucklers  and  tyrants. 
The  taxpaying  citizen,  pledged  to  military  service, 
shall  be,  henceforth,  the  sole  sovereign  of  Europe. 
Even  if  it  were  proved  that  all  the  wielders  of  divine 
prerogatives  were  men  of  genius  (and  the  world's 
history  shows  the  opposite  to  be  the  case),  we  will 
not  and  cannot  trust  ourselves  any  longer  to  their 
mercy/' 


The  Prerequisite  Conditions  for  a  EuROPRAiq" 

Peace 

What,  therefore,  we  ask  in  the  name  of  the  future 
peace  and  civilisation  of  Europe  is,  in  general  terms, 
the  continuation,  completion,  and  the  widest  possible 
application  of  the  principles  proclaimed  by  the  great 
French  Revolution.  The  World  War  must  complete 
the  work  of  that  Revolution,  which  has  been  inter- 
rupted by  the  dynasties,  or,  at  all  events,  it  must  open 
the  way  to  mankind  for  the  gradual  realisation  of 
these  immortal  human  ideals. 

And  what  we,  in  particular,  ask  of  Germany  Is  a 
general  transformation  of  generally  accepted  ideas  and 
institutions. 

The  first  and  the  most  general  demand  that  we 
German  democrats  and  pacifists  urge  is :  Germany  for 
the  Germans!  German  government  by  the  German 
People.  And  in  order  that  this  popular  government 
shall  not,  as  hitherto,  be  merely  a  comedy  for  the 
delectation  of  exalted  personages,  we  make  this  second 
fundamental  demand:     The  German  Army  for  the 


296        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

German  People!  The  armed  force  must  be  the  sup- 
port and  servant  of  the  popular  sovereignty! 

Universal  military  service  without  popular  sover- 
eignty is  political  serfdom.  That  an  army  composed 
of  all  the  citizens  of  the  nation  should  take  the  oath 
to  the  person  of  the  sovereign  may  be  very  well  for 
a  negro  or  Aztec  State,  but  in  the  case  of  a  great 
modern  nation  it  is  a  scandal  which  at  length  must 
cease. 

By  the  carrying  out  of  these  two  fundamental 
reforms  all  the  rest  are  achieved  automatically:  a 
thorough  revision  of  the  German  Imperial  Constitu- 
tion, abolition  of  the  Prussian  "three  class"  franchise, 
reasonably  proportioned  electoral  districts,  Ministers 
selected  from  the  Parliamentary  body  and  responsible 
to  it,  the  abolition  of  all  the  political  privileges  of  the 
Junkers  and  officers;  in  short,  a  safeguarding  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  will  of  the  German  people  in  all 
departments. 

How  this  new  Constitution  and  popular  assembly 
will  deal  with  the  monarchy  (assuming  that  we  are  ab- 
solutely bound  to  have  one)  is  a  secondary  matter.  We 
shall  be  satisfied,  in  the  first  instance,  with  those  fun- 
damental reforms  as  a  result  of  which  the  will  of  the 
German  people  shall  be  declared  supreme  in  Germany 
and  shall  retain  the  effective  political  power.  Whether 
the  head  of  the  State  holds  the  title  of  President,  King, 
or  Emperor,  whether  his  dignity  is  hereditary  or  not, 
matters  not  a  jot.  The  most  progressive  European 
democracy  (Denmark)  is  not  a  republic,  but  a  kingdom. 
Italy,  England,  Sweden,  Norway,  to  some  extent  also 
Spain,  are  republics  under  monarchical  titles.  We  are 
not  concerned   with  phrases  and  etiquette,  but  with 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!        297 

actualities.     And  the  actuality  to  be  achieved  must 

be  that  the  head  of  the  German  State  shall  no  longer, 

by  divine  right,  satisfy  his  personal  craving  for  power 

above  the  heads  of  the  people,  but  that  he  shall  become 

the  executive  organ  of  the  will  of  the  German  people, 

and    that   the   actual   political   power,    at   home   and 

abroad,  shall  be  in  the  hands  of  the  German  people. 
***** 

The  World  War  has  proved  that  a  radical  change  in 
all  those  political  Constitutions  that  still  concede  to 
the  dynasties  divine  rights  and  the  supreme  command 
of  their  armed  might  is  no  longer  to-day  merely  a 
question  of  home  politics  for  any  people,  but  a  Euro- 
pean necessity. 

The  World  War  has  brought  about  an  exceptional 
state  of  things,  which,  in  the  interests  of  Europe,  must 
be  utilised  in  every  State  which  maintains  an  army, 
for  the  purpose  of  altering  the  Constitution  in  such  a 
way  that,  henceforth,  the  people  and  not  a  dynasty 
by  divine  right  shall  dispose  of  the  army,  which  is 
both  paid  for  by,  and  composed  of,  the  people. 

It  may  be  that  the  creation  of  this  exceptional  state 
of  things  will  prove  the  most  important  advantage 
which  the  nations  of  Europe  wull  reap  from  this  sac- 
rifice of  millions  of  lives.  For  that  which,  for  the 
past  century,  could  only  exist  as  a  vague  theory,  and, 
at  The  Hague  and  elsewhere,  was  openly  scoffed  at 
by  high  personages,  namely,  the  idea  of  an  under- 
standing between  the  nations  based  upon  international 
agreements,  may  now,  after  the  war  has  inevitably  led 
to  a  general  discussion  and  settlement  between  the 
nations  of  Europe,  be  easily  realised.  Although  the 
formation  of  a  League  of  Nations  for  the  securing  of 


298        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  world's  peace,  advocated  by  Kant  and  all  serious 
pacifists,  has  hitherto  been  wrecked  on  the  divine  rights 
of  dynasties,  the  World  War  has  now  seen  to  it  that 
this  resistance  shall  not  only  cease,  but  shall  be  recog- 
nised as  the  chief  cause  of  modern  wars. 

A  hundred  years  ago  Kant  demanded:  that  (a) 
the  inhabitants  of  a  State,  in  virtue  of  their  citizen- 
right;  (b)  the  States  in  their  mutual  relations,  in  vir- 
tue of  international  law;  and  (c)  men  and  States  in 
their  mutual  relations,  in  virtue  of  cosmopolitan  law, 
may  be  "regarded  as  citizens  of  one  world  State,"  and 
he  adds :  'This  classification  is  not  an  arbitrary  one, 
but  is  essential  in  reference  to  the  idea  of  eternal  peace. 
For,  if  even  one  of  these  were  in  a  position  physically 
to  influence  another  and  were  yet  in  a  natural  state, 
then  a  state  of  war  would  be  implied,  from  which  we 
desire  to  emancipate  ourselves. "•'■ 

And  as  Kant  insisted  a  hundred  years  ago,  it  is  no 
longer  a  question  of  putting  an  end  to  one  war,  but  to 
all  wars.  Since  almost  all  the  European  nations  are 
engaged  in  this  World  War,  they  will  all,  without  ex- 
ception, be  agreed  with  regard  to  ''the  enforcement 
of  Kant's  first  definite  article  of  perpetual  peace," 
which  states  clearly  and  positively:  *The  Civil  Con- 
stitution of  every  State  must  be  republican." 

We  therefore  demand  that  the  exceptional  condi- 
tions resulting  from  this  war  shall  be  utilised  for  the 
realisation  of  this  fundamental  reform  in  Europe,  a 
reform  equally  applicable  to,  equally  desired  by,  and 
equally  efficacious  for  all  countries  and  peoples,  and 

*Immanuel  Kant,  "Zum  ewigen  Frieden,"  published  by  Reclam 
(Leipzig),  note  to  p.  12. 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       299 

without  which  no  really  sound  state  of  peace  can  be 
brought  to  pass. 

All  that  respect  for  and  belief  in  the  authority  of 
God-appointed  dynasties,  which  has  been  bequeathed 
to  us  from  the  past,  must  give  way  before  this  funda- 
mental reform.  And,  especially  in  the  case  of  Ger- 
many, there  can  be  no  *'ifs"  and  "buts.'*  The  foolish 
chatter  of  German  professors  about  all  that  has  *'be- 
come  historic''  must  cease,  for  it  is  only  that  which  is 
in  process  of  ''becoming  historic"  that  must  influence 
us. 

If,  as  we  sincerely  hope,  the  statesmen  of  the  West- 
ern Democracies  will  have  to  speak  the  decisive  word 
in  the  peace  negotiations,  then  they  will  employ  the 
power  that  they  have  won  through  the  war  to  for- 
mulate and  insist  upon  the  satisfaction  of  demands  ex- 
pressed somewhat  as  follows,  and  applicable  to  and 
binding  upon  all  nations  and  States. 

1.  The  Civil  Constitution  in  every  State  shall  be 
republican.  That  is  to  say:  no  State  shall,  hereafter, 
be  governed  by  divine  rights  and  arbitrary  principles. 
The  chief  command  of  the  armed  forces  and  the 
decision  as  to  war  and  peace  shall,  henceforth,  in 
all  States  reside  in  Parliaments  formed  on  a  basis 
of  universal,  equal,  and  direct  suffrage,  and  endowed 
with  responsible  Ministers. 

2.  So  soon  as  in  any  State  a  coup  d'etat  is  threat- 
ened or  put  into  effect,  which  might  in  any  way  limit 
or  even  abolish  these  supreme  powers  of  the  Parlia- 
ment, the  other  States  shall,  in  the  name  of  the 
world's  peace,  have  a  right  to  protest  against  and,  if 


300        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

necessary,  to  frustrate  by  force  of  arms  any  attempt 
to  restore  personal  despotism. 

This  last  condition  is  of  the  most  vital  importance. 
The  coming  peace  must  reckon,  once  and  for  all,  with 
the  invariable  existence  of  the  will  to  power;  it  must 
treat  it  as  a  law  of  nature,  deeply  rooted  in  the  human 
heart,  and  therefore  keep  a  tight  rein  on  it,  in  that 
sphere  in  w^hich  it  might  become  dangerous  to  the 
welfare  of  Europe,  namely,  in  politics. 

States  must,  therefore,  possess  the  common  right  to 
frustrate  the  warlike  ambitions  of  individuals.  The 
history  of  France,  during  a  period  of  less  than  fifty 
years,  displays  two  painful  instances  of  the  sorcery 
that  gifted  men  with  warlike  ambitions  are  able  to 
exercise  upon  the  popular  mind.  Twice  were  the  re- 
publican institutions  of  the  country  overruled  by  a 
Napoleon,  and  twice  did  the  consequences  of  these 
coups  d'etat  bring  Europe  to  desperation.  It  may 
happen,  in  fact  we  may  confidently  predict  that  it  will 
happen,  that  in  the  future  also  warlike  "supermen" 
will  rise  up,  and  that  a  nation  will  prove  too  weak  to 
resist  the  force  and  fascination  of  their  personality. 
We  earnestly  trust  that  the  men  who  will  presently  be 
called  upon  to  secure  for  Europe  a  lasting  peace  will 
do  their  work  completely,  and  contrive  to  secure  Eu- 
rope against  the  possibility  of  new  wars  in  the  future. 

International  politics  have  been  called  "a  concert  of 
the  Great  Powers."  If  anyone  makes  a  disturbance 
in  a  concert-hall  he  will  probably,  in  the  interests  of 
the  rest  of  the  audience,  be  turned  out.  But  if  in  the 
sphere  of  international  politics  some  disturber  of  the 
peace  has  at  his  disposal  such  a  powerful  army  that 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY  I       301 

he  can  hope  to  pit  his  strength  successfully  against  the 
rest,  it  is  not  sufficient  merely  to  turn  him  into  the 
street;  he  must  be  brought  to  reason  by  means  of  war. 
In  order  that  the  concert  of  the  Great  Powers  may  at 
length  become  harmonious  and  contribute  to  the  hap- 
piness of  the  nations,  care  must  be  taken  that  any  dis- 
turbers of  the  peace  are  henceforth  deprived  of  the 
opportunity  of  making  an  interruption.  Attacks  upon 
the  parliamentary  regime  of  a  State  are  attacks  upon 
its  peace.  Anyone  who  endangers  the  Republican 
Constitution  of  the  State  endangers  (even  though  at 
first  only  indirectly  and  instinctively)  the  peace  and 
security  of  the  nations,  and  must,  in  case  of  need,  be 
prevented  from  carrying  out  his  designs  by  the  inter- 
vention of  the  neighbouring  States. 

For,  as  we  have  said,  peace  does  not  depend  so 
much  upon  the  foreign  policy  as  upon  the  internal 
Constitution  of  the  States.  If  the  Constitution  is 
mediaeval,  militarist,  and  generally  autocratic,  then 
sooner  or  later  the  foreign  policy  of  the  State  will 
tend  towards  war. 

All  the  nations  will  be  in  favour  of  an  arrangement 
of  this  kind;  the  German  nation  more  than  any;  for 
no  nation  has  suffered  more  from  this  war  and  no 
nation  desired  it  less  than  the  German  nation. 

^*  ^5  3|t  ^^  ^^ 

The  speech  of  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor  on 
November  gtli,  191 6,  compels  me  to  make  a  digression. 

In  this  speech,  for  the  first  time  in  Prusso-German 
history,  a  German  statesman  expressed  himself,  in  the 
name  of  the  German  Government,  in  favour  of  an  idea 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  has  hitherto  been  strictly  for- 


302        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

bidden  in  the  Fatherland  of  Kant.  That  which  Kant 
and  his  disciples  proposed,  and  which  Prussian  Min- 
isters and  diplomatists  have  lustily  abused  in  the 
Reichstag  and  in  the  Press  and  systematically  thwarted 
at  all  the  Hague  Conferences,  namely,  the  formation 
of  a  general  League  of  Nations  for  the  safeguarding 
of  the  world's  peace,  has  now  finally  become  the  aim 
of  the  German  Government.  The  Imperial  Chancellor 
said:  "If,  when  the  war  is  ended,  this  terrible  de- 
struction of  property  and  life  is  at  length  fully  realised 
by  the  world,  then  throughout  the  whole  world  a  cry 
will  go  up  for  peaceful  settlements  and  for  Constitu- 
tions which,  as  far  as  lies  in  human  power,  shall  pre- 
vent the  recurrence  of  such  monstrous  calamities.  This 
cry  will  be  so  strong  and  so  justifiable  that  it  is  bound 
to  lead  to  this  result :  that  Germany  will  honestly  co- 
operate in  considering  any  attempt  to  find  a  practical 
solution  and  in  working  for  its  realisation.  All  the 
more  so  if  the  war,  as  we  confidently  expect,  produces 
political  conditions  w^hich  will  further  the  free  de- 
velopment of  all  nations,  great  and  small." 

Golden  words,  which  had  they  been  only  spoken 
ten  years  earlier  and  been  accompanied  by  corre- 
sponding acts  would  have  prevented  this  World  War. 
But,  unfortunately,  they  were  not  spoken  until  after 
twenty-seven  months  of  the  most  hopeless  war  that 
the  German  Government  has  ever  waged.  And,  un- 
fortunately also,  they  are  in  absolute  contradiction 
with  the  speeches  which  the  same  statesman  delivered 
on  December  9th,  191 5,  and  April  5th,  19 16,  when  the 
military  situation  of  Germany  was  more  favourable 
than  it  is  to-day. 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       303 

And  instead  of  showing  by  wise  moderation  that  he 
is  in  earnest  about  this  idea,  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
immediately  falls  into  the  exaggerations  typical  of  the 
newly  converted,  who  by  their  obtrusive  zeal  give 
rise  to  the  suspicion  that  they  discarded  their  errors 
of  yesterday  only  under  compulsion.  In  fact,  he  not 
only  answers  for  Germany's  willingness  to  co-operate 
in  creating  this  League  of  Nations,  but  he  also  at  the 
same  time  demands  that  Germany  should  preside  over 
it:  "Germany  is  willing  at  any  time  to  join  this 
League  of  Nations.  Yes,  and  even  place  herself  at  the 
head  of  a  League  of  Nations  which  would  keep  dis- 
turbers of  the  peace  in  check." 

That  is  too  much  of  a  good  thing.  Your  Excel- 
lency: one  does  not  immediately  make  a  bishop  of  a 
converted  heathen.  It  would  be  ridiculous  in  peace 
time  to  place  Germany  "iiber  alles"  after  having  pre- 
vented her  at  the  cost  of  enormous  sacrifices  from  be- 
coming "liber  alles"  by  means  of  war. 

The  pacifist  ideal  is  still  so  unfamiliar  to  the  leaders 
of  the  German  State,  that  they  view  it  from  a  military 
standpoint,  as  they  do  everything  else,  that  is  to  say, 
they  claim  a  controlling  and  commanding  position  in 
it.  As  if  in  the  League  of  Nations  dreamed  of  by 
Kant  and  his  disciples  there  could  ever  be  such  a  thing 
as  a  leader! 

But  how  lamentably  far  the  leaders  of  Germany  are 
from  a  true  understanding  of  pacifist  ideas  and  prac- 
tice is  apparent  not  only  from  these  turns  of  phrase, 
not  only  from  the  military  traditions  and  mode  of 
thought  of  our  dynasty,  but,  above  all,  from  their 
actions  in  the  present  unhappy  time.  Four  days  be- 
fore this  beautiful  pacifist  speech  was  delivered,  Wil- 


304        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

liam  II.  proclaimed  the  "autonomy"  of  Poland  with- 
out consulting  the  people  interested,  that  is,  with  de- 
liberate disregard  of  that  international  law  the  strict 
observance  of  which  must  be  an  essential  condition  for 
the  formation  of  such  a  League  of  Nations.  And  at 
the  same  moment  that  the  Imperial  Chancellor  was 
proclaiming  this  new  ideal  of  peace  to  the  nations  of 
Europe,  thousands  of  ''lazy"  Belgians  were  being  de- 
ported to  Germany,  in  open  mockery  of  The  Hague 
Conventions  (which  had  been  subscribed  to  by  the 
German  Emperor),  to  do  forced  labour.  What  con- 
fidence can  the  world  have  in  a  man  who  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war  called  treaties  "scraps  of  paper," 
and  at  the  very  moment  when  he  is  inviting  the  na- 
tions to  enter  into  new  treaties  is  still  treating  them 
as  scraps  of  paper? 

We  must  ask  the  same  question  when  we  consider 
the  attitude  of  the  German  Government  relative  to 
its  own  nation.  The  German  Reichstag  has  during 
the  course  of  this  World  War  frequently  and  emphati- 
cally put  forward  various  democratic  demands.  It 
is  true  that,  in  its  humility,  it  did  not  dare  to  begin 
at  the  beginning,  that  is  to  say,  to  demand  the  re- 
sponsibility of  Ministers,  redistribution  of  electoral  di- 
visions, and  parliamentary  control  over  the  army.  But, 
with  surprising  unanimity,  it  demanded  the  control  of 
foreign  policy  by  the  Reichstag,  the  abolition  of  the 
disgraceful  state  of  "siege,"  of  the  precautionary  su- 
pervision and  censorship,  the  exemption  of  princes 
from  taxation,  the  special  privileges  of  the  nobility, 
etc.  The  German  Government  either  abruptly  refused 
these  demands,  or,  with  pompous  speeches,  phrases, 
and  promises,  postponed  them  for  later  consideration. 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       305 

A  paltry  inscription  over  the  doorway  of  the  Reichs- 
tag Palace  and  a  few  trifling  reforms :  this  is  all  that 
the  war,  which  in  Russia  has  already  brought  about  a 
sort  of  parliamentary  regime,  has  done  for  Germany 
as  yet. 

And  is  this  Government,  which  before  the  war  did 
everything  in  its  power  to  discredit  the  ideals  of 
pacifism,  and  which,  since  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
has,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  systematically  trampled 
under  foot  any  treaties  and  constitutional  guarantees 
that  happened  to  be  inconvenient,  now  to  be  considered 
eligible  for  co-operating  in  the  creation  of  a  League 
of  Nations,  and  even  for  presiding  over  its  activities? 
This  illusion  can  only  be  entertained  by  those  ''scien- 
tific pacifists'*  who,  like  Dr.  Fried,  still  continue  to 
imagine  that  the  European  peace-omelette  can  be  made 
of  hard-boiled  feudal  eggs. 

The  rest  of  us  know  only  too  well  that  it  is  easier 
for  a  camel  to  pass  through  the  eye  of  a  needle  than 
for  a  representative  of  God's  grace  to  pass  through 
the  portals  of  a  democratic  temple  of  international 
rights.  If  we  tried  to  explain  to  the  German  Imperial 
Chancellor  upon  what  conditions  those  ^'peaceful 
agreements  and  Constitutions"  must  necessarily  be 
based,  if  they  are  really  "as  far  as  lies  in  human 
power"  to  safeguard  peace,  he  would  probably  be 
highly  indignant,  and  at  once  declare  that  this  was  not 
the  meaning  of  his  words.  Then  we  should  have  to 
reply  to  him : 

Is  your  Excellency,  in  the  name  of  His  Majesty, 
in  favour  of  the  creation  of  a  League  of  Nations  for 
the  safeguarding  of  the  world's  peace?  Your  Excel- 
lency has  read  Kant  and,  as  we  are  delighted  to  ob- 


3o6        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

serve,  understood  him  better  than  those  sclehtific 
pacifists  who  are  not  democrats ;  otherwise,  Your  Ex- 
cellency would  not  have  used  the  significant  word 
^'Constitutions"  in  your  speech.  Kant,  in  fact,  realised 
125  years  ago  that  international  conventions  without 
democratic  national  governments  are  a  trick,  which 
can  ensnare  only  arch-revolutionists  like  Scheide- 
mann,  or  peace  specialists  like  Fried.  The  first  thing, 
therefore,  that  Your  Excellency  ought  to  do,  if  the 
Government  of  Germany  desires  honestly  to  establish 
a  League  of  Nations  for  safeguarding  the  peace  of  the 
world,  is  to  lay  before  the  Reichstag  to-morrow,  in 
the  name  of  the  German  Emperor  and  the  Federal 
Council,  a  draft  of  a  Constitution  which  would  com- 
pletely transform  the  German  political  system.  There- 
fore, enough  of  those  trifling  reforms  and  inscriptions 
with  which  you  have  hitherto  delighted  men  like 
Scheidemann  for  whom  revolution  is  merely  a  subject 
for  oratory;  but  concede  to  the  German  people  what 
they  have  most  ardently  desired  for  decades  past:  a 
parliamentary  regime,  reconstruction  of  the  electoral 
districts,  abolition  of  the  supreme  command  of  the 
army  by  the  monarch,  and  so  forth. 

What  ?  Your  Excellency  thinks  these  demands  "re- 
volutionary" in  the  highest  degree,  ''dangerous  to  the 
State"?  That  seems  a  proof  that  you  are  afraid  to 
think  out  Kant's  idea  to  its  logical  conclusion.  For 
these  demands  are  only  the  logical  and  necessary  con- 
ditions for  the  League  of  Nations  that  Your  Excel- 
lency so  heartily  desires.  If  this  League  of  Nations 
were  not  based  on  these  democratic  reforms,  it  would 
be  only  "a  Holy  Alliance"  which  once  again  would  be 
subject  to  the  pleasure  of  our  God-appointed  rulers 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       307 

and  would  in  a  few  days  be  annulled  in  accordance 
with  the  will  of  God.  The  fundamental  idea  of  a 
monarchy  by  God's  grace  is  in  the  most  flagrant  con- 
tradiction with  the  fundamental  idea  of  the  proposed 
League  of  Nations.  Anyone  who  should  attempt  to 
reconcile  these  two  opposites,  that  is  to  say,  to  make 
out  of  one  who  executes  divine  laws  a  representative 
of  earthly  reason,  would  be  only  acting  a  farce,  even 
if  he  were  unconscious  of  the  fact.  And,  therefore, 
in  the  phrase  "League  of  Nations"  we  lay  the  em- 
phasis upon  the  last  word. 

Your  Excellency  is  perhaps  of  opinion  that  this 
international  League  of  Peace  can  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  internal  affairs  of  Germany,  but  that  later 
we  may  be  able  to  arrange  something?  No!  Your 
Excellency,  it  must  be  now!  At  this  very  moment! 
Immediate  peace  is  to  be  had  at  this  price.  Your  Ex- 
cellency knows  the  true  war  aim  of  the  Allied  West- 
ern Powers  just  as  well  as  we  do.  They  are  fighting 
for  the  democratising  of  Germany  and — based  upon 
this — the  realisation  of  the  plans  for  disarmament  and 
a  court  of  arbitration  which  Germany  frustrated  at 
The  Hague,  whatever  Scheidemann  and  his  like  may 
say.  Your  Excellency  has  in  your  heart,  as  we  know, 
the  same  sympathy  with  these  Don  Quixotes  as  we 
have.  For  your  Excellency  knows  positively  that  the 
Entente  is  only  an  "Entente"  because  in  Germany  the 
monarchy  by  God's  grace  rules  with  absolute  rights 
over  war  and  peace.  The  Entente  wants  what  Kant 
wanted!  So  do  the  German  people!  So  does  the 
whole  of  Europe!  And  Europe  has  learnt,  with  su- 
preme satisfaction,  that  at  the  bottom  of  your  heart 
Your  Excellency  wants  the  same ! 


3o8        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

But  begin  to  be  serious  about  it,  Your  Excellency! 
Begin  now!  Europe  is  bleeding  to  death !  Peace  can 
be  concluded  to-morrow  if  Your  Excellency  would 
take  the  first  step  towards  the  promised  League  of 
Nations  by  proclaiming  the  rights  of  the  German 
people. 

A  hundred  years  of  Prusso-German  history  have 
taught  us  (apart  from  a  few  Scheidemanns)  some 
wisdom.  Whenever  the  storm  has  rattled  the  Palace 
windows  we  have  received  abundant  promises  of 
heavenly  and  earthly  blessing,  of  Constitutions  and 
liberties ;  but  when  the  storm  had  passed,  not  a  word 
of  all  these  promises  was  ever  kept,  and  anti-democracy 
and  divine  rights  flourished  even  more  vigorously  than 
before.  The  German  people  is  not  made  up  of 
Scheidemanns.  The  latter  preached  revolution  and 
then  became  an  enthusiastic  champion  of  Emperor  and 
Empire,  when  Tsarism  began  to  be  supreme  in  Ger- 
many. The  German  people  is  less  ridiculous  and  more 
democratic.  It  has  devoted  itself  with  courage  and  in 
good  faith  to  the  defence  of  the  Fatherland,  and  all 
the  thanks  it  has  got  for  it  is  absolute  rule  enforced 
by  the  sword,  and  this  absolutism  has  been  mitigated 
neither  as  a  result  of  the  fair  promises  of  the  Gov- 
ernment nor  yet  by  the  economic  distress  prevailing* 
to-day  in  Germany. 

The  German  people  is  democratic  in  the  real  sense 
of  the  term.  And,  therefore,  Your  Excellency  cannot 
expect  that  the  German  people  will  for  all  time  be  con- 
tent with  democracy  in  the  shape  of  inscriptions  and 
promises.  Set  to  work  in  earnest.  Your  Excellency! 
An  immediate  and  an  honourable  peace  is  possible  if 
you  will  prove  to  the  German  people  (and  at  the  same 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY  I       309 

time  to  the  world  at  large)  by  democratic  actions  that 
the  German  Government  from  this  day  onward  swears 
allegiance  to  the  international  principles  of  pacifism. 
This  is  the  only  way. 

*  *  *  !|f  * 

Accordingly,  it  is  a  question  first  of  all  of  the  cre- 
ation and  of  the  putting  into  operation  of  democratic 
republican  Constitutions  in  all  countries,  and,  secondly, 
of  the  appointment  of  an  international  police  who  shall 
not  obtrude  themselves  in  normal  times  but  shall  be 
constantly  ready  to  check  any  threatened  violation  of 
these  Constitutions.  As  the  desire  for  war  of  a  single 
individual  suffices  to  force  twelve  desirous  of  peace  to 
make  war,  it  must  be  seen  to  that  individuals  who  have 
an  inclination  towards  war  do  not  attain  a  position  of 
supreme  authority.  Europe  will  not  and  dare  not  any 
longer  tolerate  an  irresponsible  dynastic  policy  of 
force.  Every  attempt  of  this  kind  must  be  stifled  at 
the  outset  by  common  endeavour.  Any  recurrence  of 
a  Napoleon  or  a  Bismarck  must  be  made  absolutely 
impossible.  Humanity  asks  only  for  legislators,  states- 
men, philosophers,  poets,  and  not  for  conquerors. 

And  even  if  the  Bernhardis,  Rohrbachs,  Reventlows, 
Hardens,  Keims,  Delbriicks,  Limans,  Frymanns, 
Scheidemanns  and  their  Hke  are  beside  themselves 
with  anger,  that  does  not  trouble  us.  Those  among 
them  who  possess  a  conscience  will  understand  that 
the  days  of  the  policy  of  force,  when  a  few  had  a  di- 
vine right  over  all  others  and  when  the  fate  of  mil- 
lions was  callously  settled  behind  closed  doors  are  at 
last  at  an  end.  The  rest  will  doubtless  continue  from 
time  to  time  to  favour  us  with  their  scribblings  in  the 
cause  of  bloodshed.     But,  firstly,  they  will  be  talking 


310        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

in  the  name  of  a  principle  that  has  become  impotent ; 
and  secondly,  we  shall,  after  this  war,  have  a  right 
to  laugh  at  them  openly  until  they  are  ashamed  of 
themselves,  and  finally  spare  us  their  dreams  of  world- 
power. 

The  Errors  and  Advantages  of  Democracy 

Only  from  this  starting-point  do  the  paths  open  out 
to  further  reforms.  For  only  when  the  democratisa- 
tion  of  the  Constitutions  of  all  the  States  has  been 
achieved  can  those  further  demands  that  have  been 
already  put  forward  by  pacifists  and  socialists  be  dis- 
cussed and  gradually  reaHsed — an  international  court 
of  arbitration  for  the  adjustment  of  all  conflicts  aris- 
ing between  nations,  special  legislation  against  the 
bellicose  tendencies  of  the  so-called  national  Press, 
nationalisation  of  armament  industries,  conversion  of 
standing  armies  into  national  militia,  the  pubHcity  and 
parliamentary  control  of  diplomacy,  the  opening  of  an 
era  of  free  trade,  and,  finally,  even,  the  abolition  of 
that  defence  of  country  which  is  ingenuously  con- 
demned outright  by  our  present-day  ''anti-militarists" 
as  being  ''militarism"  and  which  is  alleged  to  be  the 
cause  of  the  war. 

Whoever  demands  these  and  similar  guarantees  of 
peace  without  previously  demanding  that  the  expres- 
sion of  the  dynastic  will-to-power  should  be  eliminated 
from  the  Constitutions  of  the  various  States  is  like 
one  preaching  in  a  desert,^  and  is  either  a  Utopian  or 

*For  instance,  a  neutral  (Nos.  1459  and  1633  of  the  Neue 
Ziircher  Zeitung,  1916)  made  quite  a  rational  proposal  to  create 
an  international  Fund,  in  which  all  States  should  join  and  in 
which  each  should  deposit  a  considerable  sum  in  minted  gold. 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       311 

an  intellectual  coward.  The  political  liberty  of  citi- 
zens is  the  liberty  of  liberties.  The  sovereignty  of  the 
peoples  is  and  remains  the  indispensable  condition  for 
all  earnest  culture  and  guarantees  of  peace.  Anyone 
proposing  to  reform  society  without  giving  society 
beforehand  its  Indisputable  right  to  autonomy  is  not 
proposing  a  reform,  but  only  a  mockery. 

If,  then,  we  are  looking  for  a  rock  upon  which  we 
can  build  a  lasting  and  reasonable  peace,  let  us  take 
the  popular  will.  The  sovereignty  of  the  popular  will 
expressed  in  a  democratic  form  of  government  must 
after  this  war  become  the  ruler  of  Europe.  Just  as 
dynasties  are  born  of  war,  have  through  wars  arrived 
at  the  zenith  of  their  power,  and  can  only  continue 
their  existence  by  means  of  further  wars,  so,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  democracy  born  from  the  will-to-peace 
of  nations,  develops  its  power  in  peace,  and  is  des- 
tined to  fulfil  its  most  sublime  purposes  in  internal 
peace.  The  existence'  and  the  conception  of  culture  of 
the  dynasty  are  inseparable  from  the  employment  of 

If  a  State  declares  war,  and  the  universal  opinion  is  that  it  has 
acted  rashly  and  culpably,  then  its  contribution  will  be  confis- 
cated, and  so  forth.  The  control  of  the  fund  shall  be  entrusted 
to  neutral  delegates,  whose  special  task  it  will  be  to  see  that  no 
more  secret  treaties  are  concluded,  etc  The  significant  word 
in  this  proposal  is  the  word  "control."  This  control  can  only 
exist  in  States  having  a  republican  Constitution;  States  with 
dynastic  Constitutions  have  always  from  time  immemorial  re- 
jected any  control  over  their  actions  {cf.  the  speeches  of  Wil- 
liam II).  Accordingly,  if  any  such  proposals  are  to  be  rendered 
practicable,  Kant's  fundamental  demand  must  first  of  all  be 
satisfied,  and  this,  unfortunately,  has  not  been  mentioned  in 
these  and  similar  proposals.  All  the  world  feels  the  "control" 
of  politics  to  be  the  sole  effectual  guarantee  of  the  future  peace 
of  the  world,  but  no  one  says  who  it  is  that  has  always  obsti- 
satcly  and  dogmatically  opposed  it 


312        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

military  force.  The  existence  and  the  conception  of 
culture  of  democracy  are,  on  the  other  hand,  based 
upon  the  furthering  and  the  safeguarding  of  the  pop- 
ular weal. 

We  modern  democrats  and  pacifists  are  not  roman- 
ticists, or  Utopians,  or  metaphysicians.  We  are,  in 
truth,  further  than  any  from  regarding  democracy  as 
a  paradise.  No  one  knows  the  weakness  of  democratic 
government  better  than  we  do.  As  far  as  I  am  con- 
cerned, I  think  that  in  my  book,  **Die  franzosische 
Democratic"  (Leipzig,  1914),  I  have  shown  up  these 
weaknesses  better  than  many  whose  aim  has  been  to 
attack  democracy  on  principle. 

We  know  as  well  as  our  opponents  do  that  the  pop- 
ular will,  even  with  the  best  electoral  system  in  the 
world,  is  never  quite  accurately  expressed ;  that  a  great 
proportion  of  citizens  will  always  remain  politically  in- 
different and  will  not  go  to  the  poll,  so  that  the  par- 
liamentary regime  is,  strictly  speaking,  a  delusion. 
We  perfectly  understand  that  it  may  be  a  danger  to  a 
country  if  only  one  party  rules,  and  that  this  party 
with  its  petty  interests  may  hamper  the  establishment 
and  development  of  great  human  principles. 

German  scholars  and  politicians  are  not  a  little  proud 
of  the  ''stability"  of  the  German  Government  and  its 
independence  of  party  groupings;  they  contrast  it  fa- 
vourably with  the  instability  of  democratic  party  gov- 
ernment, as  a  result  of  which  a  party  that  has  arrived 
at  power  often  completely  annihilates  the  work  of  its 
predecessor. 

But  for  us,  this  instability  of  the  democratic  regime 
is  also  a  guarantee  for  the  prevention  of  war.  It  is 
true  that  the  party  government  and  nepotism  of  a 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       313 

democracy  may,  here  and  there,  corrupt  a  Minister 
and  bring  about  a  scandal,  and,  for  a  time,  plunge  the 
nation  into  such  violent  party  feuds  that  it  may  seem 
as  if  the  whole  political  system  were  entirely  out  of 
gear.     But  what  are  these  evils  in  comparison  with 
those  born  of  the  "stability"  of  absolutism?     In  the 
first  case,  a  Dreyfus  or  Rochette  affair,  which  con- 
cerns only  the  French;  in  the  second  case,  the  Kruger 
telegram,  the  Daily  Telegraph  interview,  the  jeers  at 
The  Hague  Conferences — that  is  to  say,  things  that 
are  felt  far  beyond  the  black-white-and-red  boundary 
posts,  that  alarm  our  neighbours,  and  necessarily  ap- 
pear to  them  a  menace  to  the  world's  peace.     In  the 
first  case,  a  Panama  scandal,  a  mutiny  of  soldiers,  a 
railway  strike,   which  our  official  representatives  of 
culture  regard  with  pity,  as  though  they  would  say: 
Lord,  we  thank  Thee  that  we  are  not  like  these  de- 
cadent communities !    In  Germany,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  see  official  theories  of  State  and  international  law 
of  a  mediaeval  nature,  description  of  treaties  as  scraps 
of  paper,  systematic  disregard  of  all  guarantees  of 
justice  and  liberty  both  at  home  and  abroad.     Hence, 
that  which,  in  the  more  loosely  constructed  democracy, 
attacks  (or  apparently  attacks  )the  foundation  of  tlie 
nation,  in  a  monarchy  by  divine  right,  thanks  to  its 
''stability,"    attacks   and    disintegrates   the   whole   of 
human  civilisation.     On  the  one  hand,  the  ''corrup- 
tion"  of  a  political  system,  on  the  other,  the   "cor- 
ruption" of  an  ideal  of  humanity.     We  have  the  less 
hesitation  in  giving  preference  to  the  former,  in  that 
it  is   for  the  most  part  only  superficial.     For  who 
would  deny  that  we,  with  our  much-boasted  "stability," 
did  not  at  the  same  time  possess  a  very  flourishing 


314        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

corruption  within  our  frontiers?  (Only  read  what 
the  'Tessimist"  in  his  book  *'Unser  Kaiser  und  sein 
Volk"  had  to  say  about  it  as  early  as  1906).  The 
only  difference  between  us  and  France  is  that  in  our 
case  scandals  come  to  light  solely  by  chance,  and  are 
at  once  suppressed,  whereas  their  detection  and  dis- 
cussion (thanks  to  the  rivalry  for  political  power)  be- 
longs, as  it  were,  to  the  system  of  democratic  gov- 
ernment. And  as  we  are  by  no  means  all  angels,  a 
modern  political  system  inevitably  exhibits  a  certain 
amount  of  corruption.  Let  there  be  no  illusion  on  this 
head.  But,  here  too,  publicity  is  the  best  guarantee 
for  a  gradual  improvement. 

The  boastful  eloquence  of  German  professors  con- 
cerning the  stability  of  a  monarchical  government  is 
very  strikingly  refuted  by  the  judgments  of  a  man 
who,  because  he  himself  was  an  absolute  monarch,  was 
certainly  more  qualified  to  judge  of  such  matters  than 
all  our  Privy  Councillors  taken  together.  Frederick 
the  Great  wrote  as  early  as  1747-8  as  follows: 

"In  monarchies  the  sole  basis  of  government  is  the 
sovereign  power  of  the  ruler.  Laws,  military  systems, 
industry,  commerce,  and  all  other  component  parts  of 
the  State  are  subjected  to  the  arbitrary  power  of  a 
single  individual,  among  whose  successors  not  a  single 
one  resembles  the  other.  It  follows  that,  as  a  rule, 
with  the  accession  of  each  new  prince  the  State  is 
governed  according  to  new  principles.  And  that  is 
the  disadvantage  qf  this  form  of  government.  Unity 
resides  in  the  aims  that  republics  place  before  them- 
selves and  in  the  means  which  they  employ  towards 
their  attainment  Hence  it  ensues  that  they  rarely 
miss  their  aims.     In  monarchies,  on  the  other  hand, 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       315 

an  ambitious  prince  is  succeeded  in  turn  by  an  idler, 
a  pietist,  a  warrior,  a  scholar,  a  voluptuary.  And 
whilst  Fortune's  shifting  stage  is  ever  displaying  some 
new  scene,  the  mind  of  the  people,  dazzled  by  the 
variety  of  the  spectacle,  takes  no  definite  shape."^ 

From  this  it  is  clear  that  we  republicans  and  paci- 
fists, in  our  views  concerning  the  best  form  of  State, 
are  in  very  good  company.  We  can,  it  is  clear,  re- 
fute the  present-day  panegyrists  of  the  Hohenzollerns 
by  the  aid  of  the  Hohenzollerns  themselves,  and  Pro- 
fessor Delbriick  would  have  some  difficulty  in  recon- 
ciling his  respect  for  the  hereditary  dynasty  with  in- 
sistence on  the  correctness  of  his  "stability"  theories. 

Nothing  is  perfect  in  this  world.  We  human  beings 
are  ever}^vhere  compelled  to  choose  the  lesser  of  two 
evils.  The  finest  democracy  in  the  world  is  a  poor 
affair  compared  with  the  grand  ideal  that  great  spirits 
have  framed  for  it.  But  anyone  who  seriously  aspires 
to  free  modem  humanity  at  length  from  the  scourge 
of  war  (and  that  is  to-day  the  supreme  task)  must 
judge  the  worst  democracy  to  be  infinitely  better  than 
the  best  feudal  monarchy. 

"Eternal  peace"  is  not  a  decree.  It  must,  like  every- 
thing else,  be  won  step  by  step.  And  if  even  the  best 
democracy  in  the  world  does  not  furnish  any  absolute 
protection  against  war,  we  must  humbly  confess  that 
absolute  protection  against  war  is  impossible  in  this 
imperfect  world.  The  main  point  is  that  we  finally 
recognise  that  without  a  will-to-war  no  wars  are  pos- 
sible, and  that  this  will-to-war  can  only  be  dangerous 

*"KonigHche     Gedanken     und     Ausspriiche     Friedrichs    des 
Grossen,"  Deutsche  Bibliothek  in  Berlin,  pp.  46-7. 


3i6        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

when  it  is  backed  up  by  a  political  Constitution;  and 
that  after  we  have  clearly  recognised  this,  we  seek 
for  and  establish  that  form  of  State  and  government 
in  which  the  satisfaction  of  this  craving  for  war  is 
rendered  as  difficult  as  possible. 

This  form  of  political  government  is  beyond  all 
doubt  the  sovereignty  of  the  popular  will,  that  is  to 
say,  democracy.  For,  whilst  in  all  dynastic  forms  of 
government  the  wlU-to-war  is,  and  will  remain,  a  com- 
mand of  God,  that  is  to  say,  a  necessary  condition  of 
human  life,  on  the  other  hand,  in  democratic  forms 
of  government,  the  will-to-peace  is  a  command  of  the 
people — that  is  to  say,  a  necessary  element  of  the  State 
itself. 

No  philosopher  ever  made  a  more  absurd  remark 
than  Hegel  when  he  said :  "The  people  is  that  portion 
of  the  State  that  does  not  know  what  it  wants  \"  All 
history  from  the  time  when  it  first  began  to  be  written 
recounts  the  continuous  conflict  between  people  and 
dynasty.  The  existence  of  this  conflict  is  a  proof  of 
the  fact  that  peoples  do,  in  fact,  always  know  exactly 
what  they  want.  I  think  that  I  have  in  this  work,  by 
a  few  examples,  proved  beyond  contradiction  that  this 
was  particularly  the  case  in  Prusso-Germany  during 
the  last  century.  We  Germans  (whatever  the  Chau- 
vinists across  the  Vosges  and  across  the  Channel  may 
say  to  the  contrary)  are  a  nation  like  any  other;  we 
are  subject  to  the  same  historical  laws  and  necessities, 
we  have  the  same  ideals  of  humanity,  and  we  are 
fighting  against  the  same  obstacles  to  true  progress 
as  other  nations. 

The  people,  each  and  every  people,  has  always  and 
everywhere  a  will.    It  may  cry  "Hurrah !"  and  applaud 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       317 

military  parades  and  the  pomp  of  the  head  of  the 
State,  and  this  in  the  age  of  universal  military  service 
and  of  a  settled  code  of  law  and  morals,  but  it  will 
never  support  a  war  of  conquest.  If  it  is  ready, 
unanimously  and  resolutely,  to  protect  its  country,  the 
home  of  its  ancestors,  and  the  treasures  of  its  culture 
until  the  last  drop  of  blood,  yet  it  will  never  for  the 
sake  of  a  world-policy  plunge  into  adventures  and 
contend  for  spheres  of  influence  in  Further  India  or 
for  railways  in  Patagonia.  The  question  is  to  discover 
a  form  of  government  in  which  conquest  can  no 
longer  be  represented  as  an  act  of  self-defence  and 
the  violation  of  solemn  treaties  as  necessary  for  the 
safety  of  the  country. 

This  form  of  government  is  democracy. 

The  will  of  all  peoples  to  defend  their  fatherland 
and  to  reject  every  idea  of  conquest  is  universal.  It 
is  the  same  from  Lisbon  to  Yokohama,  from  Mel- 
bourne to  Stockholm.  Let  us,  therefore,  in  full  con- 
fidence commit  the  peace  of  Europe  to  the  sovereignty 
of  the  popular  will.  It  alone  can  be  the  basis  of  the 
era  of  true  and  peaceful  culture  now  dawning  in 

Europe. 

****** 

That  a  German  at  the  beginning  of  this  twentieth 
century  had  to  write  this  book  (yes:  had  to!),  and 
that  his  mode  of  thought  should  appear  so  terribly 
revolutionary,  is  certainly  no  proof  of  the  pre-eminence 
of  German  culture.  For  what  does  this  book  contain? 
It  contains  a  description  of  conditions  that  existed  in 
England  and  France  150  years  ago.  It  contains  a 
demand  for  reforms  which  in  all  the  civilised  coun- 
tries of  the  world  have  for  decades  past  appeared  to 


3i8       THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

the  dullest  peasant  an  understood  thing.  In  fact,  what 
I  here  demand  for  Germany  has  been  possessed  by 
the  English,  French,  Americans,  and  Swiss  for  the 
past  150  years,  by  the  Italians,  Swedes,  Norwegians, 
Danes,  Dutch,  Serbs,  Bulgarians,  Roumanians,  Greeks, 
etc.,  etc.,  for  some  decades,  and  by  the  Chinese  since 
quite  recently.     Only  think  of  it!    The  Chinese! 

The  storm-wind  of  history  will  and  must  finally 
bring  political  emancipation  to  Germany  also.  The 
romanticism  of  the  revolutionary  periods  of  1789  and 
1848;  the  period  of  "storm  and  stress";  the  categori- 
cal imperative  of  self-emancipation;  these  will  and 
must  be  the  fruits  of  this  World  War  for  Germany. 

Right,  Right,  and  again  Right :  that  is  the  founda- 
tion of  a  humanity  ready  for  peaceful  culture.  Who- 
ever says  *'Right"  says  equality ;  the  divine,  traditional, 
and  mystic  special  prerogatives  of  dynasties.  States, 
and  castes  are  mockeries  of  Right. 

Divine  right  in  the  sense  of  pomp,  parade,  phrase, 
and  fiction?  As  much  as  you  like,  if  you  cannot  exist 
without  images  of  saints,  incense,  and  ermine.  But 
divine  right  as  the  supreme  and  guiding  principle  of 
European  politics?  Divine  right  in  the  sense  of  a 
right  of  possession  over  the  individual  members,  the 
fate,  the  will,  and  the  destiny  of  the  nations,  and  the 
right  to  decide  concerning  war  and  peace  ?  A  million 
fists  would  clench  and  threaten  the  slavish  souls  who, 
after  the  catastrophe  of  these  days,  would  still  answer 
yes! 

No  half-measures,   no  lamentations,   no  cowardly 

compromise,  no  subtleties,  no  putting  off  till  later! 

That  would  be  treachery  to  our  fallen  brothers.     No ! 

I  All   the  high  things  must  be  brought   low,   all  the 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       319 

earthly  divinities  be  swept  away,  all  exceptions  ban- 
ished and  all  special  prerogatives  abolished  root  and 
branch,  and  for  all  time!  The  earth  for  human  be- 
ings, the  heavens  for  the  gods !  Thus  and  only  thus 
will  the  hunger  of  the  nations  for  justice  and  peace 
at  last  be  appeased.  Only  in  this  way  will  humanity 
be  able  to  justify  this  massacre  of  millions  before  the 
tribunal  of  history.  • 

And,  therefore,  Germany  has  to  begin  to-day  where 
the  English,   French,  Americans,   Swiss,  etc.,  began 
250  and  125  years  ago  and  where  the  German  classi- 
cists and  champions  of  liberty  broke  down  helplessly. 
That  is  in  truth  the  great  lesson  which  the  World 
War  imperatively  demands  that  we  should  learn  to-day. 
We  have  not  been  called  barbarians,  Boches,  and 
Huns  because  our  soldiers  in  Belgium  and  elsewhere 
are  alleged  to  have  wrought  such  devastation  as  did 
Attila'3  hordes.   No;  jur  political  serfdom,  our  appar- 
ently servile  adherence  to  mediaeval  theories  of  the 
State,  our  barbarous  religion  of  the  sanctity  and  beauty 
of    wars,    our   eminently   un-German    reliance   upon 
discipline  by  force  and  our  emphatic  reiteration  that 
''Might  overrules  Right" — all  this  together  with  the 
ferocious  scholarship  and  the  servility  of  our  Privy 
Councillors  of  the  Ostwald  stamp,  has  won  for  us  the 
name  of  ''barbarians"  !    A  great,  vigorous,  and  highly 
gifted  people  like  ours  can  only  play  its  true  part  in 
the  world  when  it  is  its  own  master  and  proudly  shapes 
its  own  destinies.     But  if,  as  was  the  case  with  us,  it 
entrusts  the  public  weal  both  at  home  and  abroad  to  a 
handful  of  soldiers  and  learned  mandarins,  then  it  will 
be  diverted  from  its  true  path,  and  will  become  a  dan- 
ger to  the  world  and  an  offence  against  civilisation. 


320        THE  COMING  DEMOCRACY 

If  Bismarck  was  not  Germany's  blunder,  then  he 
was  Germany's  fate.  In  these  days,  no  fatherland  can 
be  cemented  by  ''blood  and  iron."  Blood  and  iron 
can  only  be  renewed  and  maintained  by  yet  more  blood 
and  iron.     Bismarck  was  our  glory  and  our  fate. 

Away  from  Bismarck!  that  is  the  lesson  of  this 
World  War  for  Germany.  Justice  and  liberty,  not  blood 
and  iron,  are  the  cement  of  modem  fatherlands. 

Let  us  take  up  again  the  threads  of  classic  Ger- 
manism. Let  us  remember  our  intellectual  heroes 
of  the  age  of  Schiller  and  Goethe,  of  our  democratic 
national  poets  of  the  'forties  of  last  century.  Only 
with  their  help,  and  only  in  their  spirit,  can  the  Ger- 
man problem  be  finally  solved  to  the  blessing  of 
Germany  and  the  world. 

Let  us  break  with  the  development  of  the  last 
century.  The  World  War  signifies  the  collapse  of  a 
system  and  a  spirit  of  culture  that  were  thoroughly 
un-German,  that  is,  thoroughly  Prussian.  Let  us 
join  hands  with  the  other  civilised  nations  of  the 
world  as  peaceable,  equally  privileged,  and  equally 
efficient  labourers  in  the  field  of  culture.  Let  us 
begin  by  creating  that  quite  new,  quite  free,  quite 
democratic  culture  the  direction  of  which  was  indi- 
cated to  us  by  Herder  and  Kant,  by  Lessing  and 
Humboldt,  by  Goethe  and  Schiller.  No  longer 
"Deutschland  iiber  alles,"  but  Germany  with  and  by 
the  -^ide  of  all.  Only  so  shall  we  be  able  to  fulfil 
our  true  mission  in  the  world. 

Onward!   .    .  to  Democracy. 

Democracy,  in  the  world  as  it  is  to-day,  is  the  only 
possible,  the  only  desirable  basis  of  any  genuine  cul- 


ONWARD!  TO  DEMOCRACY!       321 

ture.  It  is  only  this  mother  that  is  able  to  bear  all 
the  beautiful,  promising  children  of  whom  we  Ger- 
mans spoke  all  too  soon:  socialism,  a  true  law  of 
nations,  intellectual  liberty,  and,  possibly,  complete 
disarmament.  Without  democracy  these  things  will 
continue  to  be  what  they  have  been  hitherto:  carica- 
tures and  abortions. 

Onward!   .    .  to  Democracy. 

Democracy  is  the  only  possible,  only  enduring 
basis  of  the  future  peace  of  nations.  A  peace  con- 
cluded without  a  realisation  of  Kant's  fundamental 
demand  would  be  only  patchwork  and  self-deception. 

Onward!   .    .  to  Democracy. 

This  will  and  must  to-morrow  be  the  battle-cry  of 
Europe  in  general,  and  of  Germany  in  particular. 

Away  from  Bismarck!     Germany  for  the  Germans. 

Let  that  be  the  fruit  of  this  terrible  World  War  for 
Germany. 


THE  MOST  HUMAN  BOOK  OF  THIS  MOST 
INHUMAN  WAR 

In  the  Claws  of  the 
German  Eagle 

BY 

ALBERT  RHYS  WILLIAMS 

Special  War  Correspondent  for  The  Outlook, 


Some  winced  and  cried  aloud,  others 
turned  white  with  terror,  still  others 
laughed  defiant  to  the  end.  Caught  in  the 
Claws,  the  author  shared  with  these  fellow 
prisoners  the  torments  of  trial  as  a  spy  by 
the  German  Military  Court  in  Brussels. 

Humor  brightens  the  book  where  is  de- 
scribed the  faking  of  war  photographs, 
and  eternal  romance  lifts  you  above  the 
red  reek  in  the  tale  of  the  American  girl 
the  author  aided  in  her  search  for  her 
officer  lover. 


Net  $1.50 


E.  P.  BUTTON  AND  COMPANY 
681  Fifth  Avenue  New  York  City 


(3) 


PASSED  BY  THE 
CENSOR 

BY 

WYTHE  WILLIAMS 

of  the  New  York  Times 

Paris  in  War-time;  the  Trials  of  the 
U.  S.  Embassy;  the  Fighting  on  the  French 
Front;  the  Soul  and  Organization  of  re- 
generated France;  as  seen  by  the  Paris 
Correspondent  of  the  New  York  Times, 
who  was  officially  accredited  to  the  French 
Armies  on  the  Western  Front,  and  was 
three  times  on  the  actual  fighting  front, 
as  well  as  in  a  French  military  prison  for 
trying  to  get  there  before  he  received  a 

pass. 

Here  is  the  real  story  of  those  early  days 
of  the  war;  those  days  of  confusion,  of  con- 
flicting rumor,  and  of  fear;  when  the  Ger- 
man hordes  swept  down  on  the  Paris  they 
had  doomed. 

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The 

German  Republic 

BY 

WALTER  WELLMAN 


How  is  the  Great  War  to  end? 
What  is  to  come  after  the  war? 

What  is  the  ''Irresistible  Force  now 
shaping  the  thoughts  of  the  German  peo- 
ple"? 

Here  is  a  book  that  offers  a  sane  and 
commonsense  solution  to  Europe's  terrible 
problem. 

It  is  a  book  of  vision,  a  book  of  creative 
thought,  which  may  make  history  and  is 
sure  to  influence  the  minds  and  imagina- 
tions of  thousands. 


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A 

Student  in  Arms 

BY 

DONALD   HANKEY 


Published  originally  in  the  columns  of 
the  London  Spectator,  these  short  articles, 
sketches,  and  essays,  written  by  a  man  in 
the  trenches,  form  a  "war-book"  of  quite 
unusual  kind,  dealing  with  the  deeper 
things  of  human  Hfe. 

The  high  spiritual  idealism  which  act- 
uates so  many  thousands  in  the  ranks  of 
the  Allies  finds  a  voice  in  it,  and  the  men- 
tal attitude  of  the  fighting-men  towards 
religion,  the  Church,  their  officers  and  their 
comrades,  is  exhibited  not  only  with  san- 
ity and  sympathy,  but  with  a  fine  simplic- 
ity of  language  and  an  inspiring  nobility 
of  outlook. 

Twenty-four  thousand  copies  of  this  book 

were  sold  in  the  first  month  of 

its  publication  in  England 


Net  $1.50 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFOENIA   LIBRARY 

BERKELEY 

THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 

STAMPED  BELOW 

Books  not  returned  on  time  are  subject  to  a  fine  of 
50c  per  volume  after  the  third  day  overdue,   increasing 
to  $1.00  per  volume  after  the  sixth  day.     Books  not  in 
demand  may  be  renewed  if  application  is  made  before 
expiration  of  loan  period. 

DEC  lC^94ni 

m  ' 

' 

,oniJ»  oQTU 

IN  STACKS 

MAR  30  i960 

REC'D  L.U 

APR  1  5  1950 

- 

50m-7,'16 

YB  25166 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CAUFORNIA  LIBRARY 


HERMANN  FERNAU 

yJathor  of    "BECAUSE    I    AM    A    GERMAN" 


'  I  'HIS  scathing  exposure  of  Germany's  political  system 
1  and  the  ringing  appeal  to  Germany  to  rid  itself  of 
its  obsolete  and  mischievous  imperial  dynasty  and 
all  the  monarchical  and  medieval  trappings  which  go 
with  it,  is  by  a  German,  Herr  Fernau,  who  has  already 
fastened  on  his  own  government  the  inescapable  guilt 
of  having  brought  about  the  war  in  his  earlier  book 
"BECAUSE  I  AM  A  GERMAN,"  possession  of  which 
is  now  punishable  in  Germany  by  death. 

The  author  says:  *'What  does  this  book  contain?  .  .  . 
It  contains  a  demand  for  reforms  which  in  all  the  civil- 
ized  countries  of  the  world  have  for  decades  past  ap- 
peared to  the  dullest  peasant  an  understood  thing.  In 
fact,  what  I  here  demand  for  Germany  has  been  posses- 
sed by  the  English,  French.  Americans,  and  Swiss  for 
the  past  150  years.  .  .  .  " 

"Onward  to  Democracy.  This  will  and  must  tomor- 
row be  the  battle-cry  of  Europe  in  general  and  of  Ger^ 
many  in  particular." 

"Away  from  Bismarck.     Germany  for  the  Germans." 


-^  I  muuuf 


